If you generate a nonce e, add e*G to all three base public keys, and generate the address from those, then (a) only those who know the corresponding base private keys and nonce can spend the txo, and (b) only those who know the nonce can find the base public keys in the blockchain, even after the txo is spent (
sample code from my experimental market). That's just the usual stealth math, and you can transmit the nonce however you want.
If you use BIP32 keys, then whoever generates the key can also find all other transactions by that base public key (xpub) once they're spent. So either you lose privacy, or you need some back and forth (because each party needs to generate his own key for a particular transaction).
If you literally need the transaction to be signed with the exact unmodified base keys, then you must lose privacy when the redeem script appears in the blockchain. You could e.g. do 2/4 multisig where the fourth key was provably garbage, or 3/4 multisig where it was known to everyone. That seems like an odd requirement, though.