I thought the SPV miners didn't bother to verify transactions.
I guess that depends on what you mean when you say SPV mining.
Generally when people talk about SPV mining, I think they're talking about mining where the miner (or pool) doesn't validate a block that it receives. The miner/pool simply assumes that they wouldn't have heard about the block unless it was valid, and they use the hash from it to build the next block that they're about to start mining on. Personally, I think "SPV mining" is a horrible name for it since as far as I know it has nothing to do with
Simplified
Payment
Verification at all. With this sort of mining, the miner (or pool) is taking a risk that someone might send them an invalid block. If the block they accept an invalid block, then they will be wasting all hash power that they spend mining until they realize their mistake and switch to a valid block. The rest of the network (all full node peers, and all normal miners) will have rejected the block and will continue working on the most recent valid block in the block chain.
Note that this sort of SPV mining opens a miner (or pool) up to an attack. Depending on the amount of hash power being spent on SPV mining, and the amount of hash power the attacker has, it might be profitable for an attacker to:
- Intentionally mine an invalid block
- Send a successfully mined invalid block directly to all SPV mining systems
- Switch back to mining valid blocks
This would temporarily knock all that SPV mining hashpower off the network. As such, the attacker (and anyone else that isn't SPV mining) would improve their odds of solving the next few blocks until the the SPV miners realized their error and switched back to the correct chain. It is a risky attack though. If the SPV miners realize and switch to the correct chain quickly, then the attacker will have wasted hashpower solving an invalid block, meaning that they'll have lost out on a block reward that they otherwise would have had if they had been mining a valid block.