80 minutes for first confirmation is going to go down real well with the we want it naow, naow,, naow generation.

That is only if you use the 8X parity system.

If you just use odd/even system, then there is a 50% chance your tx will be eligible to be included in the next block and, if not, will be eligible to be included in the one after that.

Having said that, in the short term, the best plan for a p2p miner would be to just mine a block with just a coinbase until it has a verified block that links to the new best block.

I'm going to take a guess that this will open nodes up to an attack where fake blocks are promised, but not delivered.

The idea is that for a p2p verification system, you need some settling time. Basically, you have proof that the block is valid, but verification is split over many nodes.

If you have all the proof, then you can verify that the block is ok, but that is pretty much having the entire block anyway.

However, if you break up the proof with something like a merkle tree, then you can share verification.

So, someone says that <merkle root> is a group of txs with a tx fee of 0.5123 bitcoins.

It is easy to show a node in the tree is invalid by showing the path down the tree. However, proving that a node is invalid requires that node + its children. So by withholding the children, you can prevent the proof.

If verification is spread out, then anyone can post that proof and it should flood to all nodes quickly.

So, the proof of corruption would be

<block header> -> (path to node) -> <node> + claim(children don't exist)

All blocks can verify that, but how to prove the children are not available. That inherently requires giving the network time to get the children.