There was no DAO hack

[iamnotback]

As far as I can tell he is saying there is a feature of EVM that makes it easier to write dangerous contracts. There is still no claim that the EVM did not execute the contract as it was written and according to the specification.

Thanks!  


Edit:  Does anyone else see more to all this?

That feature is the flaw of Turing-complete scripting, which myself (and numerous others) personally told the founders of Ethereum would lead to the clusterfuck they have now:

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1505886.msg15278364#msg15278364
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1505886.msg15284692#msg15284692
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1505886.msg15306066#msg15306066

So the bug is in Ethereum, as explained in layman's terms here:

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1523492.0

To fix the bug, they have to fix each instance of failure with a fork. This may be seen as a feature by those who are alleged to be behind this alleged conspiracy.

This is an inexorable bug, or until death do us part.

[1714973433]

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[1714973433]

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[1714973433]

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[sidhujag]

As far as I can tell he is saying there is a feature of EVM that makes it easier to write dangerous contracts. There is still no claim that the EVM did not execute the contract as it was written and according to the specification.

Thanks!  


Edit:  Does anyone else see more to all this?

That feature is the flaw of Turing-complete scripting, which myself (and numerous others) personally told the founders of Ethereum would lead to the clusterfuck they have now:

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1505886.msg15278364#msg15278364
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1505886.msg15284692#msg15284692
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1505886.msg15306066#msg15306066

So the bug is in Ethereum, as explained in layman's terms here:

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1523492.0

To fix the bug, they have to fix each instance of failure with a fork. This may be seen as a feature by those who are alleged to be behind this alleged conspiracy.

This is an inexorable bug, or until death do us part.

I thought you were in the camp that there was no actual hack and this was really just a shakeout of eth holders to get into btc and have btc dump? (thats what I have been saying is gonna happen for weeks anyways) now your saying its dead in the water or what? I see it as coming back and stronger than ever (eth)

[Ultrabat]

The majority of the miners think there is a hack. They will support the freezing of the "stolen" funds, they have voted with their hashing.

[smooth]

The majority of the miners think there is a hack are colluding to attack the network and blacklist transactions.

i.e. There is now a DAO hack in progress

[Lauda]

The Ethereum has hard forked several times before. They were all successful. I also voted for the fork to freeze the stolen funds.

So you're stating that this fork was be justified due to previous forks even though they aren't even remotely similar? By voting for this fork you are indirectly stating that you're only interested in greed, not in the principles of cryptocurrencies. ETH, the soon to be: centralized, non-censorship resistant, mutable and government friendly blockchain featuring bailouts.

The majority of the miners think there is a hack are colluding to attack the network and blacklist transactions.

i.e. There is now a DAO hack in progress

I was just about to post practically the same thing. This is them abandoning all the principles of ETH, and blacklisting coins. ETH is the Fed of the cryptocurrency space?

[iCEBREAKER]

The majority of the miners think there is a hack are colluding to attack the network and blacklist transactions.

i.e. There is now a DAO hack in progress

I hope this blacklisting hack is stopped by the "attacker."

He's a better digital contract lawyer than Team Blacklist.   

If counterprotocol blacklisting is possible, I don't see DAO and ETH working until that bug is fixed.

It apprears the problem is the DAO/ETH tokens aren't 100% fungible.  Maybe use Monero for the value/token transfer layer(s), once it has multisig and colored coins?

Or VB can add the Monero-style ring signatures he mentioned.

https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/3tappe/early_alpha_monerolike_linkable_ring_signatures/

Until then, the systems suffer from the overhead of possible fraud and may again cut themselves on your razor.

Only systems that are structurally incompatible with fraud don't suffer from the overhang of potential fraud.

[Westinhome]

It apprears the problem is the DAO/ETH tokens aren't 100% fungible.  Maybe use Monero for the value/token transfer layer(s), once it has multisig and colored coins?

Or VB can add the Monero-style ring signatures he mentioned.

https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/3tappe/early_alpha_monerolike_linkable_ring_signatures/

Until then, the systems suffer from the overhead of possible fraud and may again cut themselves on your razor.

I had several thousand Monero from the early day in 2014. I did not touch them since after 2 years, there is not much applications of Monero.

[smooth]

It apprears the problem is the DAO/ETH tokens aren't 100% fungible.  Maybe use Monero for the value/token transfer layer(s), once it has multisig and colored coins?

Or VB can add the Monero-style ring signatures he mentioned.

https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/3tappe/early_alpha_monerolike_linkable_ring_signatures/

Until then, the systems suffer from the overhead of possible fraud and may again cut themselves on your razor.

I had several thousand Monero from the early day in 2014. I did not touch them since after 2 years, there is not much applications of Monero.

Somewhat off topic, but you are indeed using one of the applications of Monero: Secure and private store of value.

[iamnotback]

Only systems that are structurally incompatible with fraud don't suffer from the overhang of potential fraud.

This is indeed true. Unfortunately Monero has periodic forks and thus its mining is not structurally incompatible with protocol fucked by the consensus or even a very powerful hashrate adversary.

So to argue that ring sigs are structurally incompatible with blacklisting is not absolutely true, for as long as mining could change the protocol and force every txn to reveal its viewkey.

[Hueristic]

Only systems that are structurally incompatible with fraud don't suffer from the overhang of potential fraud.

This is indeed true. Unfortunately Monero has periodic forks and thus its mining is not structurally incompatible with protocol fucked by the consensus or even a very powerful hashrate adversary.

So to argue that ring sigs are structurally incompatible with blacklisting is not absolutely true, for as long as mining could change the protocol and force every txn to reveal its viewkey.

First of all I thought that the forks were only during beta and second how can you identify someones coins to blacklist them on a fork if they don't share them with you? And arguing that anything is not what it's intended to be because it can be hardforked is really a logic fail. That is like saying gravity is not reliable because one day the world will spiral into the sun.

[smooth]

Only systems that are structurally incompatible with fraud don't suffer from the overhang of potential fraud.

This is indeed true. Unfortunately Monero has periodic forks and thus its mining is not structurally incompatible with protocol fucked by the consensus or even a very powerful hashrate adversary.

So to argue that ring sigs are structurally incompatible with blacklisting is not absolutely true, for as long as mining could change the protocol and force every txn to reveal its viewkey.

First of all I thought that the forks were only during beta and second how can you identify someones coins to blacklist them on a fork if they don't share them with you? And arguing that anything is not what it's intended to be because it can be hardforked is really a logic fail. That is like saying gravity is not reliable because one day the world will spiral into the sun.

He was suggesting a fork that would block some or all transactions unless they have ID attached, a form of whitelisting. It is the method of 51% attacking the coin to hold it hostage to demand design changes. It might work, but waiting out the attacker is another option. The more of a backlog of fee-paying transactions develop that the attacker won't process, the more incentive there is for other miners to join.

[Hueristic]

He was suggesting a fork that would block some or all transactions unless they have ID attached, a form of whitelisting. It is the method of 51% attacking the coin to hold it hostage to demand design changes. It might work, but waiting out the attacker is another option. The more of a backlog of fee-paying transactions develop that the attacker won't process, the more incentive there is for other miners to join.

IC, thx for clarifying that for me.

[TheMage]

The Ethereum has hard forked several times before. They were all successful. I also voted for the fork to freeze the stolen funds.

So you're stating that this fork was be justified due to previous forks even though they aren't even remotely similar? By voting for this fork you are indirectly stating that you're only interested in greed, not in the principles of cryptocurrencies. ETH, the soon to be: centralized, non-censorship resistant, mutable and government friendly blockchain featuring bailouts.

The majority of the miners think there is a hack are colluding to attack the network and blacklist transactions.

i.e. There is now a DAO hack in progress

I was just about to post practically the same thing. This is them abandoning all the principles of ETH, and blacklisting coins. ETH is the Fed of the cryptocurrency space?

Thanks Lauda, my thoughts exactly.

Greed will consume this community.

[iamnotback]

He was suggesting a fork that would block some or all transactions unless they have ID attached, a form of whitelisting. It is the method of 51% attacking the coin to hold it hostage to demand design changes. It might work, but waiting out the attacker is another option. The more of a backlog of fee-paying transactions develop that the attacker won't process, the more incentive there is for other miners to join.

IC, thx for clarifying that for me.

smooth thank you for the honest re-summary of my statement.

smooth actually including the viewkey, not necessary an ID.

smooth I am thinking of 10X hashrate attack as well, not just a 51% attack, which I had explained in the other thread is much more brutal on the other miners. In either case, the attacker can change the protocol to award his miners the fees from "incorrect transactions", while refusing to process the other outputs. So sorry your logic is refuted. The payer's input becomes spent/confiscated and the Cryptonote rings can do nothing to stop this.

[VERUMinNUMERIS]

Are inside jobs considered hacks?  :p

[iamnotback]

He was suggesting a fork that would block some or all transactions unless they have ID attached, a form of whitelisting. It is the method of 51% attacking the coin to hold it hostage to demand design changes. It might work, but waiting out the attacker is another option. The more of a backlog of fee-paying transactions develop that the attacker won't process, the more incentive there is for other miners to join.

IC, thx for clarifying that for me.

smooth thank you for the honest re-summary of my statement.

smooth actually including the viewkey, not necessary an ID.

smooth I am thinking of 10X hashrate attack as well, not just a 51% attack, which I had explained in the other thread is much more brutal on the other miners. In either case, the attacker can change the protocol to award his miners the fees from "incorrect transactions", while refusing to process the other outputs. So sorry your logic is refuted. The payer's input becomes spent/confiscated and the Cryptonote rings can do nothing to stop this.

Mea culpa. I got some sleep, then upon awakening, I realized smooth is correct. If the 51% (or 10X) attacker adds the transaction to the block chain, even if it interprets that only the fee UXTO is spendable, then when the other outputs are spent, it must add those transactions in order to take their fees.

So indeed as the transaction fees excluded from the block chain accumulate to be greater in value than the excess hashrate possessed by the attacker, then honest miners are economically incentivized to process the blacklisted transactions.

However, the attacker may drive the exchange value of the token so low by attacking it, that the transaction fees might have to accumulate over very long periods of time. Perhaps the excessive delays (a year?) would spiral the exchange value downwards and/or many users would capitulate and provide the viewkey required.

So actually smooth is only correct if the number of users of the token who don't capitulate is greater than those who do (presuming the attacker has an externally funded incentive to attack providing the excess hashrate in the first place), otherwise the attacker will have more funding than the honest miners. Because even if the honest miners include the capitulated transaction, the attacker can blacklist those blocks due to the attacker's higher level of base hashrate aforementioned.

In other words, the success of the defense smooth advocates is quite slim, because if the token ecosystem is only composed of diehards, then it is likely won't have a very high base hashrate, thus an attacker with a higher base hashrate is more likely. Whereas, if the token ecosystem is composed of the masses, then most are likely to capitulate.

Even if the token's protocol made anonymity mandatory on every transaction, such that users' clients would choose the minority hashrate fork which enforced the ban against capitulating users, the problem is it is possible to capitulate external to the block chain data, thus there would be no means by which the users' clients could discern which transactions capitulated.

It seems that it is impossible to make a minority block chain protocol that defies the desires of the majority and their collectively funded State (which can charge the cost of attacking a minority block chain to the collective, even surreptitiously). Ironically, AnonyMint had written about this in 2013.

This is why I became less focused on the anonymity feature over time. I always wanted it and was trying to find a way to perfect it, but really what we need is to make decentralized money popular. And hope that some good comes from that. We can't actually succeed by fighting the majority, unless our minority is very significant in size. I am hoping that microtransactions are so numerous and tiny, that the State can't afford to enforce some form of taxation on all of them. But I admit that eventually the global State will get organized and perfect the systems of digital control. It just seems inevitable. Only the will of the people at-large will decide if the State's power is curtailed.

Privacy on block chains could be a popular feature. But preventing the State from tracking criminals will not be popular. Thus the State must be given a viewkey. This is why I am more focused on scaling block chains, not only absolute anonymity. Privacy can be added with much less costly technology than the very heavy RingCT. That is why I was excited last month when I discovered a way to fix off chain anonymity and scale it.

[generalizethis]

He was suggesting a fork that would block some or all transactions unless they have ID attached, a form of whitelisting. It is the method of 51% attacking the coin to hold it hostage to demand design changes. It might work, but waiting out the attacker is another option. The more of a backlog of fee-paying transactions develop that the attacker won't process, the more incentive there is for other miners to join.

IC, thx for clarifying that for me.

smooth thank you for the honest re-summary of my statement.

smooth actually including the viewkey, not necessary an ID.

smooth I am thinking of 10X hashrate attack as well, not just a 51% attack, which I had explained in the other thread is much more brutal on the other miners. In either case, the attacker can change the protocol to award his miners the fees from "incorrect transactions", while refusing to process the other outputs. So sorry your logic is refuted. The payer's input becomes spent/confiscated and the Cryptonote rings can do nothing to stop this.

Mea culpa. I got some sleep, then upon awakening, I realized smooth is correct. If the 51% (or 10X) attacker adds the transaction to the block chain, even if it interprets that only the fee UXTO is spendable, then when the other outputs are spent, it must add those transactions in order to take their fees.

So indeed as the transaction fees excluded from the block chain accumulate to be greater in value than the excess hashrate possessed by the attacker, then honest miners are economically incentivized to process the blacklisted transactions.

However, the attacker may drive the exchange value of the token so low by attacking it, that the transaction fees might have to accumulate over very long periods of time. Perhaps the excessive delays (a year?) would spiral the exchange value downwards and/or many users would capitulate and provide the viewkey required.

So actually smooth is only correct if the number of users of the token who don't capitulate is greater than those who do (presuming the attacker has an externally funded incentive to attack providing the excess hashrate in the first place), otherwise the attacker will have more funding than the honest miners. Because even if the honest miners include the capitulated transaction, the attacker can blacklist those blocks due to the attacker's higher level of base hashrate aforementioned.

In other words, the success of the defense smooth advocates is quite slim, because if the token ecosystem is only composed of diehards, then it is likely won't have a very high base hashrate, thus an attacker with a higher base hashrate is more likely. Whereas, if the token ecosystem is composed of the masses, then most are likely to capitulate.

Even if the token's protocol made anonymity mandatory on every transaction, such that users' clients would choose the minority hashrate fork which enforced the ban against capitulating users, the problem is it is possible to capitulate external to the block chain data, thus there would be no means by which the users' clients could discern which transactions capitulated.

It seems that it is impossible to make a minority block chain protocol that defies the desires of the majority and their collectively funded State (which can charge the cost of attacking a minority block chain to the collective, even surreptitiously). Ironically, AnonyMint had written about this in 2013.

This is why I became less focused on the anonymity feature over time. I always wanted it and was trying to find a way to perfect it, but really what we need is to make decentralized money popular. And hope that some good comes from that. We can't actually succeed by fighting the majority, unless our minority is very significant in size. I am hoping that microtransactions are so numerous and tiny, that the State can't afford to enforce some form of taxation on all of them. But I admit that eventually the global State will get organized and perfect the systems of digital control. It just seems inevitable. Only the will of the people at-large will decide if the State's power is curtailed.

Privacy on block chains could be a popular feature. But preventing the State from tracking criminals will not be popular. Thus the State must be given a viewkey. This is why I am more focused on scaling block chains, not only absolute anonymity. Privacy can be added with much less costly technology than the very heavy RingCT. That is why I was excited last month when I discovered a way to fix off chain anonymity and scale it.

The state is corporate (or becoming obviously so with every passing day--everything from prisons to schools becoming privatized), so assuming the state is the power who will bring down crypto is a no go for me. Rehash your analysis using corporate interest and you might see anonymous digital money as a great tool in their arsenal--the bigger the threat, the more likely it will be adopted. This would be obvipus if you took the time to read Delueze and understand old world discipline systems are being replaced by more efficient new world control systems. Now, will the new corporate state be afraid of anonymous cash? Probably not as it doesn't matter to them if people spend their money morally and they are being paid for services and not tax based in any traditional sense.

[iamnotback]

The corporation will still charge the costs to the collective and keep the profits for themselves. And it will still be a power vacuum of winner takes all. So it doesn't change my argument.

Corporate-fascism is just the State by another name. It will be multi-national, i.e. a world governance.

I agree corporations will want privacy features, and months ago I urged Monero to look more in that direction. I explained that Zcash might have a better technology for that, c.f. the Thoughts on Zcash thread for that. Unfortunately that might not support the current valuation of the current individual focused ecosystem. I don't know. Someone would need to think that out.

And again, I like my recent discovery of how to do more efficient and non-simultaneity off chain anonymity, as perhaps better than both Zcash and RingCT, but I can't be sure yet because so far that is only a rough sketch in my mind and some private discussions.

[generalizethis]

The corporation will still charge the costs to the collective and keep the profits for themselves. And it will still be a power vacuum of winner takes all. So it doesn't change my argument.

Corporate-fascism is just the State by another name. It will be multi-national, i.e. a world governance.

But that doesn't change my point about taxation--it's more efficient to just charge fees onto purchases, and the corporate algorithm machine will figure this out, which means anonymous coins aren't a threat and actually give them better ways to secure the information associated with their finances. I can't imagine any company who would want their payroll or research and development funds tracked on an a clear blockchain or a traditional bank. My inkling is that banks adopt means to keep these records safe from human eyes or the corporate world does it for them.

[iamnotback]

When you have one global corporation (a group of companies beholden to their collective oligarchy) charging fees, this is equivalent to taxation. They will charge their failures to the collective and keep the profits. It is just a world government by another name.

And I agree they will want privacy, except they will demand to have the masterkey to see everything.

I totally agree with making privacy technology for corporations. I was emphasizing that months ago in the Thoughts on Zcash thread.

Individual focused anonymity technology (i.e. resisting the "State" or collective outcome) has no market and no future (whereas privacy controlled by corporations does). I don't like this realization. I am ready to retire to some obscure place and ignore the world. (but first I'll try to make my technology contribution, health willing)

Note we are threadjacking the DAO hack theme. So if we want to discuss the tangent further, it would be best to start a new thread or move discussion to an appropriate existing thread.