Ok.
So, consortiums is not entities "in law"
and there might be situations, when participation in them is risky for
"dudes".
As a potential "dude" i'am scared
If this is a problem, there is a way to remove risk for dealers: make nLockTime'd transaction which releases funds back after some time. Also track buybacks for each dealer personally.
Suppose there is a group of three dealers, say, A, B and C, each dealer puts 10 BTC of collateral into 3-of-3 transaction, with auto-release in a year. A and B are honest and buyback issued coins correctly, but C is a dick who just keeps money. A and B will get their money back, perhaps with some delay, so it causes inconvenience, but no monetary loss. C wins 10 BTC at expense of bettors, but suffers loss of reputation, so it is net loss for him.
Delay means that we isolate potential troublemakers from the market.
2) I rather trust bot for decision making, than human.
Bots are pieces of software designed by humans, which run on hardware maintained by humans, and they consume data which is affected by humans.
So in the end it is safer to assume that there is no bot but user who runs bot algo controls answers it produces.
Can you elaborate more on the rules for such cryptocoin ?
Likely there are many ways to do that, perhaps the simplest one is to follow the scheme with colored coins.
This cryptocurrency should support colored coins natively (such design is sometimes called 'ripplecoin'). Besides normal Bitcoin-like transaction, it needs several additional commands (which can be implemented as Bitcoin-like transactions with commands embedded into output script):
1. register_event(event_hash, yes_bond_color, no_bond_color, ...): register bettable event, assigning colors to yes-bond and no-bond.
2. issue(event_hash): user puts x coins into "escrow" and gets x YES-bond and x NO-bond of colors associated with that event.
3. retire: combining x YES-bonds and x NO-bonds, users can get x coins back from escrow.
4. vote(event_hash, yes/no): opinion on outcome of event.
So user can create a pair of bonds and sell bond he believes isn't true. (E.g. if you think that outcome is YES, sell NO bond.) Then he can either exit early by buying missing bonds on market and retiring them.
Or he can wait until settlement. In that case he needs to submit his vote.
If YES outcome wins the popular vote, YES-bonds can be retired back into coins without requiring NO-bonds.
Now the only problem is that outcome is decided by popular vote, but perhaps there is a way around it, like a reputation system, only users with enough reputation can issue outcome-bonds, reputation can be lost through vote of no confidence etc.
It can't be perfect, of course, but some sort of "checks and balances" might make it good enough. For example, suppose currency itself is proof-of-stake system. Suppose vote over particular event outcome requires supermajority, e.g. 66% of votes. If bond issuers are dicks and vote for a wrong outcome, stakeholders overlords can override their decision. If proof-of-stake overlords are themselves dicks and they have overriden the correct decision,
users of cryptocurrency can revolt and choose other stakeholders.
1. Bond issuers' decisions affect betting users.
2. Stakeholders' decision affect bond issuers.
3. Users decisions affect stakeholders.
So in the end this fails only if everybody is acting crazy.
