So many coins now claim they are anonymous with many different ones saying they are the first ones to do so. What are the real anonymous coins we have now. Are any 100% anonymous and untraceable?
That question doesn't make sense. Imagine that you are alone on this world with your family, and that *everybody else* is part of a big single enemy entity (the super state and most citizens are also their spies - somewhat like former Eastern Germany, but on steroids). No single cryptographic system can ever be "totally anonymous", as the computer or smartphone you buy from just anybody is loaded, every single communication you make with "the outside world" is with your enemy and every keystroke you make is registered through those loaded devices. The partners you think you are anonymously dealing with are one and the same cooperating enemy and they all know of course that it is you because all other communication is known to the enemy as it is theirs.
This extreme example of "you are alone and all the others are part of one big conspiring enemy against you" shows you that there's no such thing as 100% anonymous and untraceable, because it should then be applicable in that extreme case too and obviously, it can't, whatever it is.
So there's no such thing as "100% anonymous" in ALL cases.
So you have to say in what cases you want your anonymity to work because obviously it is not going to work always. The cases you enumerate are then your "threat model".
You also have to know that cryptocurrencies are usually NOT taking into account certain evident threats, such as compromised hardware. You can have the best cryptographic system in the world, if you run it on compromised hardware, the enemy can probably do and know everything you do and know on that machine, including passwords, secret keys and everything. This is probably the biggest, and most realistic, threat to anonymity: compromised hardware. If you buy your hardware from the enemy (that could be just as well a company like Apple or Dell), you are probably already done. If you buy hardware containing *components* made by the enemy (that could be Intel or AMD), you might already be done. If you have system software made by your enemy, you are done.
So once you have excluded all these realistic threats from your threat model, because they are not potentially your enemies (imagine you work for the US government, then Intel and Apple will not be part of your enemies), or because you "take the risk and accept it", you start considering the cryptographic part.
If you already accepted a 5% risk on this part, there's no point requiring a 0.0001% risk or less on the crypto part, is there ?
You should hence think of your question in this light: what is my threat model (what kind of attacks and enemies am I facing) ? Where do I accept to take risks *because I know that the solutions I'm using are not entirely protecting me* ?
