Any philosophers here?

[kryptqnick]

I study at the philosophy faculty and I am just wondering whether there are people here who are really into philosophy. Social philosophy, metaphysics, ethics, history of philosophy, philosophy of history, philosophy of science, epistemology...
Is anyone here a student or professor of the philosophy faculty? If yes then I am sure it would be very interesting for us to discuss some philosophical issues here as well. Or even try to formulate philosophical questions about Bitcoin. Because I'm really bored with these off-topic threads like 'your favourite drink'.
If there aren't many of those who are from the academic philosophical field but there are those who read something themselves then we can discuss such things here as well and share our knowledge with each other.
What do you think?

[megalomania1]

Hello! I'm a philosopher here. I also study at the department of philosophy. Fields of my study are metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophical anthropology (especially metaanthropology), philosophy of life. In addition, I'm in love with famous German antisemites such as Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche und Heidegger.
Again as you I'm totally bored with these primitive threads, which were created by people of ordinary being.
So I think it is great that you created such a good (in sense of greek word 'agathon') and elite topic on this commoner and materially-minded forum.
Let's discuss eternal topics and do philosophy!

[Achargeturry78]

I study at the philosophy faculty and I am just wondering whether there are people here who are really into philosophy. Social philosophy, metaphysics, ethics, history of philosophy, philosophy of history, philosophy of science, epistemology...
Is anyone here a student or professor of the philosophy faculty? If yes then I am sure it would be very interesting for us to discuss some philosophical issues here as well. Or even try to formulate philosophical questions about Bitcoin. Because I'm really bored with these off-topic threads like 'your favourite drink'.
If there aren't many of those who are from the academic philosophical field but there are those who read something themselves then we can discuss such things here as well and share our knowledge with each other.
What do you think?

I am not a philosphy but I like idiom words, phrases and statement. I wrote a book which created of my on belief in life. What is the essence of life? What is the essence of having a tough leaders and decency leaders. This is a huge difference there in paradigm also different in aspect. Words matter in decency action matter in tough leaders.

[megalomania1]

I study at the philosophy faculty and I am just wondering whether there are people here who are really into philosophy. Social philosophy, metaphysics, ethics, history of philosophy, philosophy of history, philosophy of science, epistemology...
Is anyone here a student or professor of the philosophy faculty? If yes then I am sure it would be very interesting for us to discuss some philosophical issues here as well. Or even try to formulate philosophical questions about Bitcoin. Because I'm really bored with these off-topic threads like 'your favourite drink'.
If there aren't many of those who are from the academic philosophical field but there are those who read something themselves then we can discuss such things here as well and share our knowledge with each other.
What do you think?

I am not a philosphy but I like idiom words, phrases and statement. I wrote a book which created of my on belief in life. What is the essence of life? What is the essence of having a tough leaders and decency leaders. This is a huge difference there in paradigm also different in aspect. Words matter in decency action matter in tough leaders.

The essence of life, my friend, is in eternal struggle of your will since just here your will has specific directivity and will firstly means will to power, to seize and to triumph in the world. That means to do everything as you wanted to. But not just as your ego tells you to do, not as social stereotypes as well, but as your will, your vocation, your sense of nature tells you to do. And everything will be fine.

[Ted E. Bare]

I tend to get philosophical when I'm drunk, does that count as well?

[sugarfly]

I tend to get philosophical when I'm drunk, does that count as well?

Yes, your opinion about the universe is equally valid as everyone else's.

 

-sf-

[335coin]

I tend to get philosophical when I'm drunk, does that count as well?

I think that's everyone though.

[ridery99]

username BADecker is the most wise man here on this forum. You have to read his posts to understand hoe this world works.

[CC-Resurgam]

Im no philosopher but i love to talk about it. it fascinates me. and i learn a lot about a lot of random things. i just dont have money for schooling. but phiolosophy isnt about schooling, its about how you see the world.

[European Central Bank]

it's something I've never gone in for. once you start you never find an end. the philosophers I know all seem to be miserable, insane and full of shit.

[BADecker]

Not as many as the philanderers.     

[CyberCombat]

yes i am if you want ask questions .lets your turn

[aletheia]

I am not a philosophy student but I like to read about it. I like to read about life philosophy and theology, especially Calvinism. Let's start discussing!

[MarketMagic]

I study at the philosophy faculty and I am just wondering whether there are people here who are really into philosophy. Social philosophy, metaphysics, ethics, history of philosophy, philosophy of history, philosophy of science, epistemology...
Is anyone here a student or professor of the philosophy faculty? If yes then I am sure it would be very interesting for us to discuss some philosophical issues here as well. Or even try to formulate philosophical questions about Bitcoin. Because I'm really bored with these off-topic threads like 'your favourite drink'.
If there aren't many of those who are from the academic philosophical field but there are those who read something themselves then we can discuss such things here as well and share our knowledge with each other.
What do you think?

There are many "armchair" academics here who specialise in philosophy but the best one by far is "iamnotback" He is a fountain of knowledge like the buddha except he is neither tibetan or buddhist :-)) https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?action=profile;u=851556

[dippididodaday]

I like to think about things and to make wise choices after having done so thoroughly. Apparently philosophy help with this.

[kryptqnick]

Great! So there are at least some people interested! Why don't we start from the classics then? I offer us to read some Kant and discuss how do we understand him. Try reading this:
'If, by the term noumenon, we understand a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensuous intuition, thus making abstraction of our mode of intuiting it, this is a noumenon in the negative sense of the word. But if we understand by it an object of a non-sensuous intuition, we in this case assume a peculiar mode of intuition, an intellectual intuition, to wit, which does not, however, belong to us, of the very possibility of which we have no notion—and this is a noumenon in the positive sense.
The doctrine of sensibility is also the doctrine of noumena in the negative sense, that is, of things which the understanding is obliged to cogitate apart from any relation to our mode of intuition, consequently not as mere phenomena, but as things in themselves. But the understanding at the same time comprehends that it cannot employ its categories for the consideration of things in themselves, because these possess significance only in relation to the unity of intuitions in space and time, and that they are competent to determine this unity by means of general a priori connecting conceptions only on account of the pure ideality of space and time. Where this unity of time is not to be met with, as is the case with noumena, the whole use, indeed the whole meaning of the categories is entirely lost, for even the possibility of things to correspond to the categories is in this case incomprehensible. On this point, I need only refer the reader to what I have said at the commencement of the General Remark appended to the foregoing chapter. Now, the possibility of a thing can never be proved from the fact that the conception of it is not self-contradictory, but only by means of an intuition corresponding to the conception. If, therefore, we wish to apply the categories to objects which cannot be regarded as phenomena, we must have an intuition different from the sensuous, and in this case the objects would be a noumena in the positive sense of the word. Now, as such an intuition, that is, an intellectual intuition, is no part of our faculty of cognition, it is absolutely impossible for the categories to possess any application beyond the limits of experience. It may be true that there are intelligible existences to which our faculty of sensuous intuition has no relation, and cannot be applied, but our conceptions of the understanding, as mere forms of thought for our sensuous intuition, do not extend to these. What, therefore, we call noumenon must be understood by us as such in a negative sense.
If I take away from an empirical intuition all thought (by means of the categories), there remains no cognition of any object; for by means of mere intuition nothing is cogitated, and, from the existence of such or such an affection of sensibility in me, it does not follow that this affection or representation has any relation to an object without me. But if I take away all intuition, there still remains the form of thought, that is, the mode of determining an object for the manifold of a possible intuition. Thus the categories do in some measure really extend further than sensuous intuition, inasmuch as they think objects in general, without regard to the mode (of sensibility) in which these objects are given. But they do not for this reason apply to and determine a wider sphere of objects, because we cannot assume that such can be given, without presupposing the possibility of another than the sensuous mode of intuition, a supposition we are not justified in making.
I call a conception problematical which contains in itself no contradiction, and which is connected with other cognitions as a limitation of given conceptions, but whose objective reality cannot be cognized in any manner. The conception of a noumenon, that is, of a thing which must be cogitated not as an object of sense, but as a thing in itself (solely through the pure understanding), is not self-contradictory, for we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition. Nay, further, this conception is necessary to restrain sensuous intuition within the bounds of phenomena, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensuous cognition; for things in themselves, which lie beyond its province, are called noumena for the very purpose of indicating that this cognition does not extend its application to all that the understanding thinks. But, after all, the possibility of such noumena is quite incomprehensible, and beyond the sphere of phenomena, all is for us a mere void; that is to say, we possess an understanding whose province does problematically extend beyond this sphere, but we do not possess an intuition, indeed, not even the conception of a possible intuition, by means of which objects beyond the region of sensibility could be given us, and in reference to which the understanding might be employed assertorically. The conception of a noumenon is therefore merely a limitative conception and therefore only of negative use. But it is not an arbitrary or fictitious notion, but is connected with the limitation of sensibility, without, however, being capable of presenting us with any positive datum beyond this sphere.
The division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and of the world into a mundus sensibilis and intelligibilis is therefore quite inadmissible in a positive sense, although conceptions do certainly admit of such a division; for the class of noumena have no determinate object corresponding to them, and cannot therefore possess objective validity. If we abandon the senses, how can it be made conceivable that the categories (which are the only conceptions that could serve as conceptions for noumena) have any sense or meaning at all, inasmuch as something more than the mere unity of thought, namely, a possible intuition, is requisite for their application to an object? The conception of a noumenon, considered as merely problematical, is, however, not only admissible, but, as a limitative conception of sensibility, absolutely necessary. But, in this case, a noumenon is not a particular intelligible object for our understanding; on the contrary, the kind of understanding to which it could belong is itself a problem, for we cannot form the most distant conception of the possibility of an understanding which should cognize an object, not discursively by means of categories, but intuitively in a non-sensuous intuition. Our understanding attains in this way a sort of negative extension. That is to say, it is not limited by, but rather limits, sensibility, by giving the name of noumena to things, not considered as phenomena, but as things in themselves. But it at the same time prescribes limits to itself, for it confesses itself unable to cognize these by means of the categories, and hence is compelled to cogitate them merely as an unknown something.'

[kryptqnick]

yes i am if you want ask questions .lets your turn

I am sorry but I think that is you say that you're a philosopher if I want to ask questions then you're not a philosopher. Wh yshould one philosopher ask somebody something else? Well, if you're not saying you'll give me answers, then it's fine, though.

[cryptor0th]

Great! So there are at least some people interested! Why don't we start from the classics then? I offer us to read some Kant and discuss how do we understand him. Try reading this:
'If, by the term noumenon, we understand a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensuous intuition, thus making abstraction of our mode of intuiting it, this is a noumenon in the negative sense of the word. But if we understand by it an object of a non-sensuous intuition, we in this case assume a peculiar mode of intuition, an intellectual intuition, to wit, which does not, however, belong to us, of the very possibility of which we have no notion—and this is a noumenon in the positive sense.
The doctrine of sensibility is also the doctrine of noumena in the negative sense, that is, of things which the understanding is obliged to cogitate apart from any relation to our mode of intuition, consequently not as mere phenomena, but as things in themselves. But the understanding at the same time comprehends that it cannot employ its categories for the consideration of things in themselves, because these possess significance only in relation to the unity of intuitions in space and time, and that they are competent to determine this unity by means of general a priori connecting conceptions only on account of the pure ideality of space and time. Where this unity of time is not to be met with, as is the case with noumena, the whole use, indeed the whole meaning of the categories is entirely lost, for even the possibility of things to correspond to the categories is in this case incomprehensible. On this point, I need only refer the reader to what I have said at the commencement of the General Remark appended to the foregoing chapter. Now, the possibility of a thing can never be proved from the fact that the conception of it is not self-contradictory, but only by means of an intuition corresponding to the conception. If, therefore, we wish to apply the categories to objects which cannot be regarded as phenomena, we must have an intuition different from the sensuous, and in this case the objects would be a noumena in the positive sense of the word. Now, as such an intuition, that is, an intellectual intuition, is no part of our faculty of cognition, it is absolutely impossible for the categories to possess any application beyond the limits of experience. It may be true that there are intelligible existences to which our faculty of sensuous intuition has no relation, and cannot be applied, but our conceptions of the understanding, as mere forms of thought for our sensuous intuition, do not extend to these. What, therefore, we call noumenon must be understood by us as such in a negative sense.
If I take away from an empirical intuition all thought (by means of the categories), there remains no cognition of any object; for by means of mere intuition nothing is cogitated, and, from the existence of such or such an affection of sensibility in me, it does not follow that this affection or representation has any relation to an object without me. But if I take away all intuition, there still remains the form of thought, that is, the mode of determining an object for the manifold of a possible intuition. Thus the categories do in some measure really extend further than sensuous intuition, inasmuch as they think objects in general, without regard to the mode (of sensibility) in which these objects are given. But they do not for this reason apply to and determine a wider sphere of objects, because we cannot assume that such can be given, without presupposing the possibility of another than the sensuous mode of intuition, a supposition we are not justified in making.
I call a conception problematical which contains in itself no contradiction, and which is connected with other cognitions as a limitation of given conceptions, but whose objective reality cannot be cognized in any manner. The conception of a noumenon, that is, of a thing which must be cogitated not as an object of sense, but as a thing in itself (solely through the pure understanding), is not self-contradictory, for we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition. Nay, further, this conception is necessary to restrain sensuous intuition within the bounds of phenomena, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensuous cognition; for things in themselves, which lie beyond its province, are called noumena for the very purpose of indicating that this cognition does not extend its application to all that the understanding thinks. But, after all, the possibility of such noumena is quite incomprehensible, and beyond the sphere of phenomena, all is for us a mere void; that is to say, we possess an understanding whose province does problematically extend beyond this sphere, but we do not possess an intuition, indeed, not even the conception of a possible intuition, by means of which objects beyond the region of sensibility could be given us, and in reference to which the understanding might be employed assertorically. The conception of a noumenon is therefore merely a limitative conception and therefore only of negative use. But it is not an arbitrary or fictitious notion, but is connected with the limitation of sensibility, without, however, being capable of presenting us with any positive datum beyond this sphere.
The division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and of the world into a mundus sensibilis and intelligibilis is therefore quite inadmissible in a positive sense, although conceptions do certainly admit of such a division; for the class of noumena have no determinate object corresponding to them, and cannot therefore possess objective validity. If we abandon the senses, how can it be made conceivable that the categories (which are the only conceptions that could serve as conceptions for noumena) have any sense or meaning at all, inasmuch as something more than the mere unity of thought, namely, a possible intuition, is requisite for their application to an object? The conception of a noumenon, considered as merely problematical, is, however, not only admissible, but, as a limitative conception of sensibility, absolutely necessary. But, in this case, a noumenon is not a particular intelligible object for our understanding; on the contrary, the kind of understanding to which it could belong is itself a problem, for we cannot form the most distant conception of the possibility of an understanding which should cognize an object, not discursively by means of categories, but intuitively in a non-sensuous intuition. Our understanding attains in this way a sort of negative extension. That is to say, it is not limited by, but rather limits, sensibility, by giving the name of noumena to things, not considered as phenomena, but as things in themselves. But it at the same time prescribes limits to itself, for it confesses itself unable to cognize these by means of the categories, and hence is compelled to cogitate them merely as an unknown something.'

I like the way you think.
Dropped you a message.

Regards

[Spoetnik]

The king and inventor of Science.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ibn_al-Haytham

No one else matters..

Born in Iraq too Americans 

[kryptqnick]

Fine, if nobody wants to discuss Kant let's discuss something else. Kalvinism, for example. Can someone give us a small fragment from some text which we can discuss? Or just enlighten us a bit on the topic and ask our opinion?
Or

The king and inventor of Science.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ibn_al-Haytham

No one else matters..

Born in Iraq too Americans  

can you choose something from Book of Optics for us to read then?