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[Blazr]

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[1715021886]

1715021886

[1715021886]

1715021886

[1715021886]

1715021886

[1715021886]

1715021886

[1715021886]

1715021886

[Remember remember the 5th of November]

Trying to scam us? these transactions are fake according to blockchain.info, and not just this one.

[Blazr]

Trying to scam us? these transactions are fake according to blockchain.info, and not just this one.

No scamming here. I made a transaction and it didn't have a fee and wouldn't confirm, so I tried to double spend it again with a higher fee (hence the "please push this tx"), but in the end the original tx got confirmed.

[Remember remember the 5th of November]

You do realize in order to perform a double spend you need at least 51% of the network power.

[n4ru]

You do realize in order to perform a double spend you need at least 51% of the network power.

Between your edgy username and your comment you know nothing.

[ZephramC]

You do realize in order to perform a double spend you need at least 51% of the network power.

Actually, 51% of network hash rate grants you convergence of the following probability to 1 with time: "The probability that you can double spend well-formed* transaction no matter how many confirmations it has."

* - By well formed I loosely mean: transaction which nodes relay and miners are likely to include. Transaction with very low or no fees is an exception as it probably will not be relayed and included for very long time.

[Remember remember the 5th of November]

You do realize in order to perform a double spend you need at least 51% of the network power.

Between your edgy username and your comment you know nothing.

What does my username have to do with anything?

[DeathAndTaxes]

You do realize in order to perform a double spend you need at least 51% of the network power.

That is not true.

0-confirm tx can be double spent by a mere race attack.
0-confirm tx can be double spent by a Finney attack.
A confirmed tx can be double spent by any significant % of global hashing power although as the number of confirmations rises the probability of success greatly declines.  At 6 confirms for example someone with 10% of global hashing power only has a roughly 1 in 10,000 chance of successfully building a longer chain than the rest of the network.

[DannyHamilton]

I really hope that miners will start implementing "child pays for parent" logic in their selection of unconfirmed transactions for their blocks before long.  It would eliminate the need to create these "race attack" raw transactions when someone fails to include a fee on a transaction that ought to have had one, and would allow merchants to accept low fee (or zero fee) transactions and add their own fee to speed up confirmation.  I suppose the miners would need to at least store low priority transactions for this to work well, since the relay rules of the reference client might otherwise keep them from even knowing about the parent.

It'd be nice if the relay rules of the reference client could use "child pays for parent" when relaying transactions (although that might be a bit more difficult to implement).