Noob Q: Can bitcoin be turned into POS?

[dinofelis]

Hard Coded Check Points can not be orphaned, and they can be weeks or months or years old.
(I am in favor of, and see no downside or security problems with them.)

Hard-coded check points are a centralized consensus mechanism.  Let's the dev then sign all blocks, that's the same.

So you only need to bribe the dev to change the check points he only can provide and your "decentralized consensus immutability" is gone too.

I disagree with , because they do add too much centralization for my taste. Control the checkpoint server and you control the coin.

Identical to dev signed software with checkpoints he can change at will too.

I think you didn't fully appreciate the decentralized consensus problem.  If you propose a centralized dev solution, you're missing the point all together.  Let the dev's computer sign all blocks for that matter.  No more problems.

[1715077860]

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[1715077860]

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[dfd1]

Hard Coded Check Points can not be orphaned, and they can be weeks or months or years old.
(I am in favor of, and see no downside or security problems with them.)

Hard-coded check points are a centralized consensus mechanism.  Let's the dev then sign all blocks, that's the same.

So you only need to bribe the dev to change the check points he only can provide and your "decentralized consensus immutability" is gone too.

I disagree with , because they do add too much centralization for my taste. Control the checkpoint server and you control the coin.

Identical to dev signed software with checkpoints he can change at will too.

I think you didn't fully appreciate the decentralized consensus problem.  If you propose a centralized dev solution, you're missing the point all together.  Let the dev's computer sign all blocks for that matter.  No more problems.

For the first thing we should understand why decentralization matters to us so much.
We are actually looking for the security of the network, not necessarily decentralized solution for the security of the network
Quick example: if we send centralized payment processor server to Antarctica and bury it under miles of ice no third party interference can happen to payment system, so centralized network would run secure enough.
Decentralization for the sake of decentralization can't resolve all issues, and decentralization is not a binary thing, coin can have more decentralization or less decentralization. The more decentralization actually coin has - the more problems with transactions and network will appear.
We have bitcoin block solving process decentralized to 20 computers, with hardcoded checkpoints, and network run fine. If we will try to decentralize it to 2000 computers, network latency can lead to constant reorganizations due to massive generation of orphaned blocks. So, decentralized solution do not exist for peoof of work chain.
In the other hand, delegated POS with 2000 delegates can run just fine.
So, we have "centralized" DPOS system more secure and decentralized than "decentralized" bitcoin.

[dinofelis]

For the first thing we should understand why decentralization matters to us so much.

You want an immutable and permissionless trustless system, ideally anonymous.  If the system is not immutable, then the one that is able to change the rules or the history at will, once you got in, can totally alter the value you are holding, or the things you planned to do with it.  He can even change your balance, or wipe your existence on the system.  Without immutability (of rules and history), you are doing the equivalent of signing a blanc cheque, or a blanc contract, to whomever has the ability to change the rules or the history.

If the system is not permissionless, one can kick you out, or stop you from using the system according to the rules, for your political, economical, religious, racial or social cercle identity, or simply because you happened to annoy for a known or unknown reason, those that can grand permissions or not.  So the system must be open to any participant.

==>  essentially, those being able to give permissions, to modify history or to modify the rules are a power house ; in the end power always converts to monetary and hence value advantage.  This is why you don't want that.

Because the system's role is to be able to do what the powers that be don't want you to do, or don't want you to do that easily, or because your using of the system may be frowned upon by the powers that be who have all the means to make your life miserable, using the system should be possible without giving out one's identity.

But this also puts the problem that because everybody can access the system, without identity check, that the system most resist Sybil attacks, and of course, malicious people wanting to bring the system down, or take over the power over the system.

The system cannot have any leader, capable of changing the rules of the history (power house) nor anyone deciding upon permission to use the system or not.  As such, you are obliged to have the system running by every participant, as there cannot be a centrally run server, with a root owner, that could change the history on it, change the rules by which it functions, allow or disallow participants in the system, and be able to know all (network) identities of all participants and their actions.

==> necessity of a decentralized system, in order to obtain permissionlessness and immutability, and the lack of any form of centralized leadership.  But this leads to the necessity of trustlessness and resistance to corruption or Sybil attacks.

We are actually looking for the security of the network, not necessarily decentralized solution for the security of the network
Quick example: if we send centralized payment processor server to Antarctica and bury it under miles of ice no third party interference can happen to payment system, so centralized network would run secure enough.

How do you know that server is really under the ice, and not in the room of a power-hungry maniac ?  And what happens if that computer fails ?  Who has the root password to that server ?  Who can pull the plug ?  What network provider has control over all that happens on the network interface of that server (excluding people for instance) ?

We have bitcoin block solving process decentralized to 20 computers, with hardcoded checkpoints, and network run fine.

Who can control those 20 computers ?  Who is deciding on the "hardcoded" (who is coding them ?) check points ?  What if tomorrow, these 20 computers are running an entirely different block chain ?  Is there even a block chain on them, or is it just a database pretending to be a block chain ?

[XbladeX]

Hi guys.
Plz don't kill me for asking.

I see a lot of hype around alt-coins.
When asked, many will point out POS as a plus vs bitcoin.

I was wondering:

1. Can Bitcoin change to POS if wanted to by the community?
2. Is POS really an advantage (if it is - is it an advantage because it saves energy, or because it diffuses power)?

Thank you!

Pow is much fair distribution system over POS

[dinofelis]

Pow is much fair distribution system over POS

You think that 5 entities obtaining half of the "distribution" is a fair system ?

[Snail2]

Technologically possible, but that would mess up pretty much everything, and the miners surely would swear vendetta against the developers. However we could by BTC under $10 again .

...but why do you want another PeerCoin ?

[dfd1]

How do you know that server is really under the ice, and not in the room of a power-hungry maniac ?  And what happens if that computer fails ?  Who has the root password to that server ?  Who can pull the plug ?  What network provider has control over all that happens on the network interface of that server (excluding people for instance) ?

We can't know for sure even if all these posters (including me, from your point of view) on this board really exist, or if it's just php spam bots from some guy who tricked us into buying his "coins".
Antarctica example is hypothetical, since we don't know if Antarctica really exist  
We can try to send server on Mars, but who can be sure Mars is actually a real planet, and not a fairy tale from government controlled schools?
Anyway, we should look for a good enough solution for immutable and permissionless trustless payment network, not absolute one. Bitcoin is a coin what run for almost 10 years and governments don't fight it, despite 20 computers run all the block chain. So, it's good enough solution. Can we improve it? Of course. We can take out of the equation:
miners
whales
central devs
corporate infrastructure
Probably, some future bitcoin will run on some mobile infrastructure-less mesh network with decentralized crowdfunding for development and with "1 meatbag node - 1 vote" democracy. Or not. I don't care.
POS successfully fired miners already, so we have some progress. Next to be kicked out is devs with their central websites for updates and downloads. Crowdfunding and peer reviewing can be done in the network by actual holders. And we don't need absolute decentralization for all this, 10000-100000 master nodes can run a 300 million active users network no third party able to stop or interfere.

[d5000]

If a big economic actor, especially a state, wants to destroy a coin, just any coin, it can.

Yep, surely big actors could attack any cryptocurrency.

The point is that if an attacker manages to get control over a PoS coin, the coin is practically dead because the attacker would have control over the chain forever with his 51% stake - it can only be revived with a hard fork. An 51%-attack on a PoW currency can do only temporary harm because the attacking mining cartel would have to continuously "burn" resources (electricity, mining equipment).

Proof of burn like in Slimcoin's design could be a interesting option to complement a PoS currency because here the attacker's power would decrease in time, like in PoW.

The problem with most PoS systems right now is that they also reward the staker.  This reward has to be unique, and will be fought over.  If there is no reward, then there's no battle to be had.  There's no incentive for a random stake holder to absolutely want to stake on a secondary chain and hence increasing the risk that the system he has a stake in, crumbles down.

But this reward is in place to incentive "staking", because "stakers" at least have some minimal electricity/bandwidth costs. If less accounts are staking, attackers have an easier game with "standard 51% PoS attacks", they could attack the currency even with only 1% of the supply (see cynicSOB's successful APEXcoin attack I mentioned in the answer to kiklo, it was performed with less than 0,1% of the stake). So "stakers" should be at least minimally rewarded (e.g. with Peercoin's 1%/year reward or NXT's transaction fees).  

But I agree that "high-reward" stake coins like HyperStake et al. have the problems you describe because they offer too high incentives to "double stake", but they economically are not sound either and I regard them only as toy coins.

You seem to not understand that PoS coins also reorg to the Longest Chain with the Highest Difficulty.  

That's the whole point of the "long-range" or "history attack" (or Bribing attack, as Vitalik Buterin calls it) - a couple of emptied keys that aren't that old could give the attacker the difficulty he needs for his attack chain.

I agree with you that N@S attacks are highly "impractical" but that doesn't mean they are "impossible". And I'm not against the concept of PoS - in fact, I am somewhat active in the Peercoin, Nxt and Slimcoin communities.

[dinofelis]

How do you know that server is really under the ice, and not in the room of a power-hungry maniac ?  And what happens if that computer fails ?  Who has the root password to that server ?  Who can pull the plug ?  What network provider has control over all that happens on the network interface of that server (excluding people for instance) ?

We can't know for sure even if all these posters (including me, from your point of view) on this board really exist, or if it's just php spam bots from some guy who tricked us into buying his "coins".
Antarctica example is hypothetical, since we don't know if Antarctica really exist  
We can try to send server on Mars, but who can be sure Mars is actually a real planet, and not a fairy tale from government controlled schools?

You need, as you point out, a total conspiration in order to fake a decentralized system: you can check IP numbers, you can check so many things, and most of all, you can be part of it (several times, style Sybil) and check that you can see yourself on the network. 

If there is "one server on Mars", that server is one single point of entry, one IP number that can be a proxy to something totally different without having to compromise all of your knowledge about the world, about internet and everything.

A server has a root owner.  The data that that server receives and sends back are entirely at the discretion of that root owner.  I don't see how that root owner could prove its absence of potential interference on the system.  You don't need to corrupt all of society and all of the world to change stuff on the server on which you are root password owner.  The computer on Mars can be just a proxy to just any computer on earth.  Maybe my desktop.  Why would you trust my desktop (behind a proxy server on Mars) ?

Anyway, we should look for a good enough solution for immutable and permissionless trustless payment network, not absolute one. Bitcoin is a coin what run for almost 10 years and governments don't fight it, despite 20 computers run all the block chain. So, it's good enough solution.

Those "20 computers" are the most involved computing infrastructure in the whole world !  That said, 20 root passwords determine indeed bitcoin.  For the moment, they are not colluding.  However, why then not replace this with these 20 guys signing digitally each block and promising not to sign more than a block per 10 minutes in a round-robin way ?  That's just as secure, isn't it ?
And wastes much less electricity ?  Or not ?

[YuginKadoya]

Well I think that is your decision to make, in converting bitcoin to Altcoins, I think there are many bitcoin users that are converting their bitcoin to any altcoins they like well I don't really thinking of doing this I like bitcoin more than any altcoins out there but if given a chance that there is an alt that would simply impress me then I think I would have a second thought over converting my bitcoins for it.

[dinofelis]

If a big economic actor, especially a state, wants to destroy a coin, just any coin, it can.

Yep, surely big actors could attack any cryptocurrency.

The point is that if an attacker manages to get control over a PoS coin, the coin is practically dead because the attacker would have control over the chain forever with his 51% stake - it can only be revived with a hard fork.

First of all, a coin that is for 50% or more in possession of any entity, is economically dead.   That whale can do anything with it on the market.  So if a coin is for 50% in possession of a whale, whether it technically fails or not, is not important, because it is economically dead already.

A PoS system should be such that after a short while, the "immutable history" is signed by more stake than a single, colluding economic entity is supposed to ever possess.  I would put that limit at a few %.  Any asset of which there is more than a few % in the hands of a single entity, is toxic or dead, because the market is too much in the hands of that entity.  Nobody has single-handedly the control over a few % of all $$ in circulation.

But even in the case an entity possesses 50% of the stake, you can have combined PoS signing systems (where a given block needs to be signed by a certain number of stakers) so that the probability that ALL signatures come from the same 50% of stakers, becomes arbitrarily low.  If you require, say, 100 signatures per block, chances that these 100 signatures are drawn from only the whale's staking nodes are 1/10^30 or something. (it is more complicated than this, but that's the gist).

An 51%-attack on a PoW currency can do only temporary harm because the attacking mining cartel would have to continuously "burn" resources (electricity, mining equipment).

Not really.  It will have imposed ITS branch and orphaned the other, and everybody will now mine happily on his branch, with modified past for ever.

But this reward is in place to incentive "staking", because "stakers" at least have some minimal electricity/bandwidth costs. If less accounts are staking, attackers have an easier game with "standard 51% PoS attacks", they could attack the currency even with only 1% of the supply (see cynicSOB's successful APEXcoin attack I mentioned in the answer to kiklo, it was performed with less than 0,1% of the stake). So "stakers" should be at least minimally rewarded (e.g. with Peercoin's 1%/year reward or NXT's transaction fees).  

The cost is the cost to maintain the security of the system in which you have a stake. I think the reward is inviting more problems than solving.  If you cannot be bothered to run an old PC, then you accept the increased risk of the system you're using.  Note that if everyone gets 1% on his stake, with a 1% inflation, you weren't really rewarded either.  Getting an interest equal to inflation is not a reward.
In fact, this becomes lucrative only if most stakeholders DO NOT stake.  Because then you get 1% interest, but overall inflation is smaller than 1%.  So this might give a "miner's consortium" making it difficult for people to stake, so that they get the full reward while most people don't.

Rewards corrupt.

[dfd1]

why then not replace this with these 20 guys signing digitally each block and promising not to sign more than a block per 10 minutes in a round-robin way ?  That's just as secure, isn't it ?

Yes, I think it's absolutely the same as stamping with gpu a paper contract between "20 elders of the internet" and "we, the people" for "block chain special service". Moreover,  mining hardware is a potential point of failure and power vacuum, since monopoly on network belong to few tech-savvy entrepreneurs.
In POS system money decide how money evolves, it's fair enough, and I'm actually okay with whales. Coins as shares in distributed payment system has more logic than gpu power as voting method.
There is no direct connection between hashrate and bitcoin success.
In order to harm block chain there should be an actual potential / possibility for big corp/ebil gobernment to conspire and interfere in the system, and I think bureaucratic power highly overestimated.
1000 dedicated people can ruin any corporation, 10000 well armed organized men can overthrown any government, so why we should have more  than 10000 non Sybil signing nodes to run a network? Only power any big government has is power to persuade through information monopoly (non exists more, thanks the internet) and power to print money (we work on that thing here). They can close one megaupload website, DDoS 100 "hate speech" forums, but they can't shut down 2000 tor nodes. There is no law enforcement agency to raid Asian or African datacentres, no hackers to sniff i2p for coin transactions, no way to attack all 10000 signing nodes, especially if ip addresses unknown. It's just a bunch of old guys who probably already invested in dogecoins by themselves.
Again, 10 years as bitcoin run without problems, governments are ok with it. Most problems bitcoin has now come from actual miners -- people who supposed to "secure the network" with hashrate,  and bitcoin developers.
So, we should kick out miners and decentralize developers, and only then think about other attack vectors.

[OneUnderBridge]

I think that there's a wealth of data out there within the alternative coin experimental projects which may be compiled and studied to answer this feasibility question. However, it would probably require a hybrid system and a revised acyclic data structure connecting various tiers of clients and that may be too intensive a project to undertake on the existing chain without causing conflict.

[kiklo]

Hard Coded Check Points can not be orphaned, and they can be weeks or months or years old.
(I am in favor of, and see no downside or security problems with them.)

Hard-coded check points are a centralized consensus mechanism.  Let's the dev then sign all blocks, that's the same.

So you only need to bribe the dev to change the check points he only can provide and your "decentralized consensus immutability" is gone too.

I disagree with , because they do add too much centralization for my taste. Control the checkpoint server and you control the coin.

Identical to dev signed software with checkpoints he can change at will too.

I think you didn't fully appreciate the decentralized consensus problem.  If you propose a centralized dev solution, you're missing the point all together.  Let the dev's computer sign all blocks for that matter.  No more problems.

Hard coded Checkpoints , are placed in by the dev , however the users still have to update to the new version.
That is how they signal agreement , if no one updates , then the hard coded checkpoint is ignored.
If the Majority does not update, hard coded checkpoints won't work.

Checkpoints from checkpoint servers can not be refused.

See the difference.  

 

[kiklo]

Pow is much fair distribution system over POS

If you make a PoW where everyone , can process the ~ same amount of PoW,
you would be correct, but history has proven due to economic factors the rich gleam an unfair advantage.

How many warehouses full of ASICS do you Own?   


 

[kiklo]

But this reward is in place to incentive "staking", because "stakers" at least have some minimal electricity/bandwidth costs. If less accounts are staking, attackers have an easier game with "standard 51% PoS attacks", they could attack the currency even with only 1% of the supply (see cynicSOB's successful APEXcoin attack I mentioned in the answer to kiklo, it was performed with less than 0,1% of the stake). So "stakers" should be at least minimally rewarded (e.g. with Peercoin's 1%/year reward or NXT's transaction fees).  

Side Note on the Apex,

cynicSOB pulled off a Short Range history attack ~30 blocks, not a long range.

Apex was vulnerable for the following reasons, they only had 5 Stakers with a small # of coins protecting the network,
and they had UNLIMITED Weight from Unlimited Coin Age.

cynicSOB just waited til his coin blocks Weight/Age was higher than the other 5 stakers combined, and overwrote the chain.
(Took him over 20 days before he had enough weight.)

Unlimited Weight/Age is a security issue, and ZEIT handled it by capping the Max Weight/Age at 20 days.
(This security measure was in effect before the Apex attack)  
Meaning even if you kept coins for 100 years, their max weight/age would be no more than 20 days.
So your short range history attack would fail.  

It all breaks down to this
hashProofOfStake <= [Coin-age] x [Target]      
[Coin-age] = [amount of coins] x [days in stake]      

That is why a PoS coin with a billion coins will be safer than a PoS coin with only a few million.
And you could make the argument that is why BTC should never become PoS without using rolling checkpoints or a checkpoint server,
as BTC does not have enough coins to secure the chain properly.

 

[d5000]

First of all, a coin that is for 50% or more in possession of any entity, is economically dead.   That whale can do anything with it on the market.

He cannot change transactions of other accounts, only double spend and censor transactions. So if in a PoW coin the miners manage to regain control of 51%, then the coin could continue to live - above all, if it's widely used and has reputation. A "shitcoin" obviously would die instantly (like the many ones that already died ). In a PoS coin you must additionally do the hardfork. But ok, we're talking about details, I agree that a 51% event is catastrophic in all coin systems.

A PoS system should be such that after a short while, the "immutable history" is signed by more stake than a single, colluding economic entity is supposed to ever possess.  I would put that limit at a few %. Any asset of which there is more than a few % in the hands of a single entity, is toxic or dead, because the market is too much in the hands of that entity.  Nobody has single-handedly the control over a few % of all $$ in circulation.

Yes, that are ideas like "finalization" (see in Ethereum's proposed Casper), TaPoS, or Economic Clustering. They are interesting and I would like to see more research on this. These mechanisms don't solve history/long range attack completely but make it so difficult to scam an user with it that I would say the attack is de facto impossible.

The cost is the cost to maintain the security of the system in which you have a stake. I think the reward is inviting more problems than solving.  If you cannot be bothered to run an old PC, then you accept the increased risk of the system you're using.  Note that if everyone gets 1% on his stake, with a 1% inflation, you weren't really rewarded either.  Getting an interest equal to inflation is not a reward.

I agree, a "minimal reward" like in NXT or PPC is not really a reward. But such a small incentive can be crucial. In NXT and PPC it seems to work, because this kind of minimal reward is a good incentive for a person that has stake in the system to run a full node, but not enough for an attacker to double-stake (if he has no malicious plans like destroying the currency).

In fact, this becomes lucrative only if most stakeholders DO NOT stake.  Because then you get 1% interest, but overall inflation is smaller than 1%.  So this might give a "miner's consortium" making it difficult for people to stake, so that they get the full reward while most people don't.

I don't think that 1% stake per year is enough for such a miner's consortium to form. If the reward is capped like in PPC, then the profits for large stakers to form a consortium is nearly non-existent.

But overall I agree with you, "normal" block rewards (like in Bitcoin or "high staking PoS coins") in PoS are a no-go.

It all breaks down to this
hashProofOfStake <= [Coin-age] x [Target]      
[Coin-age] = [amount of coins] x [days in stake]      

That is why a PoS coin with a billion coins will be safer than a PoS coin with only a few million.

No, no and no! That's simply false. Do the math again please. The absolute number of coins is not relevant, it's the proportion of the total coin supply a staker has.

And no, your coin has not invented the "coin age limitation". Peercoin did it, in 2012.

I recommend you and all those interested in Proof of Stake to read the blog posts of the "The history of Casper" (Chapter 1 is here) series by the Ethereum developer Vlad Zamfir. I don't know if I come to the same conclusions like him (I think he's overly pessimistic about non-Byzantine PoS algorithms), but it's an interesting read about different PoS systems and the attacks that a well thought-out system should be able to avoid.

[kiklo]

It all breaks down to this
hashProofOfStake <= [Coin-age] x [Target]      
[Coin-age] = [amount of coins] x [days in stake]      

That is why a PoS coin with a billion coins will be safer than a PoS coin with only a few million.

No, no and no! That's simply false. Do the math again please. The absolute number of coins is not relevant, it's the proportion of the total coin supply a staker has.

And no, your coin has not invented the "coin age limitation". Peercoin did it, in 2012.

I recommend you and all those interested in Proof of Stake to read the blog posts of the "The history of Casper" (Chapter 1 is here) series by the Ethereum developer Vlad Zamfir. I don't know if I come to the same conclusions like him (I think he's overly pessimistic about non-Byzantine PoS algorithms), but it's an interesting read about different PoS systems and the attacks that a well thought-out system should be able to avoid.

OK, lets clarify ,
The Overall Percentage of Staking Coins determines the Security ,  (Which we should be able to agree on.)  
However Coins with Larger Numbers , will usually have more coins per block, and therefore have a higher coin-age # .

No Argument , about peercoin inventing the age limitation 1st, and I never claimed ZEIT invented it, so not sure where that is coming from.

No offense to the Guy , but he is trying to solve N@S, when N@S is nothing but a falsehood, that shows him and Vitalik have really not bothered to think it through,
if they had, they would have come to the same conclusions I have. N@S is a Lie , and nothing to be concerned with at all.
If you read my detailed posts and it is still unclear, even after Dino agreed with me their is no reward structure for a multistaker and therefore no real point to N@S.  
Well You will just have to code a Multistaker for a PoS coin and try and prove me Wrong. 

 

[dfd1]

Regarding permissionless network. Delegated currencies, like DPoS steemit or DPoW bitcoin, has a potential problem with possible transaction moderation. Pools or witnesses can censor transactions from known annoying persons, and people can vote for these pools or witnesses with their stake or hashrate to exclude annoying person from the network, put assets on hold or even rewrite transactions like it was with ETH. I think good enough solution we can come with is delegated block signing by master nodes and voting for trusted block signers run by an algorithm. Master nodes can form consensus to exclude slow and messy peers from signing, master nodes don't need any approval from stakeholders, with big enough deposit required for master node setup there will be no room for Sybil attack. Optionally, there can be even some penalty to deposit for unhonest signers. It's still delegated PoS without randomness and network reorganisations, so block time can be very short and block size can be huge. Block chain can have 200tb of data and run fine since master nodes rewarded for their service and can afford high speed connection and huge storage. Instead of spending millions to securing network with hashrate there can be an incentive to build decentralized infrastructure for block chain storage, so it can be a network of millions of master nodes with current price people pay to miners.
Since too moral or annoyed master nodes get kicked out by an algorithm for messing with transactions network become provable permissionless. Or network can just kick out voted witnesses until reelection like it's already done in DPoS for network delay, but for transactions delay too.

[kiklo]

Regarding permissionless network. Delegated currencies, like DPoS steemit or DPoW bitcoin, has a potential problem with possible transaction moderation. Pools or witnesses can censor transactions from known annoying persons, and people can vote for these pools or witnesses with their stake or hashrate to exclude annoying person from the network, put assets on hold or even rewrite transactions like it was with ETH. I think good enough solution we can come with is delegated block signing by master nodes and voting for trusted block signers run by an algorithm. Master nodes can form consensus to exclude slow and messy peers from signing, master nodes don't need any approval from stakeholders, with big enough deposit required for master node setup there will be no room for Sybil attack. Optionally, there can be even some penalty to deposit for unhonest signers. It's still delegated PoS without randomness and network reorganisations, so block time can be very short and block size can be huge. Block chain can have 200tb of data and run fine since master nodes rewarded for their service and can afford high speed connection and huge storage. Instead of spending millions to securing network with hashrate there can be an incentive to build decentralized infrastructure for block chain storage, so it can be network of millions of master nodes with current price people pay to miners.
Since too moral or annoyed master nodes get kicked out by an algorithm for messing with transactions network become provable permissionless.

Pet Peeve of mine, that word permissionless is untrue.
All coins are Permissioned.

Here is why PoW is Permissioned, ( mined on a CPU or ASIC)
Facts
Permissions Required to generate a PoW Block if you Mine it
1.  Permission from the ASICS seller , to buy their ASIC.
2.  Permission from your local Govenment to allow the ASIC to be shipped to you.
3   Permission from the Electric Company to power your ASIC.
4.  Permission from the Mining pool you have to join because group mining is your only shot
5.  Permission from your ISP , so you have internet access to attempt to mine it.
6.  Permission from the original programmer thru the Open Source License granted so you can run the software.
If you pay someone else to mine it , You need their permission and acceptance of your currency.

Permissions Required if you just buy it. (Same for PoW & PoS)
1.  Permission from the Exchange
2.  Permission from the Seller

Free Faucet  (Same for PoW & PoS)
1.  Permission from the one running the faucet

Hopefully we can put that falsehood permissioned verses permissionless to rest , because nothing peeves me more that hearing the same lie more than once.
There are No Permissionless systems in crypto.