(I may sound like a Big Blocker here, but actually I'm a Segwit supporter, but not at all costs.)
Me too. I'm also for flexible block sizes that scale accordingly to meet the demands of the network, but within reason, within reasonable technical limits, and based on a reference framework so that there would be less chaos in the network as a whole coming to a consensus on which block size to use. I'd propose adjusting the block size along similar mechanisms as currently employed by the network in adjusting the network difficulty — i.e., adjust the block size once every two weeks based on the demand from the last two weeks. I believe this to be a far safer solution that what Emergent Consensus proposes; Emergent Consensus has the potential to unleash chaos in that different pockets of the network may end up mining different chains because these different pockets came to different consensus regarding block sizes, all before the network as a whole managed to catch up and settle on a universally-accepted block size. Hard forks and chain reorganizations may run rampant in such a case.
Furthermore, I believe that changes to the block size should come
after fixing the many bugs and issues found in the current system, especially that of transaction malleability and the network's current inefficient use of block space. Increasing the block size without fixing these bugs and without optimizing block space usage essentially means amplifying the presence and effects of those bugs, and increasing wasted block space in proportion to useful block space. (In contrast, efficiency improvements to block space usage reduces wasted block space in proportion to useful block space). The net total would essentially be a buggier but bigger block, and a bigger but more wasteful (in terms of storage space) block.
TL;DR: Fix bugs and optimize block space usage
before making changes to block size limits.
I conclude from your answers that nodes have actually some power to guide miners' (& pools') decisions and incentive them to not change the rules, but it is a bit limited because other pools also in most cases fill that role because they have similar incentives to invalidate "rule-breaking" behaviours like the economic nodes. But in situations of polarization between relatively small changes (like Segwit), "economically important nodes' opinion" should matter a bit at least, but it's an "informal" power, not a power granted by the protocol (as far as I understand).
Yup, classic
game theory at work here.
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I'm currently unaware of such a proposal to essentially sabotage the efforts of non-SegWit miners. In any case, I wouldn't call it an "incentive" to get those miners to signal for SegWit; I would call it coercion. Such efforts are to be condemned, pro-SegWit and non-SegWit alike.
Here I've found the proposal. I think the user who proposed it is not a big miner nor a pool operator, but I may be wrong.
Yeah, I haven't yet found any evidence to suggest that he's a large miner or a pool operator or both. Still, anything's possible. He seems to be a developer though, and may have contributed a fair bit to the development of Bitcoin. Nevertheless, even though I am for SegWit and would like to see it activated as soon as possible, I would not support his proposal. It does way more harm than good to the network, and I fully agree with what achow101 said in response to Carlton Banks' proposal:
I highly recommend that you don't do this because it can cause network partitioning, potentially persistent chain forks, and further the polarization of the debate...
Well, here I think "if it's possible, it will happen" and therefore it should be viewed as a legit possibility for nodes to support a softfork proposal and be included in the considerations regarding consensus. But effectively Fibre or any other possibilities for the pools to directly connect one to another would make ineffective these efforts for regular nodes.
Like you said, it's a bit different if a mining pool (or various pools) is using that kind of software - they could actually really do change the incentive structure.
You're right, FIBRE would pretty much render Banks' proposal useless, since the mining pools are essentially in a virtual private network of their own. And yes, if the pools decide to go Banks' route, then FIBRE would essentially become a mirror of what would happen on the main P2P network if his proposal goes mainstream.
The problem is if there is a large proportion of pools acting that way - e.g. all Segwit-supporting pools blocking the BU nodes, and all BU-supporting pools doing the opposite. From my limited understanding that could also possibly lead to a hard fork.
Yup, and it would be a massive problem, since that is essentially an actual hard fork. The two different factions would be mining their respective versions of the blockchain and broadcasting it to the network. SegWit nodes reject the Unlimited blockchain, and Unlimited nodes reject the SegWit blockchain. A hard fork would have occurred at that point.
So actually, all forms of updating the rules without hard fork develop into hard forks if there is no supermajority agreement for the proposal. Then I ask myself, why not simply do the hard fork and give the big blocker side an incentive to agree (e.g. a compromise solution like Segwit2MB?) to get the supermajority?
I ask myself that too. And the more I immerse myself in the Bitcoin community, the clearer and uglier it becomes to me: pride. The two factions have become so resolutely stubborn in their respective beliefs, that they have blinded themselves to the merits in each other's proposals (no matter how beneficial to the network), and more devastatingly, to the damage that they themselves are inflicting on the Bitcoin ecosystem — they refuse to take
any responsibility for their own actions, and instead prefer to blame the other party for any damage that is inflicted on the Bitcoin ecosystem as a result of their actions. They have essentially, in my opinion, reduced themselves to comparing whose dicks are bigger (there are no women in the leading development teams). They are making pathetic fools out of themselves
in front of the entire world, and the response has been
damning, to say the least.
PS: Thanks for the links! It's good to refresh basic knowledge about Bitcoin's consensus sometimes ...
Likewise, d5000.
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