Decrits: The 99%+ attack-proof coin

[AnonyMint]

Responding to a private msg in public. Rudest statements have been redacted.

I have no interest is discussing the technical issues in private. This is open-source.

you have not shown any respect for the ideas I have presented.

I would not be typing in this thread if I did not respect any of your ideas. I specifically complimented you upthread on one of your design wins. Search for "kudos".

MUTE, for example, would require tor-like data duplication to separate transactional data from its source.

I proposed the idea from MUTE that the processing peers would alter transactions in some way while forwarding them, that it would not be obvious if a transaction had been injected by the peer. However, I am not sure if this is possible (and leaning to that it is not). If possible, then thus to insure your injection point is anonymous, you run your own processing peer when you send your transactions.

Perhaps it is sufficient to not alter transactions when forwarding them, and just assume that no one will control all peers communicating with your peer, thus plausible deniability on where a transaction was injected if injected from a forwarding peer THAT YOU CONTROL (unlike Tor where you don't control the injection point peer).

I don't know where your duplication comes from?

I have effectively rendered your line of thinking with MUTE a non-starter for an efficient protocol.

Nope.

On the other hand, with encrypted, MITM-proof connections that require using the currency of the protocol to operate, there is a highly sybil-resistant, highly likely chance that you are not connected to a bunch of peers that are specifically monitoring your activity.

I have no idea what that means. And I am not going to hunt around in a haystack to try to guess what it might mean.

If you are concerned, you can run a tor bridge node and have incoming data from tor that would make it insanely improbable for someone monitoring you to know if a transaction or TB originated from you.

My understanding is that Tor is only as anonymous as you are confident that the injection point is respecting your anonymity. That is horrible because people have to break the law to offer you such injection nodes. That is why I proposed the idea from MUTE above.

Simple anonymity can be gained by utilizing Shadow Peers, as I mentioned in that more recent post.

What ever those are. How many undocumented details do you have in this system?

"Recent post" haystack.

I am not the only one in this thread who has suggested to you that you need to write down your design in a coherent document.

This doesn't even require tor, though it is less insanely improbable that some random peer connected to you is monitoring your activity. It still protects you from your ISP observing you, it still casts a significant amount doubt when you have an active "shadow peer" connection with several other peers, transferring bits of data around, unless whoever is monitoring you controls all of your connections. You should probably include tor if you have need to be that paranoid.

Can't comment because I don't know how your system is designed to work.

"I am pondering I am more comfortable with harddisk-proof-of-share, so we simply allocate what we already own, no need to go invest in a share."

You are investing in hard drive space. There must always be *some kind* of investment involved, or there are many attack vectors. You used an example somewhere with "well maybe Google could attack if they turn their cloud servers against the network", but seriously, have you not heard of the NSA's data center in Utah with all of the conspiracy crap you spout? A yottabyte of storage. Think they're using it all yet?

Why can the NSA afford to have a yottabyte of storage? Because they paid for it with fiat, something anyone outside the network can do to buy a massive amount of hard drives and a massive amount of GPUs or whatever it takes to attack the network. You are quite clear about recognizing this vulnerability in bitcoin, and even recognize it in your own design, but then resort to rationalizing it as "still better than bitcon."

Humanity doesn't own more ASICs than the power elite can readily obtain. Humanity does own more hard drive storage than the power elite can readily obtain.

Well here's the deal: using the currency of the system is infinitely better than either one. There is simply no argument. There is little point in attacking the network if it has no value. If it does have value, then fiat can *not* be used to take control. This is because in the short term, the cost of decrits will increase as the supply is strict, though unbound. Then, as new currency is created, this currency is distributed to users of the network, effectively spreading out the power of your "buy in" across the network. You've lost a lot of fiat buying decrits, and now you've lost a lot of power in decrits as the monetary supply expands to be much greater than it was at the time of purchase, reducing your effective ability to control the network from the inside. Sure they can print more money and buy more, but this will cause a collapse of the fiat currency's value in relation to decrits, at least. This by far the strongest amount of freedom that any choice of security provides. It is inarguable.

This is mathematically incorrect.

1. Dilution of conversion of fiat for decrits can't be total. If it were, no one could buy any share.

2. Debasement of decrits drives the value of decrits down relative to fiat, not vice versa as you claim (if large fiat attempts to buy in).

3. You can't have it both ways, where fiat buyins are significantly diluted yet printing of fiat is greater than printing of decrits.

4. If the total value of fiat is much greater than total value of Decrits (which is likely to always be the case), a relatively smaller percentage debasement of fiat is required to produce a higher percentage debasement of Decrits.

"With Bitcoin there is a penalty for not propagating the consensus, because otherwise you end up doing useless work yourself while you are trying to compute the next solution in a race against all others.

Our alternative designs must incentivize idle peers to propagate the consensus with the most transactions, and penalize those who did not. So far, I don't see how this can be done."

This is a useless discussion point. It all boils down to someone controlling such a vast majority of everything related to the network, just because you want to argue the 99.1% point.

No you've got the whole point inverted on its head-- has nothing to do with a 51% or 99% attack. In bitcoin, every 0.0001% peer has an incentive to propagate the consensus, because their ROI is relative to their hardware investment and not propagating means they may be wasting their hardware resources on calculating a solution that has to be discarded if it is not for the consensus block. I hope you realize that there are sometimes competing blocks in Bitcoin until they are propagated and the first one in time (with the most subsequent blocks) wins.

"Socialism is fail.

Gambling lotteries are an orthogonal service to a decentralized currency. Leave the kitchen sink out of my currency please."

Here is my ultimatum: the major properties of Decrits will not be changed.

The open-source community will decide what gets implemented. You have very little control. Winning arguments is your only control.

Generally speaking the person who demonstrates the ability to lead efficiently, fairly, inclusively, and with clarity of thought and explanation will win the benevolent dictator position.

You almost don't even deserve a reply for calling it "gambling" just because someone used the word "lottery" to describe the currency distribution. Have you read the parts of the thread at all where I talk about how the currency will be distributed? If not, why do you draw such poor conclusions from one block of text?

I admit I refuse to expend time in haystacks; isn't an efficient activity.

http://xkcd.com/979/

The distribution of the currency is key to protecting the currency. You have not yet drawn this connection and are being stubborn for the sake of being stubborn, or you have ulterior motives.

You haven't convinced me it protects anything yet.

"Greater than 6 months is unacceptable to me."

Good for you. I'm not running on your schedule. I am interested in releasing this currency with all of the major points included so that it will be the real, next generation cryptocurrency that is light-years ahead of bitcoin and its clones. And it will have a real chance of either being *the* currency, or at least being the starting point for breaking people free of plutocratic control. Bitcoin won't do that, and proof-of-hard disk doesn't even address it.

You must accept Decrits for what it is: a system that has been 2 years in the making that has meticulously addressed many significant topics in regards to the future of money and cryptocurrency, and doing it all efficiently and in an exceptionally decentralized way. And it was designed by someone at least as smart as you, but with a 2 year head start. Are you willing to have a little faith that I have a big idea here that perhaps you do not understand all of yet, or are you going to remain mucking about in the mud?

Take the chance to be a part of this or leave it. I would prefer if you take the former, but I am not going to spend any more time trying to convince you.

http://xkcd.com/349/
http://xkcd.com/439/
http://xkcd.com/1205/
http://xkcd.com/927/
http://xkcd.com/936/
http://xkcd.com/612/
http://xkcd.com/399/
http://xkcd.com/918/
http://xkcd.com/1169/

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[Etlase2]

I have many subtle ideas that should make it difficult for anyone to peg where transactions or transaction blocks are coming from. I originally had designed it where shareholders were also the connection points, but this is a DoS vulnerability. That is why they are completely separate systems now.

Please describe the DoS vulnerability and your solution.

The DoS vulnerability is having the people who secure the network (SHs) be the same people who distribute the network (now CNPs). To ensure quick propagation of network data, there must be some system for propagating that data. Ad-hoc, like bitcoin, is the worst possible way to do it. It can only result in the longest possible propagation time, and it is easier for the network to become segmented with choke points. But, if SHs and CNPs are the same entity, then there is a direct point of attack against who is providing the network's security via even simple attacks like packet overloading. The solution to this is to make the network data propagators (again, CNPs) completely irrelevant to overall system security, and allow SHs to remain in the background, using CNPs as if they are any other network node.

With some slightly more complex anonymity measures, such as using Shadow Peers or tor as an initial starting point for SHs to distribute their TBs, remaining completely anonymous in terms of IP address->SH public key should be very easy. The same goes for everyday transactions without the need for the MUTE obfuscation and bandwidth overhead requirements.

Humanity owns more hard drive storage than the governments and power elite, and certainly any smaller shark.

Humanity already possesses this asset.

Humanity does not own more money then the power elite.

But I have already addressed for you how it will be difficult for the power elite to obtain any sort of control over the decrits currency. This is linked with its distribution scheme. Buy lots of GPUs/hard disks with fiat? The minting system distributes the vast majority of currency to people other than those minting. Buy lots of decrits on the exchanges? The supply of decrits is very limited at any given point in time (and much less still will be available on exchanges), and this will cause an increasing price that will result in new currency being created and freely distributed among the users of decrits.

Humanity might own more hard drive space than the power elite, but it is silly to believe that a large portion of them are required to waste it to secure the currency. This is a poor design in terms of scalability and it leaves a fledgling network open to attack by anyone with a lot of hard drive space. Additionally, not only does using hard drive space waste resources, it is less wasteful of resources if you scale the design as an intended move to take power over the network. It is much more efficient to run storage arrays than it is personal computers. This gives a significant advantage to an attacker who will do so. Same problem as ASICs. And I believe you mentioned in your proposal that the attack gets easier the more space an attacker controls.

On top of all this, any currency used to take power over the network is locked and cannot be used for anything else that money can be used for. A hard drive is not as useful for trade as a dollar bill or a decrit. So while power over the network may increase for an attacker, he pays a large opportunity cost by no longer having the utility value of decrits. Governments can always print fiat to buy the hard drives, then print more fiat to retain control over the fiat money supply.

As far as I know, this is incorrect. If they don't propagate the consensus then they too are wasting their hardware resources searching for the next solution that might be for the non-consensus block. They have a very selfish reason to cooperate.

Of course a mining pool has an incentive to propagate the consensus. How many mining pools are there again? The intermediate nodes have no incentive though except for altruistic reasons. As the bandwidth load of the network increases, it will become more difficult for people to remain altruistic in these matters, and they will stop transmitting. If they are paid to do this by the network, many more people have the opportunity to be transmitting nodes. It is far more decentralized now and into the far future. And by using a small but significant deposit to be a public transmitting node, it also requires a heavy investment in the currency to attempt to attack this aspect of the network. In bitcoin, a government/ISP can make millions of nodes and get people "hooked" on them, then turn evil and do nefarious things. They cannot do this in decrits unless they also own a very large amount of decrits. And again, this money is locked, so there is a very large opportunity cost in attempting this attack. There is also a pseudo-identity associated with those funds, and clients can choose to ignore them and render that deposit useless from an attacking standpoint. This is not the case when an ISP can just create more IP addresses to fool more people.

I don't understand this. Every peer can't get 50%, because the total would be far in excess of 100%.

Do you mean all peers get a share of the 50% and in that case is that a sufficient incentive and why (given a total analysis of the system, which I can't do because I don't know what the system design is)?

All peers that put a deposit down to become a CNP will receive a weighted portion of that 50%, yes. It is described in section 2. Whether or not it is sufficient is only partially relevant. It scales up with transaction volume, and it is magnitudes better than absolutely no incentive, as is the case with bitcoin. And it is highly sybil-resistant because it requires the currency itself as a deposit, which cannot be printed at will and whatnot. What ends up being "sufficient" depends on what the likelihood is of someone making a directed attack at this portion of the network. This depends on how much it actually costs to run a CNP and how big transaction fees are.

Regardless, there is no p2p system that could ever be as sybil-resistant as this one that is not a copy of this one. There is no design that exists besides this one that can take proof-of-work tokens (decrits) that are in limited supply and use them as the collateral for protecting the network. It costs real and significant amounts of money that can be obtained nowhere else except from within the network, which means anyone attacking the network is at the mercy of those who use the network. The design can only be modified to make it more or less likely as a factor of transaction fees.

How can any other p2p, completely decentralized network compete with this? I believe that there is no design that currently exists that can, and I do not think that there can be anything better than slight modifications to this one in the future. At least presuming the situation of the internet as it roughly exists today.

I don't understand much of what you write about details of your proposal, because you have so many details that have never been succinctly explained in one coherent document.

So ask questions on areas where you are unclear. You have some major catching up to do if you want to be involved in a project that massively reduces the impact of any viable attack vector. Everything has a deep purpose and thought process behind it. Drop some ideas because they are too complex and you begin to tear down the protections of the system. These are not ideas that are all that complex to code, but they are more complex to first invent then explain the reasoning behind each.

I don't have time to wade through pages upon pages of discussion to build up your design in my head. It should be explained in one coherent document.

A wiki will make things easier. But the depth and breadth of all the systems described here can't be explained in one post. It is a leap forward in currency and network design that draws very little from existing systems to compare it to for reference.

Did you forget that we had a discussion upthread about the malicious fork (that excludes transactions) being clearly malicious because it will have less transactions.

You are confusing consensus with transactions. An evil network split can produce as many transactions as it wants--it cannot produce the signatures of honest SHs.

But that is not the point any way. The point is I don't know what is the incentive to propagate "the" consensus. I don't even understand the design well enough to load it in my head.

Everyone's getting paid, yo. It does not preclude the network from all-encompassing attacks, but it makes them orders of magnitude more difficult than any system that currently exists or is proposed.

How, pray tell, do you plan on distributing new currency?

To those who provide resources to keep the system running-- capitalism.

Free money steals from someone.

Then what do you call it when a miner creates a bitcoin for $5 and sells it for $6? Isn't that stealing money from those who are more willing to pay $6 than to pay $5 in mining costs? Because that $1 is "free" money for the miner. Oh wait, you call it capitalism. What about the early adopter who mined a bitcoin for 0.000001 cent and sells it for $260? Is that capitalism too?

You are also under the flawed presumption that some proof-of-wasted-resources is required to secure the network. This notion must be dropped for the sake of sanity. Miners keep the bitcoin network running, presumably your proof of harddisk miners would be little different. While using hard disks would require less electricity, there is still the incentive that "hay if I own more drives, I can make more monehhh!" which results in hard drive shortages and an epic fail waste of resources. Just because the resources may be relatively abundant does not mean they are infinite or free.

Decrits does not require this idiocy to maintain the network. No resources must be expended other than what is required for bandwidth and transaction validation. Minting currency is only a side-bar.

Are you aware of the shortage of ATI graphics cards that bitcon caused in 2011?

To avoid wasting additional resources, a large portion of money is given away because unless you have the pyramidal distribution scheme of bitcoin, the only way for value to enter the system as it is demanded is to waste resources on creating new currency, or to allow for massive bouts of deflation. Both are horrific from the standpoint of any sane currency or respect for mother Earth. However, money is only given away if some resources are being wasted. This is the metric for determining that the price of money is too high. Continuously wasting resources in a rat-race to produce new currency is the epitome of wasted resources. It is horribly inefficient, regardless of proof of work or proof of hard disk.

Now if you give that money away to the decrit-rich, you keep their power firmly entrenched over the system. If you give it away as a result of transaction activity at the lowest levels, money trickles in to the supply where it is being used. Something QE and existing monetary systems have no concept of doing and is the reason why economies do not recover even after billions of dollars have been created from nothing.

There is no stealing in this system. The vast, vast majority of the time this system will be employed to bring fiat or real-world capital value into decrits without having to destroy an equivalent amount of GPU/electricity or hard disk/electricity. In other times, if someone has used fiat to exert some amount of control, or if the money has trickled to the top in such a way that the general population is suffering unemployment and the inability to find food and shelter, more currency can be created to reduce the power of existing monetary holdings. Again, this *could* be done by creating yet another currency, or the currency can be the one true currency where these issues become an afterthought. If the rich know that the people rather than themselves are the source of new money, it is in the rich's best interest to keep the economy sane and not pull any stunts like Wall Street does repeatedly. Giving new money to those who have the hardware or those who have the money concentrates power and does not allow the people to break free of this power without breaking the system. I have devised another way.

There is a high level of economic thought behind the design.

Anonymity isn't free.

It can be cheap though.

And I suspect that will prove that anonymity isn't free, because such a system will be rabidly attacked by the governments. There won't be any plausible denial (or valid legal use case) defense.

Sure there will. People don't want anyone who can associate their account number with them to be able to determine every single purchase they've ever made. That is insanity. Use your account # 123 to pay Amazon, and now Amazon has access to your entire transactional history if you do not use some measures to unhinge this ability. I have also come up with an even better idea in regards to this, but I'll save it for now.

[Etlase2]

On the other hand, with encrypted, MITM-proof connections that require using the currency of the protocol to operate, there is a highly sybil-resistant, highly likely chance that you are not connected to a bunch of peers that are specifically monitoring your activity.

I have no idea what that means. And I am not going to hunt around in a haystack to try to guess what it might mean.

I am not convinced that you understand the properties of MUTE or tor let alone mine, so how can I effectively describe them to you? Do I have to rehash all of the attack vectors that MUTE and tor address for you? *I* don't have time to go over these basic concepts. There are explanations all over the place that you can find for yourself and have explained for you better than I can.

My understanding is that Tor is only as anonymous as you are confident that the injection point is respecting your anonymity. That is horrible because people have to break the law to offer you such injection nodes. That is why I proposed the idea from MUTE above.

You have a very bad understanding of tor. Why do you think tor would be significant at all if it were this simple to break? And why the hell would anyone be breaking the law by operating a tor bridge?

Simple anonymity can be gained by utilizing Shadow Peers, as I mentioned in that more recent post.

What ever those are. How many undocumented details do you have in this system?

It is documented in the very first post. I did not draw all of the conclusions that are possible with the Shadow Peer system because the OP is intended to be a digest. Very keen network engineers would be able to understand it and see the potential anonymity implications of the system. I can't help it if you are not knowledgeable enough to draw those conclusions yourself without help. I am willing to help. But to act as if this is some idea I have just brought on you is ridiculous. It has been in the OP since I made this thread.

This doesn't even require tor, though it is less insanely improbable that some random peer connected to you is monitoring your activity. It still protects you from your ISP observing you, it still casts a significant amount doubt when you have an active "shadow peer" connection with several other peers, transferring bits of data around, unless whoever is monitoring you controls all of your connections. You should probably include tor if you have need to be that paranoid.

Can't comment because I don't know how your system is designed to work.

No, you can't comment because you don't know how networks can be designed to be efficiently anonymous. This is not an area of your expertise.

Humanity doesn't own more ASICs than the power elite can readily obtain. Humanity does own more hard drive storage than the power elite can readily obtain.

Yada yada yada broken record that you assert something to be true which you can really have no conceivable knowledge to be true now or in the future. There is no argument here, only hopes and wishes.

This is mathematically incorrect.

1. Dilution of conversion of fiat for decrits can't be total. If it were, no one could buy any share.

If you are under the very flawed assumption that fiat is the only way to obtain decrits.

2. Debasement of decrits drives the value of decrits down relative to fiat, not vice versa as you claim (if large fiat attempts to buy in).

I don't claim that debasement drives up the value of decrits relative to fiat, I claim that it distributes that value away from the initiating fiat. It heavily reduces the power that fiat can have over the system.

3. You can't have it both ways, where fiat buyins are significantly diluted yet printing of fiat is greater than printing of decrits.

I can, actually, and it is the baked-in design via the distribution of new decrits. A given substantial amount of fiat used to purchase decrits over a short time will not achieve a similar purchasing parity in decrits because the system absorbs fiat in the form of free distribution. This encourages spending and accepting decrits rather than buying and holding/manipulating.

In bitcoin, every 0.0001% peer has an incentive to propagate the consensus, because their ROI is relative to their hardware investment and not propagating means they may be wasting their hardware resources on calculating a solution that has to be discarded if it is not for the consensus block.

You have a major misconception here. The only peers that send mining blocks are the mining pool peers. The miners don't even have a clue as to what is going on and do not need to partake in any network activity whatsoever. They do not even verify the block in any way, shape, or form. So however many mining pools there are is the total number of network peers that are directly incentivized by propagation. Of course the miners want the blocks they were involved in creating to propagate, but they have absolutely no control over it, and have no direct incentive to have any control over it.

I hope you realize that there are sometimes competing blocks in Bitcoin until they are propagated and the first one in time (with the most subsequent blocks) wins.

I hope you come to realize that I have a very advanced level of understanding of the bitcoin protocol.

I admit I refuse to expend time in haystacks; isn't an efficient activity.

You also refuse to even finish reading the OP, so why should I continue bothering if you won't even make the attempt to understand the separate parts of the protocol?

I am sorry if the design of a system that is game-changing in numerous ways is not simple for you to understand. But you have shown some serious misconceptions about bitcoin and tor as well, so perhaps you should replace the quick-to-judge aspect of your online persona with something with a little bit more humility. Or you can go work on proof of hard disk, the choice is yours.

[Anon136]

Potentially thousands/millions of shareholders

you could never get consensus among a million shareholders

[Etlase2]

you could never get consensus among a million shareholders

Oh dear, you have found a fatal, irreparable flaw. I must stop all work and never consider this idea again. Everyone should sell their bitcoins too, because once there are a million users, the system will fail epically and that will be the end. Or does the centralization of bitcoin mining save it from this failure? If 12 nodes is better than a million, perhaps 1 is better than 12?

[rpg]

everyone seems to forget that BTC is a proof of concept beta coin Any other ideas are welcome to build on the initial concept but lets not forget any currency needs to circulate, people need to be paid on the currency and spend it on goods, and now, except for a very few exceptions (i'm only aware of one) that is not the case today. So why not convince a remote island to adopt a crypto currency? But wait, everyone in that island needs to have a computer with a wallet? You're telling me a strong enough solar flare has the capabilities of erasing the wallet contents?

This is where the community should focus IMO before going forward: Build a radiation proof (perhaps USB?) wallet, maybe with a digital display of the coin count  inside, convince some remote islands to accept as their currency, create instant wallet update terminals for those that don't have a computer Just my opinion

[Anon136]

you could never get consensus among a million shareholders

Oh dear, you have found a fatal, irreparable flaw. I must stop all work and never consider this idea again. Everyone should sell their bitcoins too, because once there are a million users, the system will fail epically and that will be the end. Or does the centralization of bitcoin mining save it from this failure? If 12 nodes is better than a million, perhaps 1 is better than 12?

ok mister smarty pants i know im not smart enough to prove that your concept wont work but how about lets have a discussion. Maybe you can help me translate some of this into English.

Let me start by seeing if i have the idea of what you are trying to do right. The basic idea is that we build something very similar to bitcoin, which is a distributed accounting ledger, except we replace the proof of work system with a system where by people pay a 1 time fee to purchase the right to mint new blocks and in doing so purchase the right to mint new coin into circulation to their own account in the ledger with the blocks that they publish (like bitcoin in that respect). The advantage here being that you get the people who are minting new blocks to be distributed all over the world (no points of failure) with out the need for anyone to waste vast amounts of physical resources on huge computational infrastructure.

ok so if you dont mind, lets start with you correcting anything that i got wrong in that previous paragraph.

[AnonyMint]

Anonymity isn't free.

It can be cheap though.

The government will not allow fiat to be converted into an anonymous system. You can't make it so cheap to do so, else the system will be walled off from fiat. And thus the system will fail in the free market. PERIOD.

And I suspect that will prove that anonymity isn't free, because such a system will be rabidly attacked by the governments. There won't be any plausible denial (or valid legal use case) defense.

Sure there will. People don't want anyone who can associate their account number with them to be able to determine every single purchase they've ever made. That is insanity. Use your account # 123 to pay Amazon, and now Amazon has access to your entire transactional history if you do not use some measures to unhinge this ability. I have also come up with an even better idea in regards to this, but I'll save it for now.

Anonymity of transactions is not the same as subverting AML laws. The minting is currently exempted from AML laws, and thus it an important way of avoiding them. That was my point.

I have many subtle ideas that should make it difficult for anyone to peg where transactions or transaction blocks are coming from. I originally had designed it where shareholders were also the connection points, but this is a DoS vulnerability. That is why they are completely separate systems now.

Please describe the DoS vulnerability and your solution.

The DoS vulnerability is having the people who secure the network (SHs) be the same people who distribute the network (now CNPs). To ensure quick propagation of network data, there must be some system for propagating that data. Ad-hoc, like bitcoin, is the worst possible way to do it. It can only result in the longest possible propagation time, and it is easier for the network to become segmented with choke points.

Please provide a proof of (or at least evidence supporting) this assertion.

The mining peers in Bitcoin have an incentive to propagate as efficiently as they can, because otherwise they are doing useless work and destroying their ROI on their hardware investment. This economic incentive is much more dynamically powerful than any adhoc, static, top-down architected propagation because the mining peers will adjust to conditions and try to find clever ways to optimize propagation.

But, if SHs and CNPs are the same entity, then there is a direct point of attack against who is providing the network's security via even simple attacks like packet overloading. The solution to this is to make the network data propagators (again, CNPs) completely irrelevant to overall system security, and allow SHs to remain in the background, using CNPs as if they are any other network node.

I don't understand what prevents DoS from overloading the CNPs or any communication node in the system?

My understanding is that the key to squelching DoS is to have make it very inefficient to achieve DoS. With Bitcoin, it is nearly impossible to DoS the winning peer because you don't know who is the winning peer until it has already been propagated, and it is unrealistic to DoS all the mining peers. K.I.S.S.

With some slightly more complex anonymity measures, such as using Shadow Peers or tor as an initial starting point for SHs to distribute their TBs, remaining completely anonymous in terms of IP address->SH public key should be very easy. The same goes for everyday transactions without the need for the MUTE obfuscation and bandwidth overhead requirements.

How do we trust the Shadow Peers or the injection peers for Tor?

A robustly designed system must assume any peer can be a trojan.

Humanity owns more hard drive storage than the governments and power elite, and certainly any smaller shark.

Humanity already possesses this asset.

Humanity does not own more money then the power elite.

But I have already addressed for you how it will be difficult for the power elite to obtain any sort of control over the decrits currency. This is linked with its distribution scheme.

As far as I know, I have refuted it, c.f. the next post.

Buy lots of GPUs/hard disks with fiat? The minting system distributes the vast majority of currency to people other than those minting. Buy lots of decrits on the exchanges? The supply of decrits is very limited at any given point in time (and much less still will be available on exchanges), and this will cause an increasing price that will result in new currency being created and freely distributed among the users of decrits.

Buying a currency gives it away for free to existing holders of the currency? I will never support such a system of socialism; neither will any free market.

If I don't understand, then please feel free to explain more.

Humanity might own more hard drive space than the power elite, but it is silly to believe that a large portion of them are required to waste it to secure the currency.

Most of the storage space on $50 my terabyte hard drive is unused. I would expect similarly for most desktops these days.

I also thought we might be able to store real data there, and use to create a decentralized cloud storage. After all, we simply want them to prove they have the asset, in return for a share of the minting.

This is a poor design in terms of scalability and it leaves a fledgling network open to attack by anyone with a lot of hard drive space.

We've already agreed upthread that such a network is resistant against the 99+% attack. Only a 100% attack can in theory stop all transactions.

Humanity has too much hard drive storage, no evil entity can get 100% of it.

Additionally, not only does using hard drive space waste resources, it is less wasteful of resources if you scale the design as an intended move to take power over the network. It is much more efficient to run storage arrays than it is personal computers. This gives a significant advantage to an attacker who will do so. Same problem as ASICs.

It is not the same threat vector at all to ASICs and Bitcoin, for numerous reasons not the least of that Bitcoin is subject to a 51% attack. We had these discussions already upthread.

I am not at all worried about the threat of attack based on control over large # of peers, with either proof of share or proof of hard disk, because we already realized that both are impervious to the 99+% attack.

I am more concerned now about the economics. Proof of share appears to be socialism.

The PC is not less efficient than the mainframe. Decentralization yields degrees-of-freedom and flexibility and the ability to do more than one thing at a time. This outflanks efficiencies-of-scale (i.e. mass).

On top of all this, any currency used to take power over the network is locked and cannot be used for anything else that money can be used for. A hard drive is not as useful for trade as a dollar bill or a decrit. So while power over the network may increase for an attacker, he pays a large opportunity cost by no longer having the utility value of decrits. Governments can always print fiat to buy the hard drives, then print more fiat to retain control over the fiat money supply.

You assume that Decrits are more difficult to obtain with fiat than hard disks are. I question this assumption, because as I explained it doesn't make any sense mathematically, c.f. my next post. If indeed you suceed in making Decrits hard to obtain with fiat, you kill Decrits in the free market, because you've made it some kind of "give away my money" system.

If I am missing some aspect of the design, then explain and refute.

As far as I know, this is incorrect. If they don't propagate the consensus then they too are wasting their hardware resources searching for the next solution that might be for the non-consensus block. They have a very selfish reason to cooperate.

Of course a mining pool has an incentive to propagate the consensus. How many mining pools are there again? The intermediate nodes have no incentive though except for altruistic reasons.

Wrong. My understanding is if they don't propagate, then the entire pool will suffer and that mining pool will under perform, thus their share will suffer too.

As the bandwidth load of the network increases, it will become more difficult for people to remain altruistic in these matters, and they will stop transmitting. If they are paid to do this by the network,

They are paid by the minted coins. They have an incentive to do so, else they can't get minted coins. If the bandwidth rises, less peers will participate and thus difficulty will decrease until the ROI is sufficient.

Seems you don't understand very well Bitcoin's fundamentals.

many more people have the opportunity to be transmitting nodes. It is far more decentralized now and into the far future. And by using a small but significant deposit to be a public transmitting node, it also requires a heavy investment in the currency to attempt to attack this aspect of the network. In bitcoin, a government/ISP can make millions of nodes and get people "hooked" on them, then turn evil and do nefarious things. They cannot do this in decrits unless they also own a very large amount of decrits.

You are conflating differences. Agreed the 99+% attack improvement over Bitcoin is a plus, as we agreed upthread. Disagree that you've clearly shown how Bitcoin is more centralized.

And again, this money is locked, so there is a very large opportunity cost in attempting this attack. There is also a pseudo-identity associated with those funds, and clients can choose to ignore them and render that deposit useless from an attacking standpoint. This is not the case when an ISP can just create more IP addresses to fool more people.

Again I disagree with your economic assumptions about advantages of Decrits, c.f. above and next post.

Do you mean all peers get a share of the 50% and in that case is that a sufficient incentive and why (given a total analysis of the system, which I can't do because I don't know what the system design is)?

All peers that put a deposit down to become a CNP will receive a weighted portion of that 50%, yes. It is described in section 2. Whether or not it is sufficient is only partially relevant. It scales up with transaction volume, and it is magnitudes better than absolutely no incentive, as is the case with bitcoin.

In bitcoin the minting incentive scales with difficult and economics automatically. The problem with Bitcoin is the 51% attack vector and that minting stops in 2034.

And it is highly sybil-resistant because it requires the currency itself as a deposit, which cannot be printed at will and whatnot.

You depend on not making fiat convertible to Decrits then, c.f. next post there is no mathematical way around it.

As I told you from the beginning of my participation in this thread, you can't create a walled garden. Coase's theorem says the free market will route around you the obstruction as if it is a disease.

What ends up being "sufficient" depends on what the likelihood is of someone making a directed attack at this portion of the network. This depends on how much it actually costs to run a CNP and how big transaction fees are.

Regardless, there is no p2p system that could ever be as sybil-resistant as this one that is not a copy of this one. There is no design that exists besides this one that can take proof-of-work tokens (decrits) that are in limited supply and use them as the collateral for protecting the network. It costs real and significant amounts of money that can be obtained nowhere else except from within the network, which means anyone attacking the network is at the mercy of those who use the network. The design can only be modified to make it more or less likely as a factor of transaction fees.

How can any other p2p, completely decentralized network compete with this? I believe that there is no design that currently exists that can, and I do not think that there can be anything better than slight modifications to this one in the future. At least presuming the situation of the internet as it roughly exists today.

If we separate the economic assumption that fiat is not readily convertible to Decrits, then the above quoted comment can be seen as an architectural point, then please see my reply above where I said Bitcoin dynamically adjusts to attacks because the peers have an economic incentive to propagate and protect their ROI.

I don't understand much of what you write about details of your proposal, because you have so many details that have never been succinctly explained in one coherent document.

So ask questions on areas where you are unclear.

I don't know enough to ask questions, because your CNPs and Shadows etc design is completely opaque to me. No where have I see a concise, comprehensive, coherent explanation. If there is, point me to it.

You have some major catching up to do if you want to be involved in a project that massively reduces the impact of any viable attack vector. Everything has a deep purpose and thought process behind it. Drop some ideas because they are too complex and you begin to tear down the protections of the system. These are not ideas that are all that complex to code, but they are more complex to first invent then explain the reasoning behind each.

You expend too much verbiage talking about how we should just trust your omniscience and too little verbiage on explaining the specifics of your design in a concise, coherent document.

I don't trust you as I don't trust everyone. I have proven to myself numerous times in life that most people (including myself) make a lot of big mistakes, especially when they don't communicate well and test their thinking against other peer review.

I don't have time to wade through pages upon pages of discussion to build up your design in my head. It should be explained in one coherent document.

A wiki will make things easier. But the depth and breadth of all the systems described here can't be explained in one post. It is a leap forward in currency and network design that draws very little from existing systems to compare it to for reference.

Ah the "it is too advanced to explain" excuse. I have seen a lot of BS in my 30 years of programming. "TALK IS CHEAP, SHOW ME THE CODE"-- Linus Torvalds. At least show me the concise, coherent details sufficient to have a peer review.

Did you forget that we had a discussion upthread about the malicious fork (that excludes transactions) being clearly malicious because it will have less transactions.

You are confusing consensus with transactions. An evil network split can produce as many transactions as it wants--it cannot produce the signatures of honest SHs.

You are confused. The good branch will include all the evil transactions to prove it is the good branch by having the most transactions. You've forgotten what we agreed to upthread!

If you are going to forget key points of agreement then how can I trust that you have this very apparently (who knows?) complex nondescribed design correct.

But that is not the point any way. The point is I don't know what is the incentive to propagate "the" consensus. I don't even understand the design well enough to load it in my head.

Everyone's getting paid, yo. It does not preclude the network from all-encompassing attacks, but it makes them orders of magnitude more difficult than any system that currently exists or is proposed.

I am not clear on the design of the propagation and payment scheme. So I can't compare to Bitcoin.

I understand you plan to distribute 50% of tx fees to peers who participate, but it is not clear how this is proven and thus what the incentive is to propagate widely or narrowly and otherwise how that can be gamed. The devil is in the details.

How, pray tell, do you plan on distributing new currency?

To those who provide resources to keep the system running-- capitalism.

Free money steals from someone.

Then what do you call it when a miner creates a bitcoin for $5 and sells it for $6? Isn't that stealing money from those who are more willing to pay $6 than to pay $5 in mining costs? Because that $1 is "free" money for the miner. Oh wait, you call it capitalism. What about the early adopter who mined a bitcoin for 0.000001 cent and sells it for $260? Is that capitalism too?

If (?) you are a socialist pig (?), thus you will never succeed. Go on twirling your thumbs for another 2 years.

That is called risk and ROI.

Additionally, the difficulty is always scaling, they are not guaranteed a profit. They have to supply their knowledge to the network and compete cleverly in terms of their decisions on which hardware, how much, etc..

You are also under the flawed presumption that some proof-of-wasted-resources is required to secure the network. This notion must be dropped for the sake of sanity. Miners keep the bitcoin network running, presumably your proof of harddisk miners would be little different. While using hard disks would require less electricity, there is still the incentive that "hay if I own more drives, I can make more monehhh!" which results in hard drive shortages and an epic fail waste of resources. Just because the resources may be relatively abundant does not mean they are infinite or free.

We can use that hard disk storage for cloud storage. No waste.

To avoid wasting additional resources, a large portion of money is given away because unless you have the pyramidal distribution scheme of bitcoin, the only way for value to enter the system as it is demanded is to waste resources on creating new currency, or to allow for massive bouts of deflation. Both are horrific from the standpoint of any sane currency or respect for mother Earth. However, money is only given away if some resources are being wasted. This is the metric for determining that the price of money is too high.

I don't trust your mumbo-jumbo (can't even understand how you plan to accomplish whatever the above really means). I can already see you have some socialist fantasies about economics.

Now if you give that money away to the decrit-rich, you keep their power firmly entrenched over the system. If you give it away as a result of transaction activity at the lowest levels, money trickles in to the supply where it is being used. Something QE and existing monetary systems have no concept of doing and is the reason why economies do not recover even after billions of dollars have been created from nothing.

You are referring to some scheme to give away money for free so some others?

or if the money has trickled to the top in such a way that the general population is suffering

Ah socialism! NO way Jose!

Money only trickles back down when there is a technology that enables individuals to produce more than top-down capital can. Redistribution schemes don't reward production and are socialist failure.

[Etlase2]

ok mister smarty pants i know im not smart enough to prove that your concept wont work but how about lets have a discussion. Maybe you can help me translate some of this into English.

It is totally acceptable to be skeptical. But your argument is that true decentralization is impossible, mostly because you are familiar with the centralized-decentralized idea of bitcoin. Everyone roughly agrees on the state of the network based on what a very few (mining pools) provide as the correct state of the network. The decrits consensus system provides a platform that can scale to not the tens, but to the millions that have input on how that consensus is formed. It isn't a matter of hashing power, it's a matter of investing in the network with the currency of the network. As long as it is hard to acquire that currency, the effectiveness is the same as or much better than acquiring GPUs or whatever--except that energy is not required to provide security.

Let me start by seeing if i have the idea of what you are trying to do right. The basic idea is that we build something very similar to bitcoin, which is a distributed accounting ledger, except we replace the proof of work system with a system where by people pay a 1 time fee to purchase the right to mint new blocks and in doing so purchase the right to mint new coin into circulation to their own account in the ledger with the blocks that they publish (like bitcoin in that respect).

The security system and the coin creation system are separate. Purchasing a share does not give you the ability to create coins, it only gives you a portion of the transaction fees taken by the network. Coin creation is still based on providing proof-of-wasted-resources via GPU mining. The coin creation system is not designed to run continuously, only when the price of a decrit exceeds its cost to produce (or it is more valuable to produce compared to the basket of commodities it is compared against). This is a very different design from bitcoin.

Shares secure the network because people are putting currency of the network on the line to protect the network. This money can be destroyed if you do something malicious. GPUs, hard drives, and other resources that are derived from anything other than the network currency can not be controlled by the network; they cannot be destroyed, which means they can be repeatedly used to attack the network. Destroying currency is a *powerful* and painful and permanent disincentive for attacking the security of the network. Otherwise if you are a big government that has 50% control and says "use only account numbers we approve that have been ID-verified or we will not approve these transactions" the best you can do is frequently delay transactions by 10-60 seconds. Is the US government going to be able to make the guy in Zimbabwe signing his transaction block from his cell phone deny non-US government approved transactions when his shareholder window comes up?

That is why massive decentralization is important. Fuck government control. The guy in Zimbabwe has a cell phone. He doesn't have a PC or easy access to one. He alone can completely thwart the ability of an entire government from exerting real control over the currency by simply ignoring what they want. This can only be relevant if being a shareholder is accessible to a wide array of people. The technical difficulties of achieving this kind consensus are resolved by this proposal. True decentralization.

To continue this true decentralization, the creation of money in response to demand must be accessible to that same, wide array of people. This is accomplished by giving away free money to transaction activity when there are people using GPUs to mint currency. No longer is *any* kind of hardware required to partake in the profit of an expanding network. Value has to be transferred from fiat or other commodities somehow. Like I recently said to AnonyMint, basing this around some kind of propensity to have computer hardware neglects a vast majority of the world economy that does not give a damn about nerdcurrency. There needs to be a clear path for how it can benefit them, not just the people who came before them. Price volatility is a critical flaw that halts adoption. The entropy of random transaction activity combined with the difficulty and relatively low overall profitability of creating new currency (described in other posts in this thread) allows for a system that can actually be beneficial for everyone while disincentivizing and often preventing over-production based on simple network metrics.

You're not really shaking things up when all you can do is buy drugs, fiat, or alpaca socks with your commodity money. I think many bitcoiners would be much happier with the system if its price were lower, but many more goods and services were available for it. This requires a currency that does not require PoW for security, and has a separate coin creation system that can respond to demand.

The advantage here being that you get the people who are minting new blocks to be distributed all over the world (no points of failure) with out the need for anyone to waste vast amounts of physical resources on huge computational infrastructure.

Well, you are still combining coin creation with security. Minting is only incentivized during periods of higher demand. The security of the network is unaffected by this; it is only affected by the amount of transaction fees paid by the network. In effect, the security of the network is controlled *by the people* as they create on-network transactions. In doing so, they are incentivizing presumably honest people (if honest people are the majority of people) to become shareholders or network propagators. The more honest people securing the network, the proportionally more money evil people must waste in attempting to control the network.

[AnonyMint]

My understanding is that Tor is only as anonymous as you are confident that the injection point is respecting your anonymity. That is horrible because people have to break the law to offer you such injection nodes. That is why I proposed the idea from MUTE above.

You have a very bad understanding of tor. Why do you think tor would be significant at all if it were this simple to break? And why the hell would anyone be breaking the law by operating a tor bridge?

Do you deny that I must trust the Tor bridge not to reveal my IP address? There is absolutely no way for me to ever be sure if a bridge is recording my IP address or not.

If a Tor brigde is used to obscure illegal activities, then it is illegal. These entities running Tor bridges are incurring a huge risk to their legal standing.

For now the government is not attacking because Tor is not widely used. The worst thing the government could do is draw more attention to it, causing more people to use it. But if you design a currency with this weakness and it is widely used, the power elite will fight back.

Simple anonymity can be gained by utilizing Shadow Peers, as I mentioned in that more recent post.

What ever those are. How many undocumented details do you have in this system?

It is documented in the very first post. I did not draw all of the conclusions that are possible with the Shadow Peer system because the OP is intended to be a digest. Very keen network engineers would be able to understand it and see the potential anonymity implications of the system.

Who are these "very keen" people that can read your mind? Can you identify even one of them here in this forum?

I can't help it if you are not knowledgeable enough to draw those conclusions yourself without help. I am willing to help. But to act as if this is some idea I have just brought on you is ridiculous. It has been in the OP since I made this thread.

Insulting me (and let's not repeat what you wrote to me in private) because you are incapable of writing down your design. Nice strategy for illiciting public trust in your leadership abilities.

This doesn't even require tor, though it is less insanely improbable that some random peer connected to you is monitoring your activity. It still protects you from your ISP observing you, it still casts a significant amount doubt when you have an active "shadow peer" connection with several other peers, transferring bits of data around, unless whoever is monitoring you controls all of your connections. You should probably include tor if you have need to be that paranoid.

Can't comment because I don't know how your system is designed to work.

No, you can't comment because you don't know how networks can be designed to be efficiently anonymous. This is not an area of your expertise.

Make a citation then to prove your claim that I am suffering from canonical ignorance.

Humanity doesn't own more ASICs than the power elite can readily obtain. Humanity does own more hard drive storage than the power elite can readily obtain.

Yada yada yada broken record that you assert something to be true which you can really have no conceivable knowledge to be true now or in the future. There is no argument here, only hopes and wishes.

Amazing that you think that an evil entity can obtain 100% of the hard drives. Perhaps you forgot that we are designing a system that is 99+% resistant to attack.

You conflate this with the 51% attack available in Bitcoin.

Then you insult me due to your ignorance of the key difference (99+% vs. 51%) in your own design (and also my hard disk design) relative to Bitcoin.

This is mathematically incorrect.

1. Dilution of conversion of fiat for decrits can't be total. If it were, no one could buy any share.

If you are under the very flawed assumption that fiat is the only way to obtain decrits.

My statement made no such assumption. You are often conflating orthogonal issues.

2. Debasement of decrits drives the value of decrits down relative to fiat, not vice versa as you claim (if large fiat attempts to buy in).

I don't claim that debasement drives up the value of decrits relative to fiat, I claim that it distributes that value away from the initiating fiat. It heavily reduces the power that fiat can have over the system.

If fiat obtains any value in conversion for Decrits, and if fiat is not declining in value relative to Decrits as a result of converting for Decrits, then the new owners are also gaining share of the system and thus the probabilities of receiving any of your free redistributions of Decrits.

You forget to address point #4:

4. If the total value of fiat is much greater than total value of Decrits (which is likely to always be the case), a relatively smaller percentage debasement of fiat is required to produce a higher percentage debasement of Decrits.

3. You can't have it both ways, where fiat buyins are significantly diluted yet printing of fiat is greater than printing of decrits.

I can, actually, and it is the baked-in design via the distribution of new decrits. A given substantial amount of fiat used to purchase decrits over a short time will not achieve a similar purchasing parity in decrits because the system absorbs fiat in the form of free distribution. This encourages spending and accepting decrits rather than buying and holding/manipulating.

If you are diluting Decrits, then the purchasing power of fiat will rise relative to Decrits, so the fiat holder can buy more and more Decrits.

Sorry you have a mathematical logic fail, and it appears to be motivated by your socialist fantasy.

In bitcoin, every 0.0001% peer has an incentive to propagate the consensus, because their ROI is relative to their hardware investment and not propagating means they may be wasting their hardware resources on calculating a solution that has to be discarded if it is not for the consensus block.

You have a major misconception here. The only peers that send mining blocks are the mining pool peers. The miners don't even have a clue as to what is going on and do not need to partake in any network activity whatsoever.

Nonsense. Every peer has to communicate when it computes a solution to the next block and it has to receive the solution to the next block from the other peers. You are arguing that pools choose to route this communication through the pool central node. This is not the only way it can be done, there are decentralized pools (or ideas for them). But that isn't the point any way, the peers choose to participate in the pool, because the pool propagates as expected. If the propagation isn't being done, the peers will leave the pool. Duh!

They do not even verify the block in any way, shape, or form. So however many mining pools there are is the total number of network peers that are directly incentivized by propagation. Of course the miners want the blocks they were involved in creating to propagate, but they have absolutely no control over it, and have no direct incentive to have any control over it.

Of course they have control. They can leave the damn underperforming pool.

I hope you realize that there are sometimes competing blocks in Bitcoin until they are propagated and the first one in time (with the most subsequent blocks) wins.

I hope you come to realize that I have a very advanced level of understanding of the bitcoin protocol.

I have come to realize your opinion of yourself is higher than reality.

I admit I refuse to expend time in haystacks; isn't an efficient activity.

You also refuse to even finish reading the OP, so why should I continue bothering if you won't even make the attempt to understand the separate parts of the protocol?

I have tried to read the latter 2 sections of the OP and they make no sense because they don't contain any details. The details are critical for example see my prior post and where I mentioned the gaming of the distribution of the tx fees.

I am sorry if the design of a system that is game-changing in numerous ways is not simple for you to understand. But you have shown some serious misconceptions about bitcoin and tor as well, so perhaps you should replace the quick-to-judge aspect of your online persona with something with a little bit more humility. Or you can go work on proof of hard disk, the choice is yours.

Blah, blah, blah.

[AnonyMint]

But your argument is that true decentralization is impossible, mostly because you are familiar with the centralized-decentralized idea of bitcoin. Everyone roughly agrees on the state of the network based on what a very few (mining pools) provide as the correct state of the network. The decrits consensus system provides a platform that can scale to not the tens, but to the millions that have input on how that consensus is formed. It isn't a matter of hashing power, it's a matter of investing in the network with the currency of the network. As long as it is hard to acquire that currency, the effectiveness is the same as or much better than acquiring GPUs or whatever--except that energy is not required to provide security.

Ignoring that funding for minting stops in 2034 for Bitcoin, the remaining key difference between Bitcoin and a consensus system (regardless whether it is uses proof-of-share or proof-of-hard disk), is 51% versus 99+% attack vulnerabilities.

The key innovation is that (in theory) transactions will still be processed even if an evil entity has 51% or even 99% of the peers.

Also we can probably eliminate the 10 minute transaction delay in Bitcoin, which is a big win.

Also in Bitcoin, a cartel could drive the difficulty up without controlling 100% of peers, such that the other peers become unprofitable, thus driving the other peers bankrupt. The cartel may have more capital to sacrifice than the other peers have time to remain solvent. In theory, a cartel could do the same in a consensus system where every peer is guaranteed a turn, by flooding the # of peers and thus diluting the share of earnings from tx fees (or minting for proof of hard disk). But at least most of us have a hard disk to offer and we can be our own peer, when we want to send our own transaction, thus the 99+% resistant benefit. And we decided upthread to make sure all peers get a turn within a reasonable CB period, so that transaction delays can't be excessive when under attack.

The unresolved issue is the mechanism for applying the incentive for propagation of the TB in the consensus system. In Bitcoin, this propagation is elegantly motivated by selfish economics and there is no way to game it. We have to prove that we have a solution for a consensus system that can't be gamed.

Coin creation is still based on providing proof-of-wasted-resources via GPU mining.

So no different than Bitcoin w.r.t. to who can buy GPUs+ASICs to participate in minting.

With proof of hard disk space, everyone already has some.

The coin creation system is not designed to run continuously, only when the price of a decrit exceeds its cost to produce (or it is more valuable to produce compared to the basket of commodities it is compared against). This is a very different design from bitcoin.

Details please? How can you maintain the hash solution difficulty at the intended effect?

Shares secure the network because people are putting currency of the network on the line to protect the network. This money can be destroyed if you do something malicious. GPUs, hard drives, and other resources that are derived from anything other than the network currency can not be controlled by the network; they cannot be destroyed, which means they can be repeatedly used to attack the network. Destroying currency is a *powerful* and painful and permanent disincentive for attacking the security of the network.

This is ALMOST a valid point.

It stands orthogonally to your (apparently socialist) ideas of currency redistribution, except that an attacker could in theory buy up Decrits and cause deflation by destroying the money, unless you have offsetting debasement. However, your proposed offsetting debasement can't be total, else there is no conversion from fiat to Decrits as I explained in my prior post. Thus the disadvantage of this penalty is that it can be deflationary.

And the other disadvantage is that if you do debase to minimize deflationary impact, then it means that obtaining share is not capitalism.

So the final conclusion is you really can't destroy what you think you can, unless you destroy capitalism and then of course the system won't function in the free market.

So sorry this point is invalid in the total analysis.

This is accomplished by giving away free money to transaction activity when there are people using GPUs to mint currency. No longer is *any* kind of hardware required to partake in the profit of an expanding network.

Socialism. Fail.

Value has to be transferred from fiat or other commodities somehow. Like I recently said to AnonyMint, basing this around some kind of propensity to have computer hardware neglects a vast majority of the world economy that does not give a damn about nerdcurrency. There needs to be a clear path for how it can benefit them, not just the people who came before them. Price volatility is a critical flaw that halts adoption. The entropy of random transaction activity combined with the difficulty and relatively low overall profitability of creating new currency (described in other posts in this thread) allows for a system that can actually be beneficial for everyone while disincentivizing and often preventing over-production based on simple network metrics.

People love to adopt something that is a free giveaway, but socialism always fails, because it isn't a meritocracy w.r.t. to productivity.

You're not really shaking things up when all you can do is buy drugs, fiat, or alpaca socks with your commodity money. I think many bitcoiners would be much happier with the system if its price were lower, but many more goods and services were available for it. This requires a currency that does not require PoW for security, and has a separate coin creation system that can respond to demand.

The price of a coin has nothing to do with it. It is the price volatility that is the main issue. And it is a chicken-egg dilemma, in that price volatility won't decline until real transactions swamp speculation.

You don't get around this with socialism, which is failure because capital will run away. You get around it by making minting more accessible, so more people own the currency. Thus proof of hard disk.

Increase participation via capitalism not socialism.

The fact that human desire for debt outstrips the supply of savings, thus there will always be demand for fractional reserve (fiat) systems to lie to ourselves. But this does not justify using socialism as a solution, or that it is superior to capitalism.

The only thing that effectively trickles capital back down to the masses, is technology that makes the masses individually more productive than top-down capital can produce.

I discussed this extensively recently in the following linked blog:

http://esr.ibiblio.org/?p=4946&cpage=1#comment-402684
http://esr.ibiblio.org/?p=4946&cpage=1#comment-401450
http://esr.ibiblio.org/?p=4946&cpage=1#comment-401478
http://esr.ibiblio.org/?p=4946&cpage=1#comment-401496
http://esr.ibiblio.org/?p=4946&cpage=1#comment-401510

[aaaxn]

Etlase, you are going to create wiki or just start discussion from start every time new person comes to your thread?

[Etlase2]

Please provide a proof of (or at least evidence supporting) this assertion.

The mining peers in Bitcoin have an incentive to propagate as efficiently as they can, because otherwise they are doing useless work and destroying their ROI on their hardware investment. This economic incentive is much more dynamically powerful than any adhoc, static, top-down architected propagation because the mining peers will adjust to conditions and try to find clever ways to optimize propagation.

The mining pools have incentive to propagate to each other and that's about it. All bitcoin non-mining nodes could be just fine by connecting to 1 or 2 mining pools for its view of the network. The mining peers have no say in what transactions are included, and are not relevant when it comes to propagating the winning blocks. Why even bother with propagation nodes when the view of the network comes entirely from a small subset of mining farms or pools?

I don't understand what prevents DoS from overloading the CNPs or any communication node in the system?

Nothing, but it isn't a critical attack vector. Presuming propagation nodes are incentivized like in decrits, there will be many of them--decentralization. If there are 100k SHs, there might be 500k CNPs. How many of those can you DoS? How often have bitcoin pools been DoSed in its short history?

My understanding is that the key to squelching DoS is to have make it very inefficient to achieve DoS. With Bitcoin, it is nearly impossible to DoS the winning peer because you don't know who is the winning peer until it has already been propagated, and it is unrealistic to DoS all the mining peers. K.I.S.S.

Mining peers themselves are DoSed when the mining pool is DoSed. They can no longer mine and this reduces network security and increases transaction times. You have not passed your bitcoin history course. Only the pools have to be DoSed, not the peers. This is a significant vulnerability.

How do we trust the Shadow Peers or the injection peers for Tor?

A robustly designed system must assume any peer can be a trojan.

Tor does not have "injection peers". Using onion addresses, data is encrypted from end to end, and unlinked via the hops in between. It is not an absolutely perfect system, but it is designed for low-latency and it is going to be better than anything that can be layered on top of a currency protocol. There is no point in reinventing the wheel, unless maybe you have some notion that the wheel is illegal to use.

You don't have to trust the shadow peers, you just have maintain some level of incoming/outgoing network activity so that an outside observer must control all of the nodes you are connected to to determine with accuracy any transactions you have created. As long as there is some node that isn't controlled by the monitor that you maintain activity with, they cannot prove that you created a transaction because all of the connections are encrypted (this is not the case with bitcoin currently). If you are worried still, again the solution is to relay some Tor data, to which anyone monitoring you cannot be sure if the tx activity was sent to you in that data or if it was just random noise and you created a transaction.

There are only so many things that can be done here without vastly changing network dynamics to be less efficient. Bitcoin provides very little in the way of transaction association security without being forced to use tor. And the tor support is very sketchy. That is not to say that bitcoin could not be adapted to have better transactional anonymity, but the ideas are not even given much merit at this point.

Buying a currency gives it away for free to existing holders of the currency? I will never support such a system of socialism; neither will any free market.

But lol this is exactly what bitcoin does, and you must resolve this issue too with proof of hard disk. Bitcoin early adopters get value for nothing. I don't think you deny this. Instead of limiting the profitability to those early adopters, decrits proposes to spread out this profitability via transaction activity to incentivize a much greater number of people and to provide commodity price stability. You have not answered how you propose to solve this problem. Is it vast bouts of deflation that are only assuaged by a 2% money supply increase per year? (vaguely based on some things you have said) 2%? I don't want to go off on a tangent debating a position you may or may not have espoused. However, as of yet you have not given me one to debate, you have only derided mine. When are you going to respond to this question? This is a dishonest line of argumentation on your part until you do.

This is a poor design in terms of scalability and it leaves a fledgling network open to attack by anyone with a lot of hard drive space.

We've already agreed upthread that such a network is resistant against the 99+% attack. Only a 100% attack can in theory stop all transactions.

We've agreed that my proof of consensus is, there has been no such agreement in regards to proof of hard disk. I have shown that it requires an exponential amount of currency of the network to embark on a 90+% attack. Your paper only shows that this attack becomes easier the more resources an attacker throws at it.

Humanity has too much hard drive storage, no evil entity can get 100% of it.

You have not clearly provided anywhere near enough evidence to make the assertion that any significant portion of "hard disk space control" matters.

I am not at all worried about the threat of attack based on control over large # of peers, with either proof of share or proof of hard disk, because we already realized that both are impervious to the 99+% attack.

When did this happen?

On top of all this, any currency used to take power over the network is locked and cannot be used for anything else that money can be used for. A hard drive is not as useful for trade as a dollar bill or a decrit. So while power over the network may increase for an attacker, he pays a large opportunity cost by no longer having the utility value of decrits. Governments can always print fiat to buy the hard drives, then print more fiat to retain control over the fiat money supply.

You assume that Decrits are more difficult to obtain with fiat than hard disks are. I question this assumption, because as I explained it doesn't make any sense mathematically, c.f. my next post. If indeed you suceed in making Decrits hard to obtain with fiat, you kill Decrits in the free market, because you've made it some kind of "give away my money" system.

If I am missing some aspect of the design, then explain and refute.

I maintain that the opportunity cost is greater. You deride the "give away my money" system, but yet you want separation from fiat, do you not? Which is it? Allow fiat to have as much power as it is able, or incentivize the creation of money via trade? Do we want the same people currently in power to have power over the new system? What does that accomplish? Does the distribution of new wealth among users of the currency not decentralize the very power of this currency? The link that provides the internal security to the network. If that power is widely distributed, is the network not more decentralized? Even when a new wealthy class of innovators emerge, which will certainly not be financial institutions, would they attempt to manipulate the money supply when they know the people can upset the balance again?

This is another line of questioning you ignore. Cryptocurrency is in the wild. Consolidating power will incentivize clones that are easy to adapt to with existing infrastructure. You must encourage the widest array of people to use the currency, or they will end up using something else that does not ignore them. Unless you have come up with some incentive system better than the wheel-a-clones that bitcoin has come up with? Value has to enter the system some how. What is your proposition?

Wrong. My understanding is if they don't propagate, then the entire pool will suffer and that mining pool will under perform, thus their share will suffer too.

How can you call me "wrong" when you are clearly not confident in your understanding? Otherwise you would have stated it as a fact. There is again no reward for altruism. Mining pool peers will be sufficiently connected to other mining pool peers to handle any of the necessary block propagation. Bandwidth load will gradually become more and more difficult for no reward, and clients will rely on direct connections with mining pools rather than a distributed network. This mechanic has been predicted to occur in bitcoin by many different people, notably originated by Dan Kaminski. It is a problem of incentivization, of which there is little to none in bitcoin for merely propagating the network. And mining peers still have absolutely zero control over what they mine.

Seems you don't understand very well Bitcoin's fundamentals.

Seems you're awfully defensive of bitcoin when I realize that you intend on borrowing most of its tragedy properties in your effort at changing it.

All peers that put a deposit down to become a CNP will receive a weighted portion of that 50%, yes. It is described in section 2. Whether or not it is sufficient is only partially relevant. It scales up with transaction volume, and it is magnitudes better than absolutely no incentive, as is the case with bitcoin.

In bitcoin the minting incentive scales with difficult and economics automatically. The problem with Bitcoin is the 51% attack vector and that minting stops in 2034.

The mining incentive is irrelevant to the propagation incentive. Mining is a centralizing mechanic of bitcoin. Propagation is a decentralizing mechanic of decrits. Both are rewarded, one rewards centralization via reduced costs, one increases decentralization as network activity increases.

You depend on not making fiat convertible to Decrits then, c.f. next post there is no mathematical way around it.

This is a strawman.

If we separate the economic assumption that fiat is not readily convertible to Decrits, then the above quoted comment can be seen as an architectural point, then please see my reply above where I said Bitcoin dynamically adjusts to attacks because the peers have an economic incentive to propagate and protect their ROI.

You have little idea of the economic incentives behind bitcoin. This is abundantly clear. Unless you are pro-centralization and I missed that point among your incessant rambling about cartelization.

You are confused. The good branch will include all the evil transactions to prove it is the good branch by having the most transactions. You've forgotten what we agreed to upthread!

If you are going to forget key points of agreement then how can I trust that you have this very apparently (who knows?) complex nondescribed design correct.

If you are going to "misunderstand" key points of the agreement... "The most transactions" did not ever come up in this portion of the discussion. You are unwholeheartedly mistaken. I have even stated that separate, forked networks will have to operate almost identically so as one does not appear to be malicious at first. Otherwise the distinction is already obvious. We were actually discussing difficult scenarios.

Whatever, I'm tired. Good luck with proof of hard disk. Let me know if you can answer the bolded items.

[Etlase2]

No, you can't comment because you don't know how networks can be designed to be efficiently anonymous. This is not an area of your expertise.

Make a citation then to prove your claim that I am suffering from canonical ignorance.

MUTE does not work as a system for a decentralized network that needs to be extremely resilient. The property of having a decentralized list of peers allows for a MUTE-like property to easily be added to the system.

This, however, reduces network efficiency and opens up DoS/spam vulnerabilities that may or may not be correctable with smart peer banning. But, take this example:

There are three nodes, A, B, and C. C is connected to B and knows A's encryption key because it is public. This would be akin to searching for some illegal music file on a MUTE network and getting the location as some address hash that B knows the route to.

C can repeatedly send garbage, encrypted information, and B can not know this because he does not possess the decryption key and cannot prove a fee paying transaction. So A has to either tell B to stfu, rendering the protocol useless, or A has to ban B because A doesn't know if it is B or some other node being stupid. There is *zero* cost in performing this attack, meaning the eventual result is it will be disabled if someone is intent on disrupting the network.

MUTE works because it relies on a "pull" system--someone is requesting data. This must be a "push" system by its nature, where data is sent anonymously to someone who must retrieve it.

Additionally, if we could presume this protocol is used mostly honestly, any node that is in the chain from A->C must see double the data for every transaction encrypted this way. It reduces the network bandwidth efficiency. First it sees the encrypted transaction having no idea what it is, then it must see it again unencrypted. With the downsides already mentioned in using this protocol, this further solidifies it as a complete waste of time. For every node that sees it, bandwidth efficiency is reduced. The more nodes that use it, the more the efficiency of the network as a whole is reduced, resulting in higher transaction fees and less transactions that are able to be processed.

And why would you bother at all when Tor already provides this functionality?

[AnonyMint]

Please provide a proof of (or at least evidence supporting) this assertion.

The mining peers in Bitcoin have an incentive to propagate as efficiently as they can, because otherwise they are doing useless work and destroying their ROI on their hardware investment. This economic incentive is much more dynamically powerful than any adhoc, static, top-down architected propagation because the mining peers will adjust to conditions and try to find clever ways to optimize propagation.

The mining pools have incentive to propagate to each other and that's about it. All bitcoin non-mining nodes could be just fine by connecting to 1 or 2 mining pools for its view of the network. The mining peers have no say in what transactions are included, and are not relevant when it comes to propagating the winning blocks. Why even bother with propagation nodes when the view of the network comes entirely from a small subset of mining farms or pools?

The TBs are being propagated to all the mining peers, so the system is working. If it wasn't being propagated, the mining peers would leave the pool(s). The selfish economic incentive to cooperate (on propagation) has motivated them to aggregate for efficiency reasons, but hasn't eliminated their veto on non-propagation.

I agree with your orthogonal complaint about there not being a good incentive to include transactions in Bitcoin, but that has nothing to do with the centralization of propagation.

The key about decentralized propagation is not whether peers get together for efficiency, but whether they've lost the veto power against attacks that disrupt propagation. Don't conflate decentralization with inefficiency. Decentralization can exist in a veto power, and thus not required to be an inefficient physical architecture.

I don't understand what prevents DoS from overloading the CNPs or any communication node in the system?

Nothing, but it isn't a critical attack vector. Presuming propagation nodes are incentivized like in decrits, there will be many of them--decentralization. If there are 100k SHs, there might be 500k CNPs. How many of those can you DoS? How often have bitcoin pools been DoSed in its short history?

I need the details on your design before I can compare meaningfully.

The number of peers does not guarantee decentralization of control. It depends on the details of the design.

As an abstract example, everyone can vote in a democracy, but no one has decentralized control over the result:

http://esr.ibiblio.org/?p=4946&cpage=1#comment-402555 (read upthread from the linked comment also)

My understanding is that the key to squelching DoS is to have make it very inefficient to achieve DoS. With Bitcoin, it is nearly impossible to DoS the winning peer because you don't know who is the winning peer until it has already been propagated, and it is unrealistic to DoS all the mining peers. K.I.S.S.

Mining peers themselves are DoSed when the mining pool is DoSed. They can no longer mine and this reduces network security and increases transaction times. You have not passed your bitcoin history course. Only the pools have to be DoSed, not the peers. This is a significant vulnerability.

Indeed, but peers have a veto over the risk vs. reward. If DoS hurts their ROI relative to their other options (mine independently, other pool, or decentralized pool), they will leave the (centralized) pool(s).

Have you pass your history class upthread on how many times you have insulted me and had to eat your erroneous arrogance?

How do we trust the Shadow Peers or the injection peers for Tor?

A robustly designed system must assume any peer can be a trojan.

Tor does not have "injection peers". Using onion addresses, data is encrypted from end to end, and unlinked via the hops in between. It is not an absolutely perfect system, but it is designed for low-latency and it is going to be better than anything that can be layered on top of a currency protocol. There is no point in reinventing the wheel, unless maybe you have some notion that the wheel is illegal to use.

The inner-most onion sees the IP of the entity that submitted the request:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tor_(anonymity_network)#Weaknesses

This is elemental.

Granted the inner-most onion does not know it is the inner-most, unless there is a distinction between bridge relays and clients. If we don't connect to dedicated bridge relays, but instead every peer in the Tor network agrees to be a relay, then inner-most hops can not be easily identified. This is the same idea we are both proposing (see below). So we are both on the right track for solving anonymity of injection.

You don't have to trust the shadow peers, you just have maintain some level of incoming/outgoing network activity so that an outside observer must control all of the nodes you are connected to to determine with accuracy any transactions you have created. As long as there is some node that isn't controlled by the monitor that you maintain activity with, they cannot prove that you created a transaction because all of the connections are encrypted (this is not the case with bitcoin currently).

This is same as my MUTE idea. So why the heck were you insulting me. See if you actually wrote down your design, we wouldn't be wasting as much time here.

If you are worried still, again the solution is to relay some Tor data, to which anyone monitoring you cannot be sure if the tx activity was sent to you in that data or if it was just random noise and you created a transaction.

Except for the issue with Tor above. But agreed, I like to think about ways to make sure there is always data from many peers moving around to obscure things.

So why the heck are you accusing me of being ignorant of network anonymity concepts?

There are only so many things that can be done here without vastly changing network dynamics to be less efficient. Bitcoin provides very little in the way of transaction association security without being forced to use tor.

Agreed.

Buying a currency gives it away for free to existing holders of the currency? I will never support such a system of socialism; neither will any free market.

But lol this is exactly what bitcoin does, and you must resolve this issue too with proof of hard disk. Bitcoin early adopters get value for nothing. I don't think you deny this. Instead of limiting the profitability to those early adopters,

This issue is making sure everyone can mine at the start.

The Bitcoin early adopters deserve what they got because they believed when no one else did. They invested their capital. This is capitalism.

Now everyone will want to be an early adopter due to the proven success of Bitcoin, but the problem is that an ASICs proof-of-work requirement would make it less accessible. The hard disk proof would make it accessible to everyone, just download the client and run.

decrits proposes to spread out this profitability via transaction activity to incentivize a much greater number of people and to provide commodity price stability.

By treating someone who buys 1/10000000000000000000000 of a coin as capital equivalent as someone who buys 10000000000000000 coins.

Theft. Socialism. Fail.

You have not answered how you propose to solve this problem. Is it vast bouts of deflation that are only assuaged by a 2% money supply increase per year? (vaguely based on some things you have said) 2%? I don't want to go off on a tangent debating a position you may or may not have espoused. However, as of yet you have not given me one to debate, you have only derided mine. When are you going to respond to this question? This is a dishonest line of argumentation on your part until you do.

Allowing everyone to use their existing capital to mine maximizes capitalistic distribution.

Stealing capital as your propose, destroys capitalization and thus minimizing capitalistic distribution.

This is a poor design in terms of scalability and it leaves a fledgling network open to attack by anyone with a lot of hard drive space.

We've already agreed upthread that such a network is resistant against the 99+% attack. Only a 100% attack can in theory stop all transactions.

We've agreed that my proof of consensus is, there has been no such agreement in regards to proof of hard disk. I have shown that it requires an exponential amount of currency of the network to embark on a 90+% attack. Your paper only shows that this attack becomes easier the more resources an attacker throws at it.

It has nothing to do with the capital that is thrown into the attack. We have decided upthread that every peer gets a turn within a period of CBs, thus transactions can not be delayed forever except by 100% attack (which is exponentially impossible in both proof-of-share and proof-of-hard disk).

What we share is that everyone peer gets a turn on schedule, unlike in Bitcoin where peers must do work all the time to compete to get a turn.

See my immediately prior post on the differences between Bitcoin and consensus designs.

Humanity has too much hard drive storage, no evil entity can get 100% of it.

You have not clearly provided anywhere near enough evidence to make the assertion that any significant portion of "hard disk space control" matters.

We already agreed upthread that only 100% of all peers can stop transactions in a consensus design.

I am not at all worried about the threat of attack based on control over large # of peers, with either proof of share or proof of hard disk, because we already realized that both are impervious to the 99+% attack.

When did this happen?

Ditto above.

Wrong. My understanding is if they don't propagate, then the entire pool will suffer and that mining pool will under perform, thus their share will suffer too.

How can you call me "wrong" when you are clearly not confident in your understanding? Otherwise you would have stated it as a fact. There is again no reward for altruism. Mining pool peers will be sufficiently connected to other mining pool peers to handle any of the necessary block propagation. Bandwidth load will gradually become more and more difficult for no reward, and clients will rely on direct connections with mining pools rather than a distributed network. This mechanic has been predicted to occur in bitcoin by many different people, notably originated by Dan Kaminski. It is a problem of incentivization, of which there is little to none in bitcoin for merely propagating the network. And mining peers still have absolutely zero control over what they mine.

Wrong. The TB has to be propagated otherwise they don't get paid the minted coins. I am not going to say this again! Peers will drop out if profitability declines, then difficulty will decline, then profitability will return.

You are conflating that including transactions is not incentivized (I agree).

Seems you don't understand very well Bitcoin's fundamentals.

Seems you're awfully defensive of bitcoin when I realize that you intend on borrowing most of its tragedy properties in your effort at changing it.

Nonsense. See the comparisons to bitcoin and our proposals uppost and upthread.

All peers that put a deposit down to become a CNP will receive a weighted portion of that 50%, yes. It is described in section 2. Whether or not it is sufficient is only partially relevant. It scales up with transaction volume, and it is magnitudes better than absolutely no incentive, as is the case with bitcoin.

In bitcoin the minting incentive scales with difficult and economics automatically. The problem with Bitcoin is the 51% attack vector and that minting stops in 2034.

The mining incentive is irrelevant to the propagation incentive.

What?!!! Wrong! See comments above.

You depend on not making fiat convertible to Decrits then, c.f. next post there is no mathematical way around it.

This is a strawman.

You make no point.

If we separate the economic assumption that fiat is not readily convertible to Decrits, then the above quoted comment can be seen as an architectural point, then please see my reply above where I said Bitcoin dynamically adjusts to attacks because the peers have an economic incentive to propagate and protect their ROI.

You have little idea of the economic incentives behind bitcoin. This is abundantly clear. Unless you are pro-centralization and I missed that point among your incessant rambling about cartelization.

You make no point.

[AnonyMint]

Never attempt to design something that will make the masses perfect, as this is inherently a failed design because the center and lower-half of the bell curve are failure.

Instead design something that appeases the masses, while giving the highly motivated capitalists and freedom-lovers the opportunity to escape from the socialism of the masses. It is these technologies that enable individual productivity that cause the major wins for mankind throughout history.

On top of all this, any currency used to take power over the network is locked and cannot be used for anything else that money can be used for. A hard drive is not as useful for trade as a dollar bill or a decrit. So while power over the network may increase for an attacker, he pays a large opportunity cost by no longer having the utility value of decrits. Governments can always print fiat to buy the hard drives, then print more fiat to retain control over the fiat money supply.

You assume that Decrits are more difficult to obtain with fiat than hard disks are. I question this assumption, because as I explained it doesn't make any sense mathematically, c.f. my next post. If indeed you suceed in making Decrits hard to obtain with fiat, you kill Decrits in the free market, because you've made it some kind of "give away my money" system.

If I am missing some aspect of the design, then explain and refute.

I maintain that the opportunity cost is greater. You deride the "give away my money" system, but yet you want separation from fiat, do you not?

No we can never separate entirely from fiat, humanity demands more loans than exist supply of savings. This will never change.

I am trying to design a system that gives us more anonymity and can't be suppressed so much by fiat that we can't get our anonymous transactions to process. I am interested in that 0.1% window that the 99+% can't destroy (in the worst case scenario).

The masses' socialism will leave us 0.1% alone, so we can continue to innovate and improve the world, while they continue their lives as well-fed cows.

Which is it? Allow fiat to have as much power as it is able, or incentivize the creation of money via trade? Do we want the same people currently in power to have power over the new system? What does that accomplish? Does the distribution of new wealth among users of the currency not decentralize the very power of this currency? The link that provides the internal security to the network. If that power is widely distributed, is the network not more decentralized? Even when a new wealthy class of innovators emerge, which will certainly not be financial institutions, would they attempt to manipulate the money supply when they know the people can upset the balance again?

Exactly. I am not trying to change human nature as you are. All socialists fall into this idealism and it fails every time. Sorry to say. I don't mean it as an insult.

This is another line of questioning you ignore. Cryptocurrency is in the wild. Consolidating power will incentivize clones that are easy to adapt to with existing infrastructure. You must encourage the widest array of people to use the currency, or they will end up using something else that does not ignore them. Unless you have come up with some incentive system better than the wheel-a-clones that bitcoin has come up with? Value has to enter the system some how. What is your proposition?

I am don't want to create "SocialistCoin". I don't care if most people never use my coin, as long as those of us who need freedom from the socialism can use it.

I think a lot of people are going to be running from socialism from 2016 to 2033 at least.

I am not worried about getting enough adopters. I don't expect to replace fiat and replace the socialism of the masses. Never can be.

[AnonyMint]

I am leaning now more to the concept of individuals being able to mint their own coins.

And have registered a new name:

selfcoin.me

Here is my thread:

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=160612.msg2347913#msg2347913

Ukigo, most dolts think socialism helps them, but it actually enslaves them. I am desiring to create a currency that gives every motivated person freedom, without attempting to do the impossible, which is the impossibility of protecting dolts from destroying themselves (with socialism and debt). Or by protecting them from competition and the need to compete to be successful.

I am expending effort here, because the consensus aspects are similar and beneficial. It is the redistribution of capital in Decrits that is socialism and not in what I want to do.

[Etlase2]

The TBs are being propagated to all the mining peers, so the system is working. If it wasn't being propagated, the mining peers would leave the pool(s). The selfish economic incentive to cooperate (on propagation) has motivated them to aggregate for efficiency reasons, but hasn't eliminated their veto on non-propagation.

You still are not getting the point. Bitcoin, and anything that does not reasonably incentivize propagation, will result in a narrowing group of peers that maintain the full network state. This is a centralizing, attackable mechanic unless it is fixed. Some programmers from Microsoft even wrote some complex scheme for incentivizing the propagation nodes in a whitepaper. There are many people who believe that this is a very real attack vector on the bitcoin network, and it has been reasonably addressed with decrits.

I agree with your orthogonal complaint about there not being a good incentive to include transactions in Bitcoin, but that has nothing to do with the centralization of propagation.

That wasn't my complaint, though it is another. Centralization of the network is incentivized in bitcoin as a cost-saving measure and as a factor of the "luck" bitcoin requires for security. You were complaining you did not understand the purpose of CNPs, I have shown you why they are critical as a whole, but useless as an attack vector for a highly decentralized system, while also increasing anonymity. These are several significant and incentivized benefits to using the network.

The key about decentralized propagation is not whether peers get together for efficiency, but whether they've lost the veto power against attacks that disrupt propagation. Don't conflate decentralization with inefficiency. Decentralization can exist in a veto power, and thus not required to be an inefficient physical architecture.

Efficiency does matter if inefficiency (decentralization) is not rewarded as it must be for a very robust system.

Indeed, but peers have a veto over the risk vs. reward. If DoS hurts their ROI relative to their other options (mine independently, other pool, or decentralized pool), they will leave the (centralized) pool(s).

But you are still presuming that some option other than a centralized pool will exist. Using any form of hardware to distribute power will result in efficiency gains via wasted resources directed at centralizing the network to where it can no longer be profitably decentralized. But your argument against that is "hard drives are decentralized". Yet you have not shown any mechanic that actually keeps this decentralization viable, I have with regards to using currency instead.

Granted the inner-most onion does not know it is the inner-most, unless there is a distinction between bridge relays and clients. If we don't connect to dedicated bridge relays, but instead every peer in the Tor network agrees to be a relay, then inner-most hops can not be easily identified. This is the same idea we are both proposing (see below). So we are both on the right track for solving anonymity of injection.

We are both on the right track? I have been on the right track and you will adopt any idea that you begin to understand the reasoning behind. Unless it gets in your way, of course.

This issue is making sure everyone can mine at the start.

I thought the issue was making sure everyone can *always* mine?

The Bitcoin early adopters deserve what they got because they believed when no one else did. They invested their capital. This is capitalism.

Wow. Total, manipulative monetary control over the currency is what they deserve? Or it is what anyone who amasses a lot of control over the currency deserves? Have you read at all about how fractional reserve might exist with bitcoin? It is, in my opinion, heavily incentivized just as gold was due to the extreme scarcity of the currency concentrated into the hands of a few. FRB allows for an expansion of the money supply unnaturally. Alternatively...

Now everyone will want to be an early adopter due to the proven success of Bitcoin, but the problem is that an ASICs proof-of-work requirement would make it less accessible. The hard disk proof would make it accessible to everyone, just download the client and run.

Except everyone can not be an early adopter. This is silliness. Sure early adopters should be well rewarded, but it cannot be some pyramidal distribution scheme that affords millions of percent ROIs. People will say fuck off and create a clone. Where is your disincentive for making a clone and rendering your currency obsolete?

Allowing everyone to use their existing capital to mine maximizes capitalistic distribution.

Stealing capital as your propose, destroys capitalization and thus minimizing capitalistic distribution.

Oh, you haven't one. You presume the idea that taking value off the backs of others is the way forward.

How can you call me "wrong" when you are clearly not confident in your understanding? Otherwise you would have stated it as a fact. There is again no reward for altruism. Mining pool peers will be sufficiently connected to other mining pool peers to handle any of the necessary block propagation. Bandwidth load will gradually become more and more difficult for no reward, and clients will rely on direct connections with mining pools rather than a distributed network. This mechanic has been predicted to occur in bitcoin by many different people, notably originated by Dan Kaminski. It is a problem of incentivization, of which there is little to none in bitcoin for merely propagating the network. And mining peers still have absolutely zero control over what they mine.

Wrong. The TB has to be propagated otherwise they don't get paid the minted coins. I am not going to say this again! Peers will drop out if profitability declines, then difficulty will decline, then profitability will return.

You are conflating that including transactions is not incentivized (I agree).

You are not getting the point. You are ignoring the point and presuming I'm talking about transaction inclusion when I am not, it is only a secondary vulnerability. This is the vulnerability you wish most to address because it is a significant problem of the centralizing nature of bitcoin that is inherently solved by having as decentralized a protocol as possible which is encouraged in many different ways in decrits. You are ignoring the actual vulnerability I am describing (the profit motive of centralizing the network due to the properties of using hardware as a security mechanic) because you either don't see it as a vulnerability or don't care about the vulnerability because you seem to be only interested in what the network can do for you.

What?!!! Wrong! See comments above.

Still missing the point and assuming that I am the one missing it. See above.

Never attempt to design something that will make the masses perfect, as this is inherently a failed design because the center and lower-half of the bell curve are failure.

Instead design something that appeases the masses, while giving the highly motivated capitalists and freedom-lovers the opportunity to escape from the socialism of the masses. It is these technologies that enable individual productivity that cause the major wins for mankind throughout history.

The masses' socialism will leave us 0.1% alone, so we can continue to innovate and improve the world, while they continue their lives as well-fed cows.

:rofl: Decrits is intended to create a dynamic between the rich and the middle/poor where the rich can not exert nearly as much control over the masses as is possible under the fiat system, the bitcoin system, and presumably your system as well. I apparently have a much higher opinion of what humanity can accomplish when it is not being oppressed. I am not trying to change human nature, I am trying to give it an opportunity. The currency may trickle in via the masses, but this does not prevent the accumulation of wealth for those who innovate. Using some new currency first or having more bits than someone else is not innovation, it's luck that is heavily biased in favor of some few over the many. In fact people are incentivized to provide real innovation in decrits, not some financial bullshit. They will not be able to "innovate" via subjugation or by abusing some monetary system mechanic or by bribing politicians. It seems obvious now that subjugation is precisely what you want, because I guess you deserve it for whatever reason that makes you "0.1%".

This is another line of questioning you ignore. Cryptocurrency is in the wild. Consolidating power will incentivize clones that are easy to adapt to with existing infrastructure. You must encourage the widest array of people to use the currency, or they will end up using something else that does not ignore them. Unless you have come up with some incentive system better than the wheel-a-clones that bitcoin has come up with? Value has to enter the system some how. What is your proposition?

I am don't want to create "SocialistCoin". I don't care if most people never use my coin, as long as those of us who need freedom from the socialism can use it.

Well great then. You and your 0.1% buddies can pay to mow each others' lawns while the rest of us do something productive. I can't believe how you have totally spiraled outside of logic and reason in this corner of the debate. Wait, you are also the one who makes wild predictions for the future and states it as some inarguable fact. "World War 3 by 2033." I don't know what has happened to make you so completely disillusioned, but you have a very poor attitude. If there's no hope for humanity, what's the point of even discussing this?

[AnonyMint]

It is the redistribution of capital in Decrits that is socialism and not in what I want to do.

Oh, no...
Socialism is about concentration of capital
 in the hands of few elitists, and not about
 it's redistribution.
So, Decrits likely won't be SocialistCoin

Your understanding is egregiously myopic.

Socialism is about giving the masses free things such as free debt, free health care, free education, etc., which does end up concentrating the power and money amongst the elite, due to the power vacuum of political economics.

Read the following blogs to begin to educate yourself about statism, socialism, political & regulatory capture, and the power vacuum.

http://esr.ibiblio.org/?p=984 (Some Iron Laws of Political Economics)

Read all of "JustSaying"'s comments in the following blogs (that is me):

http://esr.ibiblio.org/?p=4946&cpage=1#comment-402555
http://esr.ibiblio.org/?p=4912
http://esr.ibiblio.org/?p=4934

Also read all of "Shelby"'s comments in the following blogs (that is me):

http://mpettis.com

The tsuris of reading the above blogs won't be enough. It will probably require many months if not years of autodidact focus to obtain an erudite state-of-mind.

Ukigo, most dolts think socialism helps them, but it actually enslaves them. I am desiring to create a currency that gives every motivated person freedom, without attempting to do the impossible, which is the impossibility of protecting dolts from destroying themselves (with socialism and debt). Or by protecting them from competition and the need to compete to be successful.

Nice.New prev. unknown word for me. Thank You !

I gifted you several more above.

The causes why unwashed masses still exist on the planet are not debt or socialism.
High-horse elitists of the world grow and on purpose
don't educate them,
 for enslavement and exploitation.

You are getting dangerously close to the dolt classification with such myopic assertions. I have been careful to not say you are dolt, and you are being given my patience and my help. But don't push it...

Decrits IMHO will try to establish more
 equal rules of the currency game, and not
to protect stupid from his mistakes.

Decrits as has been described to me, is a system that attempts to prevent capital from concentrating, by destroying capital. One thing a dolt does not understand is that redistributed capital is the same as destroying the capital. Why? Because dolts don't know how to grow capital, that is why they don't have any. They waste the capital. For example, give blacksmiths tools to a pregnant women. The tools have been wasted.

You see life is a competition. The elite exist because the dolts don't know how to manage their own lives and this creates a political power vacuum.

But I couldn't possibly begin to explain it to you here in one post. You can either start to study or remain ignorant. It is your freewill and your choice.

[Anon136]

So basically you purchase the right to mint transaction blocks from the protocol its self instead of winning that right in a competition of hashes. If you, as a shareholder, try to mint a block that doesn't conform to the rules and standards of the system it is rejected by the network (you just make a tiny little fork with only you on it).

do i have atleast that part right? lets talk in abstracts here not technical specifics.