Segwit is a 51% attack on Bitcoin

[ir.hn]

That was 2 1/2 years ago. Have you looked at the stats today?

What makes you think that pools would tell you if they are working together, or even if they are run by the same person?

How do you know that life isn't just a dream and one day you will wake up? Conspiracy theories are good for nothing. Once they are confirmed it is too late. Prep now and sell your bitcoin.  

I'm prepping by buying bitcoin.  Currently we are inside a pump and dump by china.  Know the indicators to when china will dump and you will be safe to ride the wave.  In terms of the 51% attack, they will only target zombie bitcoins in order to protect their investment.  But in the long term, bitcoin is in shambles.

1) Indeed, we can't know if all these pools are the same entity or not, and indeed, segwit (and im not an expert) addresses, don't make me feel entirely safe to keep big funds at.. which is why I just keep cold storage on legacy addresses. But it is ultimately a conspiracy. We would need to see hard proof of owned bitcoins stored in segwit addresses stolen to confirm it. All Core devs concluded that the chances of that happening are practically impossible, so if we actually see segwit funds stolen by colluding miners, it would be the end of Core and anyone involved in promoting segwit, and what's worse: The even bigger scammers (big blockers, Roger Ver etc) could seen as the ones that were right, when they are even worse.
I don't see how Core devs would risk their careers and possibly life by taking such a risk with people's funds. So I conclude that the segwit funds being stolen problem will never happen.

2) You or no one has no idea if "china is pumping bitcoin". Bitcoin is now global, too big, wall street is involved.. you can't time the top and you can't time the bottom, you can only buy the dips and hold very long term, because long term we are only going higher.

It will be a disaster.  Can anyone tell me what incentive miners will have to check the witness data?  They would only loose time waiting for that witness block before they start mining the next UTXO block...

[hatshepsut93]

It will be a disaster.  Can anyone tell me what incentive miners will have to check the witness data?  They would only loose time waiting for that witness block before they start mining the next UTXO block...

The incentive is that if they mine invalid block, it gets rejected by the network, and if it gets rejected by the network, then they are not mining Bitcoin, they are wasting electricity to mine some fork that they can't even sell on exchange. Miners do not control Bitcoin, they are simply hired to timestamp transactions, while the network of nodes enforces the rules.

[Wind_FURY]

The FUD is strong in this one. Hahaha.

The big blockers will keep spreading their propaganda and false analysis to give the newbies the wrong impression about Segwit, while they push for Bitcoin Cash as the "real" Bitcoin.

I do not have a problem with Bitcoin Cash personally, but you cannot go around and say it is the real Bitcoin. It's simply not true.

[Anti-Cen]

The brokers like Coinbase are scared to death by forks of the data and maybe this is why Bit-Gold was DDOSed when it split

You see anyone with coins held in the ledger before the split are entitle to a new coin in the new system so were has my money gone
and why won't Coinbase or other brokers allow access to Bit-Gold

Well you see they have this pool account thing in a database so if you sell a coin using a broker then
it just returns to the pool but they still charge you massive fees and then as someone buys the coin
they charge them a big fee too but this movement of digits does not take place on the block-chain even
if you think it does because they gave you a BTC public address.

No sir, these coins in the pool are fake and on any fork they won't tie up with data in the real block-chain
so kiss the free bit-gold goodbye

Each fork double the money/token supply and we have fake coins being generated by brokers so
when someone talks about having no inflation due to a limit of 21m digits then may i suggest that you turn
a blind ear because clearly this is not true.


 

[ir.hn]

It will be a disaster.  Can anyone tell me what incentive miners will have to check the witness data?  They would only loose time waiting for that witness block before they start mining the next UTXO block...

The incentive is that if they mine invalid block, it gets rejected by the network, and if it gets rejected by the network, then they are not mining Bitcoin, they are wasting electricity to mine some fork that they can't even sell on exchange. Miners do not control Bitcoin, they are simply hired to timestamp transactions, while the network of nodes enforces the rules.

If there is no incentive for you to verify then what incentive would there be for the network to verify?  The problem is everyone will be more competitive if they stop verifying the signatures.

Its like saying: You can mine gold here but you have to make sure that the gold is weighed before you take it.  Who is going to validate that you weighed the gold?  The other miners?  The other miners don't give a shit.  They will respond to you breaking the rules and getting more gold by they themselves breaking the rules so they can compete with you.  Is the little non-mining full node with the crossing guard uniform and whistle going to stop them?  No they will just bowl right over him.

The problem with segwit is the network requires a central enforcer to make sure everyone checks the signatures.  Even if people thought that was ok (which they wouldn't), the bitcoin protocol doesn't allow for a central enforcer.  You have to incentivize people to enforce, this is why there will always be many more mining nodes than non-mining full nodes.

Plus even in the slim chance that the block you mined was rejected by the network, you probably won 3 more extra blocks because you save time by not checking witness data.  A loss here and there is made up by the time you save and extra hashes you can get in.

[ir.hn]

The FUD is strong in this one. Hahaha.

The big blockers will keep spreading their propaganda and false analysis to give the newbies the wrong impression about Segwit, while they push for Bitcoin Cash as the "real" Bitcoin.

I do not have a problem with Bitcoin Cash personally, but you cannot go around and say it is the real Bitcoin. It's simply not true.

I'm not a big blocker either.  I think bitcoin blocks are too big.  If I designed the blocksize I would make it so the block propagation time to 90% of the network is less than 5% of the blocktime.  This translates into an optimized value of roughly 45kb blocks and 3.5 minute blocktime.

[Matias]

It will be a disaster.  Can anyone tell me what incentive miners will have to check the witness data?  They would only loose time waiting for that witness block before they start mining the next UTXO block...

The incentive is that if they mine invalid block, it gets rejected by the network, and if it gets rejected by the network, then they are not mining Bitcoin, they are wasting electricity to mine some fork that they can't even sell on exchange. Miners do not control Bitcoin, they are simply hired to timestamp transactions, while the network of nodes enforces the rules.

If there is no incentive for you to verify then what incentive would there be for the network to verify?  The problem is everyone will be more competitive if they stop verifying the signatures.
 

Bitcoin Core Nodes verify. Nodes decide, what is valid a Bitcoin block. Not the miners. Miners can post as much invalid blocks as they want, the only effect is, that those blocks are rejected by the nodes and miners don't get reward. Every Core node checks each block independendly.

[Carlton Banks]

If there is no incentive for you to verify then what incentive would there be for the network to verify?  The problem is everyone will be more competitive if they stop verifying the signatures.

Your trolling is very poor quality (or you're totally insane, or unable to read)

You were just told what the incentive is, and that it's a very strong motivator.

[ir.hn]

If there is no incentive for you to verify then what incentive would there be for the network to verify?  The problem is everyone will be more competitive if they stop verifying the signatures.

Your trolling is very poor quality (or you're totally insane, or unable to read)

You were just told what the incentive is, and that it's a very strong motivator.

And I made a pretty elaborate analogy to say why the network would tend to not verify, can you discuss how that is wrong?

The point is say you gain 10  seconds (1.6% blocktime) every block by not verifying the witness data.  One of your blocks is rejected by the network 1 out of 100 times (1%).  This practice gains you net profit.

[Carlton Banks]

0 out of 100 times is the correct figure

your attack is pure fiction, which is why no-one is doing it

[ir.hn]

The reason everyone verified signatures in the past is it was so quick (a few microseconds) to do that no one really thought it worthwhile to do a cost/benefit analysis of how much it is actually costing them and how much it is actually gaining them by verifying signatures.

Now verifying signatures becomes non-trivial and people will do that cost/benefit analysis sooner or later.  We can only assume some of them at some time might actually find it more favorable to stop verifying signatures.  And once one domino falls...

[DannyHamilton]

Now verifying signatures becomes non-trivial

That is not true.

It is both

trivial to verify signatures with SegWit

AND

personally a VERY expensive mistake to skip verifying them.

[ir.hn]

Now verifying signatures becomes non-trivial

That is not true.

It is both

trivial to verify signatures with SegWit

AND

personally a VERY expensive mistake to skip verifying them.

I think it can be said for certain that it takes longer to verify segwit signatures than non-segwit signatures.  Can you provide a reference that disputes this?

[pebwindkraft]

The reason everyone verified signatures in the past is it was so quick (a few microseconds) to do that ...

I am trying to bang my head around your ideas.   I cannot come to a conclusion  
Is it looking for a flaw in the design (so far this was very poor), or just to challenge the audience and keep them busy?
DannyHamilton, HeRetik and achow121 all explained, why your assumptions are wrong, still you insist on cancer, epidemic stuff, domino effects and other buzz words.
You have posted in several threads here in this forum, with a theory, that is not accepted, and you already had fairly harsh comments on it. You do not show, that you have understood how the network (network is not miners) works, and could not underline this knowledge with hard facts (e.g. mathematical proof, in CPU seconds for sig verification, or what it means in Euro/Dollar/Pounds). In your last post you are asking DannyHamilton, to provide the figures, but hey, that's not how things work! You post a statement, it is up to you to underline it with reference data, otherwise it's wasting our time. Or you'd be ready to pay for someone to underline your logic...

Your wording is repetitive, stating that it is more beneficial (than what?) for a miner to work against the network, instead of playing the game.

Miners will make more money by not checking the signature data when they verify transactions.

Besides that this statement is lacking fundamental data, I try to turn it a bit around: the incentive that miners have to check the sigs, is to have valid tx into a block no matter if segwit or not. They can only gain money, if they propagate correct blocks, otherwise they loose potential earnings, and the whole power consumption costs.

on verification: it was explained, that every full node verifies the tx (and initially the blockchain), whereas e.g. SPV wallets do not. The danger behind SPV is well known, though people are still using SPV wallets, and others rely on full nodes. Full nodes give the proof (to me !), that a forwarded tx is valid or not, and that I am on the correct set of blocks since inception. If miners want to change the rules, they can do so, and need 51% (maybe even a bit less) - that is well known, and part of bitcoin's design. So let's try to think miners do not verify, then they might waste a lot of their processing power on the "potentially wrong" chain. Until it eventually comes to the point where they propagate with the majority (51%). I think this is, what you try to phrase in your words as "domino effect". But anyhow, words are not sufficient here to gain credibility for the statements made...

[ir.hn]

Is it up to me to provide proof that changing the blockchain is detrimental or is it up to them to provide proof that changing the blockchain is innocuous?

I'm a human so I don't work in proofs, proof is relative to an individual's current knowledge.

Non mining nodes don't vote.  If someone is standing on the sideline, what they say doesn't matter.  What matters is what the person says who has the ball, ie: the person who will either mine on your chain or not.  People vote by which chain they mine on.  If they aren't mining, they aren't in the game.

So if code is released that skips the signature verification part and makes miners make more money, then the more miners adopt this code, the fewer of their blocks will be rejected and the more "valid" blocks they will create.  Thus the amount of extra money they make will snowball and get bigger and bigger.

[Carlton Banks]

So if code is released that skips the signature verification part and makes miners make more money, then the more miners adopt this code, the fewer of their blocks will be rejected and the more "valid" blocks they will create.  Thus the amount of extra money they make will snowball and get bigger and bigger.

You can keep on saying that, and it will still never happen. It's impossible while there are still regular people running full Bitcoin nodes. And as long as people have the resources to run full Bitcoin nodes, they will.


Let's put it this way: your detractors in this thread are very confident you are wrong. Why not email the major mining pools & mining farm owners to tell them about this extra money you believe they can make? Responsible behaviour is certainly not a reason, you should be trolling contacting the Bitcoin developers about this privately, not exposing it publicly so that the miners (according to your non-logic) can make malicious use your "exploit"

[ir.hn]

So if code is released that skips the signature verification part and makes miners make more money, then the more miners adopt this code, the fewer of their blocks will be rejected and the more "valid" blocks they will create.  Thus the amount of extra money they make will snowball and get bigger and bigger.

You can keep on saying that, and it will still never happen. It's impossible while there are still regular people running full Bitcoin nodes. And as long as people have the resources to run full Bitcoin nodes, they will.


Let's put it this way: your detractors in this thread are very confident you are wrong. Why not email the major mining pools & mining farm owners to tell them about this extra money you believe they can make? Responsible behaviour is certainly not a reason, you should be trolling contacting the Bitcoin developers about this privately, not exposing it publicly so that the miners (according to your non-logic) can make malicious use your "exploit"

That's not how I operate, I am open source.  I don't support centralization by telling only select people of flaws, I tell everyone so they can prepare properly and not be blindsided.

And please explain how non-mining full nodes vote on block validity?

[cr1776]

If there is no incentive for you to verify then what incentive would there be for the network to verify?  The problem is everyone will be more competitive if they stop verifying the signatures.

Your trolling is very poor quality (or you're totally insane, or unable to read)

You were just told what the incentive is, and that it's a very strong motivator.

And I made a pretty elaborate analogy to say why the network would tend to not verify, can you discuss how that is wrong?

The point is say you gain 10  seconds (1.6% blocktime) every block by not verifying the witness data.  One of your blocks is rejected by the network 1 out of 100 times (1%).  This practice gains you net profit.

The entire bitcoin network is made of nodes that verify signatures.  Everyone who uses bitcoins *wants* their node to verify signatures and they don't care if, assuming arguendo that it takes longer, it takes 10% (or 50%) more time to do so. If even 1% of the nodes stopped verifying it wouldn't matter to block verification because the other 156,520 (99% * 158,101) nodes would continue to do so and reject any blocks that had invalid signatures.  

It would be suicide for any miner to run node software that didn't verify signatures and to accept transactions with invalid signatures because the rest of the network - nodes and nodes other miners are using - would ignore them and they'd be on their own fork which would make them NO money.  In fact, it would open them up to a huge attack vector - other miners would sabotage them by submitting invalid transactions so their blocks would be ignored which would mean their hash rate would be worthless.

(And by the way your initial post is completely incorrect when it says "remove the signatures from the blockchain".)


*Number of nodes:
http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/software.html

[cr1776]

So if code is released that skips the signature verification part and makes miners make more money, then the more miners adopt this code, the fewer of their blocks will be rejected and the more "valid" blocks they will create.  Thus the amount of extra money they make will snowball and get bigger and bigger.

You can keep on saying that, and it will still never happen. It's impossible while there are still regular people running full Bitcoin nodes. And as long as people have the resources to run full Bitcoin nodes, they will.


Let's put it this way: your detractors in this thread are very confident you are wrong. Why not email the major mining pools & mining farm owners to tell them about this extra money you believe they can make? Responsible behaviour is certainly not a reason, you should be trolling contacting the Bitcoin developers about this privately, not exposing it publicly so that the miners (according to your non-logic) can make malicious use your "exploit"

That's not how I operate, I am open source.  I don't support centralization by telling only select people of flaws, I tell everyone so they can prepare properly and not be blindsided.

And please explain how non-mining full nodes vote on block validity?

I think you missed the point. Carlton's point was: contact the pools and mining farm owners, let them know about this idea, and if it is a good one, they'll use it.  If it is incorrect they won't.  That way you won't have to argue with people here, you will have a real world demonstration as to whether the idea is good or not.  Unless you think the miners don't understand the bitcoin protocol either.  You could just direct them to this thread and then see how quickly (or never) they take up this idea.

As far as "voting": Nodes reject invalid blocks.  Go ahead an create an invalid block and see what happens to it when you broadcast it from your node.  It isn't a vote, it is an outright rejection of invalid blocks by anyone running a bitcoin node.

[ir.hn]

If there is no incentive for you to verify then what incentive would there be for the network to verify?  The problem is everyone will be more competitive if they stop verifying the signatures.

Your trolling is very poor quality (or you're totally insane, or unable to read)

You were just told what the incentive is, and that it's a very strong motivator.

And I made a pretty elaborate analogy to say why the network would tend to not verify, can you discuss how that is wrong?

The point is say you gain 10  seconds (1.6% blocktime) every block by not verifying the witness data.  One of your blocks is rejected by the network 1 out of 100 times (1%).  This practice gains you net profit.

The entire bitcoin network is made of nodes that verify signatures.  Everyone who uses bitcoins *wants* their node to verify signatures and they don't care if, assuming arguendo that it takes longer, it takes 10% (or 50%) more time to do so. If even 1% of the nodes stopped verifying it wouldn't matter to block verification because the other 156,520 (99% * 158,101) nodes would continue to do so and reject any blocks that had invalid signatures.  

It would be suicide for any miner to run node software that didn't verify signatures and to accept transactions with invalid signatures because the rest of the network - nodes and nodes other miners are using - would ignore them and they'd be on their own fork which would make them NO money.  In fact, it would open them up to a huge attack vector - other miners would sabotage them by submitting invalid transactions so their blocks would be ignored which would mean their hash rate would be worthless.

(And by the way your initial post is completely incorrect when it says "remove the signatures from the blockchain".)


*Number of nodes:
http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/software.html

It all comes down to a business decision.  If miners determine that only 0.1% of blocks they skip verifying signatures is later rejected by the network and it saves them 10% of time to skip verifying signatures, then naturally they will start skipping signature verification.  I believe it is only a matter of time before this starts happening.  And like I said the more people skip verifying signatures, the amount of rejected blocks will decrease making it even more lucrative.

But yes I think you are right about the civil war you describe, when this starts happening people will try to skew that profitability metric by propagating false blocks to get the non-verifiers to mine wrong blocks.  But then if they are playing into the bad guys hands by ddosing the network and slowing it down.  So at that point bitcoin becomes a whirlwind of fraud and who is going to untangle it?