I have another proposition:

There should be a site, like https://www.bitcoin.org/signatures where there are SHA1/MD5/SHA256 signatures of every file that is avaiable for download on bitcoin.org.
This way, there will be a 100% cracker-resistant way to know that one is downloading unmodified/unhacked files.

For now, the only way to know we have a "clean" bitcoin is to download the source, pull changes from github and review them yourself, which is probably not very good for starters/noobs.
After all, latest events concerning Facebook & Tunisia government, show that it's not very hard to imagine governments or ISPs modifying bitcoin binaries to place trojan horses in them.

What do you think ? This shouldn't be verry hard to do - i mean how hard it is to setup a single static HTML page on HTTPS ?

Relying on HTTPS allows every certificate authority and their sub-authorities to break the authentication, even though bitcoin.org is self-signed. HTTPS should not be used for important authentication problems.

I use it. And I removed most of my CAs.


Yes, but the releases should just be PGP signed by Satoshi. Then there's no chance of third-party contamination.

I just had another revelation:

Signing binaries by satoshi usign PGP is no solution at all.
Why ?
Because when Satoshi's public PGP key will be avaiable over HTTP, not HTTPS, governments/ISPs still will be able to change it on the fly using their proxies/filters.

This is a chicken-egg problem.

So i was talking like it wasn't done, and it worked all the time... Stupid me.
Closing thread.