Bitcoin Forum
May 05, 2024, 02:23:14 PM *
News: Latest Bitcoin Core release: 27.0 [Torrent]
 
   Home   Help Search Login Register More  
Pages: « 1 [2]  All
  Print  
Author Topic: Offline Laptops  (Read 1908 times)
Roy Badami
Hero Member
*****
Offline Offline

Activity: 563
Merit: 500


View Profile
October 29, 2013, 10:52:15 PM
 #21

Still, can't you achieve something very close to what you want by allowing Armory to accept wallet encryption data from a USB key, and then applying FDE with a conventional passphrase?

Actually, how about this as an interesting variant:

Allow offline Armory to access the wallet entirely off a USB drive, with no sensitive data ever hitting the hard drive of the offline computer.  The obvious use case would be that the wallet is always kept in a safe deposit box, and you take the laptop with you to the safe deposit facility when you want to sign a transaction.  This would reduce the exposure of the holder of a large wallet to being coerced into making a large transaction.  The risk would then be not much worse than with a conventional bank account (i.e. the wallet holder would still have to visit a financial institution in person to obtain the wallet).

This above works better than keeping the offline laptop in the safe deposit box because:
  • A safe deposit box large enough to put even a small laptop in is rather more expensive than a safe deposit box large enough to put a USB key in (although a holder of a large wallet might not be too price sensitive here)
  • Although safe deposit facilities usually have private rooms within the facility where you can consult documents, etc, if you keep the laptop in the safe deposit box then you're reliant either on there being an available power socket in the private room, or on carrying a spare, charged battery (since the battery of a laptop kept in the safe deposit box would inevitably run down)
1714918994
Hero Member
*
Offline Offline

Posts: 1714918994

View Profile Personal Message (Offline)

Ignore
1714918994
Reply with quote  #2

1714918994
Report to moderator
1714918994
Hero Member
*
Offline Offline

Posts: 1714918994

View Profile Personal Message (Offline)

Ignore
1714918994
Reply with quote  #2

1714918994
Report to moderator
1714918994
Hero Member
*
Offline Offline

Posts: 1714918994

View Profile Personal Message (Offline)

Ignore
1714918994
Reply with quote  #2

1714918994
Report to moderator
Activity + Trust + Earned Merit == The Most Recognized Users on Bitcointalk
Advertised sites are not endorsed by the Bitcoin Forum. They may be unsafe, untrustworthy, or illegal in your jurisdiction.
1714918994
Hero Member
*
Offline Offline

Posts: 1714918994

View Profile Personal Message (Offline)

Ignore
1714918994
Reply with quote  #2

1714918994
Report to moderator
1714918994
Hero Member
*
Offline Offline

Posts: 1714918994

View Profile Personal Message (Offline)

Ignore
1714918994
Reply with quote  #2

1714918994
Report to moderator
1714918994
Hero Member
*
Offline Offline

Posts: 1714918994

View Profile Personal Message (Offline)

Ignore
1714918994
Reply with quote  #2

1714918994
Report to moderator
justmyname (OP)
Sr. Member
****
Offline Offline

Activity: 389
Merit: 250


View Profile
October 29, 2013, 11:05:44 PM
 #22

I have the WI FI disconnected on my offline computer or it's turned off. But I sometimes connect it for Windows updates, Drivers for printer, Virus software updates etc..  As long as I don't surf the net and stick to business I should be ok right?
etotheipi
Legendary
*
Offline Offline

Activity: 1428
Merit: 1093


Core Armory Developer


View Profile WWW
October 30, 2013, 12:09:54 AM
 #23

Still, can't you achieve something very close to what you want by allowing Armory to accept wallet encryption data from a USB key, and then applying FDE with a conventional passphrase?

Actually, how about this as an interesting variant:

Allow offline Armory to access the wallet entirely off a USB drive, with no sensitive data ever hitting the hard drive of the offline computer.  The obvious use case would be that the wallet is always kept in a safe deposit box, and you take the laptop with you to the safe deposit facility when you want to sign a transaction.  This would reduce the exposure of the holder of a large wallet to being coerced into making a large transaction.  The risk would then be not much worse than with a conventional bank account (i.e. the wallet holder would still have to visit a financial institution in person to obtain the wallet).

This above works better than keeping the offline laptop in the safe deposit box because:
  • A safe deposit box large enough to put even a small laptop in is rather more expensive than a safe deposit box large enough to put a USB key in (although a holder of a large wallet might not be too price sensitive here)
  • Although safe deposit facilities usually have private rooms within the facility where you can consult documents, etc, if you keep the laptop in the safe deposit box then you're reliant either on there being an available power socket in the private room, or on carrying a spare, charged battery (since the battery of a laptop kept in the safe deposit box would inevitably run down)



For reference, I do exactly this:  keeping a laptop in a safe deposit box.  I visit the bank and hang out in the privacy room for a while when I need to sign a transaction.  It's encrypted and has no battery.   The price for the larger box isn't a lot.  I think it's about $90/yr versus $50/yr for the smaller one.    Either way, if you're going to the effort of putting your laptop in a safe-deposit box, I"m sure $100/year isn't going to break the deal for you.

At my bank, the privacy room has an outlet.  It's because they have one of those calculators with a small paper/receipt printer in the room which requires power.  I don't know if that's normal, I didn't shop around. But, I made sure beforehand that the computer works with the power cable but no battery.   

I asked the bank manager if they had the option of requiring two signers at once to access the box (perhaps, to open a safe-deposit box for the company).  They misunderstood thinking I wanted multiple signers.  We later clarified they don't have any way to enforce having multiple people present to access the box, though they do keep strict records of exactly what time the box was accessed, and ID the person who accesses it (and the employee who helped).  Not ideal, but at least it still requires collusion of one of the signers and a bank employee in order for tamper evidence to be skipped/destroyed. 

Having the ability to put the wallet encryption key on a USB key is interesting.  I like it for the offline computer (for the same reason I like it for the full-disk encryption).  But for hot wallets, I'm not sure I like it as much.  It's a lot easier to write a process to copy key files every time new media is inserted than to install a keylogger remotely (though, both are still non-negligible risks).  If you do it, you'd have to make sure that removable media is thoroughly protected, so that only your user account can access it and no other system users (which is possible, but I don't think it's default, and may be inconvenient to setup and use).

Founder and CEO of Armory Technologies, Inc.
Armory Bitcoin Wallet: Bringing cold storage to the average user!
Only use Armory software signed by the Armory Offline Signing Key (0x98832223)

Please donate to the Armory project by clicking here!    (or donate directly via 1QBDLYTDFHHZAABYSKGKPWKLSXZWCCJQBX -- yes, it's a real address!)
Roy Badami
Hero Member
*****
Offline Offline

Activity: 563
Merit: 500


View Profile
November 27, 2013, 11:39:47 PM
 #24

For reference, I do exactly this:  keeping a laptop in a safe deposit box.  I visit the bank and hang out in the privacy room for a while when I need to sign a transaction.  It's encrypted and has no battery.   The price for the larger box isn't a lot.  I think it's about $90/yr versus $50/yr for the smaller one.    Either way, if you're going to the effort of putting your laptop in a safe-deposit box, I"m sure $100/year isn't going to break the deal for you.

At my bank, the privacy room has an outlet.  It's because they have one of those calculators with a small paper/receipt printer in the room which requires power.  I don't know if that's normal, I didn't shop around. But, I made sure beforehand that the computer works with the power cable but no battery.  

I asked the bank manager if they had the option of requiring two signers at once to access the box (perhaps, to open a safe-deposit box for the company).  They misunderstood thinking I wanted multiple signers.  We later clarified they don't have any way to enforce having multiple people present to access the box, though they do keep strict records of exactly what time the box was accessed, and ID the person who accesses it (and the employee who helped).  Not ideal, but at least it still requires collusion of one of the signers and a bank employee in order for tamper evidence to be skipped/destroyed.  

Having the ability to put the wallet encryption key on a USB key is interesting.  I like it for the offline computer (for the same reason I like it for the full-disk encryption).  But for hot wallets, I'm not sure I like it as much.  It's a lot easier to write a process to copy key files every time new media is inserted than to install a keylogger remotely (though, both are still non-negligible risks).  If you do it, you'd have to make sure that removable media is thoroughly protected, so that only your user account can access it and no other system users (which is possible, but I don't think it's default, and may be inconvenient to setup and use).

Sorry for slow motion conversation here, but....

Obviously in many ways the ideal solution to your multiple signatories problem is to have multiple people hold individual safe deposit boxes, and use multisig.  Now, if you want to be really secure - perhaps a really high value wallet where it's important to guarantee that none of the box holders can subvert the system by tampering with the laptop - then having a laptop in each of the boxes is justified.  But in some cases it may be an acceptable solution to go for smaller boxes and a single laptop - particular if larger boxes are hard and/or expensive to obtain.

Consider the case of a high value wallet held by an individual, where the n-of-m boxes - perhaps even in different cities - are all held by the same person, but are there in part to slow down withdrawals to make it considerably harder to successfully cooerce the owner into a withdrawal.  In that case perhaps USB keys in safe deposit boxes might considered adequate.

BTW, you're lucky to get a decent sized box for $100.  In the UK, banks are pretty much getting out of the safe deposit business.  Increasingly, banking is electronic; it's no longer about storing large reserves of cash in secure vaults, so increasingly as they move to new premise they no longer have the kinds of vaults with space to store customer boxes.  At most, they need somewhere secure to store some cash to top up the ATMs - but bank vaults are a thing of the past.  I pay more than double what you do for a box at a dedicated safe deposit facility - and it's not big enough for a laptop.

It's true, it depends on the shape of the boxes, too.  Although mine doesn't, I believe some faciiities have small boxes that have a decent area but a very small height.  I assume these are intended to allow documents to be stored without folding - but would would probably work well for storing a netbook or ultraportable laptop, too.

roy
oakpacific
Hero Member
*****
Offline Offline

Activity: 784
Merit: 1000


View Profile
November 28, 2013, 03:04:26 AM
 #25

Extra credit:  have the offline computer encrypted using a USB key, instead of a password.   Your wallet on the computer is already protected with a password, and using the same password for the disk encryption is mostly redundant (though it's better than nothing).    I know it's possible to /dev/random data on a USB key, and have the bootloader use that as the FS encryption key.  But it's been a long time since I've done that, so I don't remember how.

It will improve the "hardness" of the system if it is stolen, as long as you don't keep the USB key with the laptop.  If they don't have the USB key, there's basically no way to even brute force the FS encryption.  If the thief gets both the key and the system, well there's still the wallet password that has to be found (unless you wrote the unencrypted key data to disk;  which should not happen with standard Armory operations, but it's nice to have the extra layer of protection).

If anyone has more details about doing this, I'd love to be reminded.  I've been meaning to upgrade one of my offline systems to that method, but been too busy to go figure it out again.

What would happen if the key suffers several bitflips? It will stop working and you can't even figure out where the errors are.

A possible improvement is to store hash checksums sector by sector elsewhere, so assuming there are no more than two or three errors per sector, it would be feasible to check each sector and locate the errors.

https://tlsnotary.org/ Fraud proofing decentralized fiat-Bitcoin trading.
Roy Badami
Hero Member
*****
Offline Offline

Activity: 563
Merit: 500


View Profile
November 28, 2013, 08:43:02 PM
 #26

What would happen if the key suffers several bitflips? It will stop working and you can't even figure out where the errors are.

A possible improvement is to store hash checksums sector by sector elsewhere, so assuming there are no more than two or three errors per sector, it would be feasible to check each sector and locate the errors.

Paper backups (n-of-m if necessary) are probably the solution to USB drive failure, regardless of the failure mode.  Although I did buy some SLC USB drives on the basis they might be expected to have better longevity than the usual MLC devices.  Haven't used them for anything yet, though.

roy
Pages: « 1 [2]  All
  Print  
 
Jump to:  

Powered by MySQL Powered by PHP Powered by SMF 1.1.19 | SMF © 2006-2009, Simple Machines Valid XHTML 1.0! Valid CSS!