How to send out of a watch-only wallet?

[BTCetera]

I have a paper backup, a digital wallet backup and all the passwords: how do I retrieve the private key for a watch-only wallet so I can send some coins out of it (created in armory and imported into, for example, blockchain.info)?

If that's not possible, is using passphrase from within armory the only way to send coins out of an armory watch-only wallet?

[Dabs]

You get the private key that's on the machine that created the original wallet. Watch-only wallets don't have the private key.

[BTCetera]

You get the private key that's on the machine that created the original wallet. Watch-only wallets don't have the private key.

Thanks. I figured that out and made a little guide out of it. I hope it helps other people.

This is how you obtain the private key for an Armory wallet:

In Armory-Qt, click on Wallet Properties>Backup this wallet>See other backup options>Export Key Lists then click the button Export Key Lists. Enter your passphrase and Armory will show your wallet's private key. Note that a watch-only copy of a wallet uses the same private key as the original wallet it was created from.

This is useful if you want to send coins from an Armory wallet without using Armory, for example from an armory wallet address you imported into blockchain.info. In order to do so, you need to enter into the chosen service the private keys to the wallet you want to send from. In the case of BlockChain.info, the key it accepts is the one in PrivHexBE format, after you remove the spaces.

Word of caution: after you enter a wallet's private key into any online service that wallet is no longer secure. You should considering transferring all the coins it holds out then not using that wallet again.

[justusranvier]

Word of caution: after you enter a wallet's private key into any online service that wallet is no longer secure. You should considering transferring all the coins it holds out then not using that wallet again.

Word of caution: a wallet is not an address.

[BTCetera]

Word of caution: after you enter a wallet's private key into any online service that wallet is no longer secure. You should considering transferring all the coins it holds out then not using that wallet again.

Word of caution: a wallet is not an address.

Not sure I get what you mean or why this relates to what I said.

PS: I do really like "Bitcoin is a human rights movement." Do you have any more info on someone who has expanded on this topic?

[etotheipi]

Based on the question, I'm not sure if you totally understand the power that Armory is offering you. 

Unless you want to destroy your secure setup, please do not export private keys anywhere else.  The point of Armory is to keep those private keys on a single computer (and backup piece of paper), and never touch any other system or network.  That's what makes it secure.

Armory gives you a way to spend those coins without moving the private keys.  If you already made an Armory wallet on an offline computer and using the watching-only wallet on the online computer, you should use the system as advertised:

https://bitcoinarmory.com/about/using-our-wallet/#offlinewallet


--Your watch-only wallet (online computer) creates the unsigned transaction and saves it to USB drive
--Your offline computer reviews and asks for confirmation, and then signs with the private keys
--Your online computer takes the signed transaction and sends (broadcasts) to the network

You should never have to touch private keys.  Please do not touch them unless you are desperately trying to get away from Armory and cannot get online to send the coins to your new wallet.

[BTCetera]

I hear you, and I understand it, but in my case it was a valid solution: I needed to spend some BTC sitting in my watch only wallet. Unfortunately, Armory doesn't work for me. (I sent the log twice already, but the problem persists).

Another case where this is valid is when someone needs to spend/sell their coins and they cannot get access to a computer which has armory OR they cannot wait for the database/blockchain to sync (which as we know can take almost 24 hrs if you havent run Bitcoin-qt in the past 7 or 10 days).

For these reasons, saving the private key somewhere safe is something I recommend. Unless I'm missing something!?

[etotheipi]

I hear you, and I understand it, but in my case it was a valid solution: I needed to spend some BTC sitting in my watch only wallet. Unfortunately, Armory doesn't work for me. (I sent the log twice already, but the problem persists).

Another case where this is valid is when someone needs to spend/sell their coins and they cannot get access to a computer which has armory OR they cannot wait for the database/blockchain to sync (which as we know can take almost 24 hrs if you havent run Bitcoin-qt in the past 7 or 10 days).

For these reasons, saving the private key somewhere safe is something I recommend. Unless I'm missing something!?

Okay, sorry I couldn't correlate your online profile with one of the people sending us log files.  We get a lot!

Just be aware that once you expose the private keys to another system, then you have compromised the security of your wallet.  If you export a bunch of private keys and import them into blockchain.info, it would be best to retire that wallet and start a new one when you are sure that online Armory works for you.   

[BTCetera]

Just be aware that once you expose the private keys to another system, then you have compromised the security of your wallet.  If you export a bunch of private keys and import them into blockchain.info, it would be best to retire that wallet and start a new one when you are sure that online Armory works for you.   

Yes! That's why I included the "Word of caution" at the end of my post.

[justmyname]

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=281949.0

[segeln]

--Your watch-only wallet (online computer) creates the unsigned transaction and saves it to USB drive
--Your offline computer reviews and asks for confirmation, and then signs with the private keys
--Your online computer takes the signed transaction and sends (broadcasts) to the network

though I am a fan of USB Sticks I don`t feel fine about  using them in the offline Computer.
First you should disable the auto-run on the offline Computer, but this won´t protect you from malware getting caught in the online Computer and then the malware could go to the offline Computer, get some Data and broadcast it later via online Compuer.
I think it is better to use a single CD and destroy it after using it.
@Etotheipi, what do you think about this method or do you have any suggestion for improving security or even eliminating all potential threats of USB Sticks ?
And another question:
If I run Armory as described in the instructions (offline-never, ever touch-internet Computer  and online watching-only wallet etc.) and create all wallet adresses by Armory, I suppose you really don`t worry about the wallet.dat of bitcoin-Qt. Provided you won`t use bitcoin-Qt(adresses)as your wallet.
So, do I have really to backup the wallet.dat?
I see no reason for backups of the wallet.dat
Corrupting or stealing the wallet.dat will have no Effect for wallet-Management done by Armory.
Except in case of stealing or corrupting the wallet.dat bitcoin-Qt has to load the blockchain again in awesome time.
bitcoin-Qt runs in the Background only for "blockchaining" in the internet, not for wallet-Management. Right?
Hope i get the answer quickly as I will install Armory tomorrow on an offline Computer.

[xephyr]

Use a linux distro for your offline computer.

[Dabs]

Maybe the new No Wallet feature of the latest bitcoind is something online Armory can use.