You may ADD OR REMOVE walls of his path
Yes, that's the "obscurity" part of your reasoning. It doesn't provide any added level of (real) security. When designing a security system all forms of added levels of complexity are
risks where there might be edge cases you haven't thought about. You want as few implementation parts as possible, while still giving you a provable level of security.
You really don't know what password attacks are all about, do you? It's NOT a matter of being brutte-force proof, because there's NOT and never will be such a thing. It's a matter of TIME. The part that really matters is the attack TIMELINE:
0 m - plain text passwords broken
5 m - unsalted md5 <= 12 chars broken (Rainbow); unsalted ripemd160 <= 8 chars broken...
30m - salted (plain salt) md5 <= 10 chars broken
(...)
1 year - salted (plain) SHA256 <= 12 chars broken
(...)
This is what you can play with: TIME. If you call taken attackers time "obscurity", then it's your problem. There's no edging on encrypt/generate the salt.
"Educate users" is what fascists do! There's nothing to "educate" there. Good security is passive, active security is bullshit as the user will certainly need security against its "security". Humans are the central part to take into account, not the machines.