Making the target variable according to computing power

[Alula]

Is it possible to make the target variable for different miners. I know the target changes every 210,000 blocks (two weeks) but it is the same for every miner. But in order to discourage miners to invest in acquiring powerful machines and reduce power consumption I thought of making the target variable. The powerful the machine the smaller the target and so the more challenging the puzzle becomes. Would this be possible from implementation point of view. What consequences might this have. Thanks for explanations.

[1715589897]

1715589897

[1715589897]

1715589897

[1715589897]

1715589897

[DannyHamilton]

Is it possible to make the target variable for different miners. I know the target changes every 210,000 blocks (two weeks) but it is the same for every miner. But in order to discourage miners to invest in acquiring powerful machines and reduce power consumption I thought of making the target variable. The powerful the machine the smaller the target and so the more challenging the puzzle becomes. Would this be possible from implementation point of view. What consequences might this have. Thanks for explanations.

How would you prevent someone from lying about how powerful their machine is?

[tromp]

Is it possible to make the target variable for different miners. I know the target changes every 210,000 blocks (two weeks) but it is the same for every miner. But in order to discourage miners to invest in acquiring powerful machines and reduce power consumption I thought of making the target variable. The powerful the machine the smaller the target and so the more challenging the puzzle becomes. Would this be possible from implementation point of view. What consequences might this have. Thanks for explanations.

How would you prevent someone from lying about how powerful their machine is?

You won't believe it, but my Sinclair ZX-80 computer solved another block today at difficulty 1.3 !

[Alula]

I thought of this problem and I don’t have clear answer for now. But I was thinking of a mechanism where those who lie are disadvantaged through the rewarding mechanism. For example, if you have powerful machine but you lied. Then you will solve easier puzzle but your reward will be proportionally less. But I’m not sure of the net effect, let me take some time to think.

[fremen]

How would the system know who lied?
Also, a fundamental part of the protocol is that the consensus on truth is not "one node one vote", but rather the vote is proportional to the hashing power. Otherwise it would be easy to set up thousands of nodes to do a "51%" attack.