BitPico throwing down against Roger Ver

[jbreher]

But you have again sidestepped the question:
Why do you think non-mining validator count has any bearing on a measurement of 'economic majority'?

I did not sidestep the question. I answered you before and I will give you the same answer again.

The network needs non-mining full nodes to economically enforce the rules on the miners, and the more the better to make the network more resilient. If there are no non-mining full nodes running in the network, then we only have a network with the miners making their own rules.

You may think you have not sidestepped the question, but you certainly have not answered it. Nothing in your paragraph about needing non-mining nodes says anything whatsoever about the economic majority.

I will try one last time to rephrase. If you answer with yet another non-sequitur, then I am done with this conversation.

Why do you think that the number of non-mining validators is a measure of the economic majority?

Because if each real user and each real merchant ran a Bitcoin full validating node, it is, because they all validate and enforce the rules. If they did not run one for reasons like "the only nodes that matter are the mining nodes" then what is stopping the miners from changing the rules?

But you are sidestepping my question too. Why do you believe that a higher count of non-mining nodes have no bearing on the network? Would it not centralize all power towards miners if there are no non-mining full nodes?

No. I have answered many of your questions. I am not answering this new one until you address the question I have repeatedly posed to you. Which you have not.

"If." if if if. Not an answer. Yet another non-sequitur. Tell me a reason you believe that a measure of non-mining validators is in any way a measure of economic majority.

[Wind_FURY]

But you have again sidestepped the question:
Why do you think non-mining validator count has any bearing on a measurement of 'economic majority'?

I did not sidestep the question. I answered you before and I will give you the same answer again.

The network needs non-mining full nodes to economically enforce the rules on the miners, and the more the better to make the network more resilient. If there are no non-mining full nodes running in the network, then we only have a network with the miners making their own rules.

You may think you have not sidestepped the question, but you certainly have not answered it. Nothing in your paragraph about needing non-mining nodes says anything whatsoever about the economic majority.

I will try one last time to rephrase. If you answer with yet another non-sequitur, then I am done with this conversation.

Why do you think that the number of non-mining validators is a measure of the economic majority?

Because if each real user and each real merchant ran a Bitcoin full validating node, it is, because they all validate and enforce the rules. If they did not run one for reasons like "the only nodes that matter are the mining nodes" then what is stopping the miners from changing the rules?

But you are sidestepping my question too. Why do you believe that a higher count of non-mining nodes have no bearing on the network? Would it not centralize all power towards miners if there are no non-mining full nodes?

No. I have answered many of your questions. I am not answering this new one until you address the question I have repeatedly posed to you. Which you have not.

But I did in the best way that I can make you understand. Plus if you want to sidestep my question because you have no answer, it's ok.

"If." if if if. Not an answer.

I was only using that as an example. You are nitpicking.

Yet another non-sequitur. Tell me a reason you believe that a measure of non-mining validators is in any way a measure of economic majority.

Then what is the correct answer, if you know it? I am not asking as a challenge, but to inquire and learn.

[shawn995]

I simply accepted it would have been machines from their gathering running the assault. Perhaps any hostile to Bcash excavators out there who bounce on board if that alternative ends up conceivable.
In light of that, I was speculating they aren't anticipating keeping any of the forks alive (nothing to back this up) simply utilizing this as a disturbance to the Bcash system to demonstrate its vulnerabilities.
It would appear to be extremely outlandish for them to make these structures and afterward keep them alive. Except if their solitary issue is that Bcash is guaranteeing to be Bitcoin. In the event that that is the situation why a waste.

[jbreher]

Yet another non-sequitur. Tell me a reason you believe that a measure of non-mining validators is in any way a measure of economic majority.

Then what is the correct answer, if you know it? I am not asking as a challenge, but to inquire and learn.

Well, the rather obvious correct answer is that a measure of the number of non-mining validating entities has fuck-all to do with a measure of economic power.

However, your entire argument that the desires of the miners (as a class) is held in check by the desires of non-mining validators (as a class) is utterly dependent upon the assumption that non-mining validator count is a valid proxy for economic power. These numbers bear no relation to each other. Which is why you are either too internally mentally conflicted to be able to see this simple fact, or you are too dishonest in your argument to admit it.

[cryptotrade007]

This is great.  Roger Ver is a stain on the crypto community, and it's nice to see him taken down a few pegs.  No respect for that guy.

[Wind_FURY]

Yet another non-sequitur. Tell me a reason you believe that a measure of non-mining validators is in any way a measure of economic majority.

Then what is the correct answer, if you know it? I am not asking as a challenge, but to inquire and learn.

Well, the rather obvious correct answer is that a measure of the number of non-mining validating entities has fuck-all to do with a measure of economic power.

However, your entire argument that the desires of the miners (as a class) is held in check by the desires of non-mining validators (as a class) is utterly dependent upon the assumption that non-mining validator count is a valid proxy for economic power. These numbers bear no relation to each other. Which is why you are either too internally mentally conflicted to be able to see this simple fact, or you are too dishonest in your argument to admit it.

Yes but if there are too few non-mining full nodes then it would be easier for the miners to "Sybilize" their way to change the rules, is it not?

I do not know what the exact number of nodes is enough for decentralization, but I believe it would be better to overshoot security than undershoot it.

[Zin-Zang]

Yet another non-sequitur. Tell me a reason you believe that a measure of non-mining validators is in any way a measure of economic majority.

Then what is the correct answer, if you know it? I am not asking as a challenge, but to inquire and learn.

Well, the rather obvious correct answer is that a measure of the number of non-mining validating entities has fuck-all to do with a measure of economic power.

However, your entire argument that the desires of the miners (as a class) is held in check by the desires of non-mining validators (as a class) is utterly dependent upon the assumption that non-mining validator count is a valid proxy for economic power. These numbers bear no relation to each other. Which is why you are either too internally mentally conflicted to be able to see this simple fact, or you are too dishonest in your argument to admit it.

Personally, I don't think Wind_FURY is dishonest,

I believe Wind_FURY is just really really stupid.  

* Agree with jbreher*

non-mining validating entities has fuck-all to do with a measure of economic power.

FYI:
@Wind_FURY, why don't you re read https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=4554671.msg42433804#msg42433804
like a few hundred times and see if it sink in , what jbreher told you and Franky1 one already pointed out.

random guy 'jimmy' with just a node in his basement doesnt have sway over the community direction the network changes. and mining pools also cant just send out a new block format that nodes automatically accept new blocks (blocks do not AI rewrite the rules of nodes)

node users need to download a version that accepts the new blocks. again. pools cant just make a new format and magically make old nodes accept it

now heres where the non-mining community do have sway
what needs to happen is the merchants/exchanges which the pools and users use have more non-mining sway. because if a merchant/exchange is not seeing transactions then pools/users cannot spend their funds. so as i said little jimmy cant sway the network but if the majority of merchants/exchanges accept block B format. usually everyone else follows
...
flipping the argument
anyone can set up 20,000 littl jimmys that accept block B format. and also set up a pool of 56exahash accepting block B.. but in the end if coinbase, blockchain.info, bitstamp, (list many othr merchants) and the pools are still block A, merchants and pools will just reject blockB and ban nodes sending out blockB. thus making block B an altcoin that is unspendabl due to no mrchant adoption

end result is no disruption to the block A network. and block B jimmys and 56exahash pool of block B .. but ends up only communicating with their own kind as a altcoin.

the non-mining nodes DO have sway.. but its not home user sway of majority.. its who will accept my money/sees my payment (merchant) sway

In the end the Merchants hold the economic power as they are the ones accepting or refusing the transactions as payment for their services or products.
Number of non-mining nodes are irrelevant. One is as good as a billion , as long as you can access the one and trust it.
All they do is verify the same entry, so how many times , would you need someone to tell you 2+2=4 over & over again before you believe them.
The Merchants are trusting whichever crypto service node, they are using, so multiple merchants are all trusting Coinbase's non-mining node and caring little about what the other nodes report, such as the one in your basement.

[jbreher]

Yet another non-sequitur. Tell me a reason you believe that a measure of non-mining validators is in any way a measure of economic majority.

Then what is the correct answer, if you know it? I am not asking as a challenge, but to inquire and learn.

Well, the rather obvious correct answer is that a measure of the number of non-mining validating entities has fuck-all to do with a measure of economic power.

However, your entire argument that the desires of the miners (as a class) is held in check by the desires of non-mining validators (as a class) is utterly dependent upon the assumption that non-mining validator count is a valid proxy for economic power. These numbers bear no relation to each other. Which is why you are either too internally mentally conflicted to be able to see this simple fact, or you are too dishonest in your argument to admit it.

Yes but if there are too few non-mining full nodes then it would be easier for the miners to "Sybilize" their way to change the rules, is it not?

Again: the miners implement whatever rules they so choose. They have no need to 'Sybilize', as non-mining validators have no power of enforcement.

So, no.

[jbreher]

I believe Wind_FURY is just really really stupid.  

Well, that may not be the case.

Many in this bct.org echo chamber accept as axiomatic many things that are not true, just because they are part of the local religious dogma. If they'd bother to honestly examine their preconceptions, they'd likely arrive at an understanding of how Bitcoin really works.

[Wind_FURY]

Yet another non-sequitur. Tell me a reason you believe that a measure of non-mining validators is in any way a measure of economic majority.

Then what is the correct answer, if you know it? I am not asking as a challenge, but to inquire and learn.

Well, the rather obvious correct answer is that a measure of the number of non-mining validating entities has fuck-all to do with a measure of economic power.

However, your entire argument that the desires of the miners (as a class) is held in check by the desires of non-mining validators (as a class) is utterly dependent upon the assumption that non-mining validator count is a valid proxy for economic power. These numbers bear no relation to each other. Which is why you are either too internally mentally conflicted to be able to see this simple fact, or you are too dishonest in your argument to admit it.

Personally, I don't think Wind_FURY is dishonest,

I believe Wind_FURY is just really really stupid.  

* Agree with jbreher*

non-mining validating entities has fuck-all to do with a measure of economic power.

I agree, I am stupid and I have never said that I am smart. I am hear to learn, and I am open to hear to anything you say to convince me. But are you saying anything good to learn from? No.

In the end the Merchants hold the economic power as they are the ones accepting or refusing the transactions as payment for their services or products.
Number of non-mining nodes are irrelevant. One is as good as a billion , as long as you can access the one and trust it.
All they do is verify the same entry, so how many times , would you need someone to tell you 2+2=4 over & over again before you believe them.
The Merchants are trusting whichever crypto service node, they are using, so multiple merchants are all trusting Coinbase's non-mining node and caring little about what the other nodes report, such as the one in your basement.

But are the users not a part of the economic majority? Was the failure of 2X not a lesson that the users can also impose themselves on the network?

Plus what is the difference of the nodes from the other nodes' point of view? They all validate and relay transcations and blocks if valid. Nodes do not care if it is a mining node, a merchant's node, or a node in a basement.

Can you answer this?

But if there are too few non-mining full nodes then it would be easier for the miners to "Sybilize" their way to change the rules, is it not?

I want to know your opinion.

[jbreher]

But are the users not a part of the economic majority?

Well, you have not defined what you mean by the term 'users'. But if I may speculate that you are referring to bitcoin transacters that are neither merchants nor miners, the answer is 'of course they are part of the economic majority'.

The issue that I have had with your ongoing position is your confused notion that a count of non-mining validators has some relationship with the economic majority.

Now you seem to be introducing another confused notion that a count of non-mining validators has some relationship with the count of users? Not sure if this is really what you mean, but again, no.

Was the failure of 2X not a lesson that the users can also impose themselves on the network?

In that 'users' (again, you have not defined the term) are a proxy for the economic power of those users, yes - but only in relation to the economic power of other entities in the system. And again - non-mining validators are not a measure of 'users', for any logical definition of the term 'users'.

Plus what is the difference of the nodes from the other nodes' point of view?

None. Well, they can be, if the operator goes in and edits bitcoin.conf. Or is a non-mining validator is cast out of the allowed peers due to dishonesty. But by default, all non-mining validators treat other potential peers identically.

[Zin-Zang]

In the end the Merchants hold the economic power as they are the ones accepting or refusing the transactions as payment for their services or products.
Number of non-mining nodes are irrelevant. One is as good as a billion , as long as you can access the one and trust it.
All they do is verify the same entry, so how many times , would you need someone to tell you 2+2=4 over & over again before you believe them.
The Merchants are trusting whichever crypto service node, they are using, so multiple merchants are all trusting Coinbase's non-mining node and caring little about what the other nodes report, such as the one in your basement.

But are the users not a part of the economic majority? Was the failure of 2X not a lesson that the users can also impose themselves on the network?

Plus what is the difference of the nodes from the other nodes' point of view? They all validate and relay transcations and blocks if valid. Nodes do not care if it is a mining node, a merchant's node, or a node in a basement.

Users are Users, they only have an effect on the economic power, when they buy or sell bitcoins.
Unless they are buying or selling in the millions per day, their effect on the economics is too small to notice.
Merchants have a greater effect on economic power because of the higher % , that flows thru them.

All of the Merchants using Coinbase , are not running their own node, they are using Coinbase's node and completely trusting coinbase to maintain it ,
they are not even hooked up to the bitcoin network so they could care less what your basement node is doing.

Example:
I have never ran a bitcoin node, because their is no financial incentive for me to do so. (No interest or transaction fees earned)
I gain nothing from keeping a bitcoin wallet maintained and synced and instead use the exchange's wallet to hold my bitcoins and letting their node be the arbiter.
Am I giving up some security because of this , sure. But the additional security is not worth it to me , as I don't hold bitcoin as a store of value but only use it as a payment network when required. I also never break the cardinal rule: Never leave more coins sitting on a single exchange than what you are willing to lose.
Most Merchants are the same as they immediately convert to fiat to avoid fluctuations in btc price verses fiat, because the input costs to run their business are in fiat not crypto.

But if there are too few non-mining full nodes then it would be easier for the miners to "Sybilize" their way to change the rules, is it not?

Sorry to butt in jbreher, I'll leave you guys to your conversation after this.

Sybil attacks
1. can refuse to relay transactions and slow down block propagation to other nodes.
2. can isolate your node from the network and block you from syncing with the network.
3. can in some rare cases cause you to run on a temporary fork.
(In which case, transactions won't match the rest of the network.
Monitoring a trusted 3rd party block explorer that it block height matches your node is a easy way to block sybil attack.)

(Including addnodes in your conf file to a few trusted IPs, blocks Sybil attacks 2 & 3)  

Sybil attacks can not change the program code on my node therefore they can not change the rules of the network.
IE: They can't change hard coded things like block size or block speed or anything that my node program code will reject.

[jbreher]

Sybil attacks
1. can refuse to relay transactions and slow down block propagation to other nodes.

True, but trivial to counteract.

2. can isolate your node from the network and block you from syncing with the network.

True, but trivial to counteract.

3. can in some rare cases cause you to run on a temporary fork.

True, but trivial to counteract. As you point out. Though 'trusted' is not really as important is avoiding nefarious peers.

[Wind_FURY]

But if there are too few non-mining full nodes then it would be easier for the miners to "Sybilize" their way to change the rules, is it not?

Sybil attacks can not change the program code on my node therefore they can not change the rules of the network.
IE: They can't change hard coded things like block size or block speed or anything that my node program code will reject.

I reply to this one first.

Ok. But what if the Bitcoin network has very few mining or non-mining nodes. Would it not be an open opportunity for some group to do a UAHF Sybil set up to force the decentralized part of the network to hard fork to the rules the group wants?

Is it possible that that kind of set up, controlled by Jihan Wu, is in place in Bitcoin Cash's network?

[Zin-Zang]

But if there are too few non-mining full nodes then it would be easier for the miners to "Sybilize" their way to change the rules, is it not?

Sybil attacks can not change the program code on my node therefore they can not change the rules of the network.
IE: They can't change hard coded things like block size or block speed or anything that my node program code will reject.

I reply to this one first.

Ok. But what if the Bitcoin network has very few mining or non-mining nodes. Would it not be an open opportunity for some group to do a UAHF Sybil set up to force the decentralized part of the network to hard fork to the rules the group wants?

Nope,  
Sybil attacks can not change the program code on my node therefore they can not change the rules of the network.
# of nodes is irrelevant.

You are confusing a hard fork with a sybil attack.  My previous post explained what a sybil attack could do:
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=4554671.msg43399300#msg43399300

https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hard-fork.asp
A hard fork  as it relates to blockchain technology, is a radical change to the protocol that makes previously invalid blocks/transactions valid (or vice-versa).
This requires all nodes or users to upgrade to the latest version of the protocol software.

*Any attempts to change the protocol with less than full consensus of all of the miners does nothing more than create an ALT coin for the splinter group.*

[Wind_FURY]

I have contemplated on this debate, and I admit my mistake, and that it is true that Bitcoin's consensus security does not come from the amount of "users" running full nodes, but from the unableness of bad actors from changing the "rules" from both the mining side and the client side.

But we will not have a network that will have real full scale consensus security if we let miners dictate consensus freely by saying "only mining nodes matter" which Roger Ver and some from community are saying. Non-mining nodes are also very important.

[jbreher]

Non-mining nodes are also very important.

Nope - you're still not getting it.

Non-mining nodes do not have any enforcement power. The only counterbalance to the community of miners, and their ability to enact whatever rules they so desire, is the threat of the economic majority abandoning the chain that the miners are making.

Many in the community advance the addle-brained notion that a count non-mining validators has some proportional relationship to economic majority. But as demonstrated above, these two figures are essentially unrelated.

[jbreher]

Hmm. This is kind of interesting: BitPico bails on BTC:
 
@bitPico
Follow Follow @bitPico
More
We are no longer bullish on #bitcoin $btc & dumped all @ 8300 USD. We’ve put our farm up for sale also. Why? We no longer want to participate in the worlds most manipulated commodity. Bitcoin is now just a shit show. Good luck!

https://twitter.com/bitPico/status/1025816258414039040

[Wind_FURY]

Non-mining nodes are also very important.

Nope - you're still not getting it.

Non-mining nodes do not have any enforcement power. The only counterbalance to the community of miners, and their ability to enact whatever rules they so desire, is the threat of the economic majority abandoning the chain that the miners are making.

Many in the community advance the addle-brained notion that a count non-mining validators has some proportional relationship to economic majority. But as demonstrated above, these two figures are essentially unrelated.

But we cannot just allow the miners to centrally dictate consensus as they wish, can we? The best examples of the community and the economic majority imposing themselves against the miners are the UASF and NO2X. Tell me if I am wrong in this.

[Steamtyme]

Hmm. This is kind of interesting: BitPico bails on BTC:
 
@bitPico
Follow Follow @bitPico
More
We are no longer bullish on #bitcoin $btc & dumped all @ 8300 USD. We’ve put our farm up for sale also. Why? We no longer want to participate in the worlds most manipulated commodity. Bitcoin is now just a shit show. Good luck!

https://twitter.com/bitPico/status/1025816258414039040

Thanks for posting that, I hadn't really looked to much further into who(m) Bitpico was supposed to be.

Not a lot to go on in any sense, and seems like an odd way to get out of the game. Looks like one big circle jerk of a marketing promoting game in the end; really no substance to any of it.

That or some sort of meltdown, to delete all past posting history.

Enjoyed watching you and Wind_Fury discuss the network.

I'm going to lock the topic, as there is no need for it to be around. Request received to reopen topic