Is this a puzzle/canary transaction? Unusual patterns in MD160 values.

[almightyruler]

https://www.blockchain.com/btc/tx/1053fc6eaa6d9fce1b2084069ebb7ae08bcca0c96193ee7067f39df8fa0145b1?show_adv=false

All outputs except one (change?) are the same 5480 satoshi amount.

Some of the addresses have interesting looking patterns or sequences when viewed in hex format:

Code:

0001050101010101010000000000000000010203
0101010101010100000000000001020304050607
03050504040000017d0102030004110512213141
2e6a70677c303030303030303030303030303030
303030303030303030303036365c623339613566
3838393263353561326633666631383638303231
3e3030303030303030303030303030303035343a
5349472a303030303038382f494e497775756f48
5da8ffecc8ecffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
6465666768696a737475767778797a8283848586
85868788898a92939495969798999aa2a3a4a5a6
a7a8a9aab2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9bac2c3c4c5c6c7c8
f4f5f6f7f8f9faffda000c03010002110311003f
ffe4f3fff6c4c8ffffffffffffffffffddffffff
ffffffffffffffffdb0043013d4040564b56a85d
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffc00011
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff

This is just a quick visual browse of a few hundred hex values, so there's probably several I've missed. Viewing in binary or other formats may also reveal something.

To 'solve' patterns like this - matching a specific RIPEMD-160 hash - would effectively require brute forcing the private key space, right? So then, it's more like a canary: if the funds assigned to any of these non-random patterns ever moved, it would be a very unlikely coincidence, or an indication that something is very wrong.

Comments?

[1714945870]

1714945870

[Coding Enthusiast]

To 'solve' patterns like this - matching a specific RIPEMD-160 hash - would effectively require brute forcing the private key space, right?

You can't go in reverse. There are first two hashing algorithms that you have to reverse in order to find the public key: RIPEMD160 then SHA256 which is obviously impossible to reverse one, let alone two!
Even having the public key you still have to reverse the Elliptic Curve calculations to get to the private key. Which is again obviously impossible.

So then, it's more like a canary: if the funds assigned to any of these non-random patterns ever moved, it would be a very unlikely coincidence, or an indication that something is very wrong.

Not necessarily. All you can say is that it is impossible to find the private key by having the address. But what you don't know is that someone might have gotten lucky and actually created one of those addresses from a private key so they can spend the funds belonging to that key.

[nc50lc]

I think that this is some kind of a test, the sender must have tried to see if there is someone out there who's bruteforcing simple formats.
And now currently monitoring these addresses.

There's one thing for sure.
No one will actually solve them for a small change (584sat/address).

[almightyruler]

To 'solve' patterns like this - matching a specific RIPEMD-160 hash - would effectively require brute forcing the private key space, right?

You can't go in reverse. There are first two hashing algorithms that you have to reverse in order to find the public key: RIPEMD160 then SHA256 which is obviously impossible to reverse one, let alone two!
Even having the public key you still have to reverse the Elliptic Curve calculations to get to the private key. Which is again obviously impossible.

That was exactly my point: trying to find matches for these 'special' addresses is as statistically improbable as finding a brute force match for any address. So this wouldn't be a solvable puzzle.

So then, it's more like a canary: if the funds assigned to any of these non-random patterns ever moved, it would be a very unlikely coincidence, or an indication that something is very wrong.

Not necessarily. All you can say is that it is impossible to find the private key by having the address. But what you don't know is that someone might have gotten lucky and actually created one of those addresses from a private key so they can spend the funds belonging to that key.

Okay then, modify "any" to "more than a couple"

Another unusual thing about this transaction: most of the addresses seem to have no apparent pattern (when viewed in hex, anyway). I can think of two potential reasons off the top of my head:

1. The private keys are randomly generated and are used as extra markers to reinforce proof of indiscriminate and broad key cracking. (Canary)
2. The private keys themselves have some kind of pattern, which is obfuscated by hashing to generate the address. (Puzzle)

Or perhaps the sender just did some random crap in the hope that someone would notice and start a thread asking about it

[simplexum]

maybe someone just wanted to encode something and put it into blockchain, but for some reason decided to not use op_return approach, and encoded it in this strange manner?

[HeRetiK]

maybe someone just wanted to encode something and put it into blockchain, but for some reason decided to not use op_return approach, and encoded it in this strange manner?

Seems like it.


There's a couple of human-readable strings in there when converted to ASCII:

Attempting to recreate #Foucault #Gyroscope
<3 #embiiLNK

Some of which seem to be part of an encoded jpg file:

2nd Foucault Attempt.jpg [...] JFIF [...] ExifMM [...] paint.net 4.0.9

And then there are these bits...

&'()*456789:CDEFGHIJSTUVWXYZcdefghijstuvwxyz

&'()*56789:CDEFGHIJSTUVWXYZcdefghijstuvwxyz

...which turn up in a couple of posts related to steganography CTF challenges so maybe there's some data hidden inside the encoded image?


I'm drawing a blank on the rest though. Here's the full hex for anyone feeling like giving it a go:

Code:

5349472a303030303038382f494e497775756f48
364242452b66636f566c656b573667334b4e5556
516d76345751312f355273634d2f72654b537067
6331587447786b37616635497a5853734b634338
524f4c4c716b39582b3174364d4d49337130633d
3e3030303030303030303030303030303035343a
417474656d7074696e6720746f20726563726561
74652023466f756361756c7420234779726f7363
6f70650d0a3c332023656d6269694c4e4b3c3030
303030303030303030303036365c623339613566
3838393263353561326633666631383638303231
6438613366333961393538333666333965626236
3836623332613963656131646566333166360d0a
326e6420466f756361756c7420417474656d7074
2e6a70677c303030303030303030303030303030
323439353422ffd8ffe000104a46494600010101
00c000c00000ffe100aa4578696600004d4d002a
000000080009011a0005000000010000007a011b
0005000000010000008201280003000000010002
000001310002000000100000008a030100050000
00010000009a0303000100000001000000005110
0001000000010100000051110004000000010000
0000511200040000000100000000000000000000
00c000000001000000c0000000017061696e742e
6e657420342e302e3900000186a00000b18fffdb
00430039272b322b2439322e32403d3944568f5d
564f4f56af7d84688fcfb6dad6cbb6c8c4e4ffff
ffe4f3fff6c4c8ffffffffffffffffffddffffff
ffffffffffffffffdb0043013d4040564b56a85d
5da8ffecc8ecffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffc00011
08023c040003012200021101031101ffc4001f00
0001050101010101010000000000000000010203
0405060708090a0bffc400b51000020103030204
03050504040000017d0102030004110512213141
0613516107227114328191a1082342b1c11552d1
f02433627282090a161718191a25262728292a34
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85868788898a92939495969798999aa2a3a4a5a6
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eaf1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9faffc4001f0100030101
0101010101010100000000000001020304050607
08090a0bffc400b5110002010204040304070504
0400010277000102031104052131061241510761
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38393a434445464748494a535455565758595a63
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f4f5f6f7f8f9faffda000c03010002110311003f
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3494a38a005a4a527d29322800a434bd4d271408
5078a4cd18a28010f5a72d34d19340127149c7ad
33ea6940c5031723b53d64e69a149e95204c5002
8638a29281400b9a5cd26290d003b34a2994f140
0b49d2863e94dcf1cd00293c52034941a007668e
949486800ce69c29a29d400bc519a4a514005262
968a004a2969ac6800a33450a3078a005a2814b4
00da314ea314009da9052e29714009452d250000
d141a38a60252f7a294520131cd2e28a5a00052d
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d33764d28eb400ea4268279a4a00438a3381c521
fd69541a00334bf5a5c0a43400b91403c5252806
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520eb40052fe341a43400d24d19a38a2800cd2d2
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50019a5079e690d250049d68a60269dbb8a005a3
3480d2d001477a4cd19a005a2928a0028cd2e690
0a04028a338a28187d682690d06800a677a7d34f
5a4030f5a4cd38f5a69a621a4d28e9494bf5a005
a43451400514514000f7a3b7bd145030340a4a07
26810629e06691464d482818a07147340a750037
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380a3140ce39a5a0028a296801b4b41a4cd00145
14500068c529a4a004c51d294d34d003b8a38f5a
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f14a47ad00252f6a0518a4002827279a70148073
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cd145001403494a6801d494da5068016969b4a28
00ef4b4d3d68a005341e94946280173499a4a70a
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a28cd3101a296928185148696801334b4945020a
7014c1cd483a5031dd69714da78a0428a5149d29
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45002628c53a8ed400dc5267d69dde908cd00251
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51400b9a339a4a280148a318a4a37500381a5a68
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3400014e1494b8a0008a4a5c1a00a004c53714fe
6820d00379a46a7e0d211914011d29a3bd266800
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34a3a53734a0d201475c52914831d68a005cd281
9a403269c68000052f14da5a0070a01e69b46281
8fcd19a4c52e2800a5cd2628a6019a334628c520
0cd14628a0028a31494c05e28a4a2900b4949450
02d149473400b499a4a39a005cd19e6939a39cd0
21d9a29b9a280179a334506800079a2928cd0014
6693346680168a33466800a4a3229734009475a5
a280128cd0693a50029c5266909a4cd003f20502
a3c9cd483a500068069334b40031a01a42695680
179c51d4519a280128141a074a00891f1529236d
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4a31400ece68cfbd2628a005c9f5a334518a0033
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5253875a43d6801334a39a6138a5068014d34e47
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1da9b8a005a295572093d29b8a002968652bd68a
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42d14521a0028c5251400b452734a05001452e29
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000320fb5369d1f0c476a6918931db34012a1000
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928cd2734e1d281884fad3694f3499a0421a28ef
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5e11bf9d5661f31ab56a311938e7a5567ff58de9
9a48040280b4528a60382d2ecc537752eea005db
4d20fa5383d26f3400ddb4605481fda94b8f4140
11518a712a7b527d2801bd28c9a711405e280101
34649a762971400807a9a5c0f5a314b40843f2d3
463a934e2462a2e68025dcb81eb4061daa30b4f0
28192063eb4bbcfad30628c8a043f7d1be9bc519
1400edc29370a63b7cbf2d30127b50049bc76a09
f6a68a70228189f851b7da94b519a004d949b295
9f14c6909e9c0a0429503a9a4dc074e6984d2500
38b1f5a4cd251400b45252d300a297eb45002514
0a2900e51eb52038e41e6a31d28cd0049e73839d
c691a42fc9c67da99464e6801c5b3c934e562380
78a6014a462801d914ff003147441510e6978140
0acdb8e4d2ab29187cf1d314cc8a4cfb520262eb
8c2afe34c56dac09a6eef6a42c6801e4e493eb52
21cc6558d400f146ea00711489f7c7d69a58d2af
27e940124df78d419e6a4739a8bbd00582c9260b
1da69b23863c741c0a8a8a603fcc3b36f6ce69e2
6e140edd6a1cd0185202595d5b1807814eb63894
67bd45c50188391d68007f95d803c668c9ef4879
34940126735328c0a8946715350052e869cbc834
d2734aa69884c52d145030a28a0f140051451408
2973499a5a06069a69690d00145145310ab4a077
a6679a7678a00701cd211cd2afbd2b75a4318452
77a711484500145140a00502ac419daea06722a1
02a7b7eac3da80210b4ec5068a007c63f74e3d69
8054d10f91aa16245003a93eb480d04d0004d19a
074a4a00764d2678a5069c2818d5e7b539978a50
314b4088b1460e6a438a438a0061514d2a2a4a42
0500340a5e00a5c52104d003850ded480529a006
d0452e297140c611494e348462801a70293af4a0
8cf34a280258a356db9e726a4fb3c6cc71b8516d
8c37ad4a9903140c8fec89ea68fb30fef1a9e968
02b7d9873cd37eca7b30ab545003224d91ed26a1
6818b1395ab38e28da3d290154dbb76229a6de4f
41573681da8c5302898641da9a6365ea08ad0c53
40249cf23d280286314b9a92750b270319a8e810
678a294500fb5002528141614d327a0a007938a0
1cd444966e29c0e0e05301fcd148a49a5348051d
39a4278a421b149822980a39e4d388cd340a7d20
0da68da69696801318a46dbde948cd2703ad0030
b1ec28f988a9001dc52e2811110077a0538a60d3
945031b8a29f8a8dd82f4e4d0029e298cfd85318
9279a4a005a2814e0339a006e28a5c518a004a31
477a3140052d18a280128a290d002d0319a6d3d4
7340870a02ee6c0a78c7a5491e0a10080c68023f
294757fc8534ae09c1e3d69e5181c1149ed4860e
a15c81d2a363534c3f79f85458cb6050020ce28c
d4cb100b827e6a8483bb1de9884cd28058e05010
eedb8e6a4847ef467b500458a9a350f1b83d4720
d46c72c7d33535b8c2b11d7148657a290e727345
310a6963e5b1eb4869f6ff00eb07e7400494dd9f
bbdfef8a9a5fde28603d8d3829da232474ce2901
5692a48943312fd17934a1637070486f4a2e0426
8a9447fba2f9e871491c61d492718a60460d2d2e
dc9c0e6a6f9225c632f48086814b48680264a909
c0a8d3a5389a4055a51c74a280455084a2834500
28a5ed494500145149400a48069734cef4b4c009

[TheArchaeologist]

Just adding my 2 cents:

It sure looks like this is a transaction for storing data in the blockchain using "Pay 2 Fake Key". The RIPEMD-160 is  made based upon a message that was needed to encode. Based on BASE-58 encoding this was turned into an address. This means the private key for the address is unknown. The fact none of the inputs has been spent afterwards also points out to Pay 2 Fake Key addresses being used. So I agree this doesn't seem at all like a puzzle transaction aimed at cracking the private keys.



 

[TheArchaeologist]

Even having the public key you still have to reverse the Elliptic Curve calculations to get to the private key. Which is again obviously impossible.

Well that depends. Based on the "32 BTC Puzzle transaction" thread it was made clear you can get the private key from a public key if you know already that the private key lies in a very limited range using a technique called "Baby Step - Giant Step".  Borrowed from said thread:

Getting the private key from a public key is known as "the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem".

There are several algorithms to solve this problem:

1) brute force attack  (roughly p steps)

2) Pollard Rho (roughly sqrt(p) steps, based on birthday paradox)

3) Baby Step - Giant Step ( roughly sqrt(p) steps if you have enough memory space to store sqrt(p) points)

(p = number of points = number of private keys )

Take a look at:
http://andrea.corbellini.name/2015/06/08/elliptic-curve-cryptography-breaking-security-and-a-comparison-with-rsa/
http://www.cs.umd.edu/~gasarch/COURSES/198/Su14/baby.pdf

[Thirdspace]

All outputs except one (change?) are the same 5480 satoshi amount.

would be interesting to also include this in private keys brute force efforts
too bad they all in the amount of 5480 satoshi, though I notice a few with double or higher amount
I traversed the chain back and forward and the txid you posted isn't the start point,
there are more similar txs and at one point there are a few same addresses used in those txs
which later he consolidated and then distributed again...
still can't figure out what exactly the true intention or meaning of all those txs

[almightyruler]

All outputs except one (change?) are the same 5480 satoshi amount.

would be interesting to also include this in private keys brute force efforts
too bad they all in the amount of 5480 satoshi, though I notice a few with double or higher amount
I traversed the chain back and forward and the txid you posted isn't the start point,
there are more similar txs and at one point there are a few same addresses used in those txs
which later he consolidated and then distributed again...
still can't figure out what exactly the true intention or meaning of all those txs

As suggested above, perhaps another way to embed data in the blockchain. I'm currently working through the list of used addresses (in hex format) and storing any lines which match at least 4 characters of a dictionary word. Much of it is coincidentally matching junk but there's plenty that look like they were deliberate:

Code:

0000000000000000000000000041706f6c6c6f5f .............Apollo_
0000000000000000000048656c6c6f576f726c64 ..........HelloWorld
00000000554e49434f444500002affe20bf84943 ....UNICODE..*....IC
000000015061696e742e4e45542076332e352e31 ....Paint.NET v3.5.1
00000186a00000b18e50686f746f73686f702049 .........Photoshop I
0000040054657374696e672e2e2e206f6e652c20 ....Testing... one,
0000526573656172636820496e204d6f74696f6e ..Research In Motion
003650686f746f73686f7020332e30003842494d .6Photoshop 3.0.8BIM
00436f7079726967687420286329203139393820 .Copyright (c) 1998
00d320766f6963656420746865697220636f1dd4 .. voiced their co..
01000000c6000002b64d6f746f726f6c61000044 .........Motorola..D
0321617320616e206578616d706c65206f661587 .!as an example of..

The run is barely 1% completed yet. Not really much point to this, since you'd find the same text by extracting strings from the blk*.dat files, but I'll publish the output once it's done.

Possibly related, I've also seen transactions with multiple 546 satoshi unspent outputs: https://www.blockchain.com/btc/tx/cc9c0b95ac772515235147d8354ec8b8b0763bf842ad16b8b23f855c3dc6a57e

I'm not very good at tracing transactions so there's probably a lot more weird stuff like this floating around, especially from the earlier days when the cost to send to an unspendable output was small.

[almightyruler]

I wonder if anyone has used arbitrary 20 byte data in outputs for timestamping purposes?

Instead of sending to hash160(pubkey(sha256("string"))), you could simply use hash160("string")

For explorers which display the hex value of the address hash (such as blockchain.com) you could encode numerical data directly, eg 0000000000000000000000000000000008675309

The catch is that the outputs will be (effectively) unspendable, which will pollute the UTXO space.

[almightyruler]

Just for fun I searched for some hex magic numbers:

Code:

deadbeef:
 1875a4b3640b3a6aa7b69ddeadbeef1274a32ab3
 2cedeadbeefc782db0d9fdd1859403ba4fb6a306
 429b24604593dbbe36376cd5deadbeef8d2ec7a9
 52deadbeef97ba7a45941b4383ebc275429d7a8c
 5425931b5b99c58b40bdce877ac13fb2deadbeef
 5bd18b6a42b9247ef79214b7f87a2b53deadbeef
 d7de29af7c8deadbeef2b7c5fcedd1a63e61493e
 deadbeef00000000b00b1350000000000f00baba
 deadbeeff21e63bba92d19eee659ea6986583358
 f9d6e2a2dca59ab6bf2bab6072a04deadbeef86e

badf00d:
 6be68581c7c55b30ac7d7dfbaadf00dd162aa236
 73e77c2f47963e30e794916c45baadf00da2bfe9
 86baadf00d9abbe2dc3c6b6648352ae40cc3c05c
 8d2f1da3a404cb53a146fbce1b3abaadf00d85d6
 9d2f11e50997b7b360d58a13baadf00d8ad177b9

facebooc:
 1dc16d838049ba8b38581483840d9fbcfaceb00c
 a57ac2b22eb4d19623a195faceb00cc4611e7828
 ca2189268c19faceb00c98765266d23d134eae7b

I checked several of these addresses and the funds have been spent, which means the match is likely to be coincidental. This one is an exception: https://www.blockchain.com/btc/address/deadbeef00000000b00b1350000000000f00baba

(I guess you could generate usable vanity MD160 addresses, too. Maybe that's what deadbeeff21e63bba92d19eee659ea6986583358 is?)

Edit: I created a crude vanity generator for MD160 values. After 300 million random keys there are three generated addresses that are one hex digit off a 'deadbeef' prefix. So it's certainly possible.

deadbeeaa5eedf9508a895e25a65e1ddd71cbd75 1MJR9evt3JZF15yUQ7WBzYXEx36qWBshvR
deadbee292b0ed1c329c084b6a0cd19938a875da 1MJR9eS5daeCLSoAtemFuMZvDQkvYEdM4m
deadbee8a83a5832898e40f0afaebbcfe7fd3c0d 1MJR9eonBNVDiwzmS4BQNWwWTJVPHsHi6s

Edit again: after 600m keys I found me some md160 deadbeef! CPU time well spent (not!)

deadbeef9bf4d14b53cd7f0331ab82e186600250 https://www.blockchain.com/btc/address/1MJR9fEaGS4Qkf78FFdEVgTYqaBzvABpHm

[apxu]

https://cryptograffiti.info

[HeRetiK]

https://cryptograffiti.info

Fun project, but different blockchain (ie. the page above is exploring the Bitcoin Cash blockchain, not the Bitcoin blockchain).

[almightyruler]

https://cryptograffiti.info

So all this was generated by user entered text on a website? Game over, then. That's no fun.

-----

Something else related to address-as-data that I noticed: if you map the distribution of the first couple of bytes of all addresses (in raw/hex format), it's not as even as you would expect for a few hundred million cryptographic hashes. The following prefixes are over-represented:

0x0000 count 10049
0x04dd count 23896
0x0691 count 18798
0x69f3 count 34940
0x6aa3 count 12060

The average count, if evenly distributed, should be around 6800.

Why does the 0x69f3 slot have nearly 6 times more addresses than the average?

Drilling down further into that prefix:

3 bytes (only outliers shown)
0x69f373 count 2955
0x69f374 count 7744
0x69f375 count 7636
0x69f376 count 7669
0x69f377 count 2302

Things get more murky when I expand that to 4 and 5 bytes. I guess it may be several sets of embedded data which have many instances of the string 69 f3 7x in them.

[apxu]

https://cryptograffiti.info

Fun project, but different blockchain (ie. the page above is exploring the Bitcoin Cash blockchain, not the Bitcoin blockchain).

That project was on Bitcoin blockchain in past. And there was not BitcoinCash in 2016