MtGox2014Leak.zip

[lzp729]

Mod note: be careful with the executable, run it only on an isolated virtual machine

download here

http://blog.magicaltux.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/MtGox2014Leak.zip

Im not responsible for anything

[1715272683]

1715272683

[BitCoinDream]

Mod note: be careful with the executable, run it only on an isolated virtual machine

download here

http://blog.magicaltux.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/MtGox2014Leak.zip

Im not responsible for anything

Mod note: be careful with the executable, run it only on an isolated virtual machine
Nor am I...

http://89.248.171.30/MtGox2014Leak.zip  

[emrcan]

What's this?

[WindMaster]

What's this?

Database dumps from Gox.  Check the other thread:
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=508162.0

[tkbx]

no torrent? 

[dserrano5]

no torrent? 

magnet:?xt=urn:btih:b6545ecc7db8d44c8cbc4e93989edf8221af75f5&dn=MtGox2014Leak.zip&tr=udp%3A%2F%2Ftracker.openbittorrent.com%3A80&tr=udp%3A%2F%2Ftracker.openbittorrent.com%3A80&tr=udp%3A%2F%2Ftracker.ccc.de%3A80&tr=udp%3A%2F%2Ftracker.istole.it%3A80&tr=udp%3A%2F%2Ftracker.publicbt.com%3A80&ws=http%3A%2F%2Fblog.magicaltux.net%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2014%2F03%2FMtGox2014Leak.zip

[bananas]

why is it lacking december 2013, januar and febuary 2014? Those are important months. The OP in reddit said it was dumped in febuary.

[tvbcof]

OP: You should put a checksum with a file like this.  It would be an obvious ploy to replace some of the files with trojans.  If the original is though to be clean, people may execute exploits contained in a zip they thought to be real.

I downloaded a copy from:

  [http]://blog.magicaltux.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/MtGox2014Leak.zip

at in the morning PST (2014.03.09) and this is the checksum I get:

  snip@snip ~> sha256 MtGox2014Leak.zip
  SHA256 (MtGox2014Leak.zip) = ffcf6742ab84d7e29ef16ca4f0829d7c4e7a4f739414d2b6d2ded52f05e75a67

Several people on a different thread get the same checksum, but I don't know if they got it from the same place or not.

Checksums are easy to check, reliable, and quite critical for data such as this.  I would be very wary of anything sensitive that I downloaded which did not come with a checksum, and I would (and do) cross-check these.

If anyone finds a file of the same name with a different checksum it would be good to report it (even worth starting a new thread) and handing it over to people who can analyze the contents.  We really don't need any more people losing money to stupid things associated with Mt. Gox...though I suspect we'll see a lot more in the weeks to come

[joesmoe2012]

OP: You should put a checksum with a file like this.  It would be an obvious ploy to replace some of the files with trojans.  If the original is though to be clean, people may execute exploits contained in a zip they thought to be real.

I downloaded a copy from:

  [http]://blog.magicaltux.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/MtGox2014Leak.zip

at in the morning PST (2014.03.09) and this is the checksum I get:

  snip@snip ~> sha256 MtGox2014Leak.zip
  SHA256 (MtGox2014Leak.zip) = ffcf6742ab84d7e29ef16ca4f0829d7c4e7a4f739414d2b6d2ded52f05e75a67

Several people on a different thread get the same checksum, but I don't know if they got it from the same place or not.

Checksums are easy to check, reliable, and quite critical for data such as this.  I would be very wary of anything sensitive that I downloaded which did not come with a checksum, and I would (and do) cross-check these.

If anyone finds a file of the same name with a different checksum it would be good to report it (even worth starting a new thread) and handing it over to people who can analyze the contents.  We really don't need any more people losing money to stupid things associated with Mt. Gox...though I suspect we'll see a lot more in the weeks to come

Yeah especially when there's exe and pdf inside.

[kostagr33k]

Not sure how a checksum helps here ... Checksums ONLY work when you trust the party that constructed the file + checksum. Did someone trusted create the file + checksum linked above?


Kosta

[joesmoe2012]

Not sure how a checksum helps here ... Checksums ONLY work when you trust the party that constructed the file + checksum. Did someone trusted create the file + checksum linked above?


Kosta

Nope an allegedly there's a trojan in one of the versions out there as well, so download with care.

[dave111223]

It contains EXEs and no useful information.

Probably the info in there is a combination of transactions taken from the API, and bullshit balance list; all put together in order to try and get you to try and run the "Backoffice" EXEs...which is no doubt a virus trying to steal your bitcoins.

Don't waste your time downloading it.

[joesmoe2012]

It contains EXEs and no useful information.

Probably the info in there is a combination of transactions taken from the API, and bullshit balance list; all put together in order to try and get you to try and run the "Backoffice" EXEs...which is no doubt a virus trying to steal your bitcoins.

Don't waste your time downloading it.

In another thread someone said they had decompiled it and had posted the code, and that there was some suspicious code. I don't know if that was here or another forum though.

[V4Vendettas]

How many new members posting this url in the last 24 hours ?

[tvbcof]

Not sure how a checksum helps here ... Checksums ONLY work when you trust the party that constructed the file + checksum. Did someone trusted create the file + checksum linked above?

Kosta

A file which does not checksum will have different contents (or be corrupt) which is a give away that someone has monkeyed with it.  Almost certainly such a thing would indicate the inclusion of contents with exploits.

When I wrote that, it was unknown whether the 'original' contained exploits or not.  Reports now seem to indicate that it is full of them.  (Who could have seen that coming?)

Checksums are basic and simple things that have been in use for decades.  For good reason.  Using checksums in a situation like this one can help identify a very likely class of theft attempts.  There is no reason but utter ignorance and laziness not to use them...except to attempt to perpetrate a theft that is.

[joesmoe2012]

Not sure how a checksum helps here ... Checksums ONLY work when you trust the party that constructed the file + checksum. Did someone trusted create the file + checksum linked above?

Kosta

A file which does not checksum will have different contents (or be corrupt) which is a give away that someone has monkeyed with it.  Almost certainly such a thing would indicate the inclusion of contents with exploits.

When I wrote that, it was unknown whether the 'original' contained exploits or not.  Reports now seem to indicate that it is full of them.  (Who could have seen that coming?)

Checksums are basic and simple things that have been in use for decades.  For good reason.  Using checksums in a situation like this one can help identify a very likely class of theft attempts.  There is no reason but utter ignorance and laziness not to use them...except to attempt to perpetrate a theft that is.

But we would need a checksum from the 'hacker' in order to ensure integrity.

[tvbcof]

Not sure how a checksum helps here ... Checksums ONLY work when you trust the party that constructed the file + checksum. Did someone trusted create the file + checksum linked above?

Kosta

A file which does not checksum will have different contents (or be corrupt) which is a give away that someone has monkeyed with it.  Almost certainly such a thing would indicate the inclusion of contents with exploits.

When I wrote that, it was unknown whether the 'original' contained exploits or not.  Reports now seem to indicate that it is full of them.  (Who could have seen that coming?)

Checksums are basic and simple things that have been in use for decades.  For good reason.  Using checksums in a situation like this one can help identify a very likely class of theft attempts.  There is no reason but utter ignorance and laziness not to use them...except to attempt to perpetrate a theft that is.

But we would need a checksum from the 'hacker' in order to ensure integrity.

Huh?  No, the goal is simply to see if different zip archives are being passed around, and potentially leveraging some level of confidence that might have been associated with the 'original'.  It dawned on my right away that a good way for a thief to distribute trojans would be to  replace some of the dangerous files (specifically .exe and .pdf files) with one's own variant of them.  This whether the 'original' was trojan free or not.

We are not measuring absolute values here but rather looking for differential information.  The latter can be as valuable as the former in many cases.  Even more so since the 'original' would not have provided any information about safety anyway.

[itsunderstood]

It is well known by those who know things, that PDF are absolute crapware destruction vector.  See the Aurora hacks of three years ago.

This whole exploit is another sad reality: Abused little shitbags grow up into thieving adult high-tech shitbags.

[Phinnaeus Gage]

OP: You should put a checksum with a file like this.  It would be an obvious ploy to replace some of the files with trojans.  If the original is though to be clean, people may execute exploits contained in a zip they thought to be real.

I downloaded a copy from:

  [http]://blog.magicaltux.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/MtGox2014Leak.zip

at in the morning PST (2014.03.09) and this is the checksum I get:

  snip@snip ~> sha256 MtGox2014Leak.zip
  SHA256 (MtGox2014Leak.zip) = ffcf6742ab84d7e29ef16ca4f0829d7c4e7a4f739414d2b6d2ded52f05e75a67

Several people on a different thread get the same checksum, but I don't know if they got it from the same place or not.

Checksums are easy to check, reliable, and quite critical for data such as this.  I would be very wary of anything sensitive that I downloaded which did not come with a checksum, and I would (and do) cross-check these.

If anyone finds a file of the same name with a different checksum it would be good to report it (even worth starting a new thread) and handing it over to people who can analyze the contents.  We really don't need any more people losing money to stupid things associated with Mt. Gox...though I suspect we'll see a lot more in the weeks to come

This is fucking nuts! First, I had to get up to speed as to what the hell a motiff[sic] is in BFL's thread back in the day, now I need to learn what the heck a checksum is, then learn how to use it.

To show you what type of noob I am, although I know quite a bit about HTML and CSS, for the life of me I couldn't tell you what those acronyms stand for sans looking them up first. I know just enough about PHP as it applies to Wordpress that caused me all kinds of problems till I finally learnt to do backups of any codes I'm altering.

[tvbcof]

This is fucking nuts! First, I had to get up to speed as to what the hell a motiff[sic] is in BFL's thread back in the day, now I need to learn what the heck a checksum is, then learn how to use it.

To show you what type of noob I am, although I know quite a bit about HTML and CSS, for the life of me I couldn't tell you what those acronyms stand for sans looking them up first. I know just enough about PHP as it applies to Wordpress that caused me all kinds of problems till I finally learnt to do backups of any codes I'm altering.

Knowing how to use a simple md5 or sha256 checksum should be pretty much mandatory for anyone messing around with Bitcoin in my opinion.  What a checksum is is pretty easy to understand and it should be pretty simple to use them on all platforms.

Anyone doing any coding really owes it to themselves to use a revision control system of some sort.  Keeping a local subversion repository one one's hard drive is a really a relatively simply operation and a getting the hang of a few command line options is all one really needs to do in order to use it effectively.  The comfort of knowing that you can easily snapshot anything and see changes expedites development.  I probably would not have gotten around to learning how nice this is if it were not a factor for my professional work, but I'd have been much the worse for it.

I find SVN to be really useful for remote admin/dev and deployment as well in conjunction with gmake, but that's beyond the scope of what most people need.

For routine system admin tasks I habitually use RCS which is built into most of the systems I use.  This lets me quickly see all of the stuff I've done on my system (and what I might be forgetting when I build another system and so on.)  RCS has some gotchas though.

The thought of Mt. Gox not using a revision control system is so absurd that I find it hard to believe.  I'm inclined to think that this is another bullshit story and feeble attempt to make people believe that they are more incompetent than they actually are.

[itsunderstood]

[..]

The thought of Mt. Gox not using a revision control system is so absurd that I find it hard to believe.  I'm inclined to think that this is another bullshit story and feeble attempt to make people believe that they are more incompetent than they actually are.

So true that it pays to play dumb.  And interesting gambit to release crapcode as smokescreen to cover cointheft.  Much to ponder, thanks a lot because also, most programs suck ass and are swiss cheese.  Your efforts to help are appreciated.

[SmokeTooMuch]

The TibanneBackOffice.exe executable is wallet stealing malware and here is decompiled proof

[elebit]

Mod note: be careful with the executable, run it only on an isolated virtual machine

Don't even run untrusted executables in a virtual machine! There have been several ways of breaking out of one, and there certainly will be more!

Why in the name of Satoshi would you run it at all?

You decompile untrusted executables, you don't run them.

Apparently the wallet stealer was some sort of super simple interpreted code this time and would only look for wallet.dat and upload it to the thieves this time, but next time it could very be much more advanced malware. Do not take stupid risks.

[razorfishsl]

Yep…….
Let us not forget that even inside a VM any  virus/exploit is already BEHIND your main defense and can easily access the ip addresses of any computers on your internal network(not to mention default passwords/access on your router!!)
Including the machine the VM is being hosted on…(not much point in having a DMZ, if you are going to put shit inside it…)
and that is before we even consider the capability to  crash 'out' of a VM.

This is the result of teaching liberal arts at school…. many people seem incapable of thinking more than one move ahead.

[justusranvier]

Let us not forget that even inside a VM any  virus/exploit is already BEHIND your main defense and can easily access the ip addresses of any computers on your internal network(not to mention default passwords/access on your router!!)
Including the machine the VM is being hosted on…(not much point in having a DMZ, if you are going to put shit inside it…)
and that is before we even consider the capability to  crash 'out' of a VM.

You're assuming the most simplistic possible implementation of virtualized networking.

Also, using off the shelf routers is a really bad idea. All that shit's rooted.

[kostagr33k]

But I don't think your truly explaining the reason to use checksums: A trusted person releases a file to the wild, and states this is my files checksum. The problem here is the person who created this file is not trusted.

Just want to make that clear for people that are not engineers or coders or tech savvy to understand when to be using a checksum.


Since this file was released by an untrusted source checksums become useless and could give someone false hope.


Kosta

Not sure how a checksum helps here ... Checksums ONLY work when you trust the party that constructed the file + checksum. Did someone trusted create the file + checksum linked above?

Kosta

A file which does not checksum will have different contents (or be corrupt) which is a give away that someone has monkeyed with it.  Almost certainly such a thing would indicate the inclusion of contents with exploits.

When I wrote that, it was unknown whether the 'original' contained exploits or not.  Reports now seem to indicate that it is full of them.  (Who could have seen that coming?)

Checksums are basic and simple things that have been in use for decades.  For good reason.  Using checksums in a situation like this one can help identify a very likely class of theft attempts.  There is no reason but utter ignorance and laziness not to use them...except to attempt to perpetrate a theft that is.

[malevolent]

Mod note: be careful with the executable, run it only on an isolated virtual machine

Don't even run untrusted executables in a virtual machine! There have been several ways of breaking out of one, and there certainly will be more!

Why in the name of Satoshi would you run it at all?

You decompile untrusted executables, you don't run them.

Apparently the wallet stealer was some sort of super simple interpreted code this time and would only look for wallet.dat and upload it to the thieves this time, but next time it could very be much more advanced malware. Do not take stupid risks.

That's why I wrote "isolated" (no shared folders, preferably on a separate physical machine, guest additions disabled, etc.).

[RodeoX]

Anyone who downloads this is fuckin crazy. What a crock of crap. I love how it is labeled "leak".  
Is that supposed to remind Mark that he leaked it to himself?

[AT101ET]

Guys, word of advice, do NOT open any links or files that you aren't entirely aware of.
They may compromise your wallets or install a key logger on your PC recording your passwords.
Be careful!

[SmokeTooMuch]

You're not "fuckin crazy" just because you are smart enough to understand how to look at text files. My personal opinion is that you are extremely stupid if you seriously believe that unzipping a file and looking at plain text files will harm you in any way.

Assuming you can be 100% sure that the software you are using to open these files (or to unzip them) is absolutely secure and there are no exploits for them known to mankind. Which you can't.

[RodeoX]

You're not "fuckin crazy" just because you are smart enough to understand how to look at text files. My personal opinion is that you are extremely stupid if you seriously believe that unzipping a file and looking at plain text files will harm you in any way.

Assuming you can be 100% sure that the software you are using to open these files (or to unzip them) is absolutely secure and there are no exploits for them known to mankind. Which you can't.

+1 Why would I even bother to take the risk? To see a supposed secret leaked document?  I know what the risks are, I've been on the internet and into computing for over 20 years now. I also worked on a farm and learned the smell of bullshit IRL. 

[nagnagnag2]

I can concur that 'mtgox_balances' is accurate and well up to date. I was able to verify myself with the correct balance.

[SmokeTooMuch]

Assuming you can be 100% sure that the software you are using to open these files (or to unzip them) is absolutely secure and there are no exploits for them known to mankind. Which you can't.

Yes Yes like zlib has a exploit that only these fancypants hackers know about. Sure. That's so likely.

Feel free to show us where in the zlib source code this exploit you imagine exists. I'm sure a zillion people would like to know.

Ever heard of 0-day exploits? I don't have to prove anything here. All I'm saying is, that there is a risk you should not be willing to take if you don't know exactly what you are doing.
Files handed to you by cybercriminals can not be trusted.

[tvbcof]

But I don't think your truly explaining the reason to use checksums: A trusted person releases a file to the wild, and states this is my files checksum. The problem here is the person who created this file is not trusted.

Just want to make that clear for people that are not engineers or coders or tech savvy to understand when to be using a checksum.

Since this file was released by an untrusted source checksums become useless and could give someone false hope.

Kosta

If it is simply a question about whether there are multiple files called exactly 'MtGox2014Leak.zip' floating around, checksums are anything but useless.  They are in fact mandatory.

Knowing whether there are multiple different files with that name being distributed would be terrific information to know as early as possible.

If you want to trust someone you should be looking for a PGP sig.  Checksums only speak to the integrity of a file contents...they say nothing about the content (other than it differs from some other variant.)

Your point about danger of checksum hashes giving (lazy, ignorant, naive) people a false sense of security is a good one however.  The same can be said of PGP sigs and a lot of other otherwise useful constructs.  That is not really a good excuse not to use these tools however.

[one4many]

In another thread someone said they had decompiled it and had posted the code, and that there was some suspicious code. I don't know if that was here or another forum though.

The .pdf contains the evil JavaScript.

Hmm ... I analyzed the PDF and there is no JS inside. It looks like the real deal, I mean it has been created with a very old version of OpenOffice

Code:

PDFiD 0.1.2 CV-Mark_Karpeles_20100325.pdf
 PDF Header: %PDF-1.4
 obj                   41
 endobj                41
 stream                14
 endstream             14
 xref                   1
 trailer                1
 startxref              1
 /Page                  2
 /Encrypt               0
 /ObjStm                0
 /JS                    0
 /JavaScript            0
 /AA                    0
 /OpenAction            1
 /AcroForm              0
 /JBIG2Decode           0
 /RichMedia             0
 /Launch                0
 /EmbeddedFile          0
 /XFA                   0
 /Colors > 2^24         0

So the important bits are "/JS 0", "/JavaScript 0" and  "/OpenAction 1". 0 means there is nothing 1 (or more) means there is something. So evidently there is no Javascript embedded. However there is a OpenAction command. A little research reveals that it opens the following object: "/OpenAction [1 0 R /XYZ null null 0]". This means object 1 0 is going to be executed.

This object looks like this:

Code:

%PDF-1.4
1 0 obj
/pdftk_PageNum 1
/Resources 2 0 R
/Contents 3 0 R
/Parent 4 0 R
/Type /Page
/MediaBox [0 0 612 792]
/Group
/CS /DeviceRGB
/I true
/S /Transparency
endobj

This is the standard (at least at that time around the 2000s) OpenOffice page header. Which gets sometimes mistaken as malware by some crap scanners.
If anybody finds anything different let me know, I would be very much interested in this.

Cheers

    one4many

[SmokeTooMuch]

Checksums only speak to the integrity of a file contents...they say nothing about the content (other than it differs from some other variant.)

Just a quick addendum: You also have to be able to trust the source of the checksums, which in reality is harder than it sounds.
http://noncombatant.org/2014/03/03/downloading-software-safely-is-nearly-impossible/

EDIT:

If anybody finds anything different let me know, I would be very much interested in this.

Here's the link to the decompiled code of the TibanneBackOffice.exe done by a kind redditor:
https://3d3.ca/ijKOh.vbs#eV7i3HIliI93y+UR

[itsunderstood]

If there was cooperation, then the smart and gutsy "I'll run this in a sandbox" people, can help the fearful "I don't know how it works" crew.  And it seems like this is kinda happening, as helpful users are doing.

But, you took your biggest risk trusting Gox, so don't get all preachy now about being safe.  Fear is what you stepped over, to invest at Gox.  Fear is what you now relent to, because you got Goxxed.

But, fearing programs and computers, is not the place to be emotionally.  Just learn how notepad works and go from there.

[tvbcof]

Checksums only speak to the integrity of a file contents...they say nothing about the content (other than it differs from some other variant.)

Just a quick addendum: You also have to be able to trust the source of the checksums, which in reality is harder than it sounds.

http://noncombatant.org/2014/03/03/downloading-software-safely-is-nearly-impossible/

The author describes the difficulty of being rigorous in solving a somewhat different problem.  Rigor against sophisticated, motivated, and well funded attackers is damn difficult.  To bad that putty doesn't make it more practical since this is one of the few pieces of software where it is really necessary in some cases.

For the item under discussion here, we are mostly concerned about non-sophisticated parties doing cheap hacks.  The possibility that some Bulgarian hacker will be able to distributed a modified version of sha256 which will recognize his crafted mtgox.zip and give false info is remote.  Similarly, the possibility that an attacker would be able to do DPI and modify all values of the checksum which a user sees and thus fool them is also remote.

By sharing checksums on a forum such as this, people are acting as a community and attacks which are otherwise possible (if difficult) become effectively impossible.  A few people producing the checksums that they have could reliably uncover an effort to distributed multiple variants of a file which would be very valuable to know about.

My concern was that the original would be found to be benign but there would evolve toxic variants and people would be fooled in this way.  The simple act of looking at a checksum would halt that problem.  As it is, it looks like the file was full of attacks from the get-go.

[SmokeTooMuch]

I don't see the point of a checksum of a file, published by a cybercriminal, that has proven to contain malware.
But in general, I agree with you.

[tvbcof]

I don't see the point of a checksum of a file, published by a cybercriminal, that has proven to contain malware.
But in general, I agree with you.

At the time I suggested it, it was not clear whether or not the archive contained trojans.

It is good practice to document a checksum for distributed files no matter what.  If the file is mirrored, this can produce a very high reliability indicator of file integrity and serves as a tip-off for subversion.  Indeed, we saw the file in question mirrored to multiple places very quickly.

Again, checksums are also useful to track versions over time.  If you get the same file from the same place, but it has a different checksum the next day, this is a very reliable indication that it has been screwed with.

Pretty much everyone, I think, was suspicious of the original file.  Had it been looked at by professionals and blessed as clean it would be critical to be able to verify that a copy that one might find in their possession was the same thing that was analyzed by competent parties.

Nobody is saying that checksums, and in particular simple ones like md5 or sha256, are the key to solving every crime worldwide.  Nor is it something with take the place of one's brain in assessing attack scenarios.  It is, however, a simple and reliable tool which can significantly reduce an attack surface.

[Aido]

Not sure if someone posted this but I've uploaded an xls version of Gox BTC balances at http://filebin.ca/1F3qa078QQSL or http://filebin.ca/1F3qa078QQSL/BTC_mtgox_balances.xls. No macros or any dodgy stuff.

[elebit]

That's why I wrote "isolated" (no shared folders, preferably on a separate physical machine, guest additions disabled, etc.).

No, that's just insane. There has been exploits to pretty much all virtualization systems, not just the guest drivers.

Sure, a separate physical machine with no network would do, but what could you possibly gain from running possible malware? Do you expect the software to burst into jackpot mode and magically withdraw all your goxcoins?

You don't run malware. Ever. You decompile it.

[elebit]

Not sure if someone posted this but I've uploaded an xls version of Gox BTC balances at [...]. No macros or any dodgy stuff.

Sure.

If there were no macros or "dodgy stuff" this would have been a csv or a txt, which are a magnitude smaller and possible to open securely.

People, don't be stupid here. Don't get carried away. There are at any time about a dozen well known ways to run code on your computer if you open anything with Excel, or Word, or Acrobat Reader. (Really. All the mentioned file formats can wrap everything from Flash to CLR components, which in turn contains even more vulnerabilities.)

[Nagle]

OK. There's a bunch of junk and some suspicious executables in that .zip file, but the files of interest are just two big text files.  Here's what they look like:
"mtgox_balances":

Code:

mysql> SELECT * FROM platform.User_Wallet WHERE platform.User_Wallet.Balance != 0 ORDER BY platform.User_Wallet.Balance DESC;
+--------------------------------------+--------------------------------------+------------+---------------+-------------+---------+---------+----------------------+------------------------+----------------+---------------------+
| User_Wallet__                        | User__                               | Currency__ | Balance       | Liabilities | Index   | Backend | Daily_Withdraw_Limit | Monthly_Withdraw_Limit | Disable_Limits | Stamp               |
+--------------------------------------+--------------------------------------+------------+---------------+-------------+---------+---------+----------------------+------------------------+----------------+---------------------+
| 5c05557d-8d1e-4e2a-9a24-21781413be32 | 711a4e9d-e183-4bec-a390-340918326538 | BTC        | 4454767562508 |           0 |  156624 | virtual |                    0 |                   NULL | N              | 2012-07-13 06:58:01 |
| a6acd802-bb4f-412b-be6d-b0bf3f2bb055 | 34fcda44-5832-48c3-8beb-60f1bd9fef37 | BTC        | 4376817697344 |           0 |   42208 | virtual |        2000000000000 |                   NULL | N              | 2014-02-25 03:53:01 |
| 221d365a-ce33-4619-a8fb-f79514940bb1 | c0b24126-f199-4cc6-83fc-c96f2bcb9381 | BTC        | 1998500000000 |           0 |       4 | virtual |                    0 |                   NULL | N              | 2012-08-11 10:30:00 |
| 2ae40a68-c862-4fd3-8ebc-a05a7e0fbfac | 92d047e9-9f2b-4dd0-9163-077db3e56dd0 | BTC        | 1150063956592 |           0 |     253 | virtual |                 NULL |                   NULL | N              | 2013-11-26 02:35:25 |
| 1ad3f250-17dc-4d3d-9aff-15f3ed40cec9 | ff84fc35-b22a-492d-b8f2-5fb79be170a7 | BTC        | 1100781000685 |           0 |    3941 | virtual |                 NULL |                   NULL | N              | 2014-02-20 22:30:51 |
| 166c11b8-f2b3-4302-a21d-c2c706994447 | 0afba433-817e-49d4-a72f-0576c660861b | BTC        |  981919410221 |           0 |    6752 | virtual |        1000000000000 |                   NULL | N              | 2014-02-24 18:41:47 |
| f070b09c-f046-4bf2-889d-cb9defcce7fd | 19b38844-b58b-4d1b-8ba1-af2e45b164f7 | BTC        |  875255455182 |           0 |   32579 | virtual |        1000000000000 |                   NULL | N              | 2014-02-24 03:13:22 |
| d4e3840c-938d-47a2-bb72-7678c3d8f7d2 | 945e5a15-4100-4199-91ea-d8d8bec7e07a | BTC        |  800000000000 |           0 |    3496 | virtual |                 NULL |                   NULL | N              | 2013-08-08 18:50:39 |
| 45548a69-11e5-4d31-bc0c-d8f0294eb4f1 | 4339257e-4b12-4412-9574-0785ccf613bb | BTC        |  605128552400 |           0 |    6966 | virtual |        1000000000000 |                   NULL | N              | 2014-02-22 08:18:31 |
| da39625a-d901-425c-9586-86bab7bf9880 | 0766852e-9187-4712-80f0-1fbb78813b07 | BTC        |  519991480916 |           0 |   16523 | virtual |         200000000000 |                   NULL | N              | 2014-02-25 00:49:35 |
| c10d31d6-81a5-4df1-9d2a-6524c4b3ad04 | f2d2f8ea-dd36-4d32-adb7-79448755d53c | BTC        |  500000000000 |           0 |     165 | virtual |                    0 |                   NULL | N              | 2014-01-21 03:22:40 |
| caebcd40-3f04-402e-84bd-13f019ca9847 | ccb564e6-f33a-40fc-b222-aa4d8bc88fa6 | BTC        |  422607868556 |           0 |     902 | virtual |          90000000000 |                   NULL | N              | 2014-02-22 17:11:30 |
| 33ec6422-fec5-458d-a25c-284790aedc99 | 0b1bb842-d189-48c2-899b-6b1893ba0db8 | BTC        |  396731866419 |           0 |    3870 | virtual |        1000000000000 |                   NULL | N              | 2014-02-24 18:56:05 |
| 30245646-10ee-481c-802e-fd8828efa43a | 40399e92-1249-4e80-be0d-30c59a995dff | BTC        |  388009278436 |           0 |    6831 | virtual |        1000000000000 |                   NULL | N              | 2014-02-21 21:43:43 |
| eee8ae06-fbc0-40eb-8ca3-d909acf096a3 | 679376ba-ffad-4fab-831c-b5c445cbb59e | BTC        |  370719697264 |           0 |    5747 | virtual |                 NULL |                   NULL | N              | 2014-02-07 14:01:24 |
| 64b2e05b-52da-4cfa-8fd8-890af1da5a10 | 944d5ea9-40c6-4dc1-92ef-45afbde02716 | BTC        |  360731800000 |           0 |     989 | virtual |                 NULL |                   NULL | N              | 2012-03-15 07:56:41 |
| 85452c04-0665-4979-bb8a-8886cc2f0a10 | 87c17550-bb6a-4ab1-b3a9-bcd8b72906f7 | BTC        |  356516619593 |           0 |    5077 | virtual |                 NULL |                   NULL | N              | 2014-02-25 01:13:16 |

"btc_xfer_report.csv":

Code:

Wallet,Entry,Date,Operation,Amount
00001bd2-cdb1-4707-b125-97dfdc46d3f4,682b3d0a-67d7-4b62-8ed4-4e1d39d54a69,"2011-07-27 11:11:00",deposit,0.05
00001bd2-cdb1-4707-b125-97dfdc46d3f4,e441aa74-372f-488d-8342-e2e845041e88,"2011-08-09 11:14:07",deposit,0.85
00001bd2-cdb1-4707-b125-97dfdc46d3f4,e1173927-a09b-4dc0-a085-138e0e21558d,"2011-09-23 11:29:47",withdraw,-1.40154
00005afe-8eac-418b-945b-6016166ccb13,a97682c8-dfc2-4d6e-9bdc-66aa1dda355b,"2013-04-12 14:25:21",deposit,100
00005afe-8eac-418b-945b-6016166ccb13,ce10fe19-0551-41e7-9160-d9241e67281a,"2013-04-08 19:23:33",withdraw,-8
00005afe-8eac-418b-945b-6016166ccb13,db9d0a3c-4a94-4710-9fcd-f98aa7dbd968,"2013-04-08 20:57:16",withdraw,-20
00005afe-8eac-418b-945b-6016166ccb13,1a812ba4-578f-42d7-a19d-8982fcc7fe72,"2013-04-16 20:42:28",withdraw,-0.1
00005afe-8eac-418b-945b-6016166ccb13,701f5de7-b527-4f50-9fb2-a6430d912ea9,"2013-04-17 19:36:14",withdraw,-99.9
00005afe-8eac-418b-945b-6016166ccb13,aaa584a1-5e22-4fab-9862-5713041c47b2,"2013-04-19 13:49:43",withdraw,-55
00005afe-8eac-418b-945b-6016166ccb13,34ff41b3-b021-4331-b834-e08be410490a,"2013-04-20 20:19:00",withdraw,-1
00005afe-8eac-418b-945b-6016166ccb13,10138f9f-ec2b-4ca1-a7c3-d36f56bae3df,"2013-05-19 09:01:31",withdraw,-0.5
00005afe-8eac-418b-945b-6016166ccb13,9731a1f6-5e66-4a76-8a53-10257411d0ba,"2013-08-08 21:23:40",withdraw,-80.06210892

What these mean, when they were created, whether they're even real, and whether they check with the blockchain remains to be analyzed. But that's what's in there.

Looking up some of those addresses at "blockchain.info" returns no find. Try it yourself. This may be totally bogus data.

[phelix]

[...]
Looking up some of those addresses at "blockchain.info" returns no find. Try it yourself. This may be totally bogus data.

What addresses? There are no Bitcoin addresses only Gox internal codes.

The data is at least partially legit, probably everything is legit (besides the .exe wallet stealer).

One could look for large withdrawals before the btc withdrawals halt...  Another thing would be to check for larger withdrawals by known accounts that are rumored to have known more than the average coinhead (e.g. Bitcoin foundation board members).

[BCB]

you have to remember that if this data is real it does not include data from Beginning of Mt Gox nor dos it include any data from from the last three months of trading.

Lots of missing and dirty data.

[phelix]

you have to remember that if this data is real it does not include data from Beginning of Mt Gox nor dos it include any data from from the last three months of trading.

Lots of missing and dirty data.

Certainly but still interesting bits. All BTC withdrawals are included from 2011-04 until the end. Though it seems not possible to link these to userIDs which might make it difficult to search for certain users withdrawals.

[BCB]

you have to remember that if this data is real it does not include data from Beginning of Mt Gox nor dos it include any data from from the last three months of trading.

Lots of missing and dirty data.

Certainly but still interesting bits. All BTC withdrawals are included from 2011-04 until the end. Though it seems not possible to link these to userIDs which might make it difficult to search for certain users withdrawals.

I've not had the time to dig in deep enough to determine any correlation between the data sets.

I'd be most interested if btc w/d could be tied to blockchain transactions by timestamp + value.  matching timestamp will be tricky.

[T.Stuart]

you have to remember that if this data is real it does not include data from Beginning of Mt Gox nor dos it include any data from from the last three months of trading.

Lots of missing and dirty data.

No trading data for the last three months? Good for those on the inside who profited during the last weeks...

[rbillig]

For info, I checked my wallet from a special website and it shows the value of the day before the final closure.
For me, this file is real.

[rbillig]

https://euvps.rolisoft.net/mtgox/

[Anddos]

http://thehackernews.com/2014/03/mtgox-hacker-tricks-people-to-install.html

[Mahn]

What these mean, when they were created, whether they're even real, and whether they check with the blockchain remains to be analyzed. But that's what's in there.

They are real. Both the balances and transaction history match as reported by many MtGox users who checked their own data, myself included. There's zero doubt about this.