this topics idea is no better than current state of affairs.
firstly if using the scenario of say 20mb(WU)(5mblegacy) mempool size where
5sat is priority(0-4mbWU(0-1mb leg)) next block,
4sat is less priority(4-8mbWU(1-2mb leg)) second block,
3sat is less priority(8-12mbWU(2-3mb leg)) third block,
a spammer pays 5sat, gets confirmed then instantly throws that utxo into a new tx of 5 sat and is instantly in the priority nxt block listing.
meaning those that paid 4sat are not guaranteed to be in the second block as the spammer is in the second block too
this, like current status just leads to games of everyone just paying ever increasing amounts, until people give up and the price then eventually resettles until people realise it settled down to then play another round of ever increasing amounts
what needs to be done is bring back a fee formulae that is a consensus rule (have to abide by) which actually has options.
EG if a tx is only 1confirm deep its 'score' is lower than someone with 144 confirms. so the spammer(1confirm) has to pay more to raise its score to be given priority.
this way it actually makes spammers pay the price, where as occassional spenders are not affected by th price. and by using the score based system its not a everyone is hit by a premium due to a few users.
this way it actually make spammers who multispend daily having to pay more, then become more incentivised to spam less or use offchain solutions. while the occassional non abusive user is not paying out alot but getting their transactions noticed by miningpools collating transactions
to explain better
this is what i see as the logical punishment for bloating/rspending spammers. whilst rewarding moral normal transactors
one which includes a CLTV voluntary option. where users gain priority points if they voluntarily agree to put their funds into a 1-day maturity. but those avoiding the one day before respend or have bloated transactions pay more to get into a block sooner.
EG
if you really need priority you agree that once confirmed you cant respend for a day.
it also means you can be selective of priority. by only putting a 142block wait if your happy to wait a couple blocks because it wont be priority for a couple blocks by not paying quite enough fee. allowing the age/maturity/fee variables to give a better flag of desire.
obviously those moral users that actually need to spend more than once a day could see the niche of LN as a way to transact often and cheaper.
and those that dont spend every day get priority and not need LN or to CLTV mature funds, because they are not spending everyday, anyway.
here is one example of a formulae that does not care about how much people are spending (not a rich gets priority, poor are victimised old formula), but rewards people willing to wait a day, have lean transactions. and penalises those that want to respend often or have bloated transactions
![](https://ip.bitcointalk.org/?u=https%3A%2F%2Fi.imgur.com%2FWnGb05Q.png&t=665&c=ipKlvjiDtYucgA)
basically
if your transaction is 2x a lean tx. you pay twice as much.
if 44x a lean tx you pay 44xif you dont want to mature your funds for 144 blocks and only want to
wait 1 block you pay 144x.if the tx is both 44x bloated and wants to respend the very next block after getting confirmed then
it costs 44x*144Xthough my formulae is not finalised or perfect for every utility. i see how changing the priority formulae can cause more benefits for good people and penalise the bad, without making it used just to be snobby about rich vs poor. due to it no longer rewarding the rich with points just for being rich, which the old formulae done