Hardware Wallet Hacked?

[cok_elat]

Can hardware wallets like Ledger Nano be hacked and their coins stolen?

all systems still have loopholes to be hacked including hardware wallets, but hardware wallets have a smaller hacking potential than wallet software

[bittick]

Can hardware wallets like Ledger Nano be hacked and their coins stolen?

all systems still have loopholes to be hacked including hardware wallets, but hardware wallets have a smaller hacking potential than wallet software

Actually back in the past these hardware wallet have some kind of holes that's leaked around but fortunately this problem can be sorted out by the company, mainly it's a hardware problem that can cause such serious cases however it's still a fact that a hardware wallet is a lot more harder and need so much resources to be hacked than desktop or even browser wallet like metamask.

The 2 factor authentication that was built in to the hardware wallet is enough giving the hacker a hard time not to mention the encryption, unlike for example MEW that can got the DNS easily hijacked in the past.

[DaveF]

There have been vulnerabilities disclosed in both of the "big 2" hardware wallets

XKCD summed it up best however:



-Dave

[Astvile]

Ledger nano and other hardware wallet is by far the most secured and trusted one to store our coins in,as long as you keep your pass phrase with you you are safe.Other than that if someone sold you a fake ledger or a legit ledger with malware that stoles infos youre done and hacked.

[Fivestar4everMVP]

Can hardware wallets like Ledger Nano be hacked and their coins stolen?

as long as you keep your passphrase or private keys or which ever you use safe, and you don't leave it to access the internet by leaving it plugged in your computer all the time, I don't think it's possible to hack

[Pmalek]

The hack of Etherdelta from a few years ago was a good test for hardware wallets. I think it was back in 2017 when the DNS servers of the site were replaced and many users who logged in to the fake site got their ETH accounts emptied and tokens stolen. Even users using MetaMask reported that they got their accounts emptied. But those who logged in to the fake site with a hardware wallet were not affected because the hacker would still need physical access to the hardware devices!

[magdaniewczas]

Can hardware wallets like Ledger Nano be hacked and their coins stolen?

Yes, you can hack a trezor and extract all 24 words

[Pmalek]

Yes, you can hack a trezor and extract all 24 words

Do you care to elaborate on that maybe? Where did you read or hear about Trezor wallets getting hacked and seed words being extracted?

I did read an article a while ago published by Kaspersky it is possible to gain access to the seed using a hacking technique called voltage glitching. More about that here:
Source: https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/hardware-wallets-hacked/25315/

Using a hacking technique called voltage glitching (applying lowered voltage to a microcontroller, which causes funny effects in the chip) they switched Trezor One’s chip state from “no access” to “partial access,” which allowed them to read the chip’s RAM, but not the flash storage. After that they found out that when the firmware upgrade process is started, the chip places the cryptographic seed into RAM to retain it while the flash is being overwritten. In this manner, they managed to get all memory contents. Finding the cryptographic seed in this dump turned out to be no problem; it was stored in RAM unencrypted, in the form of a mnemonic phrase (meaning actual words instead of random number) that was easy to spot.

[magdaniewczas]

Yes, you can hack a trezor and extract all 24 words

Do you care to elaborate on that maybe? Where did you read or hear about Trezor wallets getting hacked and seed words being extracted?

I did read an article a while ago published by Kaspersky it is possible to gain access to the seed using a hacking technique called voltage glitching. More about that here:
Source: https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/hardware-wallets-hacked/25315/

Using a hacking technique called voltage glitching (applying lowered voltage to a microcontroller, which causes funny effects in the chip) they switched Trezor One’s chip state from “no access” to “partial access,” which allowed them to read the chip’s RAM, but not the flash storage. After that they found out that when the firmware upgrade process is started, the chip places the cryptographic seed into RAM to retain it while the flash is being overwritten. In this manner, they managed to get all memory contents. Finding the cryptographic seed in this dump turned out to be no problem; it was stored in RAM unencrypted, in the form of a mnemonic phrase (meaning actual words instead of random number) that was easy to spot.

https://media.kasperskydaily.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/92/2019/01/10073034/hardware-wallets-hacked-trezor-pwned.jpg

You can hack a Trezor using side channel attack, there are various tools for this, one is Chipwhisperer manufactured in Canada. Their CEO even demonstrated the hack in a video in Las Vegas in August this year.

[malevolent]

You can hack a Trezor using side channel attack, there are various tools for this, one is Chipwhisperer manufactured in Canada. Their CEO even demonstrated the hack in a video in Las Vegas in August this year.

As long as the funds are secured by a long enough passphrase (>30 characters should be good enough), they are still safe on a Trezor.

[DaveF]

As long as the funds are secured by a long enough passphrase (>30 characters should be good enough), they are still safe on a Trezor.

I like you malevolent I really do. Your posts are usually insightful and intelligent.

This one...um....30+ character passphrase? It's hard enough getting people to use more then a 5 or 6 digit pin. You want then to use a full 30+ character saying or group of words?

-Dave

[o_e_l_e_o]

This one...um....30+ character passphrase? It's hard enough getting people to use more then a 5 or 6 digit pin. You want then to use a full 30+ character saying or group of words?

It's an unrealistic expectation, but it is technically correct.

You can read the report from Ledger where they reported on this attack here: https://ledger-donjon.github.io/Unfixable-Key-Extraction-Attack-on-Trezor/

Near the bottom there is a paragraph entitled "Mitigation" where they explain their reasoning. If the seed can be extracted, then the entire security of the wallet rests on the passphrase. They suggest a passphrase of 37 random characters (not a phrase or series of words) is necessary to reach the same level of security as a 24 word mnemonic phrase would on its own.

[DaveF]

This one...um....30+ character passphrase? It's hard enough getting people to use more then a 5 or 6 digit pin. You want then to use a full 30+ character saying or group of words?

It's an unrealistic expectation, but it is technically correct.

You can read the report from Ledger where they reported on this attack here: https://ledger-donjon.github.io/Unfixable-Key-Extraction-Attack-on-Trezor/

Near the bottom there is a paragraph entitled "Mitigation" where they explain their reasoning. If the seed can be extracted, then the entire security of the wallet rests on the passphrase. They suggest a passphrase of 37 random characters (not a phrase or series of words) is necessary to reach the same level of security as a 24 word mnemonic phrase would on its own.

I love my ColdCard more each day.
I guess I just don't get why at this point it's even worth getting a Trezor. I can use just about any wallet with a 37 character passphrase and it will be just as secure.
The entire part of hardware wallets was that even if you lost it it was still secure.

I guess I am missing something.

-Dave

[malevolent]

This one...um....30+ character passphrase? It's hard enough getting people to use more then a 5 or 6 digit pin. You want then to use a full 30+ character saying or group of words?

I'm not saying it would be convenient, certainly not for day to day use (but then most people aren't transacting in huge amounts day to day so they might as well keep two trezors, one without a passphrase, another with a secure passphrase they'd use only occasionally), I just said that in case someone thought no funds are safe on a Trezor, and that's with several assumptions: the attacker gains physical access to the device, the attacker has a lot of resources (i.e. willing to design and produce ASICs just to get to the coins) and the user wants security comparable to a 24 word passphrase from a set of 2048 words. And yeah, it'd actually have to be 37 randomly chosen characters.

In reality 5 randomly chosen words from a 300k word dictionary (e.g. Webster's) would still be more than enough and more user friendly. It'd also be a slightly stronger passphrase than one from randomly choosing 7 words from a set of 7776 words (long diceware word list).

[o_e_l_e_o]

I love my ColdCard more each day.

Just be careful in assuming that your ColdCard is completely safe. Just because an attack like this has only been demonstrated on a Trezor, doesn't mean a similar one (or indeed, a completely different attack) is not possible on a ColdCard, a Ledger, or any other hardware wallet.

I guess I just don't get why at this point it's even worth getting a Trezor.

I don't own a Trezor, but provided you realize that someone has physical access to it, and you have your seed backed up properly, then you should still have ample time (provided any reasonable length of passphrase) to sweep your funds to a new wallet.

The entire part of hardware wallets was that even if you lost it it was still secure.

Secure enough. With enough time and access to a lab with electron microscope (or money to rent such a thing), your seed is probably extractable from any hardware device. The hardware wallet buys you enough time to retrieve your mnemonic phrase and sweep your funds to new wallet.

[DaveF]

This one...um....30+ character passphrase? It's hard enough getting people to use more then a 5 or 6 digit pin. You want then to use a full 30+ character saying or group of words?

I'm not saying it would be convenient, certainly not for day to day use (but then most people aren't transacting in huge amounts day to day so they might as well keep two trezors, one without a passphrase, another with a secure passphrase they'd use only occasionally), I just said that in case someone thought no funds are safe on a Trezor, and that's with several assumptions: the attacker gains physical access to the device, the attacker has a lot of resources (i.e. willing to design and produce ASICs just to get to the coins) and the user wants security comparable to a 24 word passphrase from a set of 2048 words. And yeah, it'd actually have to be 37 randomly chosen characters.

In reality 5 randomly chosen words from a 300k word dictionary (e.g. Webster's) would still be more than enough and more user friendly. It'd also be a slightly stronger passphrase than one from randomly choosing 7 words from a set of 7776 words (long diceware word list).

I love my ColdCard more each day.

Just be careful in assuming that your ColdCard is completely safe. Just because an attack like this has only been demonstrated on a Trezor, doesn't mean a similar one (or indeed, a completely different attack) is not possible on a ColdCard, a Ledger, or any other hardware wallet.

I guess I just don't get why at this point it's even worth getting a Trezor.

I don't own a Trezor, but provided you realize that someone has physical access to it, and you have your seed backed up properly, then you should still have ample time (provided any reasonable length of passphrase) to sweep your funds to a new wallet.

The entire part of hardware wallets was that even if you lost it it was still secure.

Secure enough. With enough time and access to a lab with electron microscope (or money to rent such a thing), your seed is probably extractable from any hardware device. The hardware wallet buys you enough time to retrieve your mnemonic phrase and sweep your funds to new wallet.

So more or less it comes down to you can just as easily have a BIP38 encrypted paper wallet with your coins on it. Because either way if it's a weak passphrase you're going to loose your BTC.

Sorry to be a downer, but it just gets to me that this is out there and yet they are still selling them and people think they are safe just using an 8 digit pin.
This should be a big red alert about this.

-Dave

[o_e_l_e_o]

Because either way if it's a weak passphrase you're going to loose your BTC.

Not necessarily. For hardware wallets, the attacker still needs to extract the seed. On Trezor devices we now know that can be done for less than $100 with fairly basic components. As far as we know, other devices still require high tech equipment and the expertise to use it. Very few people have the access and skills required, and hiring such a lab would cost several thousand dollars at a minimum. It's simply not a concern for your average crypto user, but is a concern for people holding large sums of money who are being specifically targeted by criminals.

Sorry to be a downer, but it just gets to me that this is out there and yet they are still selling them and people think they are safe just using an 8 digit pin.

Nothing is 100% safe, and if you have access to additional options (such as passphrases) which increase your security, then I would always opt to use them.

[magdaniewczas]

Because either way if it's a weak passphrase you're going to loose your BTC.

Not necessarily. For hardware wallets, the attacker still needs to extract the seed. On Trezor devices we now know that can be done for less than $100 with fairly basic components. As far as we know, other devices still require high tech equipment and the expertise to use it. Very few people have the access and skills required, and hiring such a lab would cost several thousand dollars at a minimum. It's simply not a concern for your average crypto user, but is a concern for people holding large sums of money who are being specifically targeted by criminals.

Sorry to be a downer, but it just gets to me that this is out there and yet they are still selling them and people think they are safe just using an 8 digit pin.

Nothing is 100% safe, and if you have access to additional options (such as passphrases) which increase your security, then I would always opt to use them.

Well, it would be quite unique to have a multi-sig with one trezor, one ledger and letsay a bitcoin core wallet, then a two word phrase is enough as long as the attacker does not know which one is which.

There are even cooler methods but should not be disclosed as of yet...

[Ann1989]

Can hardware wallets like Ledger Nano be hacked and their coins stolen?

It's not easy to hack a hardware wallet, unless of course you give your keys to someone.

[malevolent]

Can hardware wallets like Ledger Nano be hacked and their coins stolen?

It's not easy to hack a hardware wallet, unless of course you give your keys to someone.

If someone gains physical access to your hardware wallet, I also wouldn't be so sure... at least set up a reasonably long/complex passphrase if you're using Trezor for bigger amounts of money and are taking it into account that someone could gain physical access to it.