A new cryptocurrency with two-phase-proof-of-work

[Sherlock.Holmes]

Hello everyone.

I am homlos from the crypto community. After a long time to observation and think on the underlying operating mechanism of cryptocurrency, we propose a new mechanism of the two-phase-proof -of-work. Thank you very much for the discussion and join the project construction.

In the Bitcoin network, as the computing power of the mining pool continues to increase, individual nodes can no longer independently participate in mining. Individual miners can only participate in mining by joining the mining pool, which completely deviates from "one-CPU-one- vote" vision. In essence, a mining pool is only equivalent to a node, monopoly mining is very terrible. In addition to unfair incentive, monopoly mining is possible for mining pools with greater computing power to be actively or passively carryed out attacks on the network, resulting in the collapse of the entire system.

We believe that in the Bitcoin network, the formation of the mining pool is inevitable, because in the proof-of-work mechanism, the miner can outsource part of his work to other miners. The cooperative mining between miners is obviously superior to non-cooperative mining. The traditional view is that the formation of the mining pool is due to the ASIC. We believe that this is not the key reason. Many existing projects eventually formed the mining pool after adopting the anti-ASIC strategy. The strategy only limits the growth speed of the computing power of a single node, but the advantages of cooperative mining are still obvious.

In the traditional proof-of-work mechanism, we believe that cooperative mining is inevitable. This is because there are no puzzles can’t be outsourced.

We propose a two-phase-proof-of-work mechanism to solve the problem of cooperative mining. We introduce a concept of lucky  in each round of mining, that is, miners rely on luck to mine. We split each round of mining tasks into two phases of proof of work, the first phase is a lightweight task to complete the calculation of the luck , and then calculate the difficulty of the second phase of the mining task according to the luck, The higher the luck, the smaller the difficulty, the smaller the luck, the greater the difficulty. The second phase is to complete the corresponding work according to the corresponding difficulty. We can prove that under this two-phase-proof-of-work mechanism, the expected output of miners' cooperative mining is lower than that of their non-cooperative mining. This is the key to achieving "one-CPU-one-vote". Whether each node belongs to the same miner, it will choose to mine independently.

In luck network, the systemic risk of the network is no longer a 51% computing power attack, but a 51% node attack, that is, a mine owner has mastered more than 51% of independent nodes in the entire network. Attacks are destructive to the system. But obviously, it is much easier to master 51% of the computing power than to master 51% of the nodes. In addition, for the  two-phase-proof-of-work mechanism, if the number of honest nodes in the whole network is enough, for example, more than 1000 nodes, even if a miner has mastered 51% of the nodes, he wants to make a profit through a fork, he needs on average to mine 1000000 blocks to catch up with the main network, which is a huge cost.

For more information about the project, please refer to the white paper :
https://github.com/luck-coin/luckcoin/blob/master/White-paper/luckcoin.md

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact us at
Sherlock.Holmes.luck@protonmail.com.

The official website: https://lucknet.club

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[autumngrass]

It looks like this project is good, and I expect professionals to analyze the value from technical . stay tuned。

[Sherlock.Holmes]

In essence, the proof-of-work mechanism is an effective way to resist sybil attacks, but it is conducive to the formation of mining pools. The two-stage proof-of-work mechanism proposed in the luck project is an upgrade of the proof-of-work mechanism. It not only effectively resist sybil attacks, but also prevents cooperation between miners to effectively resist the alliance and make the network more secure.

[pilosopotasyo]

I'm not very much into mining because you need the money and the technical knowledge to implement but I'd like to see how it goes, based on your thread this is going to be CPU minable, when can you make an official announcement of this project, so we can see it's potential.

[WhiteLee]

While I find the problem considered in the project interesting, as bitcoin indeed suffer from this well-known issue ( mining pool monopolized mining power). I just want to know how to paticipate in mining.

[ahyadinnn]

I'm not very much into mining because you need the money and the technical knowledge to implement but I'd like to see how it goes, based on your thread this is going to be CPU minable, when can you make an official announcement of this project, so we can see it's potential.

for mining equipment now is quite expensive, and not to mention we have to calculate the expenses used, such as paying for electricity, maintenance of mining equipment and others, I am also quite curious how much they get from mining the coins

[The1Duke]

I'm sorry, I fail to see how this fixes anything.

[Darkuso]

We propose a two-phase-proof-of-work mechanism to solve the problem of cooperative mining. We introduce a concept of lucky  in each round of mining, that is, miners rely on luck to mine. We split each round of mining tasks into two phases of proof of work, the first phase is a lightweight task to complete the calculation of the luck , and then calculate the difficulty of the second phase of the mining task according to the luck, The higher the luck, the smaller the difficulty, the smaller the luck, the greater the difficulty. The second phase is to complete the corresponding work according to the corresponding difficulty. We can prove that under this two-phase-proof-of-work mechanism, the expected output of miners' cooperative mining is lower than that of their non-cooperative mining. This is the key to achieving "one-CPU-one-vote". Whether each node belongs to the same miner, it will choose to mine independently.

I'm not against new ideas, but don't you think that this would make everything worst? Just think about it, a pool can split its miners as a single CPU, wait until one with luck gets the block and the right to mine, then join the proccessing power of that one pool, mine the block and split again. The bigger the pools is, the higher the chance to have "luck" will be  and if that stays the same  some of these pools will have a lot of luck with a really low difficulty, until at some point a big enought pool can monopolized it.

[trevelyan22]

As Dark points out above, the two-part mining puzzle doesn't change the expected payoff: miners will just switch from spending 100% of their CPU hashing to spending most of it generating privatekeys so they can "get lucky". It might be easier to get substantive feedback if you stopped talking about "luck" and just said "we're using a form of POW that requires miner signatures so people can't share work".

Which makes the real question why you need multiple puzzles? Why not do what Saito (https://org.saito.tech) does and have a mining puzzle where the POW output is a hash of a signed message? There are deeper problems with "privatekey mining" that Saito solves that you should look at too -- one issue with the existing setup is that you're basically paying people to generate keypairs that let them do brute-force attacks on user balances.

[Sherlock.Holmes]

I'm not very much into mining because you need the money and the technical knowledge to implement but I'd like to see how it goes, based on your thread this is going to be CPU minable, when can you make an official announcement of this project, so we can see it's potential.

At present, we are doing simulation testing and block difficulty adjustment test of the project to meet the theoretical assumptions. Further plans for the project will be announced soon.

[Sherlock.Holmes]

As Dark points out above, the two-part mining puzzle doesn't change the expected payoff: miners will just switch from spending 100% of their CPU hashing to spending most of it generating privatekeys so they can "get lucky". It might be easier to get substantive feedback if you stopped talking about "luck" and just said "we're using a form of POW that requires miner signatures so people can't share work".

Which makes the real question why you need multiple puzzles? Why not do what Saito (https://org.saito.tech) does and have a mining puzzle where the POW output is a hash of a signed message? There are deeper problems with "privatekey mining" that Saito solves that you should look at too -- one issue with the existing setup is that you're basically paying people to generate keypairs that let them do brute-force attacks on user balances.

Thank you for your attention. Mining with private keys can effectively prevent cooperation between miners, but there is a risk of private keys being stolen. On the other hand, if we don't introduce some mechanisms for resisting cooperative mining, A miner will let all nodes mine for only one account, so that the small miner has no advantage, he has to choose leaving. By introducing a two-phase-proof-of-work mechanism, the output of cooperative mining will be less than that of non-cooperation, so the power owned by miner is equal to the proportion of the number of nodes he owns (for two miners A and B, A has 100 nodes, B has 50 nodes, B has 1/3 chance to win), which is obviously fairer than the traditional POW.
In addition, because the calculation of the luck also consumes resources, a single miner cannot calculate the luck of multiple accounts in batches.

[Sherlock.Holmes]

We propose a two-phase-proof-of-work mechanism to solve the problem of cooperative mining. We introduce a concept of lucky  in each round of mining, that is, miners rely on luck to mine. We split each round of mining tasks into two phases of proof of work, the first phase is a lightweight task to complete the calculation of the luck , and then calculate the difficulty of the second phase of the mining task according to the luck, The higher the luck, the smaller the difficulty, the smaller the luck, the greater the difficulty. The second phase is to complete the corresponding work according to the corresponding difficulty. We can prove that under this two-phase-proof-of-work mechanism, the expected output of miners' cooperative mining is lower than that of their non-cooperative mining. This is the key to achieving "one-CPU-one-vote". Whether each node belongs to the same miner, it will choose to mine independently.

I'm not against new ideas, but don't you think that this would make everything worst? Just think about it, a pool can split its miners as a single CPU, wait until one with luck gets the block and the right to mine, then join the proccessing power of that one pool, mine the block and split again. The bigger the pools is, the higher the chance to have "luck" will be  and if that stays the same  some of these pools will have a lot of luck with a really low difficulty, until at some point a big enought pool can monopolized it.

Thank you for your attention. You are right. The more nodes, the higher the luck. However, for the two-phase-proof of work, any two miners or any two nodes in a pool, the output of cooperation must be less than that of non-cooperation. So for independent nodes, there is no motivation for cooperation, and this is the key reason for the formation of mining pools.

[Vitalicus]

Hello everyone.

I am homlos from the crypto community. After a long time to observation and think on the underlying operating mechanism of cryptocurrency, we propose a new mechanism of the two-phase-proof -of-work. Thank you very much for the discussion and join the project construction.

In the Bitcoin network, as the computing power of the mining pool continues to increase, individual nodes can no longer independently participate in mining. Individual miners can only participate in mining by joining the mining pool, which completely deviates from "one-CPU-one- vote" vision. In essence, a mining pool is only equivalent to a node, monopoly mining is very terrible. In addition to unfair incentive, monopoly mining is possible for mining pools with greater computing power to be actively or passively carryed out attacks on the network, resulting in the collapse of the entire system.

We believe that in the Bitcoin network, the formation of the mining pool is inevitable, because in the proof-of-work mechanism, the miner can outsource part of his work to other miners. The cooperative mining between miners is obviously superior to non-cooperative mining. The traditional view is that the formation of the mining pool is due to the ASIC. We believe that this is not the key reason. Many existing projects eventually formed the mining pool after adopting the anti-ASIC strategy. The strategy only limits the growth speed of the computing power of a single node, but the advantages of cooperative mining are still obvious.

In the traditional proof-of-work mechanism, we believe that cooperative mining is inevitable. This is because there are no puzzles can’t be outsourced.

We propose a two-phase-proof-of-work mechanism to solve the problem of cooperative mining. We introduce a concept of lucky  in each round of mining, that is, miners rely on luck to mine. We split each round of mining tasks into two phases of proof of work, the first phase is a lightweight task to complete the calculation of the luck , and then calculate the difficulty of the second phase of the mining task according to the luck, The higher the luck, the smaller the difficulty, the smaller the luck, the greater the difficulty. The second phase is to complete the corresponding work according to the corresponding difficulty. We can prove that under this two-phase-proof-of-work mechanism, the expected output of miners' cooperative mining is lower than that of their non-cooperative mining. This is the key to achieving "one-CPU-one-vote". Whether each node belongs to the same miner, it will choose to mine independently.

In luck network, the systemic risk of the network is no longer a 51% computing power attack, but a 51% node attack, that is, a mine owner has mastered more than 51% of independent nodes in the entire network. Attacks are destructive to the system. But obviously, it is much easier to master 51% of the computing power than to master 51% of the nodes. In addition, for the  two-phase-proof-of-work mechanism, if the number of honest nodes in the whole network is enough, for example, more than 1000 nodes, even if a miner has mastered 51% of the nodes, he wants to make a profit through a fork, he needs on average to mine 1000000 blocks to catch up with the main network, which is a huge cost.

For more information about the project, please refer to the white paper :
https://github.com/luck-coin/luckcoin/blob/master/White-paper/luckcoin.md

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact us at
Sherlock.Holmes.luck@protonmail.com.

Thanks for your help sharing. I like this mechanism of action. Does it look like it will be better than Bitcoin? I also don't understand 51% attacks, can you share more information about 51% attacks?

[autumngrass]

In essence, the proof-of-work mechanism is an effective way to resist sybil attacks, but it is conducive to the formation of mining pools. The two-stage proof-of-work mechanism proposed in the luck project is an upgrade of the proof-of-work mechanism. It not only effectively resist sybil attacks, but also prevents cooperation between miners to effectively resist the alliance and make the network more secure.

It sounds like a good idea. Does the project need to  ICO? When will the mainnet online?

[wolfwolf]

As Vitalicus just said, can you share more information about 51% attach? Why this is better than Bitcoin? 

[kushti]

There's a notion of non-outsourceable Proof-of-Work puzzles, and Ergo Platform cryptocurrency has Autolykos PoW algorithm which prevents pool formation ( see https://docs.ergoplatform.com/ErgoPow.pdf for details).

However, if smart contracts are powerful enough, still miners can do coalitions for most of NO-PoW schemes using collaterals , see this paper of my co-authorship https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/044 (published @ FC'20).

So please consider your scheme against smart-contract powered pools.

[Sherlock.Holmes]

Thanks for your help sharing. I like this mechanism of action. Does it look like it will be better than Bitcoin? I also don't understand 51% attacks, can you share more information about 51% attacks?

Regarding the 51% attack, here is a simple comparison with Bitcoin's mining model.

In the Bitcoin system, for example, honest miner A has 1000 nodes, and a malicious miner B has 1100 nodes, then B has 10% more computing power than A. B selfish mining only needs 10 blocks to exceed A .

In a two-phase-proof-of-work system, for example, honest miner A has 1000 nodes, and the malicious miner B has 1100 nodes. Because the total number of nodes in the entire network is relatively large, the work of the first phase is much larger than the second phase (the work of the second phase is the work of the node with the highest luck), B's block generation time in the first phase has no advantage, and B's block generation time in the second phase will only be reduced by 1/10 compared to A's block generation time in the second phase. In two phases, the advantage of B's block generation time is very small. If B wants to implement selfish mining, it needs a lot of blocks to exceed A.

[Sherlock.Holmes]

There's a notion of non-outsourceable Proof-of-Work puzzles, and Ergo Platform cryptocurrency has Autolykos PoW algorithm which prevents pool formation ( see https://docs.ergoplatform.com/ErgoPow.pdf for details).

However, if smart contracts are powerful enough, still miners can do coalitions for most of NO-PoW schemes using collaterals , see this paper of my co-authorship https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/044 (published @ FC'20).

So please consider your scheme against smart-contract powered pools.

If the private key signature is introduced into the puzzle, in addition to the risk of losing the funds, the problem of cooperative mining still exists.

If the private key signature is not introduced in the puzzle, We believe that there are no puzzles can't be outsourced. because the puzzles required in the proof of work mechanism needs to have three conditions: Difficult to compute, easy to verify, and measurable difficulty. The puzzles that satisfies these three conditions must be outsourced.

[wolfwolf]

Thanks for your help sharing. I like this mechanism of action. Does it look like it will be better than Bitcoin? I also don't understand 51% attacks, can you share more information about 51% attacks?

Regarding the 51% attack, here is a simple comparison with Bitcoin's mining model.

In the Bitcoin system, for example, honest miner A has 1000 nodes, and a malicious miner B has 1100 nodes, then B has 10% more computing power than A. B selfish mining only needs 10 blocks to exceed A .

In a two-phase-proof-of-work system, for example, honest miner A has 1000 nodes, and the malicious miner B has 1100 nodes. Because the total number of nodes in the entire network is relatively large, the work of the first phase is much larger than the second phase (the work of the second phase is the work of the node with the highest luck), B's block generation time in the first phase has no advantage, and B's block generation time in the second phase will only be reduced by 1/10 compared to A's block generation time in the second phase. In two phases, the advantage of B's block generation time is very small. If B wants to implement selfish mining, it needs a lot of blocks to exceed A.

It would be better if you could share some mathematical models for 51% attack.

[Shallow]

This is a unique concept I must say but everyone knows that in the crypto space, having a unique concept is one thing while being able to bring it into action or existence such that it will benefit all and sundry is another thing; and this is where the problems starts, usually after listing on exchange. To me, this is good but will be better or I will be glad to see that the team is building this project adequately while ensuring it achieves its full potential. I believe with this, the project will be a valuable and attractive one.