Zero hits for it in my email, on the Bitcoin mailing lists, or on BCT, ... seems like the authors didn't care if the Bitcoin community ever saw it.
The idea is pretty similar to other commited utxo models. It takes for form of periodically electing a block to have its utxo snapshotted (at considerable cost to nodes, hopefully offset by being infrequent) which (presumably after some delay) is included in unverified miner commitments. Its not clear to me what advantage the paper's commitment structure has over proposals that use a
rolling commitment which can be affirmed (and validated) at every block very cheaply plus a non-consensus-normative decision of what snapshots to keep.
The paper provides no meaningful security analysis and asserts that it maintains security but as far as I can determine it does not: It proposes something with SPV like security: Users of it blindly trust miners to not, say, collectively reassign all the unspent coins from the first year to themselves. It assumes "an honest majority of CoinPrune miners" but is silent on why the majority would be honest or what would happen if they're not.
As far as I can tell it's a somewhat worse than SPV security model, because miners blocks are not rejected by full nodes for committing to faithless snapshots, which would mean it lacks even the limited economic incentive argument for the security of SPV.
