Where do you store your cold wallet??

[erikoy]

There is a thread actually here opening up some cold wallet storage that are fire proof, water proof and the likes. In my case storing cold wallet may be best store in a vault. A fire proof and water proof would be better that if you really storing high number of bitcoins. I can't relate actually for now because I do not hold bitcoin for the moment.

Before, I am using centralized exchange wallet here in our local and store few amount of bitcoin. I did not have worries actually and I just need to use the 2FA so that I will know if my coins will be move or not or if there will be a transfer to be made. So far, I never had the problem with it and I will still use it in the future.

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[LTU_btc]

OP, you're basically asking where we hold our lifetime savings ? Ok, I must admit that place where I keep it isn't safest one. But there is one very important point - keep your cold wallet and recovery seed separately. Keeping it in the same place wouldn't be smartest idea.
And one idea which wasn't mention yet come to my mind while making this post. You can keep your backup phrase buried in your backyard. Use waterproof box or simple bottle or jar. But still, it would be best to use laminated paper in case if something will go wrong.

• Put it in your memory I have mine in my head that's the most safer place on earth.

For me it looks like really bad idea. People tend to forget even more simple things like passwords, phone numbers, PIN codes. While recovery seed basically is just 12 random words - it's not something what is easy to remember. Do you really want to see that you will be able to remember all words in correct order after not using your wallet for year or two? Personally, I wouldn't risk.

[actmyname]

It wouldn't help. $5 wrench would always know the exact sum you possess. He doesn't come at random and blindfold. If you deal with the excessive  amount of crypto all your data are already in databases of the various  3-letters agencies and it is only the matter of time when they will be at the hand of  $5 wrench.

If we're dealing with this level of preparedness, then it's no longer a "$5 wrench" - it's a $5 wrench + you fucking up your privacy willingly + you fucking up your digital/analog identity connections + you dealing with a persistent mugging. And if I had the amount of Bitcoin required for someone to dedicate themselves to going to my location with a wrench attack, I probably wouldn't be the type of person who is willy-nilly about his privacy.

If we're at the point where the guy is ready to start torturing you for every last one of your keys, odds are you're not going to survive, whether you give it to them or not.

[Stedsm]

I have made a settlement with my brother on this by keeping all my recovery phrases as well as cold wallets in his phone which was never used to get connected to internet and not even have a sim card. So even if I die, I'm tension free that he'll manage to withdraw my BTC (whichever I saved but it's not worth too much, maybe some satoshis) and sell them for a great value.

[lovesmayfamilis]

Very often, everything that we so zealously fear will never happen in our life. People go to madness encrypting and hiding their keys. I also agree that you shouldn't be paranoid about this. Those who had bitcoins in its early development and subsequently simply lost the keys may just go crazy about it. But is it worth it? We can all just regret and tear our hairs out, thinking that we did not acquire bitcoins as soon as possible.
Anyone who comes to bitcoin must agree that all responsibility for preserving their coins lies only with him. Otherwise, you need to keep the money in the bank.
The most valuable remedy for hacking is silence. Our language is the best key that should not tell absolutely anyone that its owner owns the cryptocurrency.

[Lucius]

The most valuable remedy for hacking is silence. Our language is the best key that should not tell absolutely anyone that its owner owns the cryptocurrency.

This is something I can completely agree with, because in order for someone to steal something from someone in any way, they must first know that someone actually has it. Nowadays, people behave very freely on social networks and practically share their secrets with complete strangers, which then puts them in very awkward situations.

Everyone should keep to themselves how they store their cryptocurrencies, especially if they have some specific/unique way. Bad guys aren't so stupid (at least not everyone) that they randomly hunt down victims, but they closely follow social networks and forums like this and wait for someone to confess that they have x BTC kept in x place - everything else can be found out through social engineering methods.

My advice is to protect your digital life first, and then your physical one as well.

[lovesmayfamilis]

Nowadays, people behave very freely on social networks and practically share their secrets with complete strangers, which then puts them in very awkward situations.

Absolutely right. Social media is an evil that can later harm account holders. By uploading their photos, users forget about such a function as metadata . They contain GPS information, date and time, and sometimes more sensitive information. Subsequently, users wonder how scammers find out about their whereabouts.

[PrimeNumber7]

. Keep some of the wallets entirely hidden, for example by using a passphrase on top a seed phrase which has some coins stored in it, or by creating a hidden encryption volume, and putting one wallet in the non-hidden volume and a different wallet in the hidden volume.

The key here is not to overdo it otherwise one may end up like that guy who encrypted his IronKey and lost password that unlocks that encryption. In the result 7,002 BTC seems to be lost, I said "seems" because he only has two attempts left to access his fund. ^reference

I am not familiar with IronKey, but I would think it would be possible to copy the (encrypted) contents of the hard drive an arbitrary number of times to allow for additional password guesses.

[squatter]

I am not familiar with IronKey, but I would think it would be possible to copy the (encrypted) contents of the hard drive an arbitrary number of times to allow for additional password guesses.

My understanding is that IronKey meets the FIPS 140-2 Level 3 standard, meaning it stores password hashes and keys in a tamper-resistant module physically separated from the memory component. If the key storage module is physically compromised, the self-destruct feature is engaged.

The standard was developed specifically to address the threat model you described. I think the security threats are still at the theoretical, academic stage.