Bitcoin's blockchain size

[ranochigo]

Here's an example:  If a change was proposed which would incentivize the miners to authorize it, but wasn't in agreement from the side of the people, what would happen? I guess that the people would split the chain, but if they hadn't enough power to secure it, wouldn't they come to a dead end? Or to change it a little bit, if there were two forks of Bitcoin, wouldn't the people prefer the one that is the most secure?

Food for thought.

Which side do you think would fold first? Would the users want to follow the majority of the miners, but aren't necessarily in agreement with them? IMO, no. Users are far more pragmatic than just going with whatever the miners says. Unless of course, they are able to reach a compromise but it is hardly true that the community only cares about the decisions that the (majority of the) miners make.

If a hypothetical fork were to happen, and that miners were all insistent on a specific fork that isn't in favour of the community (or were in a sense ridden with hidden motives), who suffers more? Miners who are already surviving on thin margins or the general community which doesn't really stand to lose much? I agree that the best case scenario would be cooperation from both parties, but it really doesn't mean that miners has to "authorize" any changes! That is a flawed system and also why we have backup plans to force activation of soft forks.

I thought the idea of UASF during the peak of the block wars would've been a good example of which party stands to lose more by prolonging the fight. They were so adamant on a block size increase. If miners could've successfully coerced the community into adopting a block size increase, then why didn't they go on with it? FWIW: This encompasses the rationale behind UASF: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1805060.0.

[BlackHatCoiner]

Which side do you think would fold first?

Hmm... I think that I now got what you said, but I'll prefer taking this step-by-step.

So the problem you're describing to me is that if the users do not agree with the miners and a fork occurred, one of the followings would happen first:

• People would remain to the fork they accept which isn't incentivizing miners.
• Miners would prefer mining the chain that benefits them the most. (in this case, the new one)

So, if the people migrated to the fork that wouldn't change Bitcoin and most of the miners to the one that benefits them the most, the security of the unchanged fork would decrease, but the money would remain. Thus, it'd be more profitable for the miners to mine what people follow and not what is benefiting them in the protocol level.

Am I correct so far?

[ranochigo]

People would remain to the fork they accept which isn't incentivizing miners.

Not necessarily. People choose the fork that they deem to be better for the community in general. Given the various stakeholders, either you come to a compromise or you choose the best for yourself.

So, if the people migrated to the fork that wouldn't change Bitcoin and most of the miners to the one that benefits them the most, the security of the unchanged fork would decrease, but the money would remain. Thus, it'd be more profitable for the miners to mine what people follow and not what is benefiting them in the protocol level.

Miners don't want the network to split, simple as that. If there comes a day that miners or the community are willing to destroy Bitcoin, by having a hard fork that separate the key stakeholders (or economic agents), then Bitcoin is doomed. It isn't about what chain is more profitable to mine on or which has more security, it is about making the rational decisions for themselves, by looking at the bigger picture. If you tarnish the reputation of Bitcoin and/or otherwise destroy the confidence of the general public and potential investors, then you're just digging a hole for yourself.

[BlackHatCoiner]

Miners don't want the network to split, simple as that. If there comes a day that miners or the community are willing to destroy Bitcoin, by having a hard fork that separate the key stakeholders (or economic agents), then Bitcoin is doomed.

So, this applies:

Thus, it'd be more profitable for the miners to mine what people follow and not what is benefiting them in the protocol level.

They mine what the people want. Thus, their fork will become meaningless if the people say so. That's why they'll never have more power than the people. Because, people are essentially the miners' incentive; the miners' income comes from the people's “vote” in the market. They're dependent from the people.

I think that I know cleared it up, thanks ranochigo!

[Wind_FURY]

Miners don't want the network to split, simple as that. If there comes a day that miners or the community are willing to destroy Bitcoin, by having a hard fork that separate the key stakeholders (or economic agents), then Bitcoin is doomed.

So, this applies:

Thus, it'd be more profitable for the miners to mine what people follow and not what is benefiting them in the protocol level.

They mine what the people want. Thus, their fork will become meaningless if the people say so. That's why they'll never have more power than the people. Because, people are essentially the miners' incentive; the miners' income comes from the people's “vote” in the market. They're dependent from the people.

I think that I know cleared it up, thanks ranochigo!

Yes, the vote is showed through which fork is dumped, and which coin is continued to be HODLed, and given value by the open market. The more valued fork would therefore get more hashing power.

Was it Bitfinex that listed two tokens, one for Bitcoin Unlimited and one for Bitcoin Core to let the market “speak” for itself?