Hi everyone,
with Bitcoin halving the block subsidy every few years, we need one of two things to happen in order to secure enough secruity-budget for the mainlayer: One is NGU. If the prices of Bitcoin rise, less stats will be sufficient to pay for mining hardware and electricity. If BTC/USD doesn't increase, fees nominated in sats/vB will need to rise. Either way main layer transactions will become more expensive nominated in "purchasing power", the more subsidy shrinks.
Personally I don't think this is a problem for the mainlayer. We were already able to witness mainlayer congestion a few times in the past and were are still so early. With more adoption, there will be more congestion and therefore a highly competetive fee market.
Now my question: I have just read "Blockstreams" paper on eltoo. They propose a second layer that waives the carrot/stick method of punishment by introducing state numbers, but the whole system still relies on OP_CSV and a honest peer enforcing the right state faster than a dishonest actor. But in a few years (or even decades) "fast" settlement might be very very expensive. A dishonest actor might be wiling to spend way more on mining fees, as they will be rewarded with their peers coins, if the attack is sucessful, while a honest actor will only loose money in a race against the attacker.
Did is misinterpret something? Is this problem already solved?
Thanks for your time!
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