I have 3 important questions

[Klutuk]

hello everyone.. Instead cold storage a lockdown mode address or Frozen Storage address could be added to bitcoin? and I have 3 important questions.. I hope you are willing to answer these questions along with the reasons.

1. Attacker might able to steal private key after user make a transaction from special address,but how do you plan to prevent this accident?
2. How do someone veto a transaction which made by attacker where we can verify who's the owner or attacker without compromise owner privacy?
3. Assuming a transaction is reversed, that means blocks would become invalid since it's hash (along with all next blocks) will become invalid? How do you plan to solve this problem?

[OmegaStarScream]

0. There are a few ways to do that[1][2]

1. Good security practices when using desktop/mobile wallets so you don't get your device infected or simply a cold storage wallet.
2. Once the transaction gets a confirmation, there's no way to reverse it.

[1] https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Timelock
[2] https://coinb.in/#newTimeLocked

[tranthidung]

1. Attacker might able to steal private key after user make a transaction from special address,but how do you plan to prevent this accident?

Only if you download a phishing wallet and leak your private key or you use custodial wallet and get trapped by phishing one, login with info which is stolen later.

3. Assuming a transaction is reversed, that means blocks would become invalid since it's hash (along with all next blocks) will become invalid? How do you plan to solve this problem?

Transactions are irreversible. In addition, the older a transaction is, the less chance to reverse it sucessfully. Because cost will become more expensive with older transactions.

One way to think about the blockchain is like layers in a geological formation, or glacier core sample. The surface layers might change with the seasons, or even be blown away before they have time to settle. But once you go a few inches deep, geological layers become more and more stable. By the time you look a few hundred feet down, you are looking at a snapshot of the past that has remained undisturbed for millions of years. In the blockchain, the most recent few blocks might be revised if there is a chain recalculation due to a fork. The top six blocks are like a few inches of topsoil. But once you go more deeply into the blockchain, beyond six blocks, blocks are less and less likely to change. After 100 blocks back, there is so much stability that the coinbase transaction—the transaction containing newly mined bitcoin—can be spent. A few thousand blocks back (a month) and the blockchain is settled history, for all practical purposes. While the protocol always allows a chain to be undone by a longer chain and while the possibility of any block being reversed always exists, the probability of such an event decreases as time passes until it becomes infinitesimal.

[pakhitheboss]

1. Attacker might able to steal private key after user make a transaction from special address,but how do you plan to prevent this accident?

Through a transaction hash or wallet address, attackers cannot find the private key unless a user reveals it or it has been accessed using malware on the device and through a phishing email.

Read this to know the Recommended wallets

2. How do someone veto a transaction which made by attacker where we can verify who's the owner or attacker without compromise owner privacy?

Once a transaction is made you cannot amend, recall or cancel the transaction.

3. Assuming a transaction is reversed, that means blocks would become invalid since it's hash (along with all next blocks) will become invalid? How do you plan to solve this problem?

As mentioned above you cannot recall a transaction once it has been processed.

[Charles-Tim]

Instead cold storage a lockdown mode address or Frozen Storage address could be added to bitcoin?

Depending on the wallet you are using, like on Electrum, you can make use of coin control to freeze input(s) or address freeze to freeze all inputs on an address. But if your seed phrase or private key is compromised, the attacker can unfreeze the inputs. And this is never meant for security purpose but just for privacy means of making transaction.

You have the option of cold storage like paper wallet, wallet on an airgapped device or hardware wallets. Alternatively, if you have different devices, you can still setup a multisig wallet. For maximum security, you can setup a multisig wallet on two or three hardware wallet.

1. Attacker might able to steal private key after user make a transaction from special address,but how do you plan to prevent this accident?

You do not have to make transaction before an attacker can compromise your wallet and steal coins. What is most important is to never let anyone know your see phrase or private key which can be used for the attack. People that are using online wallets are most vulnerable to this type of attack as they may click on ads, link ads and also visiting other sites that can introduce and install malware like Trojan horse on their device that can be used by the attacker to compromise your device.

2. How do someone veto a transaction which made by attacker where we can verify who's the owner or attacker without compromise owner privacy?

Better not to send to a scammer because this will most likely lead to loss that is not recoverable. Be careful of scammers. Once a transaction is confirmed, the transaction can not longer cancelled or reversed, while even transaction can not be reversed at all for non-RBF transactions.

3. Assuming a transaction is reversed, that means blocks would become invalid since it's hash (along with all next blocks) will become invalid? How do you plan to solve this problem?

51% attack? Bitcoin has the strongest blockchain. But making sure a transaction is confirmed before accepting it.

[NeuroticFish]

1. Attacker might able to steal private key after user make a transaction from special address,but how do you plan to prevent this accident?

I don't see any relation between the alleged theft and the use of a "special address". Are you sure you understand how bitcoin works?
But a private key can be stolen, OK. One can learn to keep the keys safe. If one doesn't trust himself, he can try to use others' services (but imho those can easily be riskier).

2. How do someone veto a transaction which made by attacker where we can verify who's the owner or attacker without compromise owner privacy?

Veto? Well, use m-of-n wallets if you want to. But after a transaction is signed, sent and confirmed, it's gone and you cannot veto.

3. Assuming a transaction is reversed, that means blocks would become invalid since it's hash (along with all next blocks) will become invalid? How do you plan to solve this problem?

This assumption of yours is wrong: after properly confirmed, it won't be reversed. There's no problem to solve.


You seem to rise problems caused by insufficient knowledge of Bitcoin. No offense, but you should start with the start and read/understand the basics; afterwards you can think about what can go wrong.. based on what's actually possible.
Just my 2 satoshi.

[Little Mouse]

As mentioned above you cannot recall a transaction once it has been processed.

What did you mean by "process"?
As long as a tx isn’t confirmed, you have full control over it. You can cancel a tx (not cancel actually) in Electrum wallet if the tx isn’t yet confirmed. You can send the same input of your tx to another address by creating a tx with higher fee. But all that's possible till the tx pending (no confirmation).

[witcher_sense]

1. Attacker might able to steal private key after user make a transaction from special address,but how do you plan to prevent this accident?

If you're concerned about your private key being exposed after you make a payment from a "special" address, then spend all the outputs associated with this address in a single transaction. In short, send the entire amount without creating change. When you have emptied your address, the private key of that address becomes useless for an attacker, stealing it does not give them any control over your funds.

2. How do someone veto a transaction which made by attacker where we can verify who's the owner or attacker without compromise owner privacy?

You have already been told that confirmed transactions cannot be reversed, and you're unlikely to quickly notice your funds having been stolen while the transaction is still in the pool of unconfirmed transactions. Oftentimes scammers are stupid enough to have sent stolen funds to their verified accounts on centralized exchanges. In this case, you can try to contact the technical support of the exchange and ask them to freeze stolen money.

3. Assuming a transaction is reversed, that means blocks would become invalid since it's hash (along with all next blocks) will become invalid? How do you plan to solve this problem?

Again, you can't reverse a transaction that is confirmed, but you can make it disappear from the blockchain along with the corresponding block by convincing miners to perform a blockchain rollback.

[dkbit98]

hello everyone.. Instead cold storage a lockdown mode address or Frozen Storage address could be added to bitcoin?

I don't know what lockdown mode or frozen storage address, and it probably exist only in your imagination.

Attacker might able to steal private key after user make a transaction from special address,but how do you plan to prevent this accident?

Private key can never be stolen from any transactions you are making.
Best way to protect your private key or seed words is to keep it offline, written on paper or on metal, and adding passphrase would be best simple protection.
Multisig setup is much more safe but it adds complexity and it's not foe crypto newbies.

How do someone veto a transaction which made by attacker where we can verify who's the owner or attacker without compromise owner privacy?

There is easy way to sign a message with Electrum or other wallets to confirm you are the original owner, but there is no way to ''veto'' transaction, whatever that is.
Identity of person who signed a message is safe and not revelead.

Assuming a transaction is reversed, that means blocks would become invalid since it's hash (along with all next blocks) will become invalid? How do you plan to solve this problem?

There is no problem to solve here, and transaction in bitcoin can not be reversed if they are confirmed.

[hosseinimr93]

As long as a tx isn’t confirmed, you have full control over it. ...........

This isn't always true. You have full control over the inputs of an unconfirmed transaction only if the transaction has been marked as RBF.
If your transaction hasn't been marked as RBF, it's very unlikely that you succeed in replacing that with a new transaction spending same input(s).
Nodes usually reject any transaction spending UTXOs that have already been spent in a non-RBF transaction, even if the original transaction is still unconfirmed and you have paid a very higher fee for the new transaction.

[witcher_sense]

This isn't always true. You have full control over the inputs of an unconfirmed transaction only if the transaction has been marked as RBF.
If your transaction hasn't been marked as RBF, it's very unlikely that you succeed in replacing that with a new transaction spending same input(s).
Nodes usually reject any transaction spending UTXOs that have already been spent in a non-RBF transaction, even if the original transaction is still unconfirmed and you have paid a very higher fee for the new transaction.

Pardon my ignorance but first, you said the double-spend transaction relays "only if" it was marked as RBF beforehand, but then you said that "if" it wasn't marked as RBF, it is very "unlikely" it will relay and that nodes "usually" reject such a transaction. Could you elaborate on that? Are there special circumstances in which it is possible to get around existing network restrictions and get your double-spend transaction confirmed before the initial one is confirmed? Given that a double-spend transaction is still valid to the network and also has significantly higher fees, miners will want to include it. The only problem I see is that miners won't know that such a transaction even exists because the nodes of the network won't tell them it exists. What if a person who wants his double spending to succeed merely gets in contact with mining pool operators and asks them to include this transaction in a candidate block instead of the first one?

[hosseinimr93]

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Let's say I have broadcast two transactions. They are spending same UTXOs and both are still unconfirmed.
Miners are free to include any of transactions and there's nothing to stop them. They can include the one made later even if it's paying lower fee. They can also ignore the one paying higher fee even if it has been made earlier. They can include any of the transactions regardless of whether the original one (the one made earlier) has been marked as RBF or not.

Although miners are free to include any of the transactions, they usually use the rules mentioned in BIP125 standard.
According to BIP125 standard, the original transaction can be replaced by a new one if it has been marked as RBF, the replacement transaction spends at least one of inputs of the original transaction and pays a higher transaction fee.

Again, miners are not forced to follow the rules mentioned in BIP125 standard. But they usually do so and that's why I said "If your transaction hasn't been marked as RBF, it's very unlikely that you succeed in replacing that with a new transaction spending same input(s)."
A miner can break the standard rules for any reason. For example, because it's their own transaction or because they have been paid by someone.