"Surprisingly, Tail Emission Is Not Inflationary" -- A post by Peter Todd

[o_e_l_e_o]

You say you have "many such addresses which would be classified as stale" but you don't even know how "stale" would be defined. It might be something where if funds were not moved from an address in one generation, say 100 years. So given that, none of your addresses would be considered stale. I think it's reasonable to expect someone that inherits bitcoin from someone else would attempt to do at least a small transaction to make sure things work.

And yet, even after 100 years, you have no way of knowing that coins which haven't moved in that time are lost. I am unconvinced that it fees alone are not enough to maintain the security of the network, then fees + any coins which haven't moved in 100 years would be either. It might delay things, but as Gregory pointed out on first page of this thread, it is entirely possible for coin loss to be come so inconsequentially small that you would essentially just be back to relying on fees only, albeit with a delay of a couple of decades (as truly lost coins from the first several years of bitcoin's life were added to the block reward, provided they hadn't already been moved or stolen by some entity breaking the ECDLP).

There is no reason to do a small transaction "to make sure things work" - if you inherit a private key, you can tell exactly which addresses and which coins it will unlock without having to broadcast anything to the network.

[1714999991]

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[1714999991]

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[1714999991]

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[buwaytress]

There is no reason to do a small transaction "to make sure things work" - if you inherit a private key, you can tell exactly which addresses and which coins it will unlock without having to broadcast anything to the network.

Agree, just perhaps for him, as in my experience, anyone I've properly helped get on with Bitcoin always wants proof for themself that it works... from a 15-yr old kid (now 18 and still asks if we should try again) to a 44 yr old who isn't convinced that simply being able to access the wallet, or sign a message, proves it works.

Maybe it's the case that I don't explain well enough, but I almost kind of get that compulsion to just "test and see if it works".

That said, we're also probably more interested in the larger amounts of dormant coins -- and anyone holding that would probably broadcast as a last resort.

[larry_vw_1955]

The subject just creates drama today because we all clearly signed up for a system with a particular economic policy, for better or worse.  It would be immoral in the extreme to try to coerce people onto a different one.

Right. I can agree with that. But the problem is, how do you enforce the original "economic policy"? Bitcoin is not immutable code, it's not a smart contract. So you can never really enforce bitcoin except through people. And people can make decisions that go against the original economic policy. it is probably unlikely to happen in the immediate future but who knows what could happen someday. Bitcoin is not unchangeable, it can be changed. Some people think of that as a strength but in this particular case, it's a weakness. As Greg suggests by his use of the word "immoral". Maybe bitcoin should have been written as a smart contract so that it could never be changed.

[garlonicon]

how do you enforce the original "economic policy"?

By running a full node. You can enforce 21 million coins limit, but you cannot enforce that 1 BTC will be worth more than one dinner.

Bitcoin is not immutable code, it's not a smart contract.

That would not change anything, because no kind of contract will enforce that for 1 BTC you can buy a house.

So you can never really enforce bitcoin except through people.

You can say that about all monetary systems, including gold. Starving people cannot eat gold, the same with other popular coins.

Maybe bitcoin should have been written as a smart contract so that it could never be changed.

There is no such thing as "writing a coin in the way to make it change-resistant". To reach that, you have to block coin flow, so that all coins should be assigned to all owners from the start, and the whole blockchain should be fully deterministic. But that level of change-resistance would make it useless. Because guess what: if Bitcoin would have P2PK and absolutely no other features, and no Script at all, then it would be still possible to introduce things like tail supply.

[larry_vw_1955]

how do you enforce the original "economic policy"?

By running a full node. You can enforce 21 million coins limit, but you cannot enforce that 1 BTC will be worth more than one dinner.

ok, I never said I wanted to enforce a price on bitcoin. as far as running a full node, that's not enforcing anything beyond a shadow of a doubt. it's just casting your one single vote. I didn't ask "how do you HELP enforce..." I asked "how do you enforce..."

Bitcoin is not immutable code, it's not a smart contract.

That would not change anything, because no kind of contract will enforce that for 1 BTC you can buy a house.

whether 1 btc can buy a house is immaterial and irrelevant to this discussion. we're talking about how to enforce the 21 million btc limit without trusting people. the only way you can do that is with immutable code. hence a smart contract. or some other type of code that cannot be altered. there are downsides to a setup like that but that's what you have to accept to get immutability.

So you can never really enforce bitcoin except through people.

You can say that about all monetary systems, including gold. Starving people cannot eat gold, the same with other popular coins.

and we're not talking about gold. we're talking about bitcoin.

Maybe bitcoin should have been written as a smart contract so that it could never be changed.

There is no such thing as "writing a coin in the way to make it change-resistant". To reach that, you have to block coin flow, so that all coins should be assigned to all owners from the start, and the whole blockchain should be fully deterministic. But that level of change-resistance would make it useless. Because guess what: if Bitcoin would have P2PK and absolutely no other features, and no Script at all, then it would be still possible to introduce things like tail supply.

well I don't believe you about that. you can make an entire codebase immutable if you want to. so that a single bit of it could never be changed. and it would have to run the same way for all time. if you really want to enforce a 21 million bitcoin limit, you could do it then. because then no one could ever change it. no matter what.

[garlonicon]

ok, I never said I wanted to enforce a price on bitcoin

But that's why tail supply was proposed in the first place: as a payment for security. So, if you will have 21 million coins, and if you will have a consensus rule that 100% coins should be sent as fees, and then miners should collect those coins, and create outputs in the coinbase transaction, then you will have your fixed supply, but that kind of coin would be useless. And guess what: it is a perfect soft-fork.

I didn't ask "how do you HELP enforce..." I asked "how do you enforce..."

By running a node. It is really that simple, because Bitcoin is not ruled by miners.

whether 1 btc can buy a house is immaterial and irrelevant to this discussion

It is crucial, because if 1 BTC is worth $1 or even less, then the whole security is very low. You can see many altcoins with tail supply, and they have much lower security, because they have much lower difficulty (or no difficulty at all, when it comes to Proof of Stake, where the whole chain can be overwritten by getting enough signatures, and no additional work is needed).

the only way you can do that is with immutable code

No, you can enforce that only with immutable blockchain, because immutable code still allows for example soft-forks, or just tracing the chain by another chain ("a coin in a coin" model).

and we're not talking about gold. we're talking about bitcoin

I thought the whole topic is about tail subsidy, so also about securing the blockchain with no basic block reward. And that is directly related to how many goods and services each miner can buy for a given amount, mined in a coinbase transaction. If you can buy one sandwich for 1 BTC, then guess what, the whole security will be much lower, even if you will get 100% coins as fees.

well I don't believe you about that

You don't have to believe, you can simply read about previous soft-forks that are backward compatible. So, even if someone didn't upgrade the software, it is not enough to reach immutability. Can you stop Segwit by not upgrading? Can you stop Taproot by not upgrading? Of course you cannot stop it, because those changes are compatible. And some soft-forks or no-forks that can introduce tail supply are also unstoppable, when it comes to writing some data to the blockchain. So, the only barrier is the human factor.

Also, read about evil soft forks by Peter Todd, you will quickly see that any rules can be introduced in this way, including tail supply: https://petertodd.org/2016/forced-soft-forks

So what is a valid Bitcoin 2.0 block? It could be anything at all! For example, the inflation schedule can be changed to make the coin supply unlimited.

Surprisingly, Peter Todd wrote about unlimited supply in 2016.

[NotATether]

@aliashraf

Still waiting for your summary of the Part 2 "less important, miscellaneous proposals for tackling the tail emission problem" - Part 1 really hit the spot

[aliashraf]

@aliashraf

Still waiting for your summary of the Part 2 "less important, miscellaneous proposals for tackling the tail emission problem" - Part 1 really hit the spot

Actually, you are the first and the only one who cares (no merits, tho ) but it is ok, having one audience makes a huge difference, I'll do this in few hours, just for you 

P.S.
For other potential audiences: Part 1

[garlonicon]

you are the first and the only one who cares

No, you are the first who asked, but not the only one who cares. I was surprised that you mentioned me in your description at all, and I wonder, what else could be in part two.

[larry_vw_1955]

But that's why tail supply was proposed in the first place: as a payment for security.

well they should have thought of that in the first place. i thought the block reward and transaction fees pay for security. that's not good enough?

whether 1 btc can buy a house is immaterial and irrelevant to this discussion

It is crucial, because if 1 BTC is worth $1 or even less, then the whole security is very low.

well i don't know. its been so long since bitcoin was $1. but if it was $1, then i don't think it needs as much security as if it was higher price like $20,000.

No, you can enforce that only with immutable blockchain, because immutable code still allows for example soft-forks, or just tracing the chain by another chain ("a coin in a coin" model).

there are tokens on ethereum that are run on a smart contract. they cannot be changed. for better or worse. but it does form a guarantee that things cannot be changed. you don't get that guarantee with bitcoin. not unless it runs on a smart contract or something similar.

I thought the whole topic is about tail subsidy, so also about securing the blockchain with no basic block reward. And that is directly related to how many goods and services each miner can buy for a given amount, mined in a coinbase transaction. If you can buy one sandwich for 1 BTC, then guess what, the whole security will be much lower, even if you will get 100% coins as fees.

saying that bitcoin's security depends on bitcoins price doesn't sound so appealing. because that would mean if bitcoin price goes down then my bitcoin is not as secure as it used to be. and i need the price to go back up to have it be more secure.

Also, read about evil soft forks by Peter Todd, you will quickly see that any rules can be introduced in this way, including tail supply: https://petertodd.org/2016/forced-soft-forks

that's assuming the code is available for inspection and modification. that doesn't necessarily have to be the case for something that never changes. as long as people trust it and use it, they might not necessarily have access to the source code. for bitcoin they do but maybe not something else.

[garlonicon]

that's not good enough?

I think it is, but tail supply supporters seems to think that for some reason, fees alone are not good enough. I don't know why, because fees can be collected from the mainchain, from LN, from the Merged Mining, so if you add all of that, it should be enough. Unless there are no transactions at all in the whole Bitcoin network, but then, it is a different kind of problem.

then i don't think it needs as much security as if it was higher price

In the past, attacking was easier, because it was easier to reorganize a chain. Imagine you sent 10,000 BTC to buy pizza, and the block reward was 50 BTC. Then, you needed 200 blocks to have it well-covered by coinbase transactions. Of course, there were many reasons, why less confirmations were enough at that time, including the fact that the whole network was in its infancy, and everyone knew it.

they cannot be changed

They can, because of the DAO hard fork. Also, ETH is based on hard-forks, so anything can change at any time, and you cannot really control it. Imagine that you use ETH and you don't want some changes, what then? In Bitcoin, you have soft-forks, so changes are backward-compatible, in ETH, you are forced to upgrade, and if you don't, then you are landing in another network.

saying that bitcoin's security depends on bitcoins price doesn't sound so appealing. because that would mean if bitcoin price goes down then my bitcoin is not as secure as it used to be

It is not an instant change. It takes time to lower the difficulty. Imagine that the price is $1 again, what then? Then, the chain would simply stop, as more and more miners would turn their machines off. If you have 80 zero bits, it would take two months, instead of two weeks, to reach 78 zero bits. That means, if you want to go from 80 to 32 bits, you need 48 bits to be shifted, so that means 48/12=4 years of constant difficulty falling, to reach the minimal value. And if it would drop by more than 75%, then it would take even longer. Also, that means if you want to transact at all, then it is needed to constantly use Merged Mining to produce the same next block again and again, until reaching the mainnet difficulty. So, some kind of sidechain is needed to recover from a situation, where only CPU miners would handle all of that. And you know, what does it mean: hodlers would be forced to invest into mining, to protect their coins.

that's assuming the code is available for inspection and modification

But it is. You can clone the whole code, modify it, and publish it. It is not BSV, where the license says explicitly that you cannot use it anywhere else.

as long as people trust it and use it

That's the point: you can make a new version, but then, you have to convince miners to use it. Or invest in mining and use it alone. For example, if you want to enable free transactions, you have to convince some miner to change node settings, or you have to start mining, and change it in your own node.

they might not necessarily have access to the source code

There are countless places, where people have cloned the whole source code. Many bitcoiners have such copy, and most altcoin creators also have it, if it is based on BTC.

for bitcoin they do but maybe not something else

For "something else" it doesn't matter, because altcoins have separate rules, so if they want tail supply, they can discuss it in their own channels.

[TraderTimm]

Listen up, and listen good.

If you think changing Bitcoin's issuance or fee structure makes sense -- then I can tell you as someone who has been deeply immersed in this since 2011 that I'm not going to go along with it.

First -- no one is giving the original design a chance. Why in the fucking fuck are proposals to change something that hasn't even run a decent course in the first place? If you're bored, go program something in assembly, leave Bitcoin alone.

Second -- malleable monetary policy isn't why I'm involved with Bitcoin. You try to change this, I will evaluate and likely dump/leave. This also goes for proposals that try to pursue altcoin strategies for Miner Extracted Value..

I'm not alone, and I'd rather you fucking fuckers worked on problems that need solving instead of being tempted to twiddle the knobs on the best scarce digital asset on the planet. Seriously, what the fuck. Just fork it and make your own nightmare, thanks.

[garlonicon]

If you're bored, go program something in assembly, leave Bitcoin alone.

Surprisingly, those two topics could meet, when it comes to microcode in the Script: imagine treating OP_CHECKSIG as a bunch of opcodes, related to some ECDSA operations, having OP_SHA256 somewhere, or even just treating OP_HASH256 as a compressed version of "OP_SHA256 OP_SHA256". This topic is still open, it appeared some times in the mailing list, and I guess there will be some proposal like that in the future, also because Bitcoin Core is going further into descriptors, that would redefine the way we think about the Script (and could potentially redefine the rules of counting such opcodes into any computation-based fees, currently they are size-based, but they don't have to be, other things like UTXO-complexity, or even Script-complexity are possible, and guess what: 100 OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY opcodes are more complicated than 100 OP_2DROP opcodes, but the transaction cost could be identical).

worked on problems that need solving instead of being tempted to twiddle the knobs on the best scarce digital asset on the planet

True, the whole topic cannot be taken seriously. The only thing we can do is to prepare for any kind of tail supply attacks, and counter-attack by rejecting any such proposals, burning those coins, selling them if it will be profitable, or simply ignoring them at all, if they are harmless.

[larry_vw_1955]

Listen up, and listen good.

If you think changing Bitcoin's issuance or fee structure makes sense -- then I can tell you as someone who has been deeply immersed in this since 2011 that I'm not going to go along with it.

i don't think alot of people would go along with it but that's not the point. the point is bitcoin being opensource means people can look at and change the code and given that, we can pretty much assume every aspect of bitcoin will be put under a microscope and there will always be factions that want this change or that. one of the weaknesses of bitcoin not being immutable code...

[garlonicon]

i don't think alot of people would go along

I think it is more likely that people will stay with fixed supply, no matter what. Too many people entered the system because of that, so if there will be any proposal to make it mandatory to produce blocks with tail supply, I guess people will simply act against it, and such coin will end up being an altcoin.

one of the weaknesses of bitcoin not being immutable code...

If you think that it is really reachable by some kind of smart contract, then go on, and implement that. Then, if people will be interested, you will see, how soft-forks can alter your contracts. And you will also see, how easily someone could just take your code, and make a clone. Because, guess what, altcoins are more opened to hard-forks than Bitcoin, so the most likely scenario is that your code will be simply hard-forked. But it is also possible that if your code will be rock solid, then it will be soft-forked, no matter how "smart" your contract will be. If you will use for example any typical signatures, then you will open the door for commitments, and for soft-forks.

[aliashraf]

I'll do this in few hours, just for you  

I sincerely apologize for failing to be on-time.

From where we left in Part 1:
1- Peter Todd's "tail-emission" suggestion is settled as being strongly rejected as far as it is about a solution to the zero-subsidy dilemma, and as long as it is about bitcoin, @tromp nailed it.

If there is only one way to get it right, then it would be tail emission from launch.
In gmaxwell's words, that's a pretty strong attractor in the design space, with nothing arbitrary about it.

2- The security concerns he has about the issue, disincentivized mining industry, mostly, is recognized as being serious.
2- Different alternative approaches/mitigations are presented.
This part is a walkthrough of the latter class of posts: alternatives to continuous subsidy or mitigations to the problem for bitcoin where tail subsidy is cut.

PART 2

Don't Break Anything, There Is Hope

Before starting to summarize the two major alternatives to tail subsidy, discussed in this topic, let's take a look at a third, less vocal, yet important view:

Alternative #0: In Whales, We Trust!
In case, God forbid, bitcoin security becomes fragile because of a drop in the hashrate due to miners' marginal profits vanishing which in turn would be the result of subsidy decrease/cut, whales will do something about it, like by bribing miners/donating large fees, and so on as they have huge incentives to keep their wealth secure, no worries.

Actually, Gregory Maxwell has drafted the groundwork for this approach in his first post:

{} If Bitcoin's scheme turns out to not work out then users in the future will have many alternatives they could consider-- including adopting Bitcoin variants that are created that have constant subsidy (as tail subsidizers propose) or attempt to achieve security through other means.   To those people, should that future ever come to exist, the discussion will be much simpler though because they'll know if Satoshi's simple economic-effect minimizing scheme works or not, they'll know if alternatives are necessary.

Few posters have mentioned the whales solution, explicitly in the thread, not followed so much as it causes the discussion to be deferred infinitely, but taking into account Maxwell's mindset, I think it is where the community is for now: Nothing to worry about, it is working, miners are just stupid business people, whales and/or devs, God bless, will take care of us.

MY Take
Disclaimer: I hate whales because of jealousy or my left leaning mindset, or both.  
Objection 1: Bitcoin is not a stake based system, you can't leave its security in hands of holders, they are mostly a bunch of greedy bastards.
Rather than the hodling (ugh) discourse, a true bitcoiner is the one who depends on transaction processing, the one who accepts bitcoin for his or her goods/services. Miners are awarded the silver badge for burning their fortunes and securing the transactions, so providing the infrastructure for the hero merchants aforementioned.
Miners deserve more respect than what bitcoin cult leaders show, on the contrary, whales go never close to the top of the bitcoin respect list. BTW, read the disclaimer above, again.  
Objection 2: Since mass adoption is a critical priority, we need an established theory inclined toward newcomers and resilient against fiat-fed academic debunks, it can't include a whale based security justification.  


Now we examine the two major alternatives presented in the topic, they share the same idea that there is something to be fixed but ...
Alterntive #1:
Subsidize The Tail By Taxing The Head.
It is the first and the main trend proposed and supported firstly by @vujdue, @garlonicon (surprisingly, the same guys who presented the second approach as well ) The core idea being something like this:
It is possible to force, via a soft fork, an extra fee which is locked for long future, such that future miners, as a block builder, would be able to claim the reserved satoshis gradually, and as an extra income, a virtual block subsidy which infinitely continues without touching the 21M hard cap.

But I do care that everyone else also chips in so we don't have a tragedy of the commons.

So make it a soft-fork proposal, where N out of M coins are locked in every coinbase transaction, to cover future rewards. It will have higher chances of being deployed than any other hard-fork, and will also increase future mining rewards. You want to get a 0.01 BTC tail emission? No problem, just send 0.01 BTC to block 1000000, then 0.01 BTC to block 1000001, and so on.

An alturistic version of this is discussed (no soft forks) as well, where people voluntarily chip-in for the same purpose.

MY Take
Disclaimer: check the disclaimer above again
Objection #1: This works as a negative pressure towards mass adoption because of the fees being lifted.
Objection #2:  It fails to answer Greg Maxwell's original objection to Peter Todd, i.e.: How much tail subsidy is adequate and why?


Alternative #2:
Just follow Paul Sztorc!
It is the second trend, advocated (again!) by @vjudeu and @garlonicon. Putting it in the simplest sense, Sztorc says other than hard forking/ruining bitcoin by violating 21M hard cap or 1M block size limit, you have this beautiful option to support merge mined side-chains which provide new source of income hence incentives for miners.
@tromp, this wise guy, is the only one who has made a reasonable (though, mild) objection to the idea in this thread:

So, given that the majority of bitcoin blocks are already taking part in one or more merged mining protocols, what are the main arguments against using merged mining to create security once the block subsidy is insufficient?

If merge miners only make a small fraction of their revenue from bitcoin, then it becomes rather cheap to bribe them to mine censoring bitcoin blocks.
In that sense, the security of the bitcoin blockchain against censorship seems to depend on just the bitcoin block rewards.

Unfortunately, it didn't get enough attention let alone a proper answer, I'll fill this gap.

MY Take
Disclaimer: I've been busy for a long time working on a project based on the same ideas as what Paul Sztorc has been advocating for half a decade and more; DYOR!

As of @tromp objection:
If it is just about solving the subsidy dilemma, @tromp objection would be plausible. IOW, you can't solve just one problem by such a disruptive idea, you shouldn't. Leaving the situation with pools and BIG mining farms that has centralized bitcoin mining scene so much, as is, makes it impossible to fix/improve anything in bitcoin.

As of Paul, @vjudeu, @garlonicon, ..., and the whole idea of zero emission, side-chain:
I'm a believer, but you need to read my take against @tromp's argument as well: It should be presented as a complete package, a framework, a project, even a cult-fork (just made it up) with established roadmap for fixing most crucial bitcoin issues including, not limited to, the dilemma under consideration. The most important candidates would be mining centralization, scaling, and mass adoption. I'd add two covert problems as well: whale cult and hacktopia (again, made it up just now).


P.S.
Wish you guys find this part useful, if so, you are welcome to correct me in case I've missed or misrepresented anything.

[garlonicon]

surprisingly, the same guys who presented the second approach as well

It is not that surprising, because it is not a secret that we know each other.

It should be presented as a complete package, a framework, a project, even a cult-fork (just made it up) with established roadmap for fixing most crucial bitcoin issues including, not limited to, the dilemma under consideration.

What else is incomplete here? https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-June/020532.html

That idea is quite simple: you have the mainchain, you sign your coins, and then they appear on the sidechain. Then, you move those coins on the mainchain, and then they are destroyed on the sidechain. So, the whole problem is simplified into making the right output scripts.

If you think that technical description is incomplete, then you can try to see, what is really needed. To sign anything, it is needed to make an invalid transaction, that would prove you own some coins on the mainchain. To do that, you can use the signet way of signing blocks, just make "to_spend" and "to_sign" transactions, and place them on your sidechain. As far as I know, vjudeu is working on a technical description for signet-based signatures. Also, I noticed that it was recently touched on the mailing list, and BIP-322 is a good starting point, because it can be used to prove any funds, including Taproot outputs, that could contain some hidden TapScript branches, designed especially for things like sidechains.

mining centralization

It is a separate problem, I wrote some posts about it, but there are many possible solutions, and it is still discussed here and there (for example, making pay-to-block-hash address type could solve it, if it would be possible to claim such coins by using Taproot (if everyone agreed on everything), or use on-chain settlement as a fallback, and revealing enough data to make sure that miner X can claim N coins from such address). Another option is to always fully verify every share, but then I am not sure if there are enough resources for that.

scaling

Scaling is again a separate problem, and it is mainly about compression. One possible option to compress things, is to allow transaction joining, but some people are against it, because this kind of feature can also enable sidechains and other things, so it is hard to accept for those who are afraid that something will be activated, and that feature will have more, unintended consequences, that nobody is aware of now.

mass adoption

Again, it is entirely different problem, also because if there are no sidechains, then some features will happen only on altcoins. As long as there is no convenient, decentralized way, to try new things, users are forced to choose: use Bitcoin with its features, or sell Bitcoin, and buy something else, to get another features.

whale cult

It is possible only because of speculation, and endless fiat inflation. In normal circumstances, it would be possible to have a slow, stable growth, and then there would be no cult. But it is a human factor, that no source code will eliminate entirely.

hacktopia

Again, it is a different problem, related to something like "not everyone is a programmer, and it will never be the case".

[ABCbits]

the point is bitcoin being opensource means people can look at and change the code and given that, we can pretty much assume every aspect of bitcoin will be put under a microscope and there will always be factions that want this change or that. one of the weaknesses of bitcoin not being immutable code...

Are you trying to imply Bitcoin protocol and it's implementation should be closed source? I find it's ridiculous. Even Windows have to deal with people/company who reluctant to upgrade through WoW and LTSC.

mining centralization

Unfortunately Bitcoin miner not interested to use P2Pool[1] which development stopped on 2018[2]. Since Monero is mentioned here, i'd like to mention P2Pool for Monero is actively developed[3] with ~4.7% network hashrate[4].

[1] http://p2pool.in/
[2] https://github.com/p2pool/p2pool
[3] https://github.com/SChernykh/p2pool/
[4] https://p2pool.io/#blocks

[TraderTimm]

Allow me to simplify.

Don't fuck with my money.

This isn't an "experiment" anymore. The moment people incorporated it into their lives and DEPEND on it -- it ceases to be something that you can view as your personal petri dish.

Let me paint a theoretical picture for you:

You, enterprising software engineer have the itch to change Bitcoin. Maybe you do, through hook or crook, and the entire ecosystem falters.
Do you really want to be the idiot in the hotseat when millions of pissed off former Bitcoin holders come looking?
I'd think not.

Take this shit seriously, and don't propose changes just to soothe your ego. This is a real system that people depend on. We could give a shit about how clever you think you are.

Don't fuck with OUR money.

Got it?

[garlonicon]

Unfortunately Bitcoin miner not interested to use P2Pool

Because they cannot get the same things as in centralized pools. So, to convince them into P2P way, it should be possible to redirect the traffic first, and then miners should see, that they could switch from centralized pools to decentralized ones, and claim their rewards by themselves. Because even in 100% decentralized model, it is still possible to build centralized pools on top of that. So, miners first should redirect their shares, and mine in centralized and decentralized pools at the same time, and then they should see, that decentralized model is stable enough to fully switch into that. Because as long as centralized pools have more features, people won't switch. And because of Merged Mining, it is possible to mine on both, to see, how it works, and why decentralized pools can give miners more control over blocks they mine.