Less private but perhaps secure HOT wallet

[DaveF]

Just more of a thought experiment. Would people be willing to have a nominally more secure hot wallet that is less private?
Starting with: A wallet on your phone or PC is not secure, we all accept that.
Would people want one that has some 2nd form of authentication that could probably be used to identify you, but in the event that the device was compromised not allow funds to be sent.

Kind of like it only sends it's transactions through a certain set of servers, and after you create and transmit the transaction you have to then do a quick login and approve.

Just talking about some things with some people the other day and the subject came up of more secure then hot, but don't want to deal with a hardware wallet / multisig / anything like that.

-Dave

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[o_e_l_e_o]

Would people want one that has some 2nd form of authentication that could probably be used to identify you, but in the event that the device was compromised not allow funds to be sent.

This already exists by using Electrum's 2FA via TrustedCoin. However, having both the wallet and the 2FA app on the same device is meaningless, as explained below.

Kind of like it only sends it's transactions through a certain set of servers, and after you create and transmit the transaction you have to then do a quick login and approve.

If someone can compromise the wallet on your phone, then they will almost certainly also be able to compromise your login details for a website you access via your phone (which, to be honest, 99% of users would simply save in their browser's built in password manager anyway), or your 2FA app.

I don't see how you can make a hot wallet on a phone any more secure without requiring a second physical device, be that another phone for multi-sig, a hardware wallet, or even a hardware YubiKey or similar for 2FA. Any 2FA using the same phone as the wallet itself, be that a code, a login, a second wallet, receive an email, etc., adds almost zero additional security.

[DaveF]

Would people want one that has some 2nd form of authentication that could probably be used to identify you, but in the event that the device was compromised not allow funds to be sent.

This already exists by using Electrum's 2FA via TrustedCoin. However, having both the wallet and the 2FA app on the same device is meaningless, as explained below.

Kind of like it only sends it's transactions through a certain set of servers, and after you create and transmit the transaction you have to then do a quick login and approve.

If someone can compromise the wallet on your phone, then they will almost certainly also be able to compromise your login details for a website you access via your phone (which, to be honest, 99% of users would simply save in their browser's built in password manager anyway), or your 2FA app.

I don't see how you can make a hot wallet on a phone any more secure without requiring a second physical device, be that another phone for multi-sig, a hardware wallet, or even a hardware YubiKey or similar for 2FA. Any 2FA using the same phone as the wallet itself, be that a code, a login, a second wallet, receive an email, etc., adds almost zero additional security.

We were discussing the possibility of a wallet app that would not let you save the login / password. So every time you wanted to send you would have to enter it. There are a lot of security apps out there that generate an onscreen keyboard that you have to use to enter the information so keyloggers would be pointless.

I don't know if there is a way to do it really securely, but was wondering what everyone else thought.

Personally, I treat my hot wallet like cash. It's risky to carry a lot around, but still nice to have it with you if you need it.

-Dave

[o_e_l_e_o]

We were discussing the possibility of a wallet app that would not let you save the login / password.

Do most mobile wallet apps not already do this and require unlocking via a password or PIN (or biometric, but those are notoriously insecure and shouldn't be used)? And most people have some sort of locking mechanism on their phone. So for someone to access your wallet they must first bypass/crack/know your master phone security lock and then bypass/crack/know your wallet security lock as well. Which is why I made my point above - if someone can already do this to access the wallet app, then presumably they can also do it for any 2FA setup using the same device.

Personally, I treat my hot wallet like cash. It's risky to carry a lot around, but still nice to have it with you if you need it.

This is the right answer. If you would carry x amount of bitcoin in cash in your pocket, then store that in a hot wallet. If you wouldn't, then store it somewhere safer.

[n0nce]

Would people want one that has some 2nd form of authentication that could probably be used to identify you, but in the event that the device was compromised not allow funds to be sent.

This already exists by using Electrum's 2FA via TrustedCoin. However, having both the wallet and the 2FA app on the same device is meaningless, as explained below.

I guess it could still be useful when the hot wallet is installed on a laptop and the phone is used for 2FA. It's unlikely to lose both devices at the same time, right.
Then again, you could also just do regular 2-of-2 multisig.

[o_e_l_e_o]

I guess it could still be useful when the hot wallet is installed on a laptop and the phone is used for 2FA. It's unlikely to lose both devices at the same time, right.

Yes, definitely beneficial in that case, or any case in which the wallet and the 2FA app are on separate devices. As I've said many times before in various threads, the whole point of a 2FA set up is that it is a second factor that is required to authenticate you, your transaction, your account, whatever. If both wallet and 2FA can be compromised by compromising a single device, then it isn't a second factor at all - it is the same factor.

A similar case is when people receive a confirmation email or an email with a code in it to the same email address they have used to register the account in question in the first place. That is not 2FA at all, as if an attacker compromises the email address - a single factor - then they can reset the password and receive any 2FA code.

Then again, you could also just do regular 2-of-2 multisig.

I think this is far preferable to paying excess fees and sacrificing privacy to use TrustedCoin. Marginally more complicated to set up and use, but worth it for the benefits.

[witcher_sense]

Yes, definitely beneficial in that case, or any case in which the wallet and the 2FA app are on separate devices. As I've said many times before in various threads, the whole point of a 2FA set up is that it is a second factor that is required to authenticate you, your transaction, your account, whatever. If both wallet and 2FA can be compromised by compromising a single device, then it isn't a second factor at all - it is the same factor.

Compromising one factor doesn't necessarily lead to compromising the other factor, even if both factors rely on a single device. For example, you can duplicate fingerprints and access someone's mobile phone with installed bitcoin wallets, but that doesn't automatically mean that you can guess a password to an authentication application or that you can break the system and extract all sensitive information. Even if you succeeded in extracting this data, it still remains encrypted with the algorithm that will take years to break. Two-factor authentication is about different forms of identification, not necessarily about different types of devices: I can use my fingerprint as a first factor and a strong password as a second factor. Both these factors will be used to create a separate layer of security (specifically, encryption), which means both layers need to be broken for data compromise. Whether these layers are on a single device or on multiple devices doesn't really matter, because it always will depend on who you are trying to protect yourself from. Skilled hackers or intelligence agencies will find a way to hack all your devices, but not all people are being chased by those.

[n0nce]

Compromising one factor doesn't necessarily lead to compromising the other factor, even if both factors rely on a single device.
[...]
Two-factor authentication is about different forms of identification, not necessarily about different types of devices: I can use my fingerprint as a first factor and a strong password as a second factor.

At that point, the fingerprint and password scan could just be implemented in the same app, though. I believe some banking apps already offer to use biometrics + password.
That's still not 2 factors, though.

I mean, we're getting into semantics now; sure, there may be cases where someone steals your phone with the wallet software on it and has a copy of your fingerprint, but no idea about the password.
But there are also scenarios where compromising the device means compromising both factors, e.g. if the password is stored in your password manager, which is unlockable with your fingerprint.

I wouldn't bet on users correctly using 2 factors on the same device and instead just enforce the 2FA application to be on a different device than the wallet software.

[Welsh]

I mean, we're getting into semantics now; sure, there may be cases where someone steals your phone with the wallet software on it and has a copy of your fingerprint, but no idea about the password.
But there are also scenarios where compromising the device means compromising both factors, e.g. if the password is stored in your password manager, which is unlockable with your fingerprint.

I personally like to take physical security as serious as I would with encryption or digital security. So, if my device was compromised physically, I'd automatically assume that everything on it is compromised, even though in the majority of cases this wouldn't be the case. However, I like to have contingency plans so if this ever did happen, I'd be able to either wiping it from a distance, change the credentials or move the funds if it's Bitcoin.

Physical security in my opinion is one of the easiest options anyhow. Fingerprints aren't secure absolutely aren't, there's just too many ways of obtaining fingerprints which you might not be aware of at the time. Even with a password plus a fingerprint, I feel like the fingerprint additional step is just trivial rather than adding any meaningful protection. Obviously, it would protect you from distance attacks, but for physical attacks or by someone who's in close proximity of you, it's rather trivial.

[BlackHatCoiner]

I think we need to draw a line between security that comes with responsibility, and security that comes with irresponsibility.

If you don't want to be responsible for your funds' custody, then you can only achieve very questionable security. For example, shared custody with a third party involves both yours and their risk, but shared. If you don't feel confident with this either, you can hand over your custody to that one third party. That's your best course if you consider yourself very clumsy and uncertain. Perhaps do some search for someone who's reputable enough to handle your funds; don't just pick randomly. You should also make sure both you and the third party acknowledge that it's likely for your device(s) to be compromised, and introduce more reputable third parties (such as email, SMS etc.) each time you make a transaction. 

On the other hand, if you feel you can handle this yourself, and believe you're more capable of managing that money than anyone, then you need to behave securely in another manner. Namely, to take care of your system, verify what's about to be installed, use reputable open-source software, and the like.

Starting with: A wallet on your phone or PC is not secure, we all accept that.

Depends. I consider both my computer and my mobile phone secure enough to handle a few satoshis. I consider both of these options much better than a sense of questionable security a third party can provide me.

[andulolika]

Remembers me of the bank model of a couple hundred years back where bank would pay to get you robbed so you use their bank, feels similar enough but with privacy at stake.
I think tiny spendable wallets are way to go, satori chips were inspirative back in the day when they launched, relying on internet is becoming disgusting.

[o_e_l_e_o]

Two-factor authentication is about different forms of identification, not necessarily about different types of devices: I can use my fingerprint as a first factor and a strong password as a second factor.

I disagree. With this definition, then any mobile wallet is already using 2FA, since you must first unlock the phone with one PIN/password, and then unlock the wallet app with a second PIN/password. I would not call this two factors, just as I don't call my encrypted wallet files stored on a hard disk which is also encrypted two factors, despite needing two different decryption keys to access the wallets.

2FA isn't just two different passwords. In it's most basic form, it should be something you know (a password or login) and something you have (ideally a hardware key, but more usually a software key in the form of a TOTP from another electronic device, usually a phone). These must be separate or they aren't two factors; they are just a more complex single factor. Of course more passwords and more layers will add security, but it will never be two factors as long as all those layers are on the same device.

If an attacker can both physically access your phone and has been able to hack/crack/steal/observe or otherwise gain knowledge of one password, then it is highly likely your second password is also at high risk of compromise. hence the reason the two factors must be separate or they aren't two factors at all.

[BlackHatCoiner]

[...]

Correct. Logging into an online service sometimes does require 2FA from the same device, though. For example, logging into Discord from mobile requires me to enter an SMS I'm about to receive. Whoever compromises my phone can access my Discord (assuming they already know my password), so it's 1 factor over all. That's poor security.

2FA should be 2 factors that are not correlated with each other. In my case, it's the SD card (which is used for the SMS) and the password, both of which are known by someone who steals my mobile.


By the same reasoning, multi-sig is also 2FA. In fact, it's n-FA.

[PowerGlove]

[This is about 2FA in general, not about 2FA as it pertains to wallets]

I've seen a few posts in this thread (and others) pointing out that 2FA can only do 100% of its job if it's implemented correctly (i.e. uncorrelated factors on fully separate devices). That's true, but I think it's worth pointing out that there are still important security benefits, even when it's done "wrong" (i.e. both factors, like your password manager and authenticator app, on a single device).

Like witcher_sense said above, just because you can compromise a device in one way, it doesn't necessarily follow that you can compromise it in other ways. Certain kinds of malware may be able to get to your password (keyloggers, clipboard sniffers, etc.) without ever being able to compromise your second factor, even if it's on the same device.

Also, some attack vectors don't rely on compromising your device at all (like phishing), and in those cases 2FA is a game changer, even in its "bad" form.

Full-strength 2FA is laudable and should be the goal, but even weak 2FA is beneficial and worth having.

[Welsh]

[This is about 2FA in general, not about 2FA as it pertains to wallets]

I've seen a few posts in this thread (and others) pointing out that 2FA can only do 100% of its job if it's implemented correctly (i.e. uncorrelated factors on fully separate devices). That's true, but I think it's worth pointing out that there are still important security benefits, even when it's done "wrong" (i.e. both factors, like your password manager and authenticator app, on a single device).

Like witcher_sense said above, just because you can compromise a device in one way, it doesn't necessarily follow that you can compromise it in other ways. Certain kinds of malware may be able to get to your password (keyloggers, clipboard sniffers, etc.) without ever being able to compromise your second factor, even if it's on the same device.

Also, some attack vectors don't rely on compromising your device at all (like phishing), and in those cases 2FA is a game changer, even in its "bad" form.

Full-strength 2FA is laudable and should be the goal, but even weak 2FA is beneficial and worth having.

Right, but when it comes to wallets, and basically being responsible for your own money. It's only recommendable to do your upmost when it comes to securing your funds, and therefore half arsing a two factor authentication (2FA) doesn't really cut it. Every security practice you can put into place has a downside, however it completely depends on your threat model what you deem acceptable risk, and what you don't deem acceptable risk. Personally, a lot of the traditional two factor authentications are half arsed, and wouldn't cut it for me.

I'd say that weak 2FA is only acceptable if A) you know the risks, and accept them B) It's a temporary measure until you can implement better security. I'm a firm believer that security shouldn't be compromised on unless the drawbacks are much, much higher than the benefits. For example, security should only be compromised for convenience, however if you compromise too much, you no longer have security. If you don't have enough convenience it's likely to cause you problems, i.e having a key file stored 100 miles away from you, in a field is probably going to cause more harm than good if you need that to access funds.

[PowerGlove]

@Welsh: Yep, I think we mostly agree with one another, the last line of my previous post said: "Full-strength 2FA is laudable and should be the goal", which lines up with basically everything you're saying.

What I'm pushing back against is the sentiment that 2FA is "worthless" unless it's implemented in its ideal form. Like I said previously, compared to no 2FA at all, weak 2FA is technically an improvement. It will thwart certain types of attack that would previously have succeeded.

I get the emotional argument that you should go all the way or not bother at all, but that's not a defensible position, IMO. I know that's not your position, but it's definitely an idea I've run across a few times on this forum.

[Zilon]

[...]

2FA should be 2 factors that are not correlated with each other. In my case, it's the SD card (which is used for the SMS) and the password, both of which are known by someone who steals my mobile.


By the same reasoning, multi-sig is also 2FA. In fact, it's n-FA.

I buy that word not correlated. I was thinking 2FA comprises of a code(password, passphrase, Private key, fingerprint or voice recognition) the device owner knows and a randomly generated code that can only be used once for a specific purpose which could come in the form of ( OTP, TOTP, (multi-sig not used once) etc) . As long as this 2FA are correlated on a single device if the device gets broken into, informations could be compromised not necessarily wallets but other valuable informations which could even grant access to making funny guess about wallet passwords and seed phrase.

2FA's are best if the exist on different devices. Even HTLC and PTLC functions almost similar as 2FA but in a transaction setting where there is a cryptographic proof of payment and why this seems even secure is the cryptographic hash it's based upon

[Synchronice]

2FA on the same device is still a normal way to secure your hot wallet because it's the wallet that is frequently used. Keep in mind that when you use something frequently, it can be a headache to have to always check another device. Also, there may be emergency cases to use your wallet and you will be in trouble, so hot wallet is hot and cold is cold, hot isn't meant to be as protected as cold.

Imagine, you are using an app and someone probably got your login/password details and tries to log in but you get the message on your smartphone as a second method of verification, more likely you are the only one who has access to it. So, it gets harder for the attacker to achieve the aim.
2FA on a hot wallet, for me, means double security, not supreme security. If you take care of your device, visit only clean websites and know a thing about security, you can relax.

Keep in mind that 2FA can't protect you if some criminal catches you and has control over you and your devices when the power and fear are in action.

The only perfect thing that could protect you would be something that's able to analyze your face, eyes, voice and have a heart-rate scanner (I mean the way smartphones show your heart rate by putting a finger) but instead of putting a finger, it should analyze your fingerprint too. By analyzing, according to face, eyes, voice and heart rate, it should determine whether the owner feels scared, under pressure or relaxed.
I know this sounds like science fiction but I think in the future, something like this will be developed for perfect security of bank accounts, crypto wallets, etc.

[LoyceV]

Would people want one that has some 2nd form of authentication that could probably be used to identify you, but in the event that the device was compromised not allow funds to be sent.

No. Even if it's private, I don't want any third-party involved. What if they don't allow me to access my funds anymore?

We were discussing the possibility of a wallet app that would not let you save the login / password.

Mycelium doesn't store my PIN, but it's only 6 digits, so it can't be hard to brute-force.

Personally, I treat my hot wallet like cash. It's risky to carry a lot around, but still nice to have it with you if you need it.

I prefer to have different wallets for different purposes. That reduces the risk of hot wallets.

Remembers me of the bank model of a couple hundred years back

How old are you?

[PrimeNumber7]

Kind of like it only sends it's transactions through a certain set of servers, and after you create and transmit the transaction you have to then do a quick login and approve.

I would encourage you to read about the 2016 hack of Bitfinex. I understand that Bitfinex contracted with a third party to act as a “2nd factor” when signing outgoing transactions, while Bitfinex also held a third key that was kept in cold storage. I understand that Bitfinex would craft and sign transactions, and would send the partially signed transactions to the third party via their api, and if the api key (credentials) was valid, the third party would provide the second signature for the transactions (the transactions were from 2 of 3 multi sig addresses). Based on the publicity available facts, it appears that the hacker was able to compromise the server that interacts with the third party, changed the settings to allow for the third party to sign a higher volume of transactions, along with the private keys that are intended to be “hot”.

I don’t think it is possible for an app to prevent the user from automatically entering credentials, and even an on-screen keyboard can be compromised.

I believe the above system was sold by the third party as being as good as cold storage, as it required multiple institutions to sign outgoing transactions. I think “2FA” systems would be sold as something as good as cold storage. I think that even if it wasn’t sold as such, users would implement it as such. I really don’t think the potential for improved security is not there. You can improve security by implementing multi sig. Security will only be improved if multiple devices are used to sign transactions. That’s the only way.