To safeguard at least one part of my bitcoin vault I have decided to sign a postdated transaction, e.g. three months from now, made with Electrum, addressed to my "hot" Electrum wallet address.
People have lost much more funds from hot wallets than from wrench attacks, so I don't think sending funds from cold storage storage makes it safer.
As another security measure I have decided to sign another similar transaction dated a little earlier, addressed to my cold storage address, to prevent spending in case of a potential "5 dollar wrench attack" makes me disclose the original transaction's hash and the "hot" wallet keys to an attacker.
So they'll just beat you longer, until you share your cold storage details. And they'll keep you locked up in your basement for 3 months to avoid calling the police.
After that being done - to delete the signing wallet file and the seed and
What if you or someone else deposits adds funds to that address again? This guy knows a thing or two about Bitcoin:
You should never delete a wallet.
I think it's much safer to keep your cold storage private. Don't tell anyone about it, and make sure nobody can find your backups.
Dear LoyceV,
Your arguments are very strong and highly appreciated.
I started changing my point of view while you described the reasonable "5 dollar wrench attack" outcome, and you finally convinced me not to TimeLock with the argument of not to delete the wallet (in addition to the potential "sending the funds to deleted wallet" reason, I personally stick to that point because it keeps a proof of historical possession in case of a taxation event or any other not-known for now cases, but forgot it when developing the scheme. There are likely other reasons which I am not aware of).
I agree with you that not telling anyone about your cold storage is the best practice, but it is so happened that I am involved in a public bitcoin educating and can easily become an attack target. So for now I haven't been able to figure out robbery-safe vault setup, except for the 2-of-3 MultiSig with one key kept on my PC and backed up at home, the second - at geographically distant friend's place and the third - in a safe deposit box in a bank. But this setup is also prone to robbery as the attacker will just have to force me to call a friend to co-sign the transaction.
If you have any additional setups or best practices to share - it would be very appreciated.