You didn't answer my question in the beginning. In the first post.
Where did you store your seed?
All you said about archive program and password means nothing and this doesn't increase your security.
With the seed anyone can just download electrum and move your coins. The seed should be your main concern.
The seed phrase should always be written in paper, which is unhackable.
It is very likely that your computer is compromised and the hacker just got access to your seed. This may have happened in the time you just created the wallet and saw the seed for the first time or later on.
the seed file is always located in another archive, also under a password. I never turn to him - there is no need. It has not been available on PC for many years.
There was no text file with the phrase. And I haven't logged into Electrum since January. None of this is stored in decrypted form anywhere else. Knowing only the password, assuming it is impossible to access the wallet. So another option suggests itself - the vulnerability of Electrum itself, the specified version. It was this executable file that was last executed in January. And it was taken from the link from the previous version, also from the official location.
Can you clarify these a bit?
Do you mean is that when you created the wallet it didn't give you a text/seed phrase?
No. Of course, when creating the wallet, the seed phrase was generated and I have it. But, as I already answered above to another participant, I do not contact her - to access the wallet, it is enough to indicate the folder with the wallet to the program and enter the correct password.
There is a vulnerability on Electrum before but it was fixed on 3.3.4 lower versions are still prawns to phishing you might have an older version than 3.3.4 and recently updated it to the latest version. Since you said that you downloaded the latest version by using the link from the previous version which is possible a phishing site.
And did you just install it without verifying the installer with the GPG tool?
I don't have any issue using the latest version but if you believe that it's a vulnerability you are free to report it directly on their GitHub page and then bring some proof that there is a leak.
I know about the vulnerability in 3.3.3. I can’t say which version I started working with this wallet with, but the exe file was always downloaded from the official website using the link from the status bar of the program. In the first message, I indicated that the last access was using version 4.3.3, which officially has no vulnerabilities at the moment.
It is a pity that this will not help me or the users of the wallet in any way - it means that there will still be the same leaks from the wallets of other owners.
You still don't seem to understand. Electrum happens to be one of the most widely used desktop wallets, along with Bitcoin Core, and has a vast user base of millions of individuals worldwide who utilize it at any given moment. It's highly unlikely that any security vulnerabilities within the software would go unnoticed, given the sheer volume of users and the attention that such flaws would attract online. I'm not saying it's impossible, just very unlikely. So, rather than making baseless accusations, it would be more constructive to provide evidence to support your claims.
I guess users of version 3.3.3 have also been told, right?
I chose exactly for its prevalence and reviews in a very distant year. I haven't had any problems since before this incident.
About 3rd party... I mean somebody did this without hacking my PC. I don't know how it could be done and it's looks imposible for me too.
Electrum is open-source software. Feel free to review the code yourself and report any loopholes or vulnerabilities you find.
I doubt very much that my level of knowledge of languages will allow me to understand the code. Have you been able or just decided to show sarcasm? )
But above I wrote why I think that access to my PC at the time of the specified date would not have given anything even if it had happened
After reading your explanation, I must say that I have serious concerns regarding your OPSEC and its effectiveness. Deleting your wallet profile after each use provide no significant protection, as it offers no real advantage in terms of security, unless you used an offline, air-gapped device to sign your transactions. Similarly, there is little advantage to adding another password to the archive since the wallet file's encryption already provides an adequate level of protection and is virtually impossible to break.
But it certainly won't get any worse, right? When an object is present but encrypted, that's one thing. But when an object is missing, it doesn't matter if it's encrypted, it just doesn't exist.
