How does addnotes connection to trusted peers secure Tor connected nodes?

[Accardo]

I was reading few write-ups and answers on stackexchange and this forum thread where a hacker claimed to launch a tool that'll be able to disclose both the sender and receiver of a bitcoin transaction. Which is one of the reasons people Torify their bitcoin node, not because of the thread alone. But, to enhance privacy and maintain pure anonymity. Along the line the disadvantages of running nodes on Tor include Eclipse attack, which according to this source: Bitcoin over Tor isn't a good idea it would take about $2500 monthly to take control of the Tor network and be able to launch an attack on Bitcoin nodes connected to Tor. Like controlling which block and transaction are relayed to the user, and also discard or delay user's transaction and block. Hence, to avoid such attack like said in bitcoin wiki, we'll have to addnotes connection to trusted peers. How does it happen?, this is where I got confused.
How the connection with trusted peers boost the security of the node against Eclipse attack? I didn't get to see any writeup on that. If anyone can help on this, it'll be greatly appreciated. Thanks. 

. By running 6
such relays the attacker can achieve 400K of bandwidth weight
in total for the price below 2500 USD (2160 USD for the traffic
and 240 for renting fast servers

[1714278103]

1714278103

[1714278103]

1714278103

[1714278103]

1714278103

[1714278103]

1714278103

[nc50lc]

Hence, to avoid such attack like said in bitcoin wiki, we'll have to addnotes connection to trusted peers.

It must be this this part of the "Tor" article, no?: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Tor#Security_considerations

How does it happen?, this is where I got confused.
How the connection with trusted peers boost the security of the node against Eclipse attack? I didn't get to see any writeup on that. If anyone can help on this, it'll be greatly appreciated. Thanks.  

The "key" statement in that article is the part where it said:

"If all of your connections are controlled by a Sybil attacker,..."

Means that the attack wont be easy to pull-off if there's an honest node connected to you.
And by using addnode with a trusted peer, it will be able to relay valid data and will enable you to receive those otherwise blocked data by the attacker's nodes.

[DaveF]

The "key" statement in that article is the part where it said:

"If all of your connections are controlled by a Sybil attacker,..."

Means that the attack wont be easy to pull-off if there's an honest node connected to you.
And by using addnode with a trusted peer, it will be able to relay valid data and will enable you to receive those otherwise blocked data by the attacker's nodes.

And that there is the long and short of it. 1 good node connected to you  is really all you need to defeat this attack.
Also, unless the attacker is coming after YOU and knows the address of YOUR node and has a way of making sure NO OTHER nodes connect to it. It's going to be impossible to make the attack work.

Or another way of putting it: The odds are better of getting hit by lightning while going to cash in your multi-million dollar winning lottery ticket then having this happen to a random user.

-Dave

[BlackHatCoiner]

How the connection with trusted peers boost the security of the node against Eclipse attack?

The eclipse attack is achieved if every single connection you have, is established by the attacker. If one of the nodes you connect with is not trying to attack you and is connected with a network where mining nodes are reachable, then they cannot be eclipsed and nor can you.

For an eclipse attack to be successful, the attacker has to surround the victim with their nodes. Bitcoin Core has taken countermeasures about that since v0.10.1: http://web.archive.org/web/20220412122303/http://cs-people.bu.edu/heilman/eclipse/.

[Accardo]

Hence, to avoid such attack like said in bitcoin wiki, we'll have to addnotes connection to trusted peers.

It must be this this part of the "Tor" article, no?: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Tor#Security_considerations

How does it happen?, this is where I got confused.
How the connection with trusted peers boost the security of the node against Eclipse attack? I didn't get to see any writeup on that. If anyone can help on this, it'll be greatly appreciated. Thanks.  

The "key" statement in that article is the part where it said:

"If all of your connections are controlled by a Sybil attacker,..."

Means that the attack wont be easy to pull-off if there's an honest node connected to you.
And by using addnode with a trusted peer, it will be able to relay valid data and will enable you to receive those otherwise blocked data by the attacker's nodes.

Yeah that's the part of the article. That means the honest node if compromised can still cause vulnerability to my node. Or is it just impossible regardless of the condition of the honest node. Like BlackHatCoiner said, if all the nodes are compromised then they can pull off with such scam. How do we know that the node we're peering with is capable to safe guard our own node from such an attack. Although I get the drill. The nodes works like a bond or a chain, if one is compromised and another is free the compromised node is safe. The risk still pose to be that nodes are spread all over and one may not be lucky enough to select the right one. For instance some nodes run and stop along the line without the owners alerting their peers of the unavailability of their node. So, the best ideas is to connect to as many honest nodes as possible, I guess.

[DaveF]

....So, the best ideas is to connect to as many honest nodes as possible, I guess.

As many NODES as possible. In theory you can't know if they are honest or not, but if you are connecting to enough random nodes then all you need is that one good one so to speak.

Outside of academia I don't think this could really happen in an open internet situation.
If you are in North Korea then it's a different story with their tight controls on what gets in and out.

-Dave