Samourai Wallet seized by the feds

[Kruw]

Prove it then. Tell me which inputs created which outputs in this Bitcoin transaction

At this point, you're making me quote him.

Hey guys! Don't look at those cars of ours on the news which are on fire! Look at these 1,000 new ones we just made. Ohhh, shiny!

o_e_l_e_o was never able to trace ANY WabiSabi coinjoins. He was proven to be a liar the entire time:

you don't need to be a "whale" at all in order to receive absolutely zero privacy from a Wasabi coinjoin.

Okay then, I'll call your bluff again- Here's 20 non whale non matching outputs from WabiSabi coinjoins, try to identify the inputs owned by even a single one of the 20 outputs (which would be 5%):

01 bc1q032caguldmlrrztmrwhv5wqveyywdu2rtmd740
02 bc1q6vgwhsfkg343mmh27vc6prg3clsd4xu3p68vyd
03 bc1qre8jjpu8p9taw8j44r39z56vfr4sw64d4wyaj4
04 bc1qarharg76gfcrvskfw46f67vtqzd6hxa9pnspp5
05 bc1q4sexgt2p96x3ytnjjttp59w6mkj00kedal3xze
06 bc1qwrf50wpjws5mhdg2rhdu5hy7nqdtl8z94lp75n
07 bc1qz0tal2udfpr20x793fdw6v8lzp2qze7z5zje64
08 bc1qqw2h7fa3n8vyxgqru664fmft2trl9sqh9kz3fp
09 bc1qsud748whmum4gpt2qu52z8gqlgzcjyvhd5w2a5
10 bc1qctvxddyvxupjj8w82m8w5grzn59arstlrnaauw
11 bc1qq2fl05cmmhkr3pzg8elyr859v2fpcltynrk2j5
12 bc1qvwkrd3aecrvql5j8mqkmketvw6g6qwzt4juprq
13 bc1qhc2565fac4lrgyfq6n0mzc0l86jeptfnv2um9x
14 bc1qat6445gutyl3qdz3zhmdng9cdt92mevjlvaljs
15 bc1qk5f3mz0fetccey4nyyjedlrmqstkz2hmun96ha
16 bc1q4tpvm378a9d4n0xcnjtwfwujtr8eatjzvru8dx
17 bc1qd5epyjpj6vuejdppj24wew5n4n5rzepjx2xnay
18 bc1qgafud63me5mffn00g90ch08jjn5h20umzwxd62
19 bc1q5u3f2ldrtqa7ea79a8hcd8kssgw2gmalk4uej9
20 bc1qa6n7g7r4j3nv78gzgzmuvg56em4guppckqpz7r

And just like o_e_l_e_o, you and NotATether haven't been able to trace anything either and were also proven to be liars. Stop making false accusations since you can't back them up.

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[dkbit98]

Litecoin has a built-in privacy tool too. It is optional to use but it is there if you need it. That way litecoin has the best of the both worlds. It is not going to targeted by the government and businesses (they may not accept ltc that use mimble-wimble though) and it is not always semi-anonymous like bitcoin. You have a choice.

I wouldn't say it was not targeted by businesses because several exchanges delisted litecoin after they introduced mweb upgrade, even if they didn't have to add support for mweb addresses.
It's interesting that mimble-wimble could easily get implemented in Bitcoin (there is proposal already) after years of working fine in litecoin, but I am almost sure Saylor and his followers won't support that. 

You can have privacy on-chain, it's just becoming more and more difficult. Joinmarket, for example, is decentralized coinjoin. But, I doubt it's getting the necessary recognition, and it's pretty expensive to be honest.

Edward Snowden said something interesting few days ago that money must be private by default, and that should not be illegal anywhere.

[DooMAD]

Was Samourai wallet a "privacy enhancing tool" or was it a money laundering tool? Or maybe it was both?

It's unquestionably both.  A motorised vehicle can be used for both legitimate purposes and illegal ones.  A knife can be used for both legitimate purposes and illegal ones.  It's all about how people choose to utilise the thing in question.

It's funny how some people start whining about "the government taking away our privacy" every time some crypto mixing service gets banned/shut down for doing illegal stuff. I guess that some people think that the ability to conduct money laundering schemes and other illegal activities online is an integral part of their online privacy. Just get a Monero wallet and start using Monero. Why do we have to care about coinjoin/mixing services?

But Monero can also be used for illegal purposes along with legitimate ones.  You could absolutely launder money using Monero if you chose to.  The only difference between Monero and coinjoin/mixing services is that Monero is far more resilient against regulatory takedown.

It's not that people think illegal activity should be an integral part of their privacy, they merely want privacy any way they can get it.  But governments are indiscriminately destroying both legitimate and illegal use alike.  So legitimate users are getting caught in the crosshairs and taking collateral damage when they've done nothing wrong.


I suggest, going forward, the solution to this problem is to stop forming crypto companies.  

• Have an independent dev team, not a company with a CEO who can be arrested and company assets which can be seized
• Have a fully peer-to-peer architecture with no single-points-of-failure, not a main server which can be deactivated to cripple the service
• Have unpaid contributors, not paid employees

The moment you have a trading name, a head office, any reportable income, a primary company server or any kind of business expenditure, you become subject to all the regulations of the jurisdiction(s) in which you operate.  You can and likely will be shut down if the government don't like the service you are offering.

To create the kind of economy we want to create, there can be no perceivable connection to their economy.  For now, that is the only way to remain private.

[BlackHatCoiner]

Edward Snowden said something interesting few days ago that money must be private by default, and that should not be illegal anywhere.

And I absolutely agree with him. If we want privacy to be an integral part of our transactions, it needs to be available by default, across all wallet software; not optionally, expensively and even questionably effectively. All of the Bitcoin users who claim ourselves as pro-privacy and inspired by the cypherpunks, should opt-out to Monero, otherwise we're being dishonest to ourselves. There's a neighbour network that operates exactly as envisioned, respecting all the fundamentals of cryptocurrency.

The only obstacle I see is our greed / risk / call it whatever you like, that Bitcoin will appreciate more in value than Monero.

To create the kind of economy we want to create, there can be no perceivable connection to their economy.  For now, that is the only way to remain private.

But, what kind of economy do we want to create? One that's underground, or one that will reshape the current system as a result of its own collapse? We cannot realistically move forwards in terms of privacy if the merchants are afraid of being punished by the state for using privacy-respecting software.

[mindrust]

h/t Shinobi: https://twitter.com/brian_trollz/status/1780220196994617725

People gave up on MimbleWimble because the privacy in practice doesn't work. The whole selling point was that transactions, which are just point multiplication, can be added together to obscure the graph.
The problem is, nodes snooping on the network are the ones who would aggregate them, and they can snoop on the individual transactions propagating before aggregation and undermine the privacy.

If you aren't lying, then prove it by tracing this Wasabi coinjoin: https://mempool.space/tx/bffa359a9d7908be069800e6bf471db1050496fc4fac40298b15c0d126202298

How about you deanonymize a MW transaction? Let's see your skills in action.

Edward Snowden said something interesting few days ago that money must be private by default, and that should not be illegal anywhere.

Money is private... If it is not private, it is not money. It is not a matter of should, that's the definition of money. It is because money is a commodity and all commodities are fungible/anonymous by nature.

[Kruw]

How about you deanonymize a MW transaction? Let's see your skills in action.

Not sure that's a fair comparison since I would have to sync a node in order to even attempt this. There's no prerequisites to my challenge at all, these accusers against Wasabi are simply scammers, you can see here how I organized a ton of evidence against them proving how persistent they were targeting Wasabi users into getting scammed by Chipmixer: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5482198.0

[mindrust]

How about you deanonymize a MW transaction? Let's see your skills in action.

Not sure that's a fair comparison since I would have to sync a node in order to even attempt this. There's no prerequisites to my challenge at all, these accusers against Wasabi are simply scammers, you can see here how I organized a ton of evidence against them proving how persistent they were targeting Wasabi users into getting scammed by Chipmixer: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5482198.0

So you are saying you can't deanonymize a MW tx? Chickened out? Do you at least know someone who can? No? Show me an example who did? No? Why are you talking about it then?

[Kruw]

So you are saying you can't deanonymize a MW tx? Chickened out? Do you at least know someone who can? No? Show me an example who did? No? Why are you talking about it then?

Because privacy education is important and people having a false sense of privacy is bad?

[mindrust]

So you are saying you can't deanonymize a MW tx? Chickened out? Do you at least know someone who can? No? Show me an example who did? No? Why are you talking about it then?

Because privacy education is important and people having a false sense of privacy is bad?

You are claiming that MW isn't working but you can't show me an example which means you are lying and misinforming people. You call that education?

[cryptosize]

How about you deanonymize a MW transaction? Let's see your skills in action.

Not sure that's a fair comparison since I would have to sync a node in order to even attempt this. There's no prerequisites to my challenge at all, these accusers against Wasabi are simply scammers, you can see here how I organized a ton of evidence against them proving how persistent they were targeting Wasabi users into getting scammed by Chipmixer: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5482198.0

So you are saying you can't deanonymize a MW tx? Chickened out? Do you at least know someone who can? No? Show me an example who did? No? Why are you talking about it then?

I've never seen anyone deanonymizing BEAM (which is private by default, unlike LTC).

[Kruw]

You are claiming that MW isn't working but you can't show me an example which means you are lying and misinforming people. You call that education?

Why don't you provide everyone the unaggregated data from your own MW node then as an example?

[mindrust]

You are claiming that MW isn't working but you can't show me an example which means you are lying and misinforming people. You call that education?

Why don't you provide everyone the unaggregated data from your own MW node then as an example?

I don't have to prove or provide anything. You are the one who claim MW isn't anonymous or its privacy can be broken. You should put your skills where your mouth is.

[Kruw]

I don't have to prove or provide anything. You are the one who claim MW isn't anonymous or its privacy can be broken. You should put your skills where your mouth is.

I do, since I have access to the data from Bitcoin nodes, I was easily able to deanonymize Whirlpool coinjoins:

Post the tx ID of any Whirlpool transaction and I will show you the tx0 transaction that was created by each of the new entrants.

Ok, here's one: https://mempool.space/tx/ed3131b544fbf00a71709942e483b55e629312ecb181e6e819409f419ee0d226

Where exactly is the privacy loss for new entrants, splitting a single UTXO in to multiple UTXOs to join the pool?

Okay, here's all the payments that can be tracked from the two new participants of the Whirlpool coinjoin transaction:

Entrant 1: bc1q03c0443ausjjdxl2h6ud5m8c0dux0zyg3dqdj7 created 0.00170417 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1q3fduld0l3r8nclyt5p3r7ak675tekurstn55tl.  Since this UTXO is not private, the sats were marked as unspendable and have not been recovered by the wallet owner  

Entrant 2: bc1qzc8zku26ej337huw5dlt390cy2r9kgnq7dhtys created 0.00191247 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1qjlltxr443uy236wl4xhpxlr6dgsu0zltlv3m44. This UTXO was used in a second tx0 transaction, creating a huge trail of transactions that could be traced to each other  

The 2nd tx0 transaction created 0.00076348 BTC unmixed change which was sent to bc1qehd7gy8rza9mnzm9wnfjhgw82rp47wmqt7vpgy

Since this unmixed change is below the .001 pool minimum, it was consolidated in a 3rd tx0 with 3 other addresses owned by the same wallet:
31x8GPqrhzdaxiBJa9N5UisuoxbX1rAnHa
16Gw5WKjbxZmg1zhZQs19Sf61fbV2xGujx
3LZtsJfUjiV5EZkkG1fwGEpTe2QEa7CNeY

The 3rd tx0 transaction created .00200317 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1q2p7gdtyahct8rdjs2khwf0sffl64qe896ya2y5
This was spent in a 0.00190000 payment to 3B8cRYc3W5jHeS3pkepwDePUmePBoEwyp1 (a reused address)

That payment left .00008553 in change that was tracked to 3Dh7R7xoKMVfLCcAtVDyhJ66se82twyZSn and consolidated with two other inputs in a 4th tx0 transaction:
bc1qeuh6sds8exm54yscrupdk03jxphw8qwzdtxgde
3ByChGBFshzGUE5oip8YYVEZDaCP2bcBmZ

This 4th tx0 created .00533406 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1qzh699s75smwukg9jcanwnlkmkn38r79ataagd9 which was consolidated with 3 more addresses into a 5th tx0:
3F2qiWQJKQjF7XFjEo8FUYP3AU5AC6RqX8
3HAYYVKUpYbr2ARMdZJr9yVu8xi8UcxtPz
3GQtwwRK31wwCc22q6WS5sCgixUHsG5KaT

The 5th tx0 created 0.00058494 BTC in unmixed change that was sent to bc1qvh2zjcwwkj9y70xulla2semvlav3lty0p3l3w3
This was spent in a .00047290 payment to bc1qvzg8jq6wqtr5navn4e3ps4qrkk9r6n4h98gjck

That payment left .00008411 in change that was tracked to bc1qg6j0f0wfhpktt2l8uzdn48ct3um2xyur40eyzd and consolidated with another input into a 6th tx0 transaction:
31iZLXWfoywhuMZTPGxTkpzphzh2NXshpP

The 6th tx0 created .00753775 in unmixed change that was tracked to bc1qgfll2apc27yct6h2c8r8wq4kqhxjsfrudhhn5q
This was spent in a .00737000 payment to bc1q5emzer2t0sq5dez0zsrqgh6scvwn0n24xsladp (a reused address)

This payment left 0.00010896 BTC in change which has not been spent yet, but the payment only took place 11 days ago, so I assume it will eventually be spent, allowing the Whirlpool user to be tracked even further.

[mindrust]

I don't have to prove or provide anything. You are the one who claim MW isn't anonymous or its privacy can be broken. You should put your skills where your mouth is.

I do, since I have access to the data from Bitcoin nodes, I was easily able to deanonymize Whirlpool coinjoins:

...

Which one of these is a MW transaction? I am missing it probably. Old rusty can't see that well nowadays  

[Kruw]

Which one of these is a MW transaction? I am missing it probably. Old rusty can't see that well nowadays  

You are missing it: The unaggregated data of the MW transactions is observed from your node.

[mindrust]

Which one of these is a MW transaction? I am missing it probably. Old rusty can't see that well nowadays  

You are missing it: The unaggregated data of the MW transactions is observed from your node.

I don't have a node. What now? Setup your own and show us?

[Kruw]

I don't have a node. What now? Setup your own and show us?

Stop shitposting.

https://litecoin.com/en/news/the-litecoin-mimblewimble-extension-block-proposal-has-been-published

MW will offer pseudo privacy as before this history gets deleted those monitoring the network will be able to store the chain state, meaning even if values are hidden it is still possible to track user activity and interactions, so while yes, this will help with fungibility it is by no means perfect.

https://medium.com/dragonfly-research/breaking-mimblewimble-privacy-model-84bcd67bfe52

TL;DR: Mimblewimble’s privacy is fundamentally flawed. Using only $60/week of AWS spend, I was able to uncover the exact addresses of senders and recipients for 96% Grin transactions in real time.

[mindrust]

I don't have a node. What now? Setup your own and show us?

Stop shitposting.

https://litecoin.com/en/news/the-litecoin-mimblewimble-extension-block-proposal-has-been-published

MW will offer pseudo privacy as before this history gets deleted those monitoring the network will be able to store the chain state, meaning even if values are hidden it is still possible to track user activity and interactions, so while yes, this will help with fungibility it is by no means perfect.

https://medium.com/dragonfly-research/breaking-mimblewimble-privacy-model-84bcd67bfe52

TL;DR: Mimblewimble’s privacy is fundamentally flawed. Using only $60/week of AWS spend, I was able to uncover the exact addresses of senders and recipients for 96% Grin transactions in real time.

Grin Devs Respond: Mimblewimble Privacy Isn’t 'Fundamentally Flawed'

“We have to assume that the author conveniently confused transaction outputs (TXOs) with addresses, but these are not the same. And, as we’ve already detailed, the fact that TXOs can be linked is hardly news.”

Lehnberg’s critique of Bogatyy’s claims continues to address several further points, with his central line of argument — details aside — resting on the statement that:

“The Grin team has consistently acknowledged that Grin’s privacy is far from perfect. While transaction linkability is a limitation that we’re looking to mitigate as part of our goal of ever-improving privacy, it does not ‘break’ Mimblewimble nor is it anywhere close to being so fundamental as to render it or Grin’s privacy features useless.”

[cryptosize]

https://medium.com/dragonfly-research/breaking-mimblewimble-privacy-model-84bcd67bfe52

TL;DR: Mimblewimble’s privacy is fundamentally flawed. Using only $60/week of AWS spend, I was able to uncover the exact addresses of senders and recipients for 96% Grin transactions in real time.

Everyone should read the comments too.

Also this:

https://medium.com/grin-mimblewimble/factual-inaccuracies-of-breaking-mimblewimbles-privacy-model-8063371839b9

TBH, these are old articles from 2019... we need to have a discourse with 2024 data. BEAM also has improvements over GRIN.

Some people also argue XMR is traceable, but devs keeps improving it (higher ring size etc).

There's also an IRS bounty if anyone's interested (it's basically free money if you think you can break it):

https://www.interactivecrypto.com/irs-625-000-bounty-for-breaking-monero-and-lightning

[Kruw]

Grin Devs Respond: Mimblewimble Privacy Isn’t 'Fundamentally Flawed'

“We have to assume that the author conveniently confused transaction outputs (TXOs) with addresses, but these are not the same. And, as we’ve already detailed, the fact that TXOs can be linked is hardly news.”

Lehnberg’s critique of Bogatyy’s claims continues to address several further points, with his central line of argument — details aside — resting on the statement that:

“The Grin team has consistently acknowledged that Grin’s privacy is far from perfect. While transaction linkability is a limitation that we’re looking to mitigate as part of our goal of ever-improving privacy, it does not ‘break’ Mimblewimble nor is it anywhere close to being so fundamental as to render it or Grin’s privacy features useless.”

Exactly, David Burkett implemented MW on Litecoin and came to the same conclusion about the weaknesses of MW privacy: https://twitter.com/DavidBurkett38/status/1780758039567446290