ㅤ

[o_e_l_e_o]

They sacrifice your privacy (as well as block space/transaction fees) by forcing you to do a tx0 transaction before coinjoining

This just isn't true at all. If you willingly sacrifice your privacy by consolidating inputs prior to going anywhere near a coinjoin, then that's on you. This has nothing to do with Samourai at all. You could quite easily sacrifice your privacy by consolidating inputs prior to using Wasabi, or JoinMarket, or Bisq, or any other service.

Please refer to my example, there is no smaller pool than .001 BTC, and the leftover output is worth .0001 (minus tx and pool fees ofc).

Cool. So swap it for Monero or Lightning.

This leaks your premix transaction history to your swap partner.  You know what's even easier than that?  A coinjoin making all of your Bitcoins private like Wasabi does without extra steps, extra layers, or extra shitcoins.

Good thing you can perform these swaps anonymously then. I mean, actually anonymously, not Wasabi "anonymously" which requires the permission of a surveillance company.

You're lying, and everyone can see you are lying - Here's the exact quote of what I said: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5286821.msg62067607#msg62067607

You can argue semantics all you like - saying it is unlikely that Whirlpool provides "any anonymity at all" is just plain false.

If I'm wrong, show everyone proof that the clients used by all 5 inputs and outputs in this Whirlpool transaction are using Tor and their own node instead of sending someone else's node their xpub

You seem to be confused about how burden of proof works. If you make a claim that all the inputs have leaked their xpub, then it's on you to prove that claim. You can't go around making wild claims and say "Disprove my unsubstantiated bullshit!"

This is a lie, all of your addresses and UTXOs are prevented from being linked to each other by blockchain analysis because Wasabi uses client side block filters to discover your wallet balance from the network.

And then hands your addresses and UTXOs straight to blockchain analysis surveillance company for investigation and approval.

This blockchain analysis would only be possible in Samourai wallet and Sparrow wallet

Right. So the entities which aren't working hand in hand with blockchain analysis companies are more susceptible to blockchain analysis than the entity literally using your coinjoin fees to pay blockchain analysis companies to analyse your UTXOs. Lmao. I'm sure even you don't believe that, but good job repeating the party line.

No, it's not okay, which is why exactly Wasabi generates a new receive address for every transaction.

So I guess all the address reuse with blockchain evidence which I've linked to is just a figment of my imagination?

So for the record: You were not able to identify the input that created an output without other matching values in address bc1qrmmypw3g2ds4aqgh3nqc59qhdp9qk779x2zlru which proves your previous claim of "you don't need to be a 'whale' at all in order to receive absolutely zero privacy from a Wasabi coinjoin" to be false.

Good job ignoring my examples. That seems to be a recurring theme here.

So in summary, coinjoins that don't work, that you need to permission to join at all, provided by a company which uses your money to pay blockchain analysis companies to spy on you.

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[Kruw]

They sacrifice your privacy (as well as block space/transaction fees) by forcing you to do a tx0 transaction before coinjoining

This just isn't true at all.

It is absolutely true, and I can prove it: Post the tx ID of any Whirlpool transaction and I will show you the tx0 transaction that was created by each of the new entrants.

If you willing sacrifice your privacy by consolidating inputs prior to going anywhere near a coinjoin, then that's on you.

If you don't consolidate, you create even more toxic change, wasting even more coins.

This has nothing to do with Samourai at all.

Yes it is:  They choose to make users who merge their inputs pay less in coordinator fees than users who don't merge their inputs since they charge a flat entry fee instead charging fees based on total amount.

You could quite easily sacrifice your privacy by consolidating inputs prior to using Wasabi, or JoinMarket, or Bisq, or any other service.

No, you can't sacrifice your privacy in Wasabi: Input consolidation is made private since it is done within a coinjoin transaction, observers cannot determine if any two inputs are owned by a single wallet.

This leaks your premix transaction history to your swap partner.  You know what's even easier than that?  A coinjoin making all of your Bitcoins private like Wasabi does without extra steps, extra layers, or extra shitcoins.

Good thing you can perform these swaps anonymously then. I mean, actually anonymously, not Wasabi "anonymously" which requires the permission of a surveillance company.

What do you mean "you can perform these swaps anonymously"?...  The counterparty of the swap is able to see the tx0 that the change output they received originated from  

You're lying, and everyone can see you are lying - Here's the exact quote of what I said: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5286821.msg62067607#msg62067607

You can argue semantics all you like - saying it is unlikely that provides Whirlpool "any anonymity at all" is just plain false.

Why would you assume it is likely that most users would change all their default settings in their wallet that are required to become private?... Since Whirlpool coinjoins are only 5 inputs, 4 users who used the default settings will automatically deanonymize the remaining user who customized his settings to turn his client private.

If I'm wrong, show everyone proof that the clients used by all 5 inputs and outputs in this Whirlpool transaction are using Tor and their own node instead of sending someone else's node their xpub

You seem to be confused about how burden of proof works. If you make a claim that all the inputs have leaked their xpub, then it's on you to prove that claim. You can't go around making wild claims and say "Disprove my unsubstantiated bullshit!"

The only people who can prove how many users Samourai is able to spy on is Samourai.  That's why I used the word "unlikely" because it's not possible to prove.

This is, once again, why WabiSabi coinjoins are strictly superior to Whirlpool coinjoins since you don't have to worry about honest users being used as unknowing and unwilling spies against you.

This is a lie, all of your addresses and UTXOs are prevented from being linked to each other by blockchain analysis because Wasabi uses client side block filters to discover your wallet balance from the network.

And then hands your addresses and UTXOs straight to blockchain analysis surveillance company for investigation and approval.

Again, this is a lie:  No one knows that addresses and UTXOs belong to any single user because Wasabi masks this information with client side block filters and Tor by default.

Only Samourai could hand addresses and UTXOs straight to blockchain analysis surveillance companies for investigation since they collect the xpubs of their users, which includes all previously used addresses, all future unused addresses, including addresses from coinjoins that Samourai told their users were "private".

This blockchain analysis would only be possible in Samourai wallet and Sparrow wallet

Right. So the entities which aren't working hand in hand with blockchain analysis companies are more susceptible to blockchain analysis than the entity literally using your coinjoin fees to pay blockchain analysis companies to analyse your UTXOs. Lmao. I'm sure even you don't believe that, but good job repeating the party line.

Blockchain analysis only works against Samourai because they receive your xpub by default.  Blockchain analysis can't find your Wasabi wallet history thanks to using client side block filters and Tor by default.

No, it's not okay, which is why exactly Wasabi generates a new receive address for every transaction.

So I guess all the address reuse with blockchain evidence which I've linked to is just a figment of my imagination?

There's nothing you can do to stop someone from sending two transactions to the same address.  If you want to change that, you'll need the entire Bitcoin network to accept a consensus fork making the second transaction invalid.

So for the record: You were not able to identify the input that created an output without other matching values in address bc1qrmmypw3g2ds4aqgh3nqc59qhdp9qk779x2zlru which proves your previous claim of "you don't need to be a 'whale' at all in order to receive absolutely zero privacy from a Wasabi coinjoin" to be false.

Good job ignoring my examples. That seems to be a recurring theme here.

So in summary, coinjoins that don't work, that you need to permission to join at all, provided by a company which uses your money to pay blockchain analysis companies to spy on you.

The transaction you linked isn't even a WabiSabi coinjoin and doesn't have a 4.39250624 BTC output.  You are just posting nonsense trying to distract from the fact I proved you wrong by posting a non whale non matching output that you were not able to trace: bc1qrmmypw3g2ds4aqgh3nqc59qhdp9qk779x2zlru

Bluff after bluff after bluff.  That's okay bro, keep going, I have an entire blockchain full of evidence I can prove you wrong with.

[o_e_l_e_o]

Post the tx ID of any Whirlpool transaction and I will show you the tx0 transaction that was created by each of the new entrants.

Ok, here's one: https://mempool.space/tx/ed3131b544fbf00a71709942e483b55e629312ecb181e6e819409f419ee0d226

Where exactly is the privacy loss for new entrants, splitting a single UTXO in to multiple UTXOs to join the pool?

Why would you assume it is likely that most users would change all their default settings in their wallet that are required to become private?... Since Whirlpool coinjoins are only 5 inputs, 4 users who used the default settings will automatically deanonymize the remaining user who customized his settings to turn his client private.

Why would you assume users interested in privacy would not be running their own node? And even if all 4 are leaking the xpubs, I can just leave my UTXOs in the pool for unlimited free remixes.

This is, once again, why WabiSabi coinjoins are strictly superior to Whirlpool coinjoins since you don't have to worry about honest users being used as unknowing and unwilling spies against you.

You can instead just rest safe in the knowledge that your coordinator is willingly being used to spy against you, and you are paying for the privilege. Lol.

Again, this is a lie:  No one knows that addresses and UTXOs belong to any single user because Wasabi masks this information with client side block filters and Tor by default.

Cool, I never said that. What I said that Wasabi "hands your addresses and UTXOs straight to a blockchain analysis surveillance company for investigation and approval."

There's nothing you can do to stop someone from sending two transactions to the same address.

Can you make up your mind? First you say Wasabi doesn't reuse addresses, but then it's not your fault when Wasabi does reuse addresses?

Here's a lovely example of Wasabi reusing addresses, which led to the user in question being doxxed: https://nitter.it/ErgoBTC/status/1585671294783311872

The transaction you linked isn't even a WabiSabi coinjoin and doesn't have a 4.39250624 BTC output.

Perhaps try reading what I wrote again before just blurting out your sound bites.

The transaction I linked has an output of 6.46652537 BTC which could only be created by a single input. This output of 6.46652537 BTC is then coinjoined with Wasabi a second time (in this transaction https://mempool.space/tx/568e6cc87909648c58487a95729d2ba21c011da635323ab7a21d281a03ca705c), creating a 4.39250624 BTC output which again couldn't have come from anywhere else. Two Wasabi coinjoins in a row, zero privacy gained.

You are just posting nonsense trying to distract from the fact I proved you wrong by posting a non whale non matching output that you were not able to trace: bc1qrmmypw3g2ds4aqgh3nqc59qhdp9qk779x2zlru

So your argument boils down to "I can show you some examples which cannot be deanonymized, therefore all your examples of Wasabi coinjoins failing spectacularly are moot". Seriously?

Hey guys, only 5% of our cars randomly explode and kill the driver, so they are perfectly safe!

[NotATether]

Oh boy, what a meat grinder I have walked into! 

Honestly, I'm going to shift the status quo to another question: Considering that governments are hostile to mixers now, how do we know that coordinators will also be safe?

Is there any legal ruling that explicitly allows or forbids the running of any kind of CoinJoin coordinator (for example, in the US), or some kind of implication that it would also be classified as a money transmitting service?

And how can we be sure that governments won't go after coordinators in the future? The fact that there's only one coordinator (zkSNACKs) that is practical for Wasabi users - as the rest have too small liquidity - puts the project in jeopardy if zkSNACKs becomes the target of legal action.

[Wind_FURY]

Or just use a coinjoin implementation which is not actively coordinating with blockchain analysis, is not anti-privacy, and is not pro-censorship.

JoinMarket remains the best but also the hardest for the average user to use. So for them they can either download Samourai on mobile or Sparrow on desktop and use Whirlpool.

Sorry, might be off-topic, but I'm curious, do you frequently use Sparrow Wallet? I have it downloaded, but have yet to install it, to try their implementation of BIP-47. I just want to ask about your personal experience in using the wallet, and in your opinion, if it's good to use for public donations to avoid the sanctions that happened to the Trucker's Protest wallet.

[Kruw]

Post the tx ID of any Whirlpool transaction and I will show you the tx0 transaction that was created by each of the new entrants.

Ok, here's one: https://mempool.space/tx/ed3131b544fbf00a71709942e483b55e629312ecb181e6e819409f419ee0d226

Where exactly is the privacy loss for new entrants, splitting a single UTXO in to multiple UTXOs to join the pool?

Okay, here's all the payments that can be tracked from the two new participants of the Whirlpool coinjoin transaction:

Entrant 1: bc1q03c0443ausjjdxl2h6ud5m8c0dux0zyg3dqdj7 created 0.00170417 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1q3fduld0l3r8nclyt5p3r7ak675tekurstn55tl.  Since this UTXO is not private, the sats were marked as unspendable and have not been recovered by the wallet owner  

Entrant 2: bc1qzc8zku26ej337huw5dlt390cy2r9kgnq7dhtys created 0.00191247 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1qjlltxr443uy236wl4xhpxlr6dgsu0zltlv3m44. This UTXO was used in a second tx0 transaction, creating a huge trail of transactions that could be traced to each other  

The 2nd tx0 transaction created 0.00076348 BTC unmixed change which was sent to bc1qehd7gy8rza9mnzm9wnfjhgw82rp47wmqt7vpgy

Since this unmixed change is below the .001 pool minimum, it was consolidated in a 3rd tx0 with 3 other addresses owned by the same wallet:
31x8GPqrhzdaxiBJa9N5UisuoxbX1rAnHa
16Gw5WKjbxZmg1zhZQs19Sf61fbV2xGujx
3LZtsJfUjiV5EZkkG1fwGEpTe2QEa7CNeY

The 3rd tx0 transaction created .00200317 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1q2p7gdtyahct8rdjs2khwf0sffl64qe896ya2y5
This was spent in a 0.00190000 payment to 3B8cRYc3W5jHeS3pkepwDePUmePBoEwyp1 (a reused address)

That payment left .00008553 in change that was tracked to 3Dh7R7xoKMVfLCcAtVDyhJ66se82twyZSn and consolidated with two other inputs in a 4th tx0 transaction:
bc1qeuh6sds8exm54yscrupdk03jxphw8qwzdtxgde
3ByChGBFshzGUE5oip8YYVEZDaCP2bcBmZ

This 4th tx0 created .00533406 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1qzh699s75smwukg9jcanwnlkmkn38r79ataagd9 which was consolidated with 3 more addresses into a 5th tx0:
3F2qiWQJKQjF7XFjEo8FUYP3AU5AC6RqX8
3HAYYVKUpYbr2ARMdZJr9yVu8xi8UcxtPz
3GQtwwRK31wwCc22q6WS5sCgixUHsG5KaT

The 5th tx0 created 0.00058494 BTC in unmixed change that was sent to bc1qvh2zjcwwkj9y70xulla2semvlav3lty0p3l3w3
This was spent in a .00047290 payment to bc1qvzg8jq6wqtr5navn4e3ps4qrkk9r6n4h98gjck

That payment left .00008411 in change that was tracked to bc1qg6j0f0wfhpktt2l8uzdn48ct3um2xyur40eyzd and consolidated with another input into a 6th tx0 transaction:
31iZLXWfoywhuMZTPGxTkpzphzh2NXshpP

The 6th tx0 created .00753775 in unmixed change that was tracked to bc1qgfll2apc27yct6h2c8r8wq4kqhxjsfrudhhn5q
This was spent in a .00737000 payment to bc1q5emzer2t0sq5dez0zsrqgh6scvwn0n24xsladp (a reused address)

This payment left 0.00010896 BTC in change which has not been spent yet, but the payment only took place 11 days ago, so I assume it will eventually be spent, allowing the Whirlpool user to be tracked even further.

Why would you assume it is likely that most users would change all their default settings in their wallet that are required to become private?... Since Whirlpool coinjoins are only 5 inputs, 4 users who used the default settings will automatically deanonymize the remaining user who customized his settings to turn his client private.

Why would you assume users interested in privacy would not be running their own node?

I assume Samourai users aren't running their own node because Samourai is a mobile phone wallet application.

I can just leave my UTXOs in the pool for unlimited free remixes.

That's a critical design flaw: Sybil attackers can get UNLIMITED FREE ATTACKS from just paying a one time fee.

This is, once again, why WabiSabi coinjoins are strictly superior to Whirlpool coinjoins since you don't have to worry about honest users being used as unknowing and unwilling spies against you.

You can instead just rest safe in the knowledge that your coordinator is willingly being used to spy against you, and you are paying for the privilege. Lol.

How can the coordinator spy on you if all of your addresses are never linked to each other and your IP address is never revealed?

Again, this is a lie:  No one knows that addresses and UTXOs belong to any single user because Wasabi masks this information with client side block filters and Tor by default.

Cool, I never said that. What I said that Wasabi "hands your addresses and UTXOs straight to a blockchain analysis surveillance company for investigation and approval."

Wasabi cannot hand your addresses and UTXOs to a blockchain analysis surveillance company because they do not have your xpub or IP address.  Only Samourai collects this personal information about their users, so only Samourai can hand this information to blockchain analysis surveillance companies.

There's nothing you can do to stop someone from sending two transactions to the same address.

Can you make up your mind? First you say Wasabi doesn't reuse addresses, but then it's not your fault when Wasabi does reuse addresses?

You don't understand at all:  Since Wasabi is non custodial, that means it would require a consensus fork on the entire Bitcoin network to prevent users from sending to an address twice.

Here's a lovely example of Wasabi reusing addresses, which led to the user in question being doxxed: https://nitter.it/ErgoBTC/status/1585671294783311872

Here's the Bitcoin whitepaper again since you seemed to miss it the first time I posted it:

Everyone already knows you shouldn't reuse addresses, it's in the Bitcoin whitepaper:

As an additional firewall, a new key pair should be used for each transaction to keep them from being linked to a common owner. Some linking is still unavoidable with multi-input transactions, which necessarily reveal that their inputs were owned by the same owner. The risk is that if the owner of a key is revealed, linking could reveal other transactions that belonged to the same owner.

The transaction you linked isn't even a WabiSabi coinjoin and doesn't have a 4.39250624 BTC output.

Perhaps try reading what I wrote again before just blurting out your sound bites.

Perhaps link the correct transaction ID if you want anyone to analyze it.

The transaction I linked has an output of 6.46652537 BTC which could only be created by a single input. This output of 6.46652537 BTC is then coinjoined with Wasabi a second time (in this transaction https://mempool.space/tx/568e6cc87909648c58487a95729d2ba21c011da635323ab7a21d281a03ca705c), creating a 4.39250624 BTC output which again couldn't have come from anywhere else. Two Wasabi coinjoins in a row, zero privacy gained.

You said you could trace users who were not the whale:

you don't need to be a "whale" at all in order to receive absolutely zero privacy from a Wasabi coinjoin.

4.39250624 is the largest output of the transaction, which is the whale  

You are just posting nonsense trying to distract from the fact I proved you wrong by posting a non whale non matching output that you were not able to trace: bc1qrmmypw3g2ds4aqgh3nqc59qhdp9qk779x2zlru

So your argument boils down to "I can show you some examples which cannot be deanonymized, therefore all your examples of Wasabi coinjoins failing spectacularly are moot". Seriously?

Hey guys, only 5% of our cars randomly explode and kill the driver, so they are perfectly safe!

Okay then, I'll call your bluff again- Here's 20 non whale non matching outputs from WabiSabi coinjoins, try to identify the inputs owned by even a single one of the 20 outputs (which would be 5%):

01 bc1q032caguldmlrrztmrwhv5wqveyywdu2rtmd740
02 bc1q6vgwhsfkg343mmh27vc6prg3clsd4xu3p68vyd
03 bc1qre8jjpu8p9taw8j44r39z56vfr4sw64d4wyaj4
04 bc1qarharg76gfcrvskfw46f67vtqzd6hxa9pnspp5
05 bc1q4sexgt2p96x3ytnjjttp59w6mkj00kedal3xze
06 bc1qwrf50wpjws5mhdg2rhdu5hy7nqdtl8z94lp75n
07 bc1qz0tal2udfpr20x793fdw6v8lzp2qze7z5zje64
08 bc1qqw2h7fa3n8vyxgqru664fmft2trl9sqh9kz3fp
09 bc1qsud748whmum4gpt2qu52z8gqlgzcjyvhd5w2a5
10 bc1qctvxddyvxupjj8w82m8w5grzn59arstlrnaauw
11 bc1qq2fl05cmmhkr3pzg8elyr859v2fpcltynrk2j5
12 bc1qvwkrd3aecrvql5j8mqkmketvw6g6qwzt4juprq
13 bc1qhc2565fac4lrgyfq6n0mzc0l86jeptfnv2um9x
14 bc1qat6445gutyl3qdz3zhmdng9cdt92mevjlvaljs
15 bc1qk5f3mz0fetccey4nyyjedlrmqstkz2hmun96ha
16 bc1q4tpvm378a9d4n0xcnjtwfwujtr8eatjzvru8dx
17 bc1qd5epyjpj6vuejdppj24wew5n4n5rzepjx2xnay
18 bc1qgafud63me5mffn00g90ch08jjn5h20umzwxd62
19 bc1q5u3f2ldrtqa7ea79a8hcd8kssgw2gmalk4uej9
20 bc1qa6n7g7r4j3nv78gzgzmuvg56em4guppckqpz7r

[o_e_l_e_o]

Sorry, might be off-topic, but I'm curious, do you frequently use Sparrow Wallet? I have it downloaded, but have yet to install it, to try their implementation of BIP-47. I just want to ask about your personal experience in using the wallet, and in your opinion, if it's good to use for public donations to avoid the sanctions that happened to the Trucker's Protest wallet.

I wouldn't say frequently, but I certainly use it from time to time. It is great at just how easy it is to run from your own node. Unlike Electrum, you don't have to run an Electrum server on top your node. You can just point Sparrow directly at your node, and off it goes. I have never used its BIP47/PayNym function beyond spending coinjoin outputs.

In what way are you looking to avoid sanctions? If your addresses/UTXOs are already sanctioned, or the addresses you are sending to are sanctioned, then it does not matter what wallet you use to make the transaction. The obvious option is simply not to interact with any service which employs blockchain analysis, treats some UTXOs as tainted, and is anti-fungibility and pro-censorship. Unless you mean about using Whirlpool via Sparrow to remove any "taint" or other such nonsense from your UTXOs? It's certainly a very easy option. As I said, it is incredibly easy to run Sparrow from your own node and also incredibly easy to route any external traffic via Tor, which means you can use Whirlpool completely anonymously and completely trustlessly. And of course there is no risk of being censored with Whirlpool like there is with Wasabi.

If you want the best coinjoining method out there then JoinMarket is where you should go, but it remains harder to set up and use than Samourai/Sparrow.

[Kruw]

Or just use a coinjoin implementation which is not actively coordinating with blockchain analysis, is not anti-privacy, and is not pro-censorship.

JoinMarket remains the best but also the hardest for the average user to use. So for them they can either download Samourai on mobile or Sparrow on desktop and use Whirlpool.

Sorry, might be off-topic, but I'm curious, do you frequently use Sparrow Wallet? I have it downloaded, but have yet to install it, to try their implementation of BIP-47. I just want to ask about your personal experience in using the wallet, and in your opinion, if it's good to use for public donations to avoid the sanctions that happened to the Trucker's Protest wallet.

BIP47 requires address reuse for on chain notifications, allowing anyone to observe the total amount of donators. BIP47 also rarely protects your privacy since it requires the donator to make their payment privately using different UTXOs that never interact with their original notification, so there's nothing the receiver can do to actually stop the sender from linking the notification transaction to the donation transaction.

Silent payments is a superior stealth address scheme to BIP47 since the notification payload is sent in the payment itself, reducing block space usage and increasing privacy.  You can read more about it here:  https://gist.github.com/RubenSomsen/c43b79517e7cb701ebf77eec6dbb46b8

[o_e_l_e_o]

Wasabi cannot hand your addresses and UTXOs to a blockchain analysis surveillance company because they do not have your xpub or IP address.

I realize you are deliberately trying to shift the goalposts, but xpubs are irrelevant here. Every time you register a UTXO with the Wasabi coordinator, they pay a blockchain analysis for information about that UTXO.

You don't understand at all:  Since Wasabi is non custodial, that means it would require a consensus fork on the entire Bitcoin network to prevent users from sending to an address twice.

Right. So when a Samourai user spends their change, that's Samourai's fault, but when the Wasabi software reuses addresses resulting in users being doxxed, that's working as intended. Lmfao.

4.39250624 is the largest output of the transaction, which is the whale

Exactly my point. 4 BTC is not a whale by any reasonable standard. Your definition of a "whale" is completely variable and depends entirely on the other users in the coinjoin.

Okay then, I'll call your bluff again- Here's 20 non whale non matching outputs from WabiSabi coinjoins

Great job proving my point. You have again completely ignored the blockchain evidence of Wasabi coinjoins being broken.

Hey guys! Don't look at those cars of ours on the news which are on fire! Look at these 1,000 new ones we just made. Ohhh, shiny!

[Kruw]

Wasabi cannot hand your addresses and UTXOs to a blockchain analysis surveillance company because they do not have your xpub or IP address.

I realize you are deliberately trying to shift the goalposts, but xpubs are irrelevant here. Every time you register a UTXO with the Wasabi coordinator, they pay a blockchain analysis for information about that UTXO.

So what?  All the coordinator can do is just not register that UTXO because Wasabi hides that user's xpub address and IP address.  There's absolutely no risk to the user whatsoever.

By contrast, Samourai's coordinator can link all of the UTXOs owned by that user together by default and sell that data to chain analysis or have that information seized by law enforcement.

You don't understand at all:  Since Wasabi is non custodial, that means it would require a consensus fork on the entire Bitcoin network to prevent users from sending to an address twice.

Right. So when a Samourai user spends their change, that's Samourai's fault, but when the Wasabi software reuses addresses resulting in users being doxxed, that's working as intended. Lmfao.

Yes, it is Samourai's fault since they require that change to be exposed in a tx0 transaction in order to coinjoin.  If the user from the Whirlpool transaction you linked had used Wasabi instead, I would not have been able to trace all those other transactions from his wallet.

4.39250624 is the largest output of the transaction, which is the whale

Exactly my point. 4 BTC is not a whale by any reasonable standard. Your definition of a "whale" is completely variable and depends entirely on the other users in the coinjoin.

0.5 BTC is the largest output you can create from a Whirlpool transaction.  Can you find a whale that small in a WabiSabi coinjoin?

Okay then, I'll call your bluff again- Here's 20 non whale non matching outputs from WabiSabi coinjoins

Great job proving my point. You have again completely ignored the blockchain evidence of Wasabi coinjoins being broken.

Hey guys! Don't look at those cars of ours on the news which are on fire! Look at these 1,000 new ones we just made. Ohhh, shiny!

So, for the record, I proved your claim false that you can trace any of the non whale non matching outputs:

you don't need to be a "whale" at all in order to receive absolutely zero privacy from a Wasabi coinjoin.

[o_e_l_e_o]

So what?

You are using coinjoin fees to pay mass surveillance firms to analyze your users' UTXOs and then grant their permission to allow those UTXOs to be conjoined. That's what. You are directly funding mass surveillance. You are pro-surveillance, you are pro-censorship, you are anti-privacy, you are anti-fungibility, and all the hand waving in the world about Samourai doesn't change any of that.

[BlackHatCoiner]

So what?  All the coordinator can do is just not register that UTXO because Wasabi hides that user's xpub address and IP address.  There's absolutely no risk to the user whatsoever.

Why isn't denial of service an existent risk to you? Someone needs privacy, but for some reason chain analysis don't approve that. How can you not see the irony that they supposedly are in favor of fungibility, but don't treat the currency as fungible in the first place?

Honestly, I'm going to shift the status quo to another question: Considering that governments are hostile to mixers now, how do we know that coordinators will also be safe?

Coordinators that fund surveillance companies which are also funded by government spending can sleep easy.

[Kruw]

So what?

You are using coinjoin fees to pay mass surveillance firms to analyze your users' UTXOs and then grant their permission to allow those UTXOs to be conjoined. That's what. You are directly funding mass surveillance. You are pro-surveillance, you are pro-censorship, you are anti-privacy, you are anti-fungibility, and all the hand waving in the world about Samourai doesn't change any of that.

I just completely broke the privacy of a user from the Whirlpool coinjoin you chose yourself, how could you call this on chain evidence "hand waving"?

Post the tx ID of any Whirlpool transaction and I will show you the tx0 transaction that was created by each of the new entrants.

Ok, here's one: https://mempool.space/tx/ed3131b544fbf00a71709942e483b55e629312ecb181e6e819409f419ee0d226

Where exactly is the privacy loss for new entrants, splitting a single UTXO in to multiple UTXOs to join the pool?

Okay, here's all the payments that can be tracked from the two new participants of the Whirlpool coinjoin transaction:

Entrant 1: bc1q03c0443ausjjdxl2h6ud5m8c0dux0zyg3dqdj7 created 0.00170417 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1q3fduld0l3r8nclyt5p3r7ak675tekurstn55tl.  Since this UTXO is not private, the sats were marked as unspendable and have not been recovered by the wallet owner  

Entrant 2: bc1qzc8zku26ej337huw5dlt390cy2r9kgnq7dhtys created 0.00191247 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1qjlltxr443uy236wl4xhpxlr6dgsu0zltlv3m44. This UTXO was used in a second tx0 transaction, creating a huge trail of transactions that could be traced to each other  

The 2nd tx0 transaction created 0.00076348 BTC unmixed change which was sent to bc1qehd7gy8rza9mnzm9wnfjhgw82rp47wmqt7vpgy

Since this unmixed change is below the .001 pool minimum, it was consolidated in a 3rd tx0 with 3 other addresses owned by the same wallet:
31x8GPqrhzdaxiBJa9N5UisuoxbX1rAnHa
16Gw5WKjbxZmg1zhZQs19Sf61fbV2xGujx
3LZtsJfUjiV5EZkkG1fwGEpTe2QEa7CNeY

The 3rd tx0 transaction created .00200317 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1q2p7gdtyahct8rdjs2khwf0sffl64qe896ya2y5
This was spent in a 0.00190000 payment to 3B8cRYc3W5jHeS3pkepwDePUmePBoEwyp1 (a reused address)

That payment left .00008553 in change that was tracked to 3Dh7R7xoKMVfLCcAtVDyhJ66se82twyZSn and consolidated with two other inputs in a 4th tx0 transaction:
bc1qeuh6sds8exm54yscrupdk03jxphw8qwzdtxgde
3ByChGBFshzGUE5oip8YYVEZDaCP2bcBmZ

This 4th tx0 created .00533406 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1qzh699s75smwukg9jcanwnlkmkn38r79ataagd9 which was consolidated with 3 more addresses into a 5th tx0:
3F2qiWQJKQjF7XFjEo8FUYP3AU5AC6RqX8
3HAYYVKUpYbr2ARMdZJr9yVu8xi8UcxtPz
3GQtwwRK31wwCc22q6WS5sCgixUHsG5KaT

The 5th tx0 created 0.00058494 BTC in unmixed change that was sent to bc1qvh2zjcwwkj9y70xulla2semvlav3lty0p3l3w3
This was spent in a .00047290 payment to bc1qvzg8jq6wqtr5navn4e3ps4qrkk9r6n4h98gjck

That payment left .00008411 in change that was tracked to bc1qg6j0f0wfhpktt2l8uzdn48ct3um2xyur40eyzd and consolidated with another input into a 6th tx0 transaction:
31iZLXWfoywhuMZTPGxTkpzphzh2NXshpP

The 6th tx0 created .00753775 in unmixed change that was tracked to bc1qgfll2apc27yct6h2c8r8wq4kqhxjsfrudhhn5q
This was spent in a .00737000 payment to bc1q5emzer2t0sq5dez0zsrqgh6scvwn0n24xsladp (a reused address)

This payment left 0.00010896 BTC in change which has not been spent yet, but the payment only took place 11 days ago, so I assume it will eventually be spent, allowing the Whirlpool user to be tracked even further.

Like I explained before, if this user had used Wasabi to coinjoin instead, then none of these payments would have been linked together.  The user would have achieved total privacy.

So what?  All the coordinator can do is just not register that UTXO because Wasabi hides that user's xpub address and IP address.  There's absolutely no risk to the user whatsoever.

Why isn't denial of service an existent risk to you? Someone needs privacy, but for some reason chain analysis don't approve that. How can you not see the irony that they supposedly are in favor of fungibility, but don't treat the currency as fungible in the first place?

As a coinjoin coordinator, would you deny service to Sam Bankman Fried if he wanted to coinjoin stolen FTX funds?  Or would you make his stolen coins private instead?

[BlackHatCoiner]

As a coinjoin coordinator, would you deny service to Sam Bankman Fried if he wanted to coinjoin stolen FTX funds?

The answer is no regardless the client. Fungibility means coins are equal. By the same reasoning, Bitcoin miners should deny confirming any transaction coming from Sam's funds, unless approved by some chain analysis company; and yep, at this point we've switched from censorship-resistant cash to pro-censorship, just as the coordinator did.

If you think Sam shouldn't have his coins private, you can freely admit it. I can acknowledge it and respect your opinion to an extent. What I cannot respect is defending someone who's outright lying in the main page that privacy should be preserved at all times, but simultaneously not at all times.

[o_e_l_e_o]

As a coinjoin coordinator, would you deny service to Sam Bankman Fried if he wanted to coinjoin stolen FTX funds?  Or would you make his stolen coins private instead?

Hell, why stop there? If your blockchain analysis buddies don't want to provide services to SBF, then why not petition miners to blacklist his transactions altogether? There has been more than one mining pool in the past which has selectively censored transactions based on a blockchain analysis blacklist, OFAC blacklist, or other such bullshit. Only approved people should be allowed to use bitcoin at all! Congrats, you've just invented a CBDC.

After all, if you've got nothing to hide, you've got nothing to fear, right? Everyone who doesn't comply is a target.

You can fuck right off with your malignant permissioned privacy bullshit.

[Kruw]

As a coinjoin coordinator, would you deny service to Sam Bankman Fried if he wanted to coinjoin stolen FTX funds?

The answer is no regardless the client. Fungibility means coins are equal. By the same reasoning, Bitcoin miners should deny confirming any transaction coming from Sam's funds, unless approved by some chain analysis company; and yep, at this point we've switched from censorship-resistant cash to pro-censorship, just as the coordinator did.

If you think Sam shouldn't have his coins private, you can freely admit it. I can acknowledge it and respect your opinion to an extent. What I cannot respect is defending someone who's outright lying in the main page that privacy should be preserved at all times, but simultaneously not at all times.

Why would you help Sam hide the stolen money from his victims?

As a coinjoin coordinator, would you deny service to Sam Bankman Fried if he wanted to coinjoin stolen FTX funds?  Or would you make his stolen coins private instead?

Hell, why stop there? If your blockchain analysis buddies don't want to provide services to SBF, then why not petition miners to blacklist his transactions altogether? There has been more than one mining pool in the past which has selectively censored transactions based on a blockchain analysis blacklist, OFAC blacklist, or other such bullshit. Only approved people should be allowed to use bitcoin at all! Congrats, you've just invented a CBDC.

After all, if you've got nothing to hide, you've got nothing to fear, right? Everyone who doesn't comply is a target.

You can fuck right off with your malignant permissioned privacy bullshit.

Sure, I'll approach it from the base layer:  As a miner, would you deny service to Sam Bankman Fried if he wanted to coinjoin stolen FTX funds?  Or would you make his stolen coins private instead?

[o_e_l_e_o]

As a miner, would you deny service to Sam Bankman Fried if he wanted to coinjoin stolen FTX funds?

Absolutely not. I don't believe in censoring anyone. I believe in free speech, and I believe bitcoin should be freely transacted without requiring permission from any third party.

If you honestly don't see the problem with censorship and the slippery slope which follows, I really don't know what to say. Perhaps once Wasabi stops paying you to sell out bitcoin you could get a job with the NSA.

[Kruw]

As a miner, would you deny service to Sam Bankman Fried if he wanted to coinjoin stolen FTX funds?

Absolutely not. I don't believe in censoring anyone. I believe in free speech, and I believe bitcoin should be freely transacted without requiring permission from any third party.

If you honestly don't see the problem with censorship and the slippery slope which follows, I really don't know what to say. Perhaps once Wasabi stops paying you to sell out bitcoin you could get a job with the NSA.

Why would you help Sam hide the stolen money from his victims?

[o_e_l_e_o]

Because I'm not so arrogant nor so ignorant to try to appoint myself the sole arbiter of who is and is not allowed to use bitcoin.

[Kruw]

Because I'm not so arrogant nor so ignorant to try to appoint myself the sole arbiter of who is and is not allowed to use bitcoin.

As the coinjoin coordinator, you are not the arbiter of whether or not SBF is allowed to use Bitcoin, you are the arbiter of whether or not you turn his stolen coins private.  I'm asking you why you would choose to help Sam hide the stolen money from his victims.