large mining pool that does not publish its mempool

[citb0in]

Hi all,

is there any well-known and large publicly known mining pool that does not make submitted transactions publicly visible until the corresponding block has been mined? This mining pool should enjoy a good reputation and be known for a very long time.The mempool should remain hidden from the public until the block in question has been mined. That means the pool does not broadcast transactions from their mempool to the network.

Is there such a pool, who knows more about it?

[ABCbits]

MARA's slipstream[1] fit your criteria, since they're willing to accept non-standard TX (which not relayed by most full nodes) and state they won't broadcast your TX before it's mined by them. I don't remember whether similar service also does same thing though.

[1] https://slipstream.mara.com/

[kano]

Other than accepting txns that standard core might not, for any other reason it, to be blunt, seems an odd thing to do.

I guess one use would be, to hide that you've succeeded in stealing someone's BTC, and then there's no chance they could RBF it.

Another point would be that it would delay the transaction.

Since the transaction is going to go public as soon as it ends in a block, I'm wondering what's gained by not distributing your transaction to the network before that happens.

[Cricktor]

Since the transaction is going to go public as soon as it ends in a block, I'm wondering what's gained by not distributing your transaction to the network before that happens.

I think citb0in's question origins from the Bitcoin puzzle threads where I've seen him from time to time posting. The problem is when you find a low entropy private key like currently open puzzle #67. If you try to publicly withdraw the ~6.7BTC from public address 1BY8GQbnueYofwSuFAT3USAhGjPrkxDdW9 you reveal the so far unknown public key. For such a low entropy private key that is behind above address, it can be found within seconds with the disclosed public key.

The result will be stealer bots replacing the solver's withdrawal transaction with their own due to FullRBF commonly active at mining pools. And pools would've an incentive to participate in such a scheme as every replacement increases the fee for the transaction turning the puzzle's coins into fees.

If someone finds the private key for currently still unsolved lower puzzles like #67, #68, #69, #71, ... (no multiples of 5) their only chance is apparently currently to use slipstream.mara.com or mine a solo block which the solver assembled on their own with a hidden mempool. The latter isn't really a viable option for apparent reasons.