Creating seed phrase, addresses. Broadcasting all addresses?

[btc-freedom-money]

  I am not sure on the terminology I should use to correctly ask my questions so don't read it too literally. This topic is about Ledger and Trezor hardware wallets.

I want to understand better how a hardware wallet works compared to a wallet like sparrow or electrum for example.

In sparrow and electrum wallet, the server will know all your public addresses that are inside your wallet.
Is it the same way with a hardware wallet? When I connect the hw wallet to a third party wallet, will the server know all the addresses that are inside my hw wallet?

What I think is confusing is that hw wallets can have more than just bitcoin. They can have other coins like eth and sol and many more. That means a server shouldn't be able to get all the addresses on the hw wallet.

I am guessing it might be that the third party wallet will automatically get all the hw wallet addresses for every blockchain, then it's up to the third party wallet how it has been built. The third party wallet could and it seems to be the standard, query all addresses at the same time. All Bitcoin addresses get sent to a bitcoin server, all eth addresses get sent to a eth node, etc, everything done at the same time.

But in theory there could be third party wallet that give you a choice to not query all addresses at the same time.

I have also read 2 things that seem contradicting. There is a popular scam where they sell used hw wallets after they have copied the seed phrase so they can recover it later when the new owner puts money into it. That's why they officially warn to never buy second hand hw wallets. But I've also read you can create new seed phrase and private keys. You can have several wallets inside the he wallet and switch between them so third party wallets will not know about the other wallets you have on the hw wallet. If that's possible then the scam threat isn't that serious if you just create a new seed phrase?

A friend asked me if she can just create a new address in her hw wallet, will it be secret address? Or is it likely coinanalys or some bitcoin server would be able to link that new address to all the other ones inside the hw wallet?

[Charles-Tim]

In sparrow and electrum wallet, the server will know all your public addresses that are inside your wallet.
Is it the same way with a hardware wallet? When I connect the hw wallet to a third party wallet, will the server know all the addresses that are inside my hw wallet?

If the third party wallet that you use with the hardware wallet is a SPV wallet, it is the same. But if you connect it to your own node, you will not rely on central servers but your own node. You can run your own Electrum server with Tor, and also there are ways you can use hardware wallet with full node with Tor enabled.

But in theory there could be third party wallet that give you a choice to not query all addresses at the same time.

It depends on the gap limit. As long as it is within the gap limit, the central server will get information about the addresses for you on the blockchain about the balance.

I have also read 2 things that seem contradicting. There is a popular scam where they sell used hw wallets after they have copied the seed phrase so they can recover it later when the new owner puts money into it. That's why they officially warn to never buy second hand hw wallets. But I've also read you can create new seed phrase and private keys. You can have several wallets inside the he wallet and switch between them so third party wallets will not know about the other wallets you have on the hw wallet. If that's possible then the scam threat isn't that serious if you just create a new seed phrase?

The seed phrase or the private key are generated by the bad people, which means the wallet is vulnerable. Also it can be in a way you will think you are generating the seed phrase and the keys but you are not as it has been generated before and known to the bad people. The best is to just buy a reputed hardware wallet from a reputed source. Although, I prefer to use wallet like Electrum on a airgapped device.

A friend asked me if she can just create a new address in her hw wallet, will it be secret address? Or is it likely coinanalys or some bitcoin server would be able to link that new address to all the other ones inside the hw wallet?

Central servers do not just know only your addresses but also your IP addresses and that can help in knowing other wallets.

[mocacinno]

--snip--
I have also read 2 things that seem contradicting. There is a popular scam where they sell used hw wallets after they have copied the seed phrase so they can recover it later when the new owner puts money into it. That's why they officially warn to never buy second hand hw wallets. But I've also read you can create new seed phrase and private keys.
--snip--

I just wanted to elaborate on Charles-Tim's answer a bit.
The problem here is dual, and not contradicting...

If you buy a second hand hardware wallet that was NOT tampered with, it is usually possible to just wipe it and generate a new seed phrase. If you'd do this, you'd be safe.
If you buy a second hand hardware wallet that was tampered with, the RNG might be intentionally broken (or the complete system might be replaced), so it would not matter if you'd receive an unitialised wallet or a pre-initialised wallet (by the bad actor). If you re-initialised said wallet, you'd always end up with derived private keys that could also be found by the bad actor, since the botched RNG would only be able to make a certain well-known preset list of seeds/master private keys.

The problem with buying from an unreputed (or second hand) source is that you have no way of telling whether the hardware wallet you received is genuine and untampered with... Re-initialising is easy, but it would only safeguard you if the wallet you received was genuine and untampered with.

Bottom line: only buy from a reputable source, check if the package is still sealed, and even then make sure you follow procedure to check for genuine hardware/firmware (if available from the official vendor). Hardware wallets are relatively cheap (certainly vs the current FIAT price), don't risk your funds by cheaping out and buying some refurbished HW wallet, or a HW wallet from sources that are either unknown or don't have a good track record (for example, amazon). Those couple bucks you saved might end up costing you everything helt on the HW wallet.

[Charles-Tim]

If you buy a second hand hardware wallet that was NOT tampered with, it is usually possible to just wipe it and generate a new seed phrase. If you'd do this, you'd be safe.

But the thing is that nearly everyone do not know if a hardware wallet is tempered with or not. Many people do not know the difference between original and fake hardware wallet. They can see the fake as cheap and that can encourage them to buy one instead of buying one directly from the official site or from an official reseller. But I think I have seen used hardware wallet on eBay before.

[Cookdata]

I am not sure on the terminology I should use to correctly ask my questions so don't read it too literally. This topic is about Ledger and Trezor hardware wallets.

I want to understand better how a hardware wallet works compared to a wallet like sparrow or electrum for example.

In sparrow and electrum wallet, the server will know all your public addresses that are inside your wallet.
Is it the same way with a hardware wallet? When I connect the hw wallet to a third party wallet, will the server know all the addresses that are inside my hw wallet?

If you are running your own node, everything you do will be limited to your own node or server, but if you are using an external server/node, there is a high chance they are going to see everything from your wallet addresses. Your wallet needs to be synced to date before you can see the total balance of Bitcoin left on your wallet's addresses. If you don't want any person to see everything, you have to run your own for your privacy, or alternatively, you can choose to connect your hardware with the server (external) with a single private key load on your hardware, only if you want to risk that particular wallet address been watch.

What I think is confusing is that hw wallets can have more than just bitcoin. They can have other coins like eth and sol and many more. That means a server shouldn't be able to get all the addresses on the hw wallet.

I am guessing it might be that the third party wallet will automatically get all the hw wallet addresses for every blockchain, then it's up to the third party wallet how it has been built. The third party wallet could and it seems to be the standard, query all addresses at the same time. All Bitcoin addresses get sent to a bitcoin server, all eth addresses get sent to a eth node, etc, everything done at the same time.

But in theory there could be third party wallet that give you a choice to not query all addresses at the same time.

Using a hardware wallet, you need a node/server to broadcast your transaction. The best way you can do is to run your own node or rely on/trust another node. Most often the SPV servers, but most hardware companies (Ledger, for example) have their own nodes which you can connect via USB or Bluetooth, and some of their servers don't run only Bitcoin nodes, their other servers support Ethereum, Solana, BNB and many more chains they support. If you are using their applications, your transactions will quickly get broadcasted, but then you are relying on their servers and can see everything about your transactions and wallet addresses.

I have also read 2 things that seem contradicting. There is a popular scam where they sell used hw wallets after they have copied the seed phrase so they can recover it later when the new owner puts money into it. That's why they officially warn to never buy second hand hw wallets. But I've also read you can create new seed phrase and private keys. You can have several wallets inside the he wallet and switch between them so third party wallets will not know about the other wallets you have on the hw wallet. If that's possible then the scam threat isn't that serious if you just create a new seed phrase?

Using a passphrase might be helpful in this situation, it helps you generate different wallet addresses even with the same seed phrase, but the best option is if you are buying a hardware wallet, don't buy from a secondary seller, buy directly and get it shipped to your house address. That's the best way to avoid any loopholes regarding this. Creating multiple seed phrases just to avoid these kinds of situations is not helpful; scammers are smart asses every day.

A friend asked me if she can just create a new address in her hw wallet, will it be secret address? Or is it likely coinanalys or some bitcoin server would be able to link that new address to all the other ones inside the hw wallet?

Like I said before, using a public server/node puts you at risk of being watched by coin analysts. You can create hundreds of seed phrases and connect your wallet to a public node; they will know about your transaction and IP address, but with your own node, you can anonymise everything about your wallet addresses. Even if you connect your node to another node, you can use Tor to route your IP address.

[btc-freedom-money]

A friend asked me if she can just create a new address in her hw wallet, will it be secret address? Or is it likely coinanalys or some bitcoin server would be able to link that new address to all the other ones inside the hw wallet?

Central servers do not just know only your addresses but also your IP addresses and that can help in knowing other wallets.

What i was thinking about is if its possible for a bitcoin address to be reversed to the public key? And then that public key reversed to see which xpub created it? I remember reading something about that.
I know it's not possible to know which master private key created the xpub but I don't know about the other things. Because if you can with an address do some algorithm to see which xpub it comes from, then you can find out all the other addresses that the xpub has created. Is any of this possible?

Using a passphrase might be helpful in this situation, it helps you generate different wallet addresses even with the same seed phrase

Can I without worry share my seed phrase publicly online if I only use a hidden wallet which uses a strong passphrase?

[Charles-Tim]

What i was thinking about is if its possible for a bitcoin address to be reversed to the public key? And then that public key reversed to see which xpub created it? I remember reading something about that.

This is not possible.

I know it's not possible to know which master private key created the xpub but I don't know about the other things. Because if you can with an address do some algorithm to see which xpub it comes from, then you can find out all the other addresses that the xpub has created. Is any of this possible?

Maybe the address has been used to make transaction. If an address is used to make transaction, the public key will be known and that is just normal.

Can I without worry share my seed phrase publicly online if I only use a hidden wallet which uses a strong passphrase?

Not advisable.

A short/weak passphrase will be easy to brute force. A very strong passphrase will be hard to brute force but not advisable.

[Cookdata]

A friend asked me if she can just create a new address in her hw wallet, will it be secret address? Or is it likely coinanalys or some bitcoin server would be able to link that new address to all the other ones inside the hw wallet?

Central servers do not just know only your addresses but also your IP addresses and that can help in knowing other wallets.

What i was thinking about is if its possible for a bitcoin address to be reversed to the public key? And then that public key reversed to see which xpub created it? I remember reading something about that.
I know it's not possible to know which master private key created the xpub but I don't know about the other things. Because if you can with an address do some algorithm to see which xpub it comes from, then you can find out all the other addresses that the xpub has created. Is any of this possible?

You need to understand that public keys are been converted to wallet address through hash function(SHA-256 and RIPEMD-160) and this function are one way, you can only truncate large characters into a shot one using hash function but you can't do it back to get original data.

You cannot get extended public key(xpub) from a single public key, it's not possible but you can use xpub to create as many as different public keys that you want.

Using a passphrase might be helpful in this situation, it helps you generate different wallet addresses even with the same seed phrase

Can I without worry share my seed phrase publicly online if I only use a hidden wallet which uses a strong passphrase?

This isn't not security wise, why will you even expose your seed phrase for people in the first place. You may have your seed phrase extended with a pass phrase but it can be brute force if it's short word, you need maximum privacy by the way, seed phrase are meant to be hidden from the rest of the world.

[mocacinno]

--snip--
Can I without worry share my seed phrase publicly online if I only use a hidden wallet which uses a strong passphrase?

I wanted to chip in because i don't feel like enough emphasis has been put on the answer of this question...

If you'd extend your seed phrase with a long passphrase and share said seedphrase (minus the passphrase) online, you'd go from having a wallet that would require trillions and trillions of years using a whole server farm to bruteforce to a wallet that could be bruteforced in a couple of days/months/years by somebody who has a couple GPU's laying around.
It's not just "not adviseable", it's really "not done". It's the equivalent of securing your physical gold by laying it on a public bus seat with a "do not touch" stuck to it while you're away versus storing it in for knox.

[btc-freedom-money]

If you are running your own node, everything you do will be limited to your own node or server, but if you are using an external server/node, there is a high chance they are going to see everything from your wallet addresses. Your wallet needs to be synced to date before you can see the total balance of Bitcoin left on your wallet's addresses. If you don't want any person to see everything, you have to run your own for your privacy, or alternatively, you can choose to connect your hardware with the server (external) with a single private key load on your hardware, only if you want to risk that particular wallet address been watch.

I need my own node if I am using a wallet with many addresses I don't want linked to same identity.
But if I don't have my own node, then I can still have good privacy if I only have 1 address per wallet and use tor to connect to the public node?
If yes, then I am guessing I can accomplish that by only exporting 1 public address from the hardware wallet at a time? For example if I have a sparrow wallet that is brand new and unused, then i connect the hardware wallet and export 1 address to sparrow. Now I can get balance for my address from a public node and send transaction and other things and they won't know my other addresses.
Later if I want to use another address, I would need to create a new sparrow wallet that is unused and then repeat by exporting the other address from hardware wallet to the other sparrow wallet?
It is more work like this but it works pretty well to protect privacy?

I wanted to chip in because i don't feel like enough emphasis has been put on the answer of this question...

If you'd extend your seed phrase with a long passphrase and share said seedphrase (minus the passphrase) online, you'd go from having a wallet that would require trillions and trillions of years using a whole server farm to bruteforce to a wallet that could be bruteforced in a couple of days/months/years by somebody who has a couple GPU's laying around.
It's not just "not adviseable", it's really "not done". It's the equivalent of securing your physical gold by laying it on a public bus seat with a "do not touch" stuck to it while you're away versus storing it in for knox.

I asked mostly to understand better the strength of the passphrase. Are you sure it's really as weak as you make it sound? If I use a password manager to generate a random passphrase that is extremely strong with 200+ bits of entropy, you think it can be brute forced in 2-3 years with a couple GPU?

Also isn't it unnecessary to have 24 words in seed phrase instead of 12? I've read a few dicussion about that and that is what I think most agreed on. But the videos I watched of people setting up hardware wallets, they only have the choice of 24 words seed phrases.

[mocacinno]

--snip

I wanted to chip in because i don't feel like enough emphasis has been put on the answer of this question...

If you'd extend your seed phrase with a long passphrase and share said seedphrase (minus the passphrase) online, you'd go from having a wallet that would require trillions and trillions of years using a whole server farm to bruteforce to a wallet that could be bruteforced in a couple of days/months/years by somebody who has a couple GPU's laying around.
It's not just "not adviseable", it's really "not done". It's the equivalent of securing your physical gold by laying it on a public bus seat with a "do not touch" stuck to it while you're away versus storing it in for knox.

I asked mostly to understand better the strength of the passphrase. Are you sure it's really as weak as you make it sound? If I use a password manager to generate a random passphrase that is extremely strong with 200+ bits of entropy, you think it can be brute forced in 2-3 years with a couple GPU?
--snip--

you are right, if you create a passphrase with that much entropy, it would be hard to crack it. You do know that if you use all characters from a common keyboard, if my calculations are correct you'd need a password that's at least 31 characters long and you'd need to be sure the RNG you used didn't have any flaws?
I was more or less talking about "common" passwords... Most people tend to make passwords that are between 8 and 12 characters long, often times not using ALL characters on their keyboards (usually a combo of lower case, upper case, numbers and a small subset of special characters). Most of these can be cracked with a couple of years if you have a (small) GPU farm.

This being said, i still would never share my seed phrase... The seed extension passphrase comes on top of the seed phrase itself. Somebody trying to bruteforce your seed phrase would have to try each combination of seed words with each combination passphrase in order to rob you. They can't "just" bruteforce your seed phrase, and then start bruteforcing your password, nope, they'd need to bruteforce the combo seed phrase + password. In case one of them gets leaked the other one should be able to protect you, but this won't be the case if you give away your seed phrase willingly.

Personally, i'd advice you not to let your seedphrase touch any machine that will ever be online. Certainly don't keep the seed phrase extension password together with the seed.

But bottom line, yes, your remark is correct. If you have a strong RNG and you create a 40 character completely random string, people won't be able to bruteforce it with a couple of GPU's in a couple of years, and the odds of getting robbed even if you would release your seed phrase into the wild are slim to none. However, even in this case, i don't see any usecase to make your seed phrase public ever... Especially if you use an online medium to generate or to store said extension password.