You are asking whether we should choose between not letting people starve today, or building hospitals for tomorrow like this is some great philosophical choice rather than a policy choice because it failed. Fuel subsidies are a confession. They are governments who are saying, "we've created an economy so fragile that if the price of diesel reaches its true values it collapses"
And to take them away, with no other choice? That is simply choosing that the poor should pay for that failure, rather than the state. Venezuela was subsidizing fuel to death and bust. Indonesia reduced subsidies and observed riots. Both were right. Both were wrong. The problem is that developing economies are caught in a resource curse where the only wealth is extraction and extraction only benefits whoever has the key to the valve
You want the real answer? Subsidies are a time-buying mechanism. The question is what are you buying time FOR. If it is to create real economic diversity (manufacturing, services, human capital) then maybe. If it is simply a matter of buying time to allow elites to take the difference, you are paying for your own stagnation
I'll try to analyze the example of subsidies in my country, Indonesia (specifically energy: fuel, electricity, 3-kg LPG). Subsidies function as a buffer for household consumption and a short-term social/inflation stabilizer to maintain domestic purchasing power and reduce political pressure on vulnerable groups. Subsidies lower the price of energy goods, so that real household consumption rises or does not fall when international prices rise. This has a direct impact on consumer spending and aggregate demand. If subsidies encourage consumption among poor households, the multiplier can be relatively high (due to the high propensity to consume), thus stimulating short-term growth.
It must be acknowledged that large subsidies impose a significant fiscal burden that reduces the space for productive spending (infrastructure, education, health), thereby suppressing medium- to long-term growth potential (a crowding-out effect). If left unchecked, fiscal risks increase and policy flexibility decreases. The size of the subsidy depends on global oil prices and the rupiah exchange rate. Fiscal pressure when world prices rise can trigger the withdrawal of reserves or the use of fiscal buffers. Recent reports have emerged of the use of reserves/fiscal engineering to fund major programs, reducing the government's room for maneuver.
The technical problem in Indonesia is that many energy subsidies (non-targeted fuel, imperfect distribution of 3kg LPG) are regressive, with wealthy households receiving a large proportion of the total subsidy. This reduces the effectiveness of subsidies as a poverty alleviation tool. Distribution leakage (sales to non-targeted markets), inefficiency of distribution companies, and fraudulent practices (e.g., QR codes/registrations triggering a shift to non-subsidized markets) are implementation issues. Cases of fuel shortages at private retailers (SHELL) and quota arrangements highlight coordination issues. The quality of recipient data (Integrated Data from the Ministry of Social Affairs, National Identity Number) determines targeting accuracy, and improvements in digital delivery (e-forms, QR codes, electronic cash transfers) can minimize leakage.
Therefore, concrete steps that the Indonesian government has, is currently, and will take include targeted temporary protection: diverting some subsidies directly to cash social assistance for vulnerable groups, which is faster and maintains consumption effects. (High priority, short term). The government should announce a subsidy reform roadmap (calendar of price increases/adjustments) and a clear compensation package to mitigate political uncertainty. (High priority). Improve targeting and digital delivery (Integrated Data from the Ministry of Social Affairs + electronic transfers) to minimize leakage. (Medium priority). The Minister of Finance is currently pushing for budget reallocation to capital expenditure and the energy transition—encouraging productive and green investment. (Medium-long priority). Establish a fiscal stabilization mechanism (reserve funds/strategic reserves) to avoid the use of emergency reserves, which erode flexibility. (Medium priority)
In my opinion, the appropriate policy chain is to directly protect the vulnerable, reduce regressive subsidies, and reallocate the budget to productive investment and the energy transition. Gradual reforms, accompanied by targeted compensation and strong public communication, are likely to provide the best combination for maintaining current consumption without sacrificing future growth