This is what most of us that know about this on this forum really against. Ledger Nano are not offline wallets, they are completely online wallets. If t is not online, how are the seed phrase sent to the anti-privacy companies for backup?
This is only valid for newer models.
Leger nano S and Nano X work without this feature. I have both and they dont have such feature. X supports it but you must enable it.
I bought them years before such feature existed...
But you can't prove that none of the code required for Ledger Recover isn't baked into the firmware on your device, which means you can't prove hackers (or Ledger, or Ledger's partners) can't access the keys in your device.
Remember, Ledger is the company that said:
"Your keys are always stored on your device and never leave it"
Then they wrote an API to do it, and they baked that API into their firmware and put it on your device whether you like it or not.
Just because the feature isn't compatible, that doesn't mean none of the code required to access your keys over the internet isn't on your device.
In my opinion, this makes the device even more dangerous. Users assume safety, while hackers assume there's vulnerability to be found.
Assuming safety is a mistake.
Bitcoin is open source. I would never trust my coins to closed source code, and I'd certainly never trust a company that lies so often about so many important things.
Here's a good example:
"WE ARE OPEN SOURCE"
Ledger printed that on the boxes for
their hardware wallets which run closed source code. That is absolute scumbaggery.
Ledger is a terrible company.
Other Ledger devices made after Nano X also has it but it has to be enabled, it is not something that is compulsory. What people do not like about it is that why should such thing even exist at all? According to what you post, likely it is only Ledger Nano S that does not has the anti-privacy feature.
Actually, what people who understand the importance of open source code don't like about Ledger Recover is that you can't prove it can't be enabled remotely.
You assume it can't be enabled remotely. You can't prove it.
You can't prove it because the code isn't open, so you have to just assume. "Well, they said..." And they lie, so their word is trash.
No hardware wallet should be reachable over the internet. Period. Anyone who thinks otherwise doesn't understand how Bitcoin signatures work or what hardware wallets actually do.
The point of using a hardware wallet is to be able to sign transactions without exposing your keys. Key extraction code is a key exposure risk. Even if you don't enable that feature... even if Ledger doesn't offer that feature for your device... if the code required to enable key extraction is on your device, your coins are at risk. It's just a matter of time until somebody figures out how to hack the code to enable the feature remotely.