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January 01, 2026, 04:35:44 PM |
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Hi everyone,
I’m researching a structural problem in DeFi and would really appreciate criticism.
Today, DeFi protocols that generate on-chain fees basically have 3 options to get capital:
- Sell governance tokens (dilution) - Take overcollateralized loans (capital inefficient) - Rely on VCs (centralization, long cycles)
There seems to be no native way to turn future on-chain revenue into upfront capital without debt.
So I’m exploring a simple idea:
A protocol could sell a fixed percentage of its future on-chain fees for a fixed time period (e.g. 20% for 12 months), enforced directly by smart contracts.
Key properties of the model: - No fixed repayments - No loans - No token issuance required - Revenue is routed automatically on-chain - Investors take pure revenue risk
Very high-level architecture: - A revenue escrow contract that captures protocol fees - A bond-like NFT representing the right to X% of fees for Y time - A small good-faith deposit (ETH/USDC) to prevent bypassing the escrow - No subjective governance or human arbitration
This is NOT a product yet and not an investment offer. I’m not raising funds or selling tokens.
I’m trying to answer one question: → Is this economically or technically flawed in a fundamental way?
I’d especially appreciate criticism on: - Incentive alignment - Attack vectors - Whether this is meaningfully different from existing DeFi primitives - Why this would or wouldn’t be used in practice
If this is obviously naive or broken, please say so. That’s exactly what I’m trying to learn.
Thanks for reading.
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