But if you are faithless or don't believe me, you can go this path specified below... we consider it one of the best qc attack mitigation.
You are free to freeze all relevant addresses, but their owners should be able to unfreeze them once they setup up security questions and answers, which is an additional security layer. But the feature has to first be implemented by developers before questions and answers can be setup by address owners.
Inputing a private keys (whether correct keys or not) without the security question shows: "this account is frozen to protect it from sophisticated attack, please setup security question and answer to further secure the account and unfreeze it". Once the security is setup and the private keys is correct, the account unlocks..
This method is QC and brute force proof because even if the right private key is guess, it does nothing until a security question is setup. An attackers will have to manually setup a security question for each private keys in order to find the right keys that unlocks the account. But If it is done too fast or automatically with AI or bot the system could get the attacker to solve puzzles .. This slows things down, and will likely take forever to guess the right keys even with the fastest QC ever invented
This solution does not violate the censorship resistant principle of Bitcoin
How would work on Bitcoin or other decentralized system? There are some concern, such as
1. Where and how the security question/answer stored?
2. How do the system know the one who setup it is the actual owner? Making the owner to sign it with their private key?
3. On protocol level, there's no thing such as account or address.
4. Even if puzzle exist to slow down attacker, large scale attacker still have benefit to write optimized puzzle solver on GPU or FPGA.
Maybe I don't agree fully with BIP-361 proposal, but doing nothing and just hoping quantum won't affect bitcoin sounds terrible to me.
I agree, this is why I'm closely following QC-related proposals to see which one looks more promising.
Although I'm skeptical on Quantum Computers (
hardware-specific), it wouldn't hurt for the network to be ready.
Even if QC not exist, old estimation of 256-bit ECDSA only good enogh until 2040.
Security level Symmetric ECC DSA/RSA Protects to year
80 80 160 1024 2010
112 112 224 2048 2030
128 128 256 3072 2040
192 192 384 7680 2080
256 256 512 15360 2120
Table 3: Comparable key sizes
It's enough to make some people concerned in different way, although the year estimation based on naive assumption.
The protection lifetimes of security levels have been extrapolated from similar NIST recommenda-
tions. The extrapolations are also loosely based on a simple assumption similar to Moore’s law:
computing power will grow by a factor of about 216 every decade. Therefore, the minimum ade-
quate security level must increase by 16 bits every 10 years. Future revisions of this standard may
amend this.