The attacker grant itself an admin role to mint eBTC on Echo protocol, used the privilege to mint 1000 eBTC, deposit roughly 45 eBTC out of the 1000 eBTC into Curvance’s eBTC market as collateral, the attacker received Curvance’s wrapped collateral receipt (ceBTC) in return. He borrowed against that collateral across multiple transactions, pulling out approximately 11.296 wBTC in total. 955 eBTC is still remaining in his wallet.
The attacker did not try to dump 1,000 eBTC into a DEX. Monad’s eBTC liquidity is thin, and the slippage would have eaten most of the extraction. They used the lending path instead, the same playbook Resolv’s attacker used to convert fake USR into ETH and KelpDAO’s attacker used to convert fake rsETH into WETH.
The reason the borrow at 11.296 wBTC instead of 45 wBTC is some combination of Curvance’s available WBTC supply, the LTV ceiling on the eBTC market, and any borrow caps set on the asset; which of those was the binding constraint isn’t yet confirmed.
So the 11.296 wBTC was stolen successfully, approximately $870000 at bitcoin price of $77000 of the attack.
If you want to understand this better, I highly advise you to read how the attack worked:
https://defiprime.com/echo-ebtc-monad-exploit. Because if you want to understand better, you need to know what Echo, Curvance, and Monad are and how Curvance was exploited without hacking it.