Lightning nodes are not trustless because they can't be: because they don't have PoW, they are subject to 51% attacks. Because of that, they are trusted nodes--again, just like CoinBase is.
"Nodes" are not relevant in Lightning as a trust factor. Because if anybody tries to manipulate the communication and thus your balance, you always will have the unilateral exit. It is this exit threat that erases the trust necessary.
The transactions you need for the unilateral exit do not run "somewhere" on a "node", but on "your own" computer. You have the transaction in your memory or your disk. And thus you have always the power to fire up Bitcoin Core, Electrum or what you want, enter the transaction to perform the unilateral exit, and then any problem that is in some way related to "Lightning nodes" and the software that runs on it, becomes irrelevant, because you are again on the "on chain" level, secured by PoW.

The only objection, as I already wrote in the OP, is that Lightning software can have additional bugs and vulnerabilities. Just like any other Bitcoin software can have. But you need more software, so there is more bug potential, and thus Lightning transactions are a little bit more prone to bugs.
I answer to some arguments from the other thread to centralize the discussion here:
An L2 can double spend at will, too. It can do anything it wants. It's just software which can favor one user over another or do a million other things. It can censor transactions. It can do all of the things people say can't be done with plain Bitcoin.
As said above, if any of that happens, then the unilateral exit is your friend. And in LN-Penalty, if someone tries to scam you, they will be ... penalized.
Bitcoin runs on incentives, and the Bitcoin Script contracts we call "Lightning" do that too.
That bundling [between L1 and L2] doesn't happen by magic, it happens with a software and hardware system that bundles transactions for you (just like CoinBase et. al.).
The bundling happens via native Bitcoin Script, and always referencing on-chain UTXOs. As you say, there is no magic. The whole chain of potential on-chain transactions you need for the unilateral exit is saved on your own device, so you always have control over it.
Your implied assumption here is that the transaction is a good one on the Bitcoin network. How do you know that until you've committed the transaction on the Bitcoin chain? You don't. Perhaps the L2 is reserving the right to reverse the transaction later.
"The L2" isn't an autonomous entity who can do that, at least in the case of Lightning or Ark. How would "Lightning" do to reverse a transaction? Please explain this technically or your argument is invalid.
The logic is actually very simple.
You have, on your own device, the Bitcoin Script transaction to close the channel. It references an UTXO which is on-chain, and where you have control over, because it is signed with your key and the channel partner's key.
Only your channel partner can move that UTXO's funds. Either if he's using the unilateral exit (and then you get your money back). Or if he's penalizing you, but that happens only if you provided the secret which means you tried to cheat yourself. (Or you have a malware on
your device which stole your key, but then it's not Lightning's fault.)
In all these cases, except when you cheat, you get your money back.
So there's no possibility for "the L2" to reverse transactions.