Both directions are interesting, and maybe future networks will need a combination of algorithm design and reward-layer design.
They'll have to answer whether the network is secure enough or not too. At the end of the day if it's "easy" for normal users to participate it might imply not a lot of energy or capital are spent to secure the chain. I'm sure someone will attack the chains with examples of how PoW-sylte chain got a rollback because the network lacks difficulty and whatnot.
Btw, you can merge some of your post into one. Especially when there's no reply before you make them.
Good point, and I agree this is one of the most important questions.
If participation is too easy, it should not mean that the chain itself becomes easy to attack.
That is why I think there must be a clear separation between:
1. base network security
2. public/community reward participation
A community mining layer should not replace the security model of the chain.
It should not allow weak participants to control block ordering, chain history, or make rollbacks easier.
The goal is different: to create a public participation and reward layer for active users, while the base network still needs enough protection, stability and difficulty to resist attacks.
So yes, if a project simply says “everyone can mine easily” but does not explain how the chain remains secure against reorgs, rollbacks, low difficulty attacks or cheap majority control, that is a serious problem.
For LQC-style mining, the idea is not “easy mining = easy chain control”.
The idea is:
- stable base production/security first
- public mining rewards only as a controlled participation layer
- active miner checks
- anti-abuse rules
- transparent reward distribution
- no public mining before liquidity
- no passive wallets receiving rewards
So I agree with you: community participation is only useful if it does not weaken the security of the chain.
Also, thanks for the forum etiquette note. I will merge/edit posts when there is no reply before posting again.