Not providing device access under duress is now a crime

[NotATether]

You guys have probably heard of that traveller dude in Atlanta who was stopped by federal security who then demanded the passcode to his Graphene OS phone, so he then provided the duress passcode, they entered it and it wiped his phone using built-in data wipe feature.

Now they are prosecuting him with charges of destroying property during an investigation (even though they are the ones who destroyed it, but that's not the point).

My concern is with hardware wallets. What's stopping them from pressing charges if they try to force us to provide hardware wallet PINs under duress and we refuse?

[Dogedegen]

You guys have probably heard of that traveller dude in Atlanta who was stopped by federal security who then demanded the passcode to his Graphene OS phone, so he then provided the duress passcode, they entered it and it wiped his phone using built-in data wipe feature.

Now they are prosecuting him with charges of destroying property during an investigation (even though they are the ones who destroyed it, but that's not the point).

Actually they are not the ones who destroyed it, I initially though that the phone had some kind of self deletion feature where too many incorrect attempts makes the phone delete itself. If it was like that, then it would have been the law enforcement that destroyed it. In this case it was the user who deliberately destroyed it by inputting this kind of PIN. If he had simply refused to provide any kind of pin then it would not have deleted itself. This is not a good thing, but we must be very careful how we describe and judge events because they mean different thing in legal contexts. In this case he did actually destroy the data on the phone deliberately during an investigation, but whether he will be convicted we will see.

My concern is with hardware wallets. What's stopping them from pressing charges if they try to force us to provide hardware wallet PINs under duress and we refuse?

Actually for the border laws it does not matter what Bitcoin is defined as in a country, or that it is technically not stored with you. When you enter a country with a hardware wallet you are in fact bringing value that is above the limit for declaration at the border, so yes they can definitely try to force you to provide a PIN to unlock this wallet. The only safe way to pass a border is to memorize or fragment a temporary seed phrase and then restore, create a new wallet and transfer everything on the other side. The laws on border capital control are very strict, the $10k limit refers to all kinds of value so Bitcoin is included.

[NotATether]

Actually they are not the ones who destroyed it, I initially though that the phone had some kind of self deletion feature where too many incorrect attempts makes the phone delete itself. If it was like that, then it would have been the law enforcement that destroyed it. In this case it was the user who deliberately destroyed it by inputting this kind of PIN. If he had simply refused to provide any kind of pin then it would not have deleted itself. This is not a good thing, but we must be very careful how we describe and judge events.

If you typed the duress PIN, and it wiped itself, technically that means you "destroyed" it even though you didn't really have the intention of deleting the data.

[obuoma]

You guys have probably heard of that traveller dude in Atlanta who was stopped by federal security who then demanded the passcode to his Graphene OS phone, so he then provided the duress passcode, they entered it and it wiped his phone using built-in data wipe feature.

Now they are prosecuting him with charges of destroying property during an investigation (even though they are the ones who destroyed it, but that's not the point).

My concern is with hardware wallets. What's stopping them from pressing charges if they try to force us to provide hardware wallet PINs under duress and we refuse?

This reminds me of the situation we also face in our country where law enforcement constantly harass people, forcing them to unlock their phones which they search without any court order. Here such things are mostly done by the police againt their code of conduct because by our law, police can only search phones and other personal belongings if they have a search warrant from a court or if there is a reported crime within that vicinity.  Hence, police does not sue and cannot sue anyone who activates such features in his device.  They will use force and intimidation to make someone yield but they cannot prosecute because they know that their action is illegal.

[Charles-Tim]

My concern is with hardware wallets. What's stopping them from pressing charges if they try to force us to provide hardware wallet PINs under duress and we refuse?

Or we should ask ourselves why hardware wallets are not going for the duress mode in a way wallets can be opened with different passwords each in a way that if one is unlocked, the other wallet on the hardware wallet can not be seen? These is the best way that duress mode can be in my opinion despite having a password that can delete all wallets on the hardware wallet.

Anyone that want maximum privacy should avoid hardware wallet. They can go for cold wallets like paper wallet and wallet on airgapped devices.

[Dogedegen]

Actually they are not the ones who destroyed it, I initially though that the phone had some kind of self deletion feature where too many incorrect attempts makes the phone delete itself. If it was like that, then it would have been the law enforcement that destroyed it. In this case it was the user who deliberately destroyed it by inputting this kind of PIN. If he had simply refused to provide any kind of pin then it would not have deleted itself. This is not a good thing, but we must be very careful how we describe and judge events.

If you typed the duress PIN, and it wiped itself, technically that means you "destroyed" it even though you didn't really have the intention of deleting the data.

What do you mean you didn't intent to delete it? What possible intention could the user have to enter a duress PIN and not delete the data? That is the only thing that this function does, delete the data! If I shoot a gun directly aimed at person, I did not intend to kill or harm him? They would still prosecute me and I would go to prison just for doing that even if a person does not die as a result of my actions, it would just be considered a smaller crime.

I use Graphene too on some old phones, and this news spooked me a little bit but I didn't even know it had this feature until this news came out. This is probably not going to be handled the same way in all the countries of the world right now, but for the US it can create a bad precedent. These recent years they have been getting stricter with their border asking for more information. They have been seeing people that have no social media or that have a very small online history as more suspicious.

This reminds me of the situation we also face in our country where law enforcement constantly harass people, forcing them to unlock their phones which they search without any court order.

Actions that the law permits explicitly is not harassment, so the comparison does not really stand. If you encounter actual abuse from the authorities based on the laws of your country, document it and then report it. Don't fight against it in the moment.

Or we should ask ourselves why hardware wallets are not going for the duress mode in a way wallets can be opened with different passwords each in a way that if one is unlocked, the other wallet on the hardware wallet can not be seen? These is the best way that duress mode can be in my opinion despite having a password that can delete all wallets on the hardware wallet.

Hardware wallets support passphrases, and that is the closest and safest to duress mode. Actually it works even better since you can create a wallet that is a decoy, with some balances and transactions and it will look much better when you unlock it than an empty wallet. Since data losses with Bitcoin can be permanent if the backups are not good and for many users they are not good, I would not recommend a duress pin! It would cause more harm than good in my view.

[NotATether]

Or we should ask ourselves why hardware wallets are not going for the duress mode in a way wallets can be opened with different passwords each in a way that if one is unlocked, the other wallet on the hardware wallet can not be seen? These is the best way that duress mode can be in my opinion despite having a password that can delete all wallets on the hardware wallet.

Come to think of it, you are right. I haven't recalled seeing any hardware wallet support this feature.

Why though? Maybe people just don't realize they need it and therefore never asked for it?

What do you mean you didn't intent to delete it?

You misunderstood me mate, I was trying to say the feds are the ones not intending to delete data when they unlock a device, as they have often have no idea if a passcode is duress or not.

[notocactus]

You guys have probably heard of that traveller dude in Atlanta who was stopped by federal security who then demanded the passcode to his Graphene OS phone, so he then provided the duress passcode, they entered it and it wiped his phone using built-in data wipe feature.

That's too much severity, I could not imagine about that.

Now they are prosecuting him with charges of destroying property during an investigation (even though they are the ones who destroyed it, but that's not the point).

My concern is with hardware wallets. What's stopping them from pressing charges if they try to force us to provide hardware wallet PINs under duress and we refuse?

I don't know but let's diversify your coins, separate them into different wallets so that you will not lose all at one event like this.

The only thing I remember is this article.

• How to protect your Bitcoin from $5 wrench attacks?
• Can duress wallets stop Bitcoin attacks?
• Does it work? It's debatable, and honestly I don't know especially it's with federal security officials.

Duress/decoy wallets

The idea here is plausible deniability. People envision the following scenario:

    Attacker coerces you into accessing your bitcoin wallet under threat of violence.
    Instead of opening your real bitcoin wallet, you open one with a much smaller amount of money in it. You transfer it to the attacker and they leave satisfied.

There are several issues with duress wallets.

    You are speculating that the amount in your decoy wallet is plausibly large enough to satisfy an attacker whose knowledge and motivations you have know way of knowing.
    You are speculating about the attacker's propensity for violence. For all you know, their plan all along may be to leave no witnesses alive.
    How far do you take the ruse with the decoy wallet? Do you transact regularly from it so that it looks like a wallet that is actually used rather than a dormant decoy? Will an attacker be sophisticated enough to be suspicious of a decoy wallet with no activity?
    You can't realistically test how you will react in such a situation.
    We've yet to hear of a single case in which a victim successfully managed to get an attacker to go away by giving up a decoy wallet. Though there haven't been a ton of publicized physical attacks... yet. We need more data.

[snowpega]

You guys have probably heard of that traveller dude in Atlanta who was stopped by federal security who then demanded the passcode to his Graphene OS phone, so he then provided the duress passcode, they entered it and it wiped his phone using built-in data wipe feature.

Now they are prosecuting him with charges of destroying property during an investigation (even though they are the ones who destroyed it, but that's not the point).

My concern is with hardware wallets. What's stopping them from pressing charges if they try to force us to provide hardware wallet PINs under duress and we refuse?

I really did not know that if such devices exist, meaning that I am outdated now, haha. It really added to my knowledge. Thanks!

Can you tell me some more about why they insist that traveller to share passcode?
Was he doing something illegal or running away from doing something wrong?

it wiped his phone using built-in data wipe feature.

How does it work? Does the system also detect that someone else gets access to the device, not the real owner?

Well, if that person hasn't done anything wrong, then I really think this is something brutal. Isn't it?

The other side of the story that just came to my mind is how they caught him even though he was using an untrackable device. That traveller might have done something wrong; because of that, maybe the authorities caught him and asked him to share the device passcode. CMIIW!

[NotATether]

I really did not know that if such devices exist, meaning that I am outdated now, haha. It really added to my knowledge. Thanks!

Can you tell me some more about why they insist that traveller to share passcode?
Was he doing something illegal or running away from doing something wrong?

it wiped his phone using built-in data wipe feature.

How does it work? Does the system also detect that someone else gets access to the device, not the real owner?

Well, if that person hasn't done anything wrong, then I really think this is something brutal. Isn't it?

The other side of the story that just came to my mind is how they caught him even though he was using an untrackable device. That traveller might have done something wrong; because of that, maybe the authorities caught him and asked him to share the device passcode. CMIIW!

Graphene OS is a privacy version of Android. You can flash it onto a phone like Google Pixel, and it's like using Linux on a computer.

About the traveller: I honestly don't remember, and I don't really care anyway. But it seems to be trending on X right now, so you can check there if you want.

$5 wrench attacks just got upgraded to $0 legal threats.

[Mia Chloe]

~snip

One thing I've come to understand is when it comes to federal and government issues the rules are totally against those under. This same trash will not happen to a major attorney obviously because they know he's gonna press charges. The idea of asking to get a device open seems alot like privacy breach to me crazy they still got away with it.

Is there a possibility of a second space on graphene OS ? On android currently I can set it such that the device i wish to access comes live depending on the finger print I use to open my device.

[Maine22K]

I think it’s important to separate the technical question from the legal one. A hardware wallet is designed to protect private keys, but whether someone can be legally compelled to reveal a PIN or passphrase depends on the laws of the jurisdiction and the circumstances of the investigation. The wallet’s security features don’t automatically determine the legal outcome. Before drawing conclusions from one reported case, I’d want to know exactly what charges were filed and whether they were based on refusing to provide access or on some other alleged conduct.

[NotATether]

Is there a possibility of a second space on graphene OS ? On android currently I can set it such that the device i wish to access comes live depending on the finger print I use to open my device.

I don't think that will help much if they attach the phone to a forensic toolkit rather than merely scrolling through apps.

I think it’s important to separate the technical question from the legal one. A hardware wallet is designed to protect private keys, but whether someone can be legally compelled to reveal a PIN or passphrase depends on the laws of the jurisdiction and the circumstances of the investigation.

If a hardware wallet does not protect your keys from physical access, then it has failed its product description.

[Mia Chloe]

I don't think that will help much if they attach the phone to a forensic toolkit rather than merely scrolling through apps.

You are right if it's just a normal stop and search it would be feasible. However there still should be a way out doesn't make any sense that you can neither protect your privacy nor your right. The fact is they got a hold of him because they were certain the device was wiped....

Why don't developers include a feature where you create something like a standby space, if stuff like this comes up you type in a particular password and it wipes your original space and you're left with a dummy space. The essence of the dummy space is to make it look real too not just an empty space that will still seem suspicious.

[Dogedegen]

What do you mean you didn't intent to delete it?

You misunderstood me mate, I was trying to say the feds are the ones not intending to delete data when they unlock a device, as they have often have no idea if a passcode is duress or not.

Alright, I get it now. It is still him who destroyed the evidence by intentionally providing a pin that does this, there is no way to go around this because of his intent and because of the function of the PIN is clear. It would be like somehow tricking or hypnotizing an officer to set on fire a paper note they found on you, it does not matter how you accomplished that it would still be your fault. It does not matter if he entered the PIN himself or he told the PIN to the officer so that the officer enters it, because the outcome is the same which is the deletion of the data and a reboot of the phone.

How does it work? Does the system also detect that someone else gets access to the device, not the real owner?

Well, if that person hasn't done anything wrong, then I really think this is something brutal. Isn't it?

The other side of the story that just came to my mind is how they caught him even though he was using an untrackable device. That traveller might have done something wrong; because of that, maybe the authorities caught him and asked him to share the device passcode. CMIIW!

He was under suspicious for other reasons already, that is why they picked him it was shared already in the news.

One thing I've come to understand is when it comes to federal and government issues the rules are totally against those under. This same trash will not happen to a major attorney obviously because they know he's gonna press charges. The idea of asking to get a device open seems alot like privacy breach to me crazy they still got away with it.

Things don't work that way in US, it is a country where lawsuits are very common and actually there are too many lawsuits over the smallest of things. If there is a good case to be made, the person would sue and some big names could even want to take the case for free. In some other countries what you have said might be true, but not in this case.

Is there a possibility of a second space on graphene OS ? On android currently I can set it such that the device i wish to access comes live depending on the finger print I use to open my device.

Profiles exist on this OS yes, but they are not plausible deniability profiles. One can see that there are multiple profiles on the phone, and that is enough to force you to open all of them or be charged for refusing to do it. Only technology that enables pure plausible deniability can be used in defense against the legal mechanism.

You are right if it's just a normal stop and search it would be feasible. However there still should be a way out doesn't make any sense that you can neither protect your privacy nor your right. The fact is they got a hold of him because they were certain the device was wiped....

Not on the border, don't try to enter a country if you don't want to comply with the demands to enter the country. The situation at the borders is very different than from the situation inside the country, completely different laws and rights apply and in many cases they are very strict. Strictness at the border does work though, people just need to not break the law man it is that easy..

Does it work? It's debatable, and honestly I don't know especially it's with federal security officials.

I am not talking about the particular wallet examples that you linked, but decoy wallets work. If they don't work, then they were not set up or used properly. If you have the characteristic of plausible deniability with something, that means there is no evidence that can prove that it is not the thing so in this case that the opened wallet is not the real one. If there is a way to prove it, then the wallet does not provide plausible deniability. Some users make simple mistakes like having empty balance or very low balance when there is data confirming that they have a lot of money. But in this case it does not work because of the wallet, it fails because of the human error.

[Ucy]

As long as the authorities are operating within a just law, they should not be resisted.. You can't even hide the total number of bitcoins you own from them in this case.

What the graphene user did was like refusing inspection at the airport. As long as the inspection is lawful/reasonable it should not be resisted.

It's best to have a wallet that requires pin before coin transfer. You can refuse to give away the pin unless it becomes absolutely necessary, maybe after a lawful court order and investigation. But pin for just viewing your wallet content should be less restrictive. If there is justifiable reason for that you could allow it. The  inspector has to give the reason, if it feels right rather than suspicious, you should probably allow it

[oll]

You guys have probably heard of that traveller dude in Atlanta who was stopped by federal security who then demanded the passcode to his Graphene OS phone, so he then provided the duress passcode, they entered it and it wiped his phone using built-in data wipe feature.

Now they are prosecuting him with charges of destroying property during an investigation (even though they are the ones who destroyed it, but that's not the point).

My concern is with hardware wallets. What's stopping them from pressing charges if they try to force us to provide hardware wallet PINs under duress and we refuse?

Unfortunately, nothing prevents them from arresting a person who refuses to keep a PIN, and they can keep him in prison until he is forced. But in hardware wallets, if I remember correctly, there is a function for maintaining different pins, and nothing prevents you from simply entering a PIN from a non-primary, empty wallet and showing it to those who require it. And this is much better than just erasing everything, because such an action (erase) will prove that there was something connected with crime. Whether it's a crypt deacon with a wallet (dirty coins), or a smartphone, it's prohibited materials.

[Ambatman]

My concern is with hardware wallets. What's stopping them from pressing charges if they try to force us to provide hardware wallet PINs under duress and we refuse?

Nothing
But depending on the jurisdiction and if their action is legally backed.

the other wallet on the hardware wallet can not be seen? These is the best way that duress mode can be in my opinion despite having a password that can delete all wallets on the hardware wallet.

Anyone that want maximum privacy should avoid hardware wallet. They can go for cold wallets like paper wallet and wallet on airgapped devices.

If I'm not mistaken though no longer open source Coldcard has a similar feature
It has a feature where using a pin would open another wallet and also one that can crash it
And restarting would only be possible through the seedphrase.

[Cryptomultiplier]

You guys have probably heard of that traveller dude in Atlanta who was stopped by federal security who then demanded the passcode to his Graphene OS phone, so he then provided the duress passcode, they entered it and it wiped his phone using built-in data wipe feature.

Now they are prosecuting him with charges of destroying property during an investigation (even though they are the ones who destroyed it, but that's not the point).

My concern is with hardware wallets. What's stopping them from pressing charges if they try to force us to provide hardware wallet PINs under duress and we refuse?

Unfortunately, nothing prevents them from arresting a person who refuses to keep a PIN, and they can keep him in prison until he is forced. But in hardware wallets, if I remember correctly, there is a function for maintaining different pins, and nothing prevents you from simply entering a PIN from a non-primary, empty wallet and showing it to those who require it. And this is much better than just erasing everything, because such an action (erase) will prove that there was something connected with crime. Whether it's a crypt deacon with a wallet (dirty coins), or a smartphone, it's prohibited materials.

Anything can happen with a hardware wallet on you while changing location and this shows it.
I read the story and the suspect is charged already for destruction of evidence because he did erase the hardware and that makes him a suspect even though the officers didn't really have a right to ask him to open it.

This shows why keeping hardware wallet in a secure zone is better than always moving with it because if it has been armed bandits or something worse than officers of the law, he would have probably lost his life because of that deed.

[greysonz]

My concern is with hardware wallets. What's stopping them from pressing charges if they try to force us to provide hardware wallet PINs under duress and we refuse?

Nothing
But depending on the jurisdiction and if their action is legally backed.

the other wallet on the hardware wallet can not be seen? These is the best way that duress mode can be in my opinion despite having a password that can delete all wallets on the hardware wallet.

Anyone that want maximum privacy should avoid hardware wallet. They can go for cold wallets like paper wallet and wallet on airgapped devices.

If I'm not mistaken though no longer open source Coldcard has a similar feature
It has a feature where using a pin would open another wallet and also one that can crash it
And restarting would only be possible through the seedphrase.

I don't like the prospect of information that such wallets can open the wrong wallet becoming more public. And it's only a matter of time before the internal affairs agencies find out and start demanding that the wallet be restored immediately so that nothing remains a secret.

In general, it is better to have a balance on the second wallet that is not zero, but a hundred dollars, so that it looks like a completely unused wallet.