The kill switch conversation is understandable. However, it shows how underdeveloped the regulatory system is. A kill switch requires that you know, in real time, and ahead of the model what is wrong. Hugging Face caught this breach before OpenAI did. It was discovered by the victim first.
That is not really what a kill-switch is, you have overstated the example of one kind of kill switch and then tried to dismiss all kinds. A kill switch does not require any kind of specific knowledge ahead of time, it would work like many cybersecurity systems work. An automated kind of kill switch can be easily deployed with a behavioral based analysis, where they use a baseline of operation and then the system automatically scans for anomalies. This could be like using API in ways that was not expected, network scanning, privilege escalation or well actually it could be anything. They would make their own baseline to have a comparison for their own agent, and then the system just monitors it for anything that is unusual and suspends it.
There are other ways of doing it too, but even so the criticism of focusing only on a kill switch does have good points such as that there will be a delay between the wrong actions and the recognition. By the time the switch activates in some cases there may be a lot of damage already. But this kind of criticism is not used to tell us that using kill switches is wrong, it is more to suggest that companies and regulators should follow a strategy that has many layers and not only rely on a kill switch.