I totally get that the current situation is frightening and concerning, and it's right that Coldcard users must act quickly to save what can be saved.
However, for users not directly affected (or even for those who are), let's not give in to panic. I'm definitely not a security expert, and I don't usually post on this forum anymore, but because one company failed to secure their product correctly doesn't mean we should start applying so-called "best-practices" blindly. A person's setup should always be tailored to their specific situation.
Is polymerbit also a Cold type of ring? Should I be afraid?
Polymerbit [...] uses keys generated offline and printed on a sort of polymer banknote with a holographic layer.
I don’t see any issues if you trust the people who created them,
if you trusted them before, you can continue to do so.
The green part is true. But that doesn't make it safe. They are very nice collectibles, not security devices. Trusting someone else to generate a seed / private key for you is worse than using a software hot wallet, which is in turn worse than using any good HWW (i.e. not Coldcard).
Here's what's safe:
1. Generate your own seed and do it right. 100 dice rolls, or, do it manually using something like
Entropia Tablets (a jar filled with seed words printed on pill-shaped plastic). You'll need a hardware wallet to generate the final word (the checksum). This isn't a security issue since the last word for a 24 word seed phrase will be one of 7 or 8 words that can mathematically form a valid checksum. Generating your own seed means there's no chance borked code can cause your seed phrase to be vulnerable.
This is safe in theory. Then in practice, your dice might not be perfectly balanced. And most importantly, this introduces potential for human errors. The main cause of lost bitcoins is, by far, user error; so I wouldn't trust a human to generate a seed by himself.
The combinaison of the entropy generated by a hardware wallet + dice rolls seems like a better alternative to me.
At this point it's so bad that you can't even trust hardware related storages anyone to the fullest. To a huge extent it seems paper backups remain the best.
The usage of a HWW and paper / metal backups are complementary. Regardless of the setup, there should always be a backup / a way to recover funds in case either the HWW or the seed backup is lost.
I hope you're not talking about the paper wallets from the good old days, that were generated using a web app, had a single key pair (unlike modern HD wallets), where we scanned the private key QR code into a hot software wallet. Those are obviously not very safe compared to modern standards.
3. Use a passphrase or multisig. As seed phrase hunters churn through billions of seeds, if they generate and test yours, they'll never know because your seed by itself generates a wallet that's never been used. If you're using a passphrase, write it on paper. Make a metal backup. Store it separately from where you store your seed. If you're doing multisig, document your work every step of the way and store that separately from your seeds.
This is probably the piece of advice I've seen the most today. It's good that you reminded people that having a passphrase or a multisig requires to have proper backups of the passphrase / keys.
Again, passphrases can be a great tool if used right, but it often gets recommended without proper guidelines, ending in users:
- choosing passphrases with weak entropy (like a single BIP39 word, or anything generated by a human really)
- not backing it up correctly (trying to remember it, or having only one copy of the passphrase)
Plus, a passphrase doesn't have a checksum: if you make a typo when entering it, you just end up with an empty wallet, wondering where your funds are.
So yes, a passphrase may be a good idea, but only if done correctly, and I'm convinced that a lot of users do it in rather unsafe ways.
Multisigs seem like a much stronger option, and to me it's the only really safe option once you start having substantial amounts (the exact amount depending on what is substantial to you, ofc). But as said, it requires a bit more time and knowledge. This is the only solution that allows to spread the seeds / devices geographically, secure the different seeds with different methods (countering different potential attack vectors) and not trusting a single hardware device / manufacturer.
This Coldcard bug is really a shame, as some users will be tempted to give up on self-custody, or use unsafe setups. Because Coldcard fucked up doesn't mean hardware wallets aren't useful.
P.S. I'm not trying to minimise what's happening. This is terrible, and the implications are deeper that what most people think. For example in terms of confidentiality, if you manage to save your funds from a vulnerable Coldcard, once it gets compromised the attacker can still link all your UTXOs together, i.e. reconstitute your whole on-chain history. This also weakens coinjoins Coldcard users were implied in, etc.