This hack is a first time ever hardware wallet hack at this scale.
Large-scale Coldcard compromise (1360.23 BTC stolen so far) Technical details and some reported cases before and after this hardware wallet hack.
https://blog.coinkite.com/coldcard-mk3-seed-generation-warning/https://blog.coinkite.com/entropy-technical-backgrounder/Cracking Unsafe Bitcoin Wallets + Coldcard Mk4 Warning (Insecure Dice Based Seeds & Private Keys)https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/s/NJXFF7hI0ahttps://x.com/Zenul_Abidin/status/2083756420843839872In Bitcoin, there are two main ways of storing your coins, with hot wallets and cold wallets. Cold wallets are best like hardware wallets and Coldcard is a hardware wallet. Wallets beyond hot and cold, are also classified as open-source and close source. Security advice is prioritizing open-source wallets over close-source wallets but it does not make a bad hardware open-source wallet is secure.
Wallet seed phrases need to be created in a secure way and the hack on Coldcard wallet is because of their manufacturer broke this security principle, and ignored warnings from community in recent years.
The most common reminder is "Not your keys, not your coins" but it's not enough as we all saw with Coldcard hardware wallet hack since days ago. It's still a good time to remind people about this, again but it's worth to do so.
Reminder: do not keep your money in online accounts.Bitcoin Q&A: Not your keys, not your coins.Wallet: DOs and DON'Ts.From Coldcard hack, the importance of passphrase (extended custom phrase/ words) is known more and it's time to dive into it for learning before applying it for your Bitcoin wallet creation, backup, and storage.
Before diving into it, there is another reminder. Firstly read below.
IMPORTANT UPDATE: We just had our first confirmed loss of a Mk3 + 2 Word Passphrase.
Drained at 2pm Aug 2nd Australia Time - Roughly 17hrs ago.
-- @BTCsessions
That post means only a passphrase is not enough to secure your wallet if the wallet seed phrase was created too weakly for example by Coldcard. You can read this test and report from Jameson Lopp to understand further about it.
How many Bitcoin seed phrases are only one repeated word?Clearly nobody will use such Bitcoin wallet seed phrases but I want to use it for reminding that with such weak wallets, if you add any passphrase (extended/ custom words), it won't be too much helpful because it won't repair weak wallet seed phrase that was created with not enough dice rolls for strong entropy like 128 bits or 256 bits.
What is entropy and how does Trezor generate your wallet?Generating entropy. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | Entropy | | | Checksum (bits) | | | Entropy + checksum (bits) | | | Recovery code words | | |
| | | 128 | | | 4 | | | 132 | | | 12 | | |
| | | 160 | | | 5 | | | 165 | | | 15 | | |
| | | 192 | | | 6 | | | 198 | | | 18 | | |
| | | 224 | | | 7 | | | 231 | | | 21 | | |
| | | 256 | | | 8 | | | 264 | | | 24 | | |
How many dice rolls or coin flips are enough for entropy?
Dice roll to Bitcoin seed - Convert Dice Entropy to BIP-39 Mnemonic | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | Mode | | | Bits/ roll | | | 12 words (128 bit) | | | 24 words (256 bit) | | |
| | | Base-6 dice (1-6) | | | 2.585 | | | 50 rolls | | | 100 rolls | | |
| | | Base-10 dice (0-9) | | | 3.322 | | | 39 rolls | | | 78 rolls | | |
| | | Coin flip (0/1) | | | 1 | | | 128 rolls | | | 256 rolls | | |
A wallet seed creation method used by
NotATetherHow to use dice and a Seedsigner to make a seed phrase (with pictures).
What is a wallet passphrase?PassphraseWhat does a Bitcoin wallet passphrase do?When you add a passphrase, even with only one word, it will create a new tree of keys, that is unique and different than an initial wallet created by only wallet seed phrase. This means of security improvement but if you lose the optional passphrase, you can not recover your wallet.
If you decide to create and use a wallet with wallet seed phrase + an optional passphrase, you must keep both as your wallet backups. Losing one of these two parts will cause completely loss of your wallet and any fund in it.
With this importance of passphrase, you must store it somewhere different than where you store your wallet seed phrase. It must be never online storage/ backup while memory can be used with some possible drawbacks similarly to how it is not recommended to remember your wallet seed phrase by memory.
How to back up a wallet?What about memorizing your backups? Well, I can only think of one situation in which I'd ever consider that - if I'm fleeing from some calamity without much time to prepare and I'm worried about physical attackers accosting me during the journey or at border crossings. That is to say - I only think memorization is a good strategy for temporary emergency use. As a long term storage strategy it creates single points of failure:
You may forget the seed phrase.
You could be injured and unable to recall it.
You could die and your heirs would be unable to access it.
You could have seed phrase coerced out of you.
Applying same steps in the article above for your wallet backups with / without a passphrase.
Create a wallet
Make its backup
Test its backup
Fund a wallet with small deposit
Test the backup for recovery
Use it when everything confirmed accurately.
It's about practice, for more technical details, you can read with
https://github.com/bitcoinbook/bitcoinbook/blob/develop/ch05_wallets.adochttps://learnmeabitcoin.com/beginners/security/#passphrasehttps://bitcoinsecurity.org/guide/passphrase/Another advantage of wallet with passphraseYou can create your decoy/ duress wallet to fool hackers
On the positive, if someone obtains your recovery code (but not your passphrase), they will see a valid BIP32 tree of keys. If you prepared for that contingency and sent some bitcoins to the nonpassphrase tree, they will steal that money. Although having some of your bitcoins stolen is normally a bad thing, it can also provide you with a warning that your recovery code has been compromised, allowing you to investigate and take corrective measures. The ability to create multiple passphrases for the same recovery code that all look valid is a type of plausible deniability.
On the negative, if you’re coerced to give an attacker a recovery code (with or without a passphrase) and it doesn’t yield the amount of bitcoins they expected, they may continue trying to coerce you until you give them a different passphrase with access to more bitcoins. Designing for plausible deniability means there’s no way to prove to an attacker that you’ve revealed all of your information, so they may continue trying to coerce you even after you’ve given them all of your bitcoins.
An additional negative is the reduced amount of error detection. If you enter a slightly wrong passphrase when restoring from a backup, your wallet can’t warn you about the mistake. If you were expecting a balance, you will know something is wrong when your wallet application shows you a zero balance for the regenerated key tree. However, novice users may think their money was permanently lost and do something foolish, such as give up and throw away their recovery code. Or, if you were actually expecting a zero balance, you might use the wallet application for years after your mistake until the next time you restore with the correct passphrase and see a zero balance. Unless you can figure out what typo you previously made, your funds are gone.
Lopp also writes about it
Can duress wallets stop Bitcoin attacks?
