Look at the practical cost of deliberately pushing the network toward a halving by filling the State with UTXOs.
Using the simplified model discussed above:
1 theoretical attack ≈ 123,731.968 NOID in fees
At $0.008/NOID ≈ $989.86
4 attacks ≈ 494,927.872 NOID
Total ≈ $3,959.42
If each attack successfully triggered one halving, the 50 NOID block reward would become:
50 → 25 → 12.5 → 6.25 → 3.125 NOID/block
This raises what I think is the key design question:
Is the halving mechanism economically secure, or does it create an attack surface where someone can effectively “buy” a reduction in block rewards at relatively low cost?
The attack cost is mainly the transaction fees.
In this model, the fees are not paid to miners. They are used to increase UTXO State and push the network toward a halving.
So the key question is: if mining pools work together, can they reuse the fee value that would normally go to miners to trigger a halving?
The real cost of the attack would be much lower than the fee amount, because mining pools could recycle the fee value.
This means almost no new outside money would be needed, making repeated halvings very cheap.
This createas an attack surface..
Buy a paid AI subscription already. The free version apparently stopped reading at log_slots 24.
After every expansion, state capacity doubles, so each successive halving requires far more live UTXOs than the previous one. You also ignored the actual work involved. For a start, you would have to generate a valid proof in your wallet for every one of those millions of transactions. The state growth fee doubles once occupancy reaches 50 percent and doubles again at 75 percent. That part of the fee is burned by consensus. Mining pools cannot recycle it through coinbase. The UTXOs also have to remain live until 75 percent occupancy has persisted through the finalized expansion window.
Good luck with your “attack” champ. Lower block rewards + more NOID burned = my NOID becomes more valuable.
