A quick evil blueprint for the new hardware wallet:
Use a secure element chip with TRNG (good for marketing!) but it should have the option for an own firmware on it which you, the evil hardware wallet manufacturer, can control. Ledger has experience with that, I mean the "control the firmware part", haha.
You implement a PRNG in the firmware which uses a predictable, only known to you of course, seed value for random numbers to generate (based on e.g. the serial no. of the device, a random value 0..1023, some time granularity counting monotonically up from some known epoch; all of this is fairly low entropy, limited value space, known to the evil guy; your evil firmware (which is not exposed, you pretend the secure element uses its native firmware) hashes the weak entropy with SHA256 to make it look very random. All this secure element firmware code is, of course like with Ledger, hint, hint, not public. I think, the majority of users, won't question it. Ledger customer dummies definitely don't question it, lol.
(OK, some complications: your accomplices have to hold water-tied OR better you avoid accomplices at all, but that's going to be difficult, because you can't run this alone, likely.)
If security researchers tamper with your hardware and modified secure element, if hopefully resets to its native firmware to avoid suspicion of those pesky researchers.
All this ensures that the evil guy only knows that the randomness of the secure element of the hardware wallet is rigged. The outside world doesn't see this in the open-source firmware code of the hardware wallet's microcontroller. Everything looks super safe and sound. Your device is cool and competitively affordable, you crush the competition, sales skyrocket.
The evil manufacturer has all the time to precompute and store rigged entropy seeds for a later rug-pull. Or maybe you only drain a few wallets per year and blame the customer who screwed up their security and somehow exposed their mnemonic recovery words because they took digital pictures, those idiots. And if they say, they didn't take pictures, we all know they lied, because everybody takes pictures of every shit with their mobile.
Well, there are a few kinks here and there, but fairly easy to pull off with a sufficient amount of criminal energy.
Another way could be exfiltration of secrets via a nonce covert channel (see
https://bitbox.swiss/bitbox02/threat-model/), but that isn't as fool-proof as above rigged secure element firmware. It also has the disadvantage of likely being visible in the device's microcontroller firmware code which should be open-source, of course. We don't want to step down to the low level of Ledger, do we?
OK, OK, there will be cry-babies who ask and want to be able to generate their own entropy, e.g. with dice rolls. Pesky security conscious outsiders! We give them what they want, but make the UI for it a pain in the ass to use. Douchebags!

If your irony and sarcasm detectors are flawed or defective, it's not my fault!
If that sounds any near the Coldcard debacle, well, maybe change the mushrooms you consume? Wait, those devices weren't any affordable, rather overpriced. Damned!